SOPhiA 2013

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programm - Vortrag

Wie Russell Frege unterschätzte
(Sprachphilosophie, Englisch)

Bertrand Russell in his essay ''On Denoting'' (1905) presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in paper ''On Sense and Reference'' (1892). The aim of the talk will be to examine Russell's paper in order to show to what extent he was misguided to depreciate Frege's ideas.

Firstly, I will discuss two claims of Russell, that are insinuating about Frege. Secondly I will try to show, what Russell has passed over. Namely that Frege's theory provides some answers for at least two out of three puzzles presented by Russell in his essay.

Russell's first depreciation was that he derived conclusion that Frege builds conventional denotations such as null-classes. But Frege would treat presented by Russell examplary conditionals as a special case, where its constituents have neither independent meaning nor independent denotation. Frege would say that these complex expressions denotes a truth-value independently from its parts. The second misguided objection to Frege starts with an observation: ''When we wish to speak about the meaning of a denoting phrase, as opposed to its denotation, the natural mode of doing so is by inverted commas'' (p.485-486). Russell ends with a conclusion, that the relation between meaning and denotation involves mysterious difficulties. For Frege, in order to speak of the sense of an expression 'A' one may simply use the phrase ''the sense of the expression 'A' ''. Other way is to use reported speech. Neither the statement, nor the examples given by Russell satisfy any of these two rules. For Frege, inverted commas themselves are used for making signs of signs, to speak of the words themselves, and not of their senses.

With respect to the first puzzle Frege's solution is to use the salva veritate rule in a proper way, namely to change constituents in such a way as to preserve the same meaning, because in reported speech reference shifts to meanings. With respect to the second puzzle Frege could answer, that since the propositions in the puzzle contain proper names with no reference, then they do not have logical values, so they do not violate any logical law. Finally with respect to the third puzzle, one might answer, that the puzzled proposition simply means that A and B have the same references, but that works only in one particular case.

Chair: Alexander auf der Straße
Zeit: 12:15-12:45, 13. September 2013 (Freitag)
Ort: HS 107
Anmerkung: ÄNDERUNG. Der Vortrag entfällt!

Adam Kubiak
(Maria Curie-Sklodowska University of Lublin; Catholic University of Lublin, Polen)

Adam Pawel Kubiak (MSc, BA) Maria Curie-Sklodowska University of Lublin; Catholic University of Lublin; 2008 master in environmental science (Univ. of Lodz); 2011 bachelor in philosophy (Catholic Univ. of Lublin); vegetation ecology; methodology and philosophy of science

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