SOPhiA 2013

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programm - Vortrag

Presentism Entails the Stage View
(Metaphysik & Ontologie, Englisch)

I look to investigate what metaphysic of material objects one should associate with presentism -- the view that only present objects exist -- and defend the view that presentism can only be coupled with the stage view -- the view that objects are stages (ie. that they exist only momentarily). I proceed as follows: I firstly present and discuss the widely held association of presentism with endurantism, the view that (i) objects persist and (ii) have no temporal parts. I develop (i) in terms of location, and present the two versions of endurantism that emerge from this development: Multilocation Theory (MT) and Extended Simples Theory (ES). According to (MT), objects are exactly located at multiple times, and according to (ES), objects are mereological atoms and have only one exact location. Briefly, (MT) is incompatible with presentism because it is not the case that an object can be located at times that do not exist, and (ES) because (ES) implies that objects have a fourdimensional exact location, but location cannot be temporally extended because to be temporally extended is to occupy different times, and there are no times except the present.

I then turn to the association of presentism with the worm view, the view according to which objects have temporal parts as well as spatial ones. I think that this association is also erroneous, and I offer new arguments against the conjunction of presentism with the worm view from Extensional Mereology.

In light of all this, I derive the criteria about location that are consistent with presentism: from the incompatibility of presentism with (MT) we have learnt that the exact location of an object must be (a) unique (ie. it should not violate Functionality, the principle according to which objects have only one exact location), and from the incompatibility of presentism with (ES) and the worm view we have learnt that the exact location of an object must be (b) threedimensional. I then show how the stage view meets (a) and (b). Finally, I briefly sketch the presentist stage view and reply to some objections. I conclude that, given the inconsistency of presentism with all the other views about material objects, it seems to be rather safe to associate presentism with the stage view. Thus, presentism entails the stage view.

Chair: Luca Gili
Zeit: 14:45-15:15, 13. September 2013 (Freitag)
Ort: HS 101

Alberto Tassoni
(University College London, United Kingdom)

Alberto Tassoni earned the Italian Scientific Diploma last July with top marks, and has been awarded the prize for 'Best Maturità' relative to that. He started his Philosophy BA at University College London last September, and he has just concluded his first year with a congratulatory departmental award for excellent performance. He is currently working on philosophy of time, grounding, mereology and location.

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