SOPhiA 2013

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programm - Vortrag

Alief und Experimentelle Philosophie
(Philosophie des Geistes, Englisch)

Probably most famous research done by Experimental Philosophers focuses on Epistemology and Intentional Action.Typically, such a studies involve presenting informants (''ordinary people'') with scenario, asking them simple yes-no questions about it (eg. "Did X know that Y?" or "Did Z do P intentionally?") and then, basing on the answers, ascribing to informants certain beliefs. Experimental research seems to suggest (sometimes contradictorily) that intuitions regarding 1) attribution of knowledge to some character in a given scenario and 2) attribution of intentionality, depend on the choice of features like: stake, salience, personal cost, vividness, skills of the agent, polarity of the outcome, affect, blame etc.(eg. Buckwalter 2010, Stanley 2005, May et all 2005, Feltz&Zarpentine 2010, Phelan, Naddelhofer 2006, Guglielmo&Malle, Mallon 2009, Machery, Knobe 2003).

However interesting, I am not convinced whether studies manage to proof authors stance. In my critical examination of them, I am going to draw attention to the notion of 'alief'. Alief, built in the opposition to 'belief', as defined by its author - Tamar Gendler is ''to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way''. I am going to show, that having alief with its purely explanatory power we have everything needed to explain experimental results. In particular, I will argue, that any attempt to ascribe to the participants of experimental studies certain beliefs (eg. the belief that that an agent in the scenario committed a deed intentionally) fails, since there is available more basic notion of alief.

In my talk I will start from more detailed introduction of Gendler's notion, critically examining it and seeking for redundancy, especially in light of the psychological concepts. Then I move to examination of chosen studies, closing with some general remarks on surveying folks' intuitions.

Chair: Sebastian Müller
Zeit: 14:45-15:15, 14. September 2013 (Samstag)
Ort: HS 107
Anmerkung: ÄNDERUNG. Der Vortrag entfällt!

Natalia Anna Pietrulewicz
(University of Warsaw, Poland)

Natalia Pietrulewicz (MA, phil.). PhD student at University of Warsaw. 2012 master in philosophy, 2011 baccalaureate in philosophy; theses concerning experimental philosophy and donkey anaphora. Conferences in philosophy of language, education and popularization of philosophy.

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