SOPhiA 2013

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programm - Vortrag

Wissen und das Transparenz-Problem
(Erkenntnistheorie, Englisch)

Most philosophers do not believe that knowledge is transparent (i.e. that I always know that I know). I will argue (against Timothy Williamson) that transparency is a necessary feature of knowledge. The transparency principle can be seen as the conjunction of the following two theses, where K stands for ''the subject X knows that'':

(i) Kφ→KKφ
(ii) ¬Kφ→K¬Kφ

To show that transparency does not hold Williamson gives the well-known example of a person N.N. believing Lincoln to be President even though Lincoln has just been assassinated. Since the subject N.N. in the example (reasonably) believes that he knows p (P1) and p is false (P2), N.N. does not know p (since falsehoods cannot be known). But then we have a counterexample to (ii), since N.N. does not know p, but he does not know that he does not know p. So transparency must be false.

To defend the principle of transparency the only option would seem to argue that (P1) is wrong. Williamson tries to ward of a potential attack against (P1), by making explicit his premiss that empirical scepticism does not hold. I will argue that subscribing to a specific form of empirical scepticism is indeed the only option to defend the principle of transparency and will try to argue why this is not as problematic as it may seem.

Chair: Martha Cassidy-Brinn
Zeit: 11:15-11:45, 14. September 2013 (Samstag)
Ort: HS 105

Yven Johannes Leist
(Universität Stuttgart, Deutschland)

Yven Johannes Leist (Mag. phil.). Universität Stuttgart. 2010 Magister in Philosophie mit einer Arbeit über "Konzepte des Wissens".

Testability and Meaning deco