SOPhiA 2013

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programm - Vortrag

How to Resolve Doxastic Disagreement
(Erkenntnistheorie, Englisch)

Doxastic disagreement is one of the biggest challenges of probabilistic approaches to social epistemology. On the one hand we have to answer the question under which conditions an epistemic agent should revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement. On the other hand we have to answer the question how the agent should revise her epistemic state in such a case. Since almost everyone agrees that there are cases of doxastic disagreement in which an agent should change her epistemic state, we focus on the latter challenge. The problems associated with it (incompatibility of various very plausible rationality requirements, inadequacy of various rules suggested in the literature) arise under an assumption we call Monistic Bayesianism, i.e., the position that an agent's epistemic state is best represented by her degree of belief function alone. In this paper we argue that for modeling cases of doxastic disagreement (and other forms of epistemic disagreement) we should adopt Pluralistic Bayesianism, i.e., the position that an agent's epistemic state is best represented by her confirmation commitments and the (total) evidence available to her. Finally, we argue that given Pluralistic Bayesianism it is possible to provide an adequate answer to the question of how to rationally revise one's epistemic state in the light of epistemic disagreement.

Chair: Martha Cassidy-Brinn
Zeit: 12:15-12:45, 14. September 2013 (Samstag)
Ort: HS 105
Anmerkung: ÄNDERUNG. (Der vorhergehend geplante Vortrag von Michel Croce entfällt!)

Anna-Maria Eder
(University of Konstanz, Germany)

No biographical note available.

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