SOPhiA 2013

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programm - Vortrag

Intuition: Ansehen und Kultur
(Erkenntnistheorie, Englisch)

According to Ernest Sosa, intuition figures as a foundational source of knowledge in philosophy and other a priori disciplines. In terms of his virtue epistemology, a knowing subject should deserve credit for truly believing an intuitively known content. Knowledge is apt true believe due to a competence on the part of the subject. True beliefs due to lucky guesses or Gettier-type situations do not qualify as knowledge, because they do not manifest a relevant competence.

One important factor of intuitive justification is the ruling out of intuitive attractions due to probably misplaced enculturation. Such bad enculturation may take the form of deep seated prejudice or superstition. On the other hand, there is little to cite in favor of a true intuitive attraction, except the very proposition triggering one's intuitive assent. Plausibly, such true intuitions are similar to lucky guesses and thereby disqualify as creditable justification and knowledge.

My aim is to point out a similarity between Jennifer Lackey's criticism of Sosa's virtue epistemology from testimony and the present issue. The CHICAGO VISITOR case presents a subject asking a passerby for directions to the Sears Tower. The subject is provided with precise information and knows her way, but arguably all the relevant credit goes to the passerby.

Omitting further detail here, a similar dilemma arises for Sosa's account of intuition mutatis mutandis. I argue that ''think twice'' would be a strange epistemic virtue in the case of enculturation, just as ''look twice'' or ''ask twice'' would be in the cases of perception and testimony; the same goes for ''gather more knowledge about the subject matter''. In unreflective intuition (all) credit seems to go to the subject's culture.

Either the notion of creditworthiness is robust enough to rule out mere enculturation, but then neither is credit deserved in large parts of alleged intuitive beliefs, such as 4 > 3 or egalitarian virtues imply tolerance; or the notion is weak enough to permit credit in most cases of unreflective intuiting, but then, too, credit is deserved in cases of enculturation.

Chair: Martha Cassidy-Brinn
Zeit: 10:30-11:00, 14. September 2013 (Samstag)
Ort: HS 105

Dejan Makovec
(Universität Wien, Österreich)

Dejan Makovec (Mag. phil.). Universität Wien. 2011 Magister der Philosophie; Diplomarbeit zur Spätphilosophie Friedrich Waismanns; Vorträge und Publikationen zu Wittgenstein, Waismann und Literaturwissenschaft.

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