SOPhiA 2013

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programm - Vortrag

Kann Logik als eine Kompetenztheorie für Gedanken gedacht werden?
(Logik & Philosophie der Mathematik, Englisch)

It has proven difficult to conceive the relationship between logic and thought. Although there seems to be consensus among philosophers, logicians and psychologist that logic is normative for thought, it is unclear what this belief amounts to. One way to make this idea more precise is by claiming that logic is about how an ideal reasoner would reason under ideal circumstances. Logic is then conceived of as a competence theory for thought. The most famous and best worked out defense of this idea was given by John Macnamara in his A Border Dispute (1986), although the view is widely held, especially within the branch of psychology which studies human reasoning. Two driving question within this branch of psychology have been how human performance differs from competence and why (see for a recent overview (Holyoak & Morrison, 2012) and (Manktelow, 2012)).

But conceiving logic as a competence theory of thought opens the door to the charge of psychologism. That is, it claims that logic is about thought. This view, however, has been generally rejected by modern logicians, who follow Frege in his famous critique of psychologistic conceptions of logic. According to Frege, logic is not about thought but about truth (See (Frege, 1893) and (1918)). In this presentation I will critically reexamine the view that logic should be conceived of as the competence theory of thought and give special attention to the charge of psychologism in light of recent developments in psychology and philosophical logic, most notably the descriptive logical pluralism of Stenning & Van Lambalgen (2008) and the normative pluralism of Beall & Restall (2007).

Chair: Christine Schurz
Zeit: 11:15-11:45, 14. September 2013 (Samstag)
Ort: HS 104

Leonard Geerdink
(University of Groningen, Niederlande)

Leon M. Geerdink (MA) studied philosophy at Utrecht University focusing on the history of analytic philosophy and the history of logic broadly conceived. Both his BA thesis (2010) and MA thesis (2012) focused on the early logical work of Bertrand Russell seen in its historical context. He is currently a PhD student at the University of Groningen in Catarina Dutilh-Novaes' project The Roots of Deduction where he works on an empirically and historically informed conception of the role of logic in the psychology of reasoning.

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