SOPhiA 2013

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programm - Vortrag

Der Zweidimensionalismus und Propositionen
(Sprachphilosophie, Englisch)

Structuralists hold that propositions have components and a certain structure that is determined by the structure of the sentences that express them. David Chalmers has recently proposed a two-dimensionalist version of structuralism according to which propositions are pairs of structures. Each such pair is composed of a complex of primary intensions and a complex of secondary intensions. Secondary intensions are functions from possible worlds to appropriate extensions and primary intensions are functions from scenarios to appropriate extensions. Scenarios are complete ways the world might have turned out to be, constrained only by a priori knowledge.

In my paper I want to raise two objections to Chalmers' structuralism. My first objection will show that we have no reason to believe that Chalmers's structuralism is really a version of structuralism. We have such a reason only if there is a reason for believing that Chalmers-propositions are struc- tured. However there is such a reason only if the structure of Chalmers-propositions must be appealed to in the explanation of hyperintensional phenomena Chalmers' structuralism provides. But Chalmers' structuralism explains the relevant data only by considering non-standard worlds, i.e. scenarios, and no appeal to structure is necessary.

My second objection is that Chalmers-propositions are so ''fine-grained'' that we face a serious set-theoretic problem, if propositions are Chalmers-propositions. For if propositions are Chalmers-propositions there is a one-to-one function from the power set of the set of propositions into the set of propositions in contradiction to Cantor's theorem. Chalmers has recently claimed that this paradox is a version of Kaplan's paradox and so can be dealt with quite easily. I will argue against that claim.

Chair: Theresa Marx
Zeit: 14:45-15:15, 13. September 2013 (Freitag)
Ort: HS 107

Jonathan Mai
(University of Heidelberg, Deutschland)

Jonathan Mai (M.A.). University of Heidelberg. 2011 Magister Artium; thesis about attitude ascriptions and compositionality. Publications in the philosophy of language.

Testability and Meaning deco