Programme and Abstracts

Organization: Department of Philosophy (Humanities)
University of Salzburg
Date: September 4–6, 2014
Venue: Department of Philosophy (Humanities)
Franziskanergasse 1, 5020 Salzburg
Languages: English and German
Website: http://www.sophia-conference.org/
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Preface

In recent years the opportunities for keeping track of science-business for students of philosophy have increased. The raising number of essay competitions and graduate conferences support this claim.

In 2014, the Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy is, once again, joining the midst of these events. The title of the conference already reveals some details about the organizers, the contributors and the conference's guiding principles. To avoid misunderstandings we want to add the following remarks: (i) Because of the high number of international participants, Salzburg stands for the location of the conference only. (ii) One of the conference's distinctive features compared to similar events is that we do not make any constraints regarding the topic of presentations. (iii) On the contrary, every philosophical discipline – as long as it is carried out in an analytic way – has its place at SOPhiA.

By combining (ii) and (iii) we want to demonstrate, in contrast to some voices which claim that Analytic Philosophy constrains our intellectual life, that all traditional topics can be advantageously examined in Analytic Philosophy. It is our utmost concern to unite analytic philosophers from all around the world (cf. (i)). This is also in the sense of Carnap, who claims in his early work *The Logical Structure of the World*:

"The new type of philosophy has arisen in close contact with the work of the special sciences, especially mathematics and physics. Consequently they have taken the strict and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their guideline for philosophical work, while the attitude of the traditional philosopher is more like that of a poet. This new attitude not only changes the style of thinking but also the type of problem that is posed. The individual no longer undertakes to erect in one bold stroke an entire system of
philosophy. Rather, each works at his special place within the one unified science."

In spirit of this motto, we wish you an interesting conference, fruitful discussions and stimulating thoughts.

The Organization Committee

The Organization Committee:
Albert J. J. Anglberger, Kevin Butz, Christian J. Feldbacher, Alexander Gebharter, Markus Hierl, Laurenz Hudetz, Christine Schurz

Special thanks to our sponsors:
Figures and Facts

**TIMEFRAME AND GENERAL INFORMATION.** From September 4–6 2014 the fifth Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy (SOPhiA 2014) will be held at the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The conference is public and attending it is free of charge. The official languages of the conference are English and German. Contributed talks will be given by philosophy students (pre-doc). The conference is hosted by members of the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The organizers can be contacted via organization@sophia-conference.org.

**MISSION STATEMENT.** Within the conference, problems of all areas of philosophy should be discussed. A topical focus is not intended – the conference has no specific theme. The presentations should rather set themselves apart by a methodological limitation to the tradition of Analytic Philosophy by usage of clear language and comprehensible arguments. The conference is meant to be a common effort to clearly formulate critically assess some of the problems of philosophy. No individual is expected to construct “a whole building of philosophy" all by himself; rather, the conference hosts expect everyone, as Carnap proposes, to bring the undertaking forward "at his specific place within" philosophy.

**PROCEDURE.** About 120 participants are expected. There will be 81 talks. The speakers are from institutions of the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Republic of Serbia, Russian Federation, Spain, Switzerland, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States of America. There are three types of talks:

Plenary talks: held by invited speakers

Workshop talks: held by invited speakers

Contributed talks: held by contributed speakers
Invited Speakers.

- Elke Brendel (University of Bonn): *Disagreement and Epistemic Relativism*
- Winfried Löffler (University of Innsbruck): *Formalization and Wide Reflective Equilibrium*
- Jeanne Peijnenburg (University of Groningen): *Lewis, Reichenbach, and Fading Foundations*
- Benjamin Schnieder (University of Hamburg): *Aristotle’s Insight and the Modest Conception of Truth*

Workshop Speakers.

Affiliated Workshop: *Tense vs Tenseless Theories. New insights to and applications of the philosophy of time*
- Sonja Deppe (University of Landau): *Experiencing Time in Continuous and Discrete Ways*
- Florian Fischer (University of Groningen): *Tensed Language of Science. Logic of Science and Reference to the Present Moment*
- Cord Friebe (University of Bonn): *Time Direction, Time Order, and the Presentist’s View on Space-Time*
- Johannes Grössl (University of Innsbruck): *Introduction*
- Thorben Petersen (University of Bremen): *Reductionism about Tense. Completeness and Explanatory Metaphysical Semantics*

Affiliated Workshop: *Social Epistemology and Joint Action in Science*
- Peter Brössel (University of Bochum) & Christian J. Feldbacher (University of Düsseldorf, DCLPS): *The Veritistic Value of Social Practices in Science: Peer Disagreement*
- Anna-Maria Eder (University of Duisburg-Essen): *Disagreement and Division of Labour*
- Cédric Paternotte (LMU Munich, MCMP): *Common Belief: Plain and Probabilistic*
- Paul Thorn (University of Düsseldorf, DCLPS): *Wise Crowds, Clever Meta-Inductivists*
Programme
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Plenary Talks
Disagreement and Epistemic Relativism

Elke Brendel

The concept of disagreement has got some attention in the recent debate between contextualism and relativism. In particular, there are situations where, on the one hand, people seem to disagree, i.e. where a speaker A utters something which is incompatible with what another speaker B says, but, on the other hand, the asserted propositions seem to be only relatively true or sensitive to certain contextual parameters. If, for example, the truth-conditions of knowledge-ascriptions are determined by certain context-sensitive standards of knowledge, as epistemic contextualists and epistemic relativists contend, how can speakers still rationally disagree about whether somebody knows a certain proposition or not?

Before I address these questions, I will give a brief formal characterization of contextualist and relativist semantics in general and of contextualist and relativist semantics of knowledge ascriptions in particular. I will then provide a taxonomy of different types of disagreement, as for example, substantial forms of disagreement, forms of faultless disagreement and false disagreement. Besides clarifying the notion of disagreement, a main aim of my talk is to argue that neither contextualism nor relativism can account for certain important features of disagreement concerning knowledge claims.
German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP). Recent publications are "Wissen", de Gruyter, 2013, and "Contextualism, Relativism, and the Semantics of Knowledge Ascriptions", Philosophical Studies, 2014. E-Mail: ebrendel@uni-bonn.de
Formalization and Wide Reflective Equilibrium

Winfried Löffler

Formalizations of natural-language texts are commonly regarded as a key tool in analytic philosophy. However, the literature on the question of what exactly distinguishes "adequate" from "inadequate" formalizations is surprisingly narrow. I address the special case of formalizing arguments and sketch a conception according to which a formalization is adequate if three groups of beliefs can be brought into a wide reflective equilibrium: (1) the spontaneous guess (recalled from memory) about the argument's structure and quality, (2) the evaluation of its structure and quality in light of the formalization and (3) a stock of contextually relevant background assumptions.

Section: Plenary
Language: English
Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher
Date: 09:00-10:30, September 5th, 2014 (Friday)
Location: HS 301

Winfried Löffler (University of Innsbruck, Austria)

Winfried Löffler is professor for philosophy at the University of Innsbruck. His current work concentrates on logic, philosophy of science, and philosophy of religion. He tries to connect the contemporary analytic approach with insights of the aristotelian-scholastic tradition. Besides philosophy he has also finished his studies in theology and law (both MA). He is president of the Austrian Society for Philosophy of Religion and guest lecturer at several universities, amongst others in Uppsala, Zagreb, and Ljubljana. Recent publications are an introduction to logic, Kohlhammer, 2008, and introduction to the philosophy of religion, WBG, 2013.

E-Mail: winfried.loeffler@uibk.ac.at
Lewis, Reichenbach, and Fading Foundations

Jeanne Peijnenburg

According to Clarence Irving Lewis (1883–1964), judgements of the form 'x is probable' only make sense if one assumes there to be a y that is certain (where x and y may be events, beliefs, or propositions). Without this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability value of x will in the end be zero. Hans Reichenbach (1891–1953) contests this idea, calling it 'a remnant of rationalism'. I will explain the relevance of the Lewis-Reichenbach debate to contemporary epistemology, concentrating on the phenomenon of fading foundations.

Jeanne Peijnenburg (University of Groningen, The Netherlands)
Jeanne Peijnenburg is professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Groningen. Her main area of research is the explication of the concept of probability in epistemology. Before she was associate professor and holder of the endowed chair Philosophical Argumentation Theory and Analysis. Recent publications: "The Emergence of Justification" (with D. Atkinson), The Philosophical Quarterly, 2013, and "A Case of Confusing Probability and Confirmation", Synthese, 2012.
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Aristotle's Insight and the Modest Conception of Truth

Benjamin Schnieder

Aristotle famously remarked: That you are pale is true because you are pale – but not vice versa. This Aristotelian Insight on truth plays a major role in the recent debate about truth. But it is controversial of how the Aristotelian Insight can be accounted for.

In my talk, I use ideas from Künne and Schnieder in order to develop, against the background of Künne's so-called modest conception of truth, a rigorous derivation of the principle employing the logic of grounding.

Section: Plenary
Language: English
Chair: Laurenz Hudetz
Date: 16:30-18:00, September 5th, 2014 (Friday)
Location: HS 301

Benjamin Schnieder (University of Hamburg, Germany)
Benjamin Schnieder is professor at the University of Hamburg. His main areas of research and interest are metaphysics and the philosophy of language and logic. Before he was director of the Emmy Noether research group Phlox at the Humboldt University Berlin and an assistant professor at the University of Hamburg. Recent publications: "Explanation by Induction?" (with M. Hoeltje and A. Steinberg), Synthese, forthcoming, and "A Logic for 'Because'", Review of Symbolic Logic, 2011.
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Workshops
Affiliated Workshop: Tense vs Tenseless Theories. New insights to and applications of the philosophy of time

Sonja Deppe & Florian Fischer & Cord Friebe & Johannes Grössl & Thorben Petersen

Systematic and historical background. The question whether it is possible to translate tensed sentences without loss of meaning into tenseless ones is one of the main areas of inquiry in the contemporary philosophy of time. Closely related but still independent of this is the debate between presentists and eternalists about the nature of time. Tenseless theorists believe that tense can and should be eliminated. Adherents of a tensed theory claim that this is (at least for some sentences) not possible.

David Hugh Mellor’s account is (still) the basis for many accounts in the tenseless theory camp. Mellor suggested that the meaning of a sentence is a function from time points to truth conditions. Following this idea, a sentence can have always the same meaning and nevertheless different truth values. Arthur Prior on the other side is the godfather of the tensers. His famous "Thank goodness"-argument centers around the joy someone feels, when an important test is completed. According to Prior, one must believe that the test is now completed to feel this joy. It is not enough to say, that the test ends at 2:00 p.m. and that 2:15 p.m. is later than 2:00 p.m., because one knew that already before.

Aim of the Workshop. The goal of this symposium is to contest the predominant tenseless theory. We will present a wide array of arguments ranging from time experience, philosophy of science, philosophy of physics to direct metaphysical insights.

Sonja Deppe focuses on the experience of time and the tension between discrete and continual ways of doing so. The continuous experience of time, which Bergson takes to be more fundamental than our discrete way of grasping its related parts, may very well only be captured by tensed sentences (if at all).

Florian Fischer revisits the logic of science of Rudolf Carnap and concludes that contrary to what Carnap himself argued, inter translatability does not hold generally. Fischer uses Carnap’s own conception
of measurement processes to show that central sentences of the logic of science can not be stated tenseless.

Cord Friebe presents an argument from physics for the tensed theory. Only a rightly understood tensed theory takes direction of time as being more fundamental than time order and closed timelike curves exist only for spacetimes that possess a globally consistent time direction but not a globally consistent time order.

Johannes Grössl will give an overview of the debate by introducing the terminology and related issues in metaphysics and philosophy of language. He will make us acquainted with Arthur Prior’s "Thank goodness"-argument for the temporal irreducibility of tensed propositions and D. H. Mellor’s opposing New Tenseless Theory of Time. Eventually, he will present and shortly discuss different theories to account for cross-time reference, among those the theory of quasi-truths by Ted Sider and the related Ersatzer Presentism advanced by Craig Bourne.

Thorben Petersen directly attacks the view endorsed by Ted Sider and Brad Skow who argue that a complete description of reality can be given from an atemporal perspective, by showing that their premises are not consistent.

Schedule.

- 09:00–09:30 Johannes Grössl: Introduction
- 09:35–10:15 Thorben Petersen: Reductionism about Tense. Completeness and Explanatory Metaphysical Semantics
- 10:20–11:00 Sonja Deppe: Experiencing Time in Continuous and Discrete Ways
- 11:00–11:20 Coffe Break
- 11:20–12:00 Florian Fischer: Tensed Language of Science. Logic of Science and Reference to the Present Moment
- 12:05–12:45 Cord Friebe: Time Direction, Time Order, and the Presentist’s View on Space-Time
- 12:45 Workshop Closing
Reflections on time, both in contexts of metaphysics and in experience of time, encounter a certain tension between continuous and discrete aspects of time. On the one hand, we experience time as continuously flowing; on the other hand, we have a strong tendency to explain time referring to separate instants of time, discrete objects, and their different states. In my talk, I will present and explain an often neglected perspective on the matter, namely the approach of the French philosopher Henri Bergson.

In his analysis of temporal experience, Bergson yields an understanding of the two aspects of time that leads to an overall picture of time and our experience of it: For him, continuity is a crucial feature of our experience of time, and even more, temporal continuity is a crucial feature of our experience in general. Thereby, the temporal continuity – the "duration" in Bergson's words – is directly connected with the qualitative aspect of experience: The way I perceive a certain sound in a piece of music – such as the harmonic resolution of a dissonance – can't be understood by isolating the one sound from the others. The present moment can't be understood by itself but rather as developing continuously out of preceding moments. Furthermore, continuity is a basic feature in Bergson's overall view of temporal process-related reality.

Up to this point it is true that Bergson takes a firm stand in favour of a continuous view of temporal experience. At the same time, however, he gives a detailed and interesting analysis of our tendency to cope with our own durational experience in a way that introduces discrete forms of access to time and to temporal processes. For him, it is the context of acting that demands to "cut" the temporal continuity into fixed objects of differentiated states, situated at instantaneous points of time. Bergson compares the tendency to access temporal phenomena in this way with the mechanism of a film camera, taking instantaneous pictures out of the continuous progression of events to be filmed.

In his view, such a fragmentation of temporal processes does not only happen in the context of our analytical reflection but already in
the context of our perception. After all we can say that this discrete way of approaching temporal processing is a basic and very natural part of our experience as well. So even if Bergson takes the continuity of time for more fundamental, he sees both our continuous experience of time and our discrete way of grasping it as related parts in the bigger context of our being incorporated in temporal processuality.

After reconstructing Bergson's approach, I will consider its possible implications for the contemporary analytic debates about time, and show that it might open new perspectives on the reasoning about experience and ontology of time. For instance, concerning the issue of temporal passage, Bergson might help to bridge the gap between certain contrary intuitions of experience and ontology.

**Florian Fischer: Tensed Language of Science. Logic of Science and Reference to the Present Moment**

This paper brings together two debates, which are interrelated content wise, but have had (virtually) no impact on each other. In contemporary philosophy of time the debate between so called tensed and tenseless theory is one of the main issues. Arthur Prior has famously argued that reference to the present moment is both important for our actions and not translatable without loss of meaning into just tenseless concepts and sentences. This argument has been much contested since and the sufficiency of a tenseless theory is open to controversy up until today. Independent of this the status of indexical concepts for Rudolf Carnap's logic of science has been subject to philosophical analysis. It is hard to pin down Carnap's position on the importance of indexicality – and thus reference to the present moment – since there is a certain tension in his own writings. His early work up until "Der logische Aufbau der Welt" differs in some important points from ideas he develops in "Testability and Meaning" or his two level conception. So the first goal of this paper is a reconstruction of Carnap's thoughts on tense regarding the language of science. I will access not only Carnap's own ouvre but also contrast him with other coeval philosophers, especially Otto Neurath and Carl Gustav Hempel. The second goal then goes beyond Carnap: I will argue for a tensed theory, i.e. I will try to show that it is not possible to translate tensed sentences, which are located
at the core of scientific language, into tenseless counterparts without loss of meaning. I claim that tensed sentences and beliefs are needed (in the style of an transcendental argument) to anchor the tenseless physical relation of earlier/later. To do so, I will borrow an argument which Carnap himself gives in the context of measuring procedures.

Cord Friebe: Time Direction, Time Order, and the Presentist's View on Space-Time

According to tenseless theories of time, time is essentially time order, characterized by the earlier-later relation between events located in spacetime. Spacetimes containing closed time-like curves, however, do not have a globally consistent time order but (only) a globally consistent time direction. It seems that time direction is more fundamental than time order, which apparently contradicts the spirit of any B-theory of time. It will be argued that presentism, by contrast, provides an understanding of "temporal succession" that is independent of an ordering relation but conceived of as being a productive succession. The present, continuously coming into being, is therefore essentially time direction, namely directed towards existence. Construed this way, the tensed theory of time copes better with general relativity than its tenseless opponents.

Thorben Petersen: Reductionism about Tense. Completeness and Explanatory Metaphysical Semantics

Sider (2011) and Skow (2014) argue that a complete description of reality can be given from an atemporal perspective. In both cases, the surprising conclusion is meant to follow from the conjunction of (1) reductionism about tense, (2) completeness and (3) explanatory metaphysical semantics, namely:

(1) Reductionism about tense: Temporally indexical sentences have tenseless truth-conditions

(2) Completeness: A description of reality is complete iff every non-
fundamental truth (or fact) is made true (or holds in virtue of) a non-fundamental truth (or fact)

(3) Explanatory metaphysical semantics: Fundamental truths (or facts) are explanatory as of non-fundamental truths (or facts).

This talk consists of three parts. I will begin by providing a brief history of reductionism about tense, and locate the Sider/Skow-view in logical space. In the second part, I argue that the Sider/Skow-view should be rejected. This is because the set of propositions consisting of (1), (2) and (3) implies

(4) Illumination: Tenseless sentences are explanatory as of the contents of tensed statements, which, on any reasonable interpretation of "being explanatory", is a proposition that is false.

Finally, I shall argue that this conclusion is (i) not in favour of dynamical theories of time, show that (ii) the phenomenon of tense can only be explained by taking into account that enduring substances change and (iii) motivate what it means to deny that a complete description of reality can be given from an atemporal perspective.

References


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Cord Friebe (University of Bonn, Germany)
Cord Friebe (PD Dr.) is researcher at the University of Bonn and professor (substitute) for theoretical philosophy at the University of Cologne. His area of research is within analytic ontology, philosophy of physics, and the philosophy of Kant. In 2011 he was a DFG-scholar at the Centre for Time at the University of Sydney. Recent publications: Guest editor of Philosophia naturalis: "Temporal Existence and Persistence in Spacetime", vol.49, 1/2012. "Kants Transzendentaler Idealismus: Eine Verteidigung der 'methodologischen' Zwei-Aspekte-Deutung". Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 39.2, 2014.
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Johannes Grössl (University of Innsbruck, Austria)
Johannes Grössl (Dr. theol., bakk. phil.). University of Innsbruck. 2007 baccalaureate in philosophy (Munich School of Philosophy); 2011 Diplom (University of Munich, master equivalent) in theology; thesis about the application of Gödel's incompleteness theorems as an argument against functionalism. Since 2011 research assistant with the Analytic Theology Project in Innsbruck. Theological PhD thesis on Open Theism, completed in 2014. Philosophical PhD thesis on Presentism in philosophy of time, in progress.
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Affiliated Workshop: Social Epistemology and Joint Action in Science

Peter Brössel & Anna-Maria Eder & Christian J. Feldbacher & Cédric Paternotte & Paul Thorn

Workshop aims & scope. Already from the beginning on as formal disciplines, the demarcation between formal philosophy of science and formal epistemology was never very strict. Although the former was and is mainly concerned with the construction, justification, and growth of scientific knowledge, whereby the latter deals more generally with problems settled around the broad notion of knowledge, both disciplines aim at normative models of rational belief and by this meet very often on the same formal grounds. This linkage can also be observed easily by considering current philosophy of science conferences' agendas, where especially the number of contributions out of social epistemology is heavily increasing. Within this workshop some of the links between these two disciplines are considered in detail and discussed to some extent.

Programme Summary. One way of joint action in science consists in overcoming disagreements about the validity of statements by aggregating the single points of view to a joint one. Within this workshop the general conditions for such a joint action will be discussed by providing (i) some desiderata for- and consequences of an optimal aggregation method, followed by (ii) the presentation of a fine-grained way of aggregating single points of view to a joint one, and (iii) combine (i) and (ii) for an optimization of joint action in science. In (iv) the investigation is expanded to differences and bridge principles between quantitative (as used in (i)–(iii)) and qualitative modes of belief.

Paul Thorn will present a meta-inductivist solution to Hume's problem of induction within the so-called best-alternative approach on induction. Meta-induction is a specific method of strategy selection which is to be shown optimal (not maximal and of course also not success-determined, hence only best amongst the available alternatives) in the long run within a prediction setting. This new approach to the traditional problem of induction bears also a number of implications for problems in social epistemology. Amongst others, Thorn will show by
means of simulations which conclusions one might draw for epistemological group performance evaluation.

In the second talk Anna-Maria Eder argues that standard monistic Bayesian approaches to cases of so-called doxastic disagreement, i.e. disagreement amongst epistemic agents in their evaluation of the validity or probability of some proposition, are philosophically inappropriate. She will show then that in pluralistic Bayesianism by keeping confirmation commitments and the grasped evidence separated, an aggregation and revision of epistemic belief states in light of disagreement becomes philosophically more appropriate.

The third talk will be given by Peter Brössel and Christian J. Feldbacher. They show how the meta-inductive approach—presented by Thorn—and pluralistic Bayesianism—as presented by Eder—can be combined in order to make the latter position even more stronger in solving problems of joint action in science.

In the fourth talk Cédric Paternotte expands the investigation of the first three talks by addressing the problem of bridging quantitative modes of belief to qualitative ones and vice versa. Besides results of formal investigations in this field he will also present some results about the influence of pragmatic factors as, e.g., the degree of publicity of events or the number of supporters of a specific thesis.

**Funding.** This workshop is supported by the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP: Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftsphilosophie)

**Schedule.**

- 09:00 Workshop Opening: Synopsis
- 09:10 Paul Thorn: *Wise Crowds, Clever Meta-Inductivists*
- 10:00 Anna-Maria Eder: *Disagreement and Division of Labour*
- 10:50 Coffe Break
- 11:55 Cédric Paternotte: *Common Belief: Plain and Probabilistic*
- 12:45 Workshop Closing
Abstracts.


The veritistic value of an agent's credences depends on the difference between agent's credences in a proposition and the proposition's truth value. The less difference the higher the agent's veritistic value. There is manifold of a priori arguments that an individual scientist's credences should obey the probability calculus and that they should be updated by what is called strict conditionalization; this maximizes the expected gain in veritistic value.

Something similar holds for social practices in science: the aim of these social practices is to increase the (expected) veritistic value of the scientists' credences. In this talk we want to investigate how the various social practices suggested in connection with peers disagreement fare with respect to this aim.

Anna-Maria Eder: Disagreement and Division of Labour

Scientists specialise in order to divide up their labour and so pursue their epistemic endeavours more efficiently. In so doing, they often rely on the testimony of fellow scientists. Such testimony may concern the collection and interpretation of data, or the assessment of the data's relevance for the hypotheses under consideration. Scientists trust the results of their colleagues and consider the results to be relevant for their own epistemic states. The questions then arise: What should scientists do when they disagree with each other? Are they required to resolve their disagreement? If so, how should they resolve their disagreement?

I shall argue that standard Bayesian approaches to answering the latter question are philosophically inappropriate. This is—roughly—due to the fact that they presuppose that agents' epistemic states are best represented by the agents' credence functions alone. I will suggest a new approach to the revision of epistemic states in light of disagreement that is philosophically more appropriate. It presupposes that agents' epistemic states are best represented by the agents' reasoning commitments and the evidence available to them. In my
talk I shall provide reasons for favouring the new approach. Some of these reasons are given from the perspective of traditional individual epistemology. They concern the representation of epistemic states in general. Other reasons are given from the perspective of formal and non-formal social epistemology. They concern, among other things, the division of labour among scientists.

**Cédric Paternotte: Common Belief: Plain and Probabilistic**

Recent analyses of common knowledge, building on Lewis’ seminal approach, have emphasised that it is not based on knowledge but on credence (probabilistic belief) – so that common knowledge is equivalent to high-degree common belief. But can we determine what degree of common belief is high enough to warrant common knowledge? Answering this question may appear to necessitate a formalization of inductive reasoning (that would establish when we treat strong beliefs as knowledge), which is notoriously lacking. I explore another option, based on recent parallels built between plain and probabilistic individual beliefs (Lin & Kelly 2012, Leitgeb 2013). I apply such approaches to cases of interactive epistemology in order to determine how common knowledge is affected by factors such as the degree of publicity of events from which it may originate, and by the number of agents who witness it. I then discuss the differences between the plain/probabilistic belief parallels in the individual and in the collective cases.

**Paul Thorn: Wise Crowds, Clever Meta-Inductivists**

Much recent discussion, along with formal and empirical work, on the Wisdom of Crowds has extolled the virtue of diverse and independent judgment as essential to the maintenance of ‘wise crowds’. In other words, communication and imitation among members of a group may have the negative effect of decreasing the aggregate wisdom of the group. In contrast, it is demonstrable that certain meta-inductive methods provide optimal means for predicting unknown events. Such meta-inductive methods are essentially imitative, where the predictions of other agents are imitated to the extent that those agents have proven successful in the past. Despite the (self-serving) optimality of meta-inductive methods, their imitative nature may undermine the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ inasmuch as these meth-
ods recommend that agents imitate the predictions of other agents. In this talk, I present selected results from Thorn and Schurz (2012), illustrating the effect on a group's performance that may result from having members of a group adopt meta-inductive methods. I then expand on Thorn and Schurz (2012) by considering three simple measures by which meta-inductive prediction methods may improve their own performance, while simultaneously mitigating their negative impact on group performance. The effects of adopting these maneuvers are investigated using computer simulations.

Section: Affiliated Workshop
Language: English
Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher
Date: 09:00-12:45, September 4th, 2014 (Thursday)
Location: HS 302

Peter Brössel (University of Bochum, Germany)
Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy and Center for Mind, Brain, and Cognitive Evolution, Ruhr-University Bochum. Before Peter went to Bochum he was assistant professor for philosophy at the University of Mainz and doctoral research fellow at the Formal Epistemology Research Group in Konstanz. He also was visiting fellow/researcher at the Universities of Tilburg (2013), Aberdeen (2011), Leuven (2010), and California at Berkeley (2009). His main area of research is within philosophy of science and formal epistemology. Recent papers are: "How To Resolve Doxastic Disagreement" (Synthese, 191, 2014, together with Anna-Maria Eder), "Assessing Theories: The Coherentist Approach" (Erkenntnis, forthcoming), and "Bayesian Confirmation Theory: A Means With No End" (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, forthcoming, together with Franz Huber). In 2012 Peter got the Best Dissertation Award for the best PhD-thesis in Philosophy at the University of Konstanz. He is also Rudolf Carnap Essay Prize awardee for a paper published in Abstracta (4, 2008).
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Anna-Maria Eder (University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany)
Research Fellow in the Project A Study in Explanatory Power at the University of Duisburg-Essen. Before her fellowship at the University
of Duisburg-Essen, Anna-Maria was a graduate student in Philosophy at the University of Konstanz and a visiting graduate student at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. During her PhD studies she also was fellow/visiting fellow at the Universities of Leuven and California at Berkeley. Her area of research focuses on topics in epistemology – amongst others: epistemic normativity, justification and evidential support – and the philosophy of science – amongst others: the clarification of scientific concepts, the aims of inquiry, the relationship between confirmation and rational belief, and between explanation and understanding. Her recent publications are in the intersection of traditional and formal epistemology: One on epistemic disagreement ("How to Resolve Doxastic Disagreement", Synthese, 191, 2014, together with Peter Broessel) and another on epistemic consequentialism and evidential support ("Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 87, 2013, together with Peter Broessel and Franz Huber).
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Postdoctoral fellow at the LMU Munich, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP). Cédric's research interests pertain to the
philosophy of groups and sociality in general, more specifically to definitions of cooperation and collective action, rational explanations of cooperation, epistemic aspects of cooperation, collective reasoning, psychological factors of cooperation, and group selection and adaptation. Before he went to Munich, Cédric held positions at the Universities of Bristol and Paris (CNRS). He was also research grant awardee of the University Paris 7 (2003 - 2006). Recent publications: "Minimal Cooperation" (Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2013), and "Theory Choice, Good Sense and Social Consensus" (Erkenntnis, 2013, together with M. Ivanova et al.).
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Paul Thorn (University of Duesseldorf, DCLPS, Germany)
Postdoctoral Researcher, University of Duesseldorf and Duesseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (DCLPS). Paul's area of specialization is within epistemology, philosophy of probability, and logic. Before he came to Duesseldorf, Paul was assistant professor of philosophy at the New College of Florida (2008-2009) and pre-doctoral researcher in the research group "Philosophy, Probability, and Modeling" at the University of Konstanz. Paul was advocate of the year at the University of Arizona, Graduate Student Association, in 2006 and 2007. Recent publications are: "Defeasible Conditionalization" (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43, 2014), and "A Utility Based Evaluation of Logico-Probabilistic Systems" (Studia Logica, forthcoming, together with Gerhard Schurz). Further information about Paul is to be found at his website.
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Abstracts & Biographical Notes
Kaplan, Rule Theory and 'I': Why We Should Reject Kaplan's Account of the First Person

Farbod Akhlaghi-Ghaffarokh

A simple rule, in context, is sufficient to provide both the meaning and the reference of all tokens of 'I'. Or so David Kaplan would have us believe. To Kaplan 'I' is a 'pure indexical' whose meaning and reference can be fixed by a 'simple rule' provided in context of the usage of a particular token of 'I'.

Kaplan's view is comprised of three claims: 1) A simple rule, in context, is sufficient to provide the meaning and determine the reference of all tokens of 'I' (Rule Theory) 2) All tokens of 'I' are logically guaranteed against reference-failure (The Guarantee) and 3) In the central uses of 'I' tokens, one need not identify what is being referred to (Independence). Call this view 'Purism'.

In this paper, I argue that Kaplan's account of the first person, Purism, is false.

I begin by presenting Kaplan's view and the three claims that comprise it, as shown above. Kaplan's position is then contrasted with Maximilian de Gaynesford's view, which maintains that 'I' is in fact a 'mixed/impure' indexical.

I proceed to show that the logical relations between these three claims are such that the truth of Rule Theory entails the truth of The Guarantee and of Independence. The converse will also be shown to hold: If The Guarantee and Independence are true then they entail the truth of Rule Theory.

Due to the logical relations of the claims that comprise Kaplan's position, all that is required to demonstrate the positions falsity is for one to show either Rule Theory is false or that The Guarantee and Independence are false. Isolating either Rule Theory or The Guarantee and Independence and demonstrating their falsity would provide us good reason to reject Kaplan's view: it would collapse.

I isolate Rule Theory. I argue that this claim in Kaplan's view runs into trouble as soon as we try to cash out what this 'simple rule' is. Kaplan's particular formulation, I argue, is especially problematic. After demonstrating why, I reformulate the simple rule in such a way that it is consistent with Kaplan's view but avoids the problems of his
formulation.

Following de Gaynesford, I demonstrate that there is a deep ambiguity to be found in all formulations of the simple rule.

To demonstrate: take 'Uses of I refer to those who use them' as a formulation of the simple rule posited in Rule Theory. Taking Ix for 'x is a use of I', Uxy for 'x uses y', and Rxy for 'x refers to y' in the domain of 'singular referring terms and their possible referents' this simple rule is ambiguous between:

i. \((\forall x)[Ix \rightarrow (\exists y)(Uyx \land Rxy)]\)

ii. \((\forall x)(\forall y)[(Ix \land Uyx) \rightarrow Rxy]\)

iii. \((\forall x)(\forall y)[(Ix \land Uyx \land (\exists z)(Rxz)) \rightarrow z = y]\)

Does the simple rule imply: (i.) 'For every use of 'I', there is a user to whom it will successfully refer?' (ii.) 'For every use of 'I' and for every user of 'I', the use will successfully refer to the user? Or (iii.) 'For every use of 'I' which has a user and which succeeds in referring, it will be to the user that the use refers!'

I proceed to argue that on both the weakest (i.) and the strongest disambiguation (iii.) of the simple rule we have good reason to reject Rule Theory.

Regarding (i.), I present a counter-example to this claim in which we have a use of 'I', which successfully refers, but its referent is not it's user but it's producer. If Kaplan insisted on (i.) then his view would only acknowledge an arbitrary set of 'I' uses. This is unsatisfactory as we should expect it to be the case that if a 'simple rule' would be sufficient to determine the reference of all tokens of 'I' then it should acknowledge all cases of 'I' usage.

As for (iii.), I present a counterexample, similar to the counterexample above. Insisting on (iii.) Kaplan would have lost the generality of his account, which is crucial if one wishes to claim that a simple rule is sufficient to determine the reference of all tokens of 'I'.

A possible response by Kaplan: let us get clear about the notions of users and producers of 'I' tokens, after which we may successfully formulate the simple rule. Let us revise the simple rule to read as: 'Any use of 'I' refers to whoever produced/used it'. This could read either as a conjunction of both 'producer' and 'user' or as a disjunction.
Finally, I argue that this revision of the simple rule does not aid Kaplan's view. If the revised rule was read as a conjunction then it could not be true. This is because there are cases in which the user and the producer of 'I' are distinct. As such, the simple rule could not claim that the reference of 'I' is sufficiently determined by a rule, which says that the referent is the user and the producer of 'I'.

Read as an inclusive disjunction, this revised rule would also not provide us with what it purports to: that is, sufficiently determine the meaning and reference of all tokens of 'I'. All we would have here would be a narrowing down of two possible candidates for the referent of 'I'. This is clearly insufficient to determine the referent of 'I'. Read as an exclusive disjunction, I maintain this revised rule is still insufficient to determine the reference of all tokens of 'I'.

It appears that Kaplan's claim that a simple rule is sufficient in context to determine the referent of 'I', on every reading provided, is false. For this reason, Rule Theory is false.

I conclude, firstly, by claiming that we should reject Kaplan's account of the first person (Purism) because, as demonstrated earlier, the falsity of Rule Theory spells the demise of Kaplan's view simpliciter and, secondly, by demonstrating how we can account for the intuitive plausibility of Rule Theory without holding a Purist account of the first person.

References:

Farbod Akhlaghi-Ghaffarokh (University of Reading, United Kingdom)

Farbod Akhlaghi-Ghaffarokh is a third-year Philosophy BA candidate at the University of Reading and was recently awarded the Laurie Brain Prize for the highest overall marks achieved by a second-year Philosophy BA candidate in 2013/2014, at the University of Reading. He was awarded the Philosophy and Politics academic prizes in his first year of A-Level studies and the Philosophy academic prize in his second year of A-Level studies, at St. Edwards School, Oxford. He is the current President of the University of Reading Philosophy Society. He has presented papers at philosophy conferences held at the University of Nottingham, University of Zagreb and the University of Reading. His areas of interest in philosophical research range broadly, some of which include: Ontology, 'Being', Metaphysics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Perception, Philosophy of Mind, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language and Meta-Philosophy. He is currently working on Metaphysics, Ontology and the 'Question of Being' for his BA Dissertation, with a particular focus on the work of both Analytic and Continental philosophers in this area such as Martin Heidegger and W.V.O. Quine.

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In Defence of Extinctionism

Frauke Albersmeier

In order to advance the philosophical debate about animal rights as well as its political impact, Donaldson and Kymlicka have presented an account of animal citizenship in Zoopolis (2011). They dismiss the abolitionist, or extinctionist approach in animal rights theory as insufficient in its theoretical foundation and disproportional regarding the means it promotes to prevent domesticated animals from suffering abuse by humans. Among the consequences of their counterproposal – granting domesticated animals citizenship – is an increased pressure to justify any interference with domesticated animals' reproductive activities. I this talk I attempt to give such justification with reference to presumed interests of individual animals in the well-being of their children as well as interests of the mixed-society to prevent overly demanding obligations towards its members. Even while recognizing existing domesticated animals as citizens, humans might be unable to fully meet their obligation to protect the most dependent of them, and therefore be justified to conditionally subscribe to "extinctionism" and limit these animals' reproduction to the extent of their ultimate extinction. Therefore, rather than upholding a strict opposition between any form of extinctionism and a political framework for animal rights, out of reasonable concern for the well-being of domesticated animals in the societies they have been placed in, a qualified extinctionist approach should be incorporated into the political framework developed in Zoopolis.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Peter Koch
Date: 11:15-11:45, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 302

Frauke Albersmeier (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Germany)
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Nagelian Reduction and Coherence

Philippe van Basshuysen

Two related questions are investigated: first, how does a Nagelian reduction of one theory (T1) to another (T2) impact on the coherence of T1 and T2? And second, it can be argued (cf. Dizadji-Bahmani et al. (2010)) that an increase in coherence is one goal that drives reductionist enterprises; consequently, the question if and how this goal is achieved can serve as an epistemic criterion for evaluating a purported reduction.

In order to answer these questions, I give a probabilistic analysis of the relation between the reduction and the coherence of theories. Different measures of coherence have been proposed (e.g. Shogenji (1999), Olsson (2002), Fitelson (2003)); I argue that the most promising approach is axiomatic (cf. Bovens, Hartmann (2003)). However, since there are counterexamples to each proposed coherence measure, we should be careful that the analysis be sufficiently stable. It turns out that this can be done.

Philippe van Basshuysen (LSE, United Kingdom)
Philippe van Basshuysen (BA phil.), MSc in Philosophy of Science, London School of Economics and Political Science; expected certificate in September 2014. BA in philosophy 2013, Ruprecht-Karls University of Heidelberg. Thesis on Tarski's definition of truth in formalised languages and Hartry Field's physicalistic critique passed on it (Supervisor: Prof Andreas Kemmerling).
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What Does it Mean to Have Implicit Prejudices?

René Baston

One of the most widely discussed concepts in social psychology is the notion of "implicit prejudice". In contrast to explicit prejudice, which are traditionally measured by questionnaires, implicit prejudice cannot be detected via introspection. Indirect measures do not scale accessible mental states but unconscious and automatic behavior. But what does it mean to have implicit prejudices? Are implicit prejudices mental states like beliefs about a social group or are they mental processes? The answer to these questions depends on the following two questions: (i) What justifies the ascription of mental entities? (ii) Which kinds of mental entities are ascribed? First, I will outline the general approaches of indirect measurement in social psychology. Next, (regarding i) Daniel Dennetts intentional stance will be confronted with a criticism by Ramsey. Following this, (regarding ii) the most relevant mental structures used in the literature to describe the concept of implicit prejudice will be analyzed and criticized: a) heuristics, b) deductive fallacies and c) beliefs (prejudice in a strict sense). Once these notions have been scrutinized, the discourse between the research groups Banaji, Nosek and Greenwald and Arkes and Tetlock will be analyzed. The investigation will show that the discourse was kept alive due to conceptual misunderstandings.
Temporal Contamination in McTaggart's Proof

Samantha Bennett

In this paper, I argue for a novel analysis of McTaggart proof of the unreality of time by examining the linguistic framework of his exposition. I argue that insofar as McTaggart expounds his proof for the unreality of time in natural language, his argument is intrinsically self-undermining. Furthermore, such natural language is constituted of temporal locutions and tenses in the indicative mood — that is, his language is temporally contaminated. By expressing his proof in terms of such contaminated language, his proof of the unreality of time is in fact self-undermining because of its implicit presupposition of time in virtue of language. I shall examine what sort of self-undermining argument McTaggart falls prey to, and precisely how it is problematic for his proof. Subsequently, I shall consider the relationship between language and reality in terms of my analysis. Specifically, I shall consider the reply that it is insignificant that McTaggart's proof is self-undermining, because such an inconsistency does not render time to be non-existent, but rather reality itself to be incoherent. In virtue of this reply, I shall answer by considering Linguisticism, and hence arguing for the priority of philosophy of language to metaphysics.

Section: Metaphysics & Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Sebastian Krebs
Date: 12:00-12:30, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 203

Samantha Bennett (University of St. Andrews, Canada)
Samantha Bennett. Candidate for MA in Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews (2016).
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The Pitfall of Early Preemption in Counterfactual Theories of Causation

Sam Careelmont

Counterfactual theories of causation gained fame by Lewis and his possible world semantics. They recently revived in a new form using the structural equations framework. Counterfactual theories of causation are challenged by several classes of counterexamples, of which cases of preemption are generally taken to be the most problematic. The aim of this talk is to disclose the problematic status of counterexamples of early preemption (subclass of cases of preemption). It will be argued that cases of early preemption have been misleading the research as they do not constitute genuine counterexamples to any counterfactual theory of causation. First, it is argued that early preemption is reducible to forward event preemption, which occurs when one event preempt another from becoming actual. Next, the counterexamples of early preemption are evaluated as cases forward event preemption using a possible world contemplation. This evaluation shows that at least one of the counterfactuals which encode the cases of early preemption makes little sense. The argument is backed up by its correspondence to an improperly encoding of an indicative conditional as a subjunctive one, following Lowe's analysis of counterfactuals. The defect in the counterexamples of early preemption becomes particularly relevant in the recent counterfactual theories of causation as they etch the causal laws directly on counterfactual conditionals without further semantic specification. Whence, the question as to which form causal laws should have comes forward as an important issue for any theory that wants to employ counterfactuals to explicate causation.

Main references:


Is it Rational to Report Supposed Cases of Scientific Misconduct?

Alexander Christian

Scientific misconduct – i.e. the fabrication or falsification of data and also plagiarism – results in the loss of epistemic integrity of research findings that can threaten society's trust in science, hinders the research process and endangers the life of human and nonhuman animals. Consequently, scientific communities and scientific institutions have established rules for the proper handling of supposed misconduct cases. One central duty in this context
demands of every participant of the research process to report such cases to the appropriate authorities. Both, the compliance with and the omission of this duty, involve several problems for whistleblowers, perpetrators and scientific institutions – beginning the individual risks in terms of acts of retaliation against the whistleblower, the prevailing risk of error or costs for illegitimate omission. I want to argue that it is not rational to report supposed cases of scientific misconduct, neither for a scientist – based on plausible assumptions about her preferences and the institutional setting – nor with respect to the general aim of safeguarding the epistemic integrity of research.

The first part of the talk gives an introduction to the problem of whistleblowing in academic and industrial research. The second part then provides an informal narrative of individual and institutional factors that lead to the erroneous omission or compliance with the norm of reporting supposed cases of misconduct. This part is based on the ongoing debate of this topic in science and engineering ethics. Building on this, the third part shows in a more accurate manner how the involved decision processes and risk assessments can be modeled within a formal framework. The last part discusses possible solutions and strategies for their institutional implementation.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Peter Koch
Date: 10:30-11:00, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 302

**Alexander Christian** (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Germany)
Alexander Christian, M.A. Studium der Philosophie, Soziologie und Biologie an der Heinrich-Heine-Universität in Düsseldorf. Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Philosophie der Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf und research fellow am Düsseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (DCLPS).
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Jesse J. Prinz: Rettung der somatosensorischen Emotionstheorien?

Sabrina Coninx


In der bisherigen philosophischen Debatte hat sich die kognitivistische Theoriefamilie als dominierend erwiesen, vor allem weil sie die Eigenschaften der Intentionalität und der Rationalität von Emotionen durch deren Bindung an Kognitionen deutlich besser einfangen kann. Die somatosensorischen Ansätze hingegen identifizieren das intentionale Objekt einer Emotion mit den physiologischen Reaktionen des Organismus, nicht aber mit einem Gegenstand oder Sachverhalt der externen Welt. Dies ist jedoch insoweit unplausibel, als dass sich Menschen und Tiere typischerweise nicht vor ihrem eigenen Körper fürchten und diese Form der emotionalen Bezogenheit daher auch nicht zu rationalen Handlungsweisen zu führen vermag. Dieses grundlegende Problem versucht der amerikanische Philosoph Jesse J. Prinz mithilfe seines somatosensorischen Ansatzes der 'embodied appraisals' zu lösen, dem zufolge Emotionen zwar physiologische Veränderungen registrieren, vermittelt darüber aber relevante Eigenschaften der Umwelt repräsentieren und auf die entsprechenden externen Objekte bezogen sind.

Im Zuge des angestrebten Vortrages soll indes der Versuch einer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit Prinz' Konzeption unternommen werden, um eine Antwort auf die Frage zu finden, ob es ihm tatsächlich

Matthew Cull

There is a problem within the philosophy of psychology which asks how we, as humans, have the capacity to understand the behaviour of other humans. The dominant paradigm for explaining how we achieve this is known as "Theory-theory", or "Theory of Mind theory" (ToM). This paradigm suggests that the individual imputes mental states to others in the mode of a scientific
theorist positing unobservables (mental states) in order to explain observed data (social behaviour). However, this model has not been uncontroversial. Both Ian Hacking and Victoria McGeer have produced critiques of ToM based on the study and experiences of Autistic individuals. Whilst sympathetic to their position, I will show how Hacking's critique of ToM falls to an argument presented by McGeer and how McGeer's own argument against ToM itself suffers from an internal contradiction. I shall then present my own critique of ToM, which draws on both Hacking and McGeer's work on "autistic autobiography" in order to show the incoherence of the ToM model. Finally, I motion towards how a different paradigm in the philosophy of psychology might better be able to answer how we understand the behaviour of others, without the incoherence and socio-political problems associated with ToM.

Matthew Cull (University of St Andrews, United Kingdom)
Matthew Cull; University of St Andrews; Studying for MA (Hons) Philosophy, predicted graduation 2015; Undergraduate Research Internship on whether sex and gender are natural kinds; publications on feminist theory and gender essentialism.
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Tracking Objects. Trace-Based Theory of Singular Thoughts

Bartłomiej Czajka & Jedrzej Grodniewicz

It is common in philosophy of language and mind to distinguish two ways of thinking about objects. The first one (descriptive) is present when no specific individual is thought about (e.g.: "The shortest spy is fat"). The second one (sin-
gular) is present when there is some specific individual that agent has in mind (e.g.: "My brother is clever").

There is a long-standing debate on what exactly makes a thought singular. One of the most recent voices in the debate is Sawyer (2012). Sawyer defends a version of acquaintance theory, according to which one can have singular thoughts about an object only if she perceives, remembers or is told about it. Sawyer enhances it by allowing additionally acquaintance via exploitation of traces left by an object (in her understanding a trace is any perceived effect of object's causal impact). These conditions rule out the possibility of having a singular thought about an object that thinker mistakenly believes to exist or about fictional entities. However, it seems that there are significant similarities in cognitive roles played by thoughts about particular objects, no matter whether these objects actually exist or not (cf. Jeshion 2010). According to Sawyer, to accommodate this observation we need to introduce a distinction into: thoughts of merely singular form and genuine (successful) singular thoughts.

Our critique of Sawyer develops a general intuition of Crane (2011) that such a distinction cannot explain a cognitive role of singular thoughts. In our opinion the insightful idea underlying Sawyer's trace-based acquaintance can be pursued on the ground of a theory rejecting acquaintance. We introduce such a competitive trace-based theory of singular thoughts and present an advantage of our theory over Sawyer's solution. As not committed to the aforementioned distinction our theory gives a unified treatment of singular thoughts about both existent and non-existential objects, at the same time dealing successfully with other examples populating the debate on singular thoughts (Jeshion 2010).

References:

**Bartłomiej Czajka** (Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland, Poland)

Bartłomiej Czajka (MA in Analytic Philosophy). Pre-doctoral researcher at Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland. 2011 - BA in philosophy (speciality: logic, ontology, epistemology) at Jagiellonian University, 2013 - MA in philosophy (speciality: analytic philosophy) at University of Barcelona (Spain). Master thesis concerning non-referential role of proper names in communication. Areas of research: philosophy of language (semantics and pragmatics, semantic content, reference in fiction), logic (epistemic logic, adaptive logic) and epistemology (theories of knowledge and justification).

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**Jedrzej Grodniewicz** (Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland, Poland)

Jedrzej Grodniewicz (MA in Analytic Philosophy). Pre-doctoral researcher at Jagiellonian University (Krakow, Poland). 2012 baccalaurate in philosophy at Jagiellonian University; 2013 master in analytic philosophy at Universitat de Barcelona (Barcelona, Spain); thesis about requirements for success in referential communication. Areas of research: philosophy of language (reference, communication theory, indexicality, context), epistemology (theories of justification), philosophy of mind (singular/descriptive thoughts).

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Can We Radically Interpret Nonhuman Great Apes?

Anna D'Andrea

Over the past few decades a great deal of studies have been conducted on nonhuman great apes behaviour and the way they interact with each other. Significant results have prompted several hypotheses about the nature of their cognitive and communicative skills, giving rise to questions about how these results are to be interpreted. Some researches claim that nonhuman great apes behaviour, and in particular their gestural behaviour, can be classified as a form of communication and that these gestures show astonishing similarities to the ones performed by humans. According to this line of thought, studying such language-independent forms of communication can help us to understand to what extent similarities between human and nonhuman great apes are relevant and how this can throw light on our evolutionary history.

The assumption that there are similarities between the communicative acts of human and nonhuman great apes seems to imply that both kinds of acts are interpretable, eventually even in the same way. If this is correct, then a theory of radical interpretation, as we find it Donald Davidson's work, should be applicable not only to humans, as linguistic creatures, but also to nonhuman great apes. In broad terms, Davidson's theory of radical interpretation is a theory about how to make sense of the communicative behaviour of a speaker of an alien language. It aims at explaining how it is possible to attribute a meaning, i.e. a propositional content, to the utterances of a speaker of an alien tongue. Thus the radical interpreter, who does not speak the speaker's language and does not possess any prior knowledge (neither of the content of the speaker's utterances nor of his beliefs), must relate the speaker's behaviour with some evidence present in the given context, if he finds himself willing to understand the speaker. This provides, or should provide, the interpretation of the communicative behaviour in question.

In a bid to extend this theory it can be argued that if the behaviour of nonhuman great apes can be regarded as communicative ("communicative" in the sense that I will explain throughout this paper), then it can be radically interpreted. I suspect that this will not do. I therefore attempt to show that there is no compatibility between nonhuman great apes gestural behaviour and a theory of radical interpretation, similar
to the one proposed by Davidson. In view of this, we might ask: how is communicative behaviour to be defined? What are the conditions a creature must satisfy to be a proper subject of radical interpretation? Is the theory of radical interpretation only confined to humans, i.e. to creatures that possess language? These questions are crucial for the hypothesis of a radical interpretation of nonhuman great apes. Here I will attempt to clarify these matters and, on the basis of an analysis of Davidson's theory of radical interpretation, I want to show that this theory cannot be extended to nonhuman great apes.

In the first section, I will present Davidson's account of radical interpretation and explicate its necessary conditions. In this respect I aim at emphasising the special place of language in the theory and in particular the role it plays in communication.

In the second section, I will go into a few current positions on great ape gestural behaviour, mainly raising the following questions: why is great ape gestural behaviour a possible candidate for radical interpretation at all? To what extent can this behaviour be considered as communicative? Is the term communication an appropriate one, when we talk about nonhuman great apes? It is in answering this last question that I attempt to show that the notion of communication is inadequate in this context and I will suggest to replace it with the one of interaction. This is not meant to be an argumentative gimmick or a mere dispute over words; rather, I want to draw an important distinction, best suited for both levels of explanation - the linguistic and the nonlinguistic. Displaying the notion of communication will serve to show the incompatibility between great ape gestural behaviour and Davidson's theory of radical interpretation.

The third and last section, aims at bringing together what has emerged in the previous sections. Here I will come to discuss concretely the very central question of this paper: can a theory of radical interpretation in Davidson's style be extended to nonhuman great apes? I will propose two reasons that undermine this possibility:

1. The notion of communication implicit in radical interpretation is necessarily linguistic, therefore it differs from the notion of communication used for explaining the gestural behaviour of nonhuman great apes, which I suggest to call interaction. The advantage of redefining these notions consists in equipping the empirical scientist with useful labels for identifying and classifying different types of behaviour; it consists
in providing notions with which he can productively operate.

2. Essential for the actualisation of radical interpretation is what I will call the reversibility of radical interpretation and this condition is not satisfied if the theory is applied to nonhuman great apes. The idea is that what satisfies the criteria of an act of radical interpretation is a sort of mutual dependence between the interpreter and the interpretee. That is, the interpreter and the interpretee must be in a position of exchanging their roles. This is what can guarantee a verification of the interpretation.

My overall intention behind drawing this distinction is neither to demonstrate that non-human great apes do not communicate, nor to account for a blind anthropocentric view, which assigns to humans the primacy over any other living being, rather I want to point to a terminological difficulty and propose a solution to it. It is, however, my firm conviction that language is an incredible resource for explaining human behaviour and human cognition. We have no chance of knowing what is really going on in the mind of others, but everyone of us certainly has the possibility of externalise what is going on in ones own mind. And it is language that enables this. To possess a language increases the way of interacting with our fellow human beings, it makes communication a fascinating phenomenon.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Robert Schwartzkopff
Date: 17:30-18:00, September 4th, 2014 (Thursday)
Location: HS 302

Anna D’Andrea (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Germany)
Anna D’Andrea (B.A. phil.). Humboldt Universität zu Berlin. 2012 Bachelor of Arts in Philosophie (Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz) mit einer Arbeit über das Verhältnis zwischen Kontingenz und Philosophie in Richard Rortys pragmatische Hermeneutik.
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Against the Principle of Verification: Isaiah Berlin and Logical Positivism

Luca Demontis

Isaiah Berlin's relationship with analytic philosophy is a very meaningful issue in the history of the latter. As he frequently recalls in his works, Berlin was a key figure in the debates with authors such as John L. Austin and Alfred Ayer that gave rise to the very influential "Oxford School of Philosophy". In fact, before devoting to the history of ideas, he wrote several essays on epistemology and philosophy of language, now collected in his Concepts and Categories.

In this paper, we will first reconstruct Berlin's arguments against the principle of verification, especially in the form that Ayer, in his Language, Truth and Logic, inherited from the logical positivism of the Wienerkreis. We will see how, in Berlin's opinion, the verification principle owes its origins to two essential presuppositions:

1. Despite its apparent empiricism, it is an expression of the epistemological monism that Berlin attributes to the rationalist tradition of philosophy, whose aim is to find a systematic method for the discovery of truth;

2. It underestimates the relevance of the influential metaphysics in the construction of our conceptions of the world.

Given these premises, we will argue that:

a. Berlin's well-known dichotomy of monism and pluralism is, to some extent, rooted in a reaction against the reductionism that he ascribed to logical positivism. As he says, his criticism against the principle of verification "has coloured everything else that I have thought";

b. we can find very similar assumptions in post-positivism (i.e. the historical change of paradigms, according to Thomas Kuhn), and in the so-called post-analytical philosophy of authors such as Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty (i.e. pluralism and scientific anti-reductionism).
In short, the aim of this paper is to highlight the relevance of Berlin's heritage in order to better understand what Erich Rech recently called "The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy".

Section: History of Analytic Philosophy  
Language: English  
Chair: Johannes Grössl  
Date: 09:45-10:15, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)  
Location: HS 202

Luca Demontis (Scuola Internazionale di Alti Studi of Modena, Italy)  
Luca Demontis is a PhD Student at the Scuola Internazionale di Alti Studi of Modena. He achieved his Bachelor's, 2010, and Master's, 2012, Degree at the University of Siena. His PhD research project is focused on the Philosophy of social sciences of Isaiah Berlin. He has given talks in English and Italian on epistemology and history of ideas.  
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Self-Beliefs: A Centered World Semantics for Indexical Propositions

Daan Dronkers

One of the central debates in contemporary philosophy of mind is the discussion about self-understanding. Regardless of a specific account of self-understanding, at stake are questions about self-beliefs: beliefs one has about oneself. However, these self-beliefs have been found to raise difficult problems of their own, and cannot easily be accommodated in a standard account of belief.
In this paper, it will be argued that self-beliefs are essentially indexical: a belief is a self-belief iff the indexical "he*" (which might be read as "he" or "I", depending on the context) occurs in it. For example, Caesar has a self-belief if Caesar believes he* conquered Gaul. On the other hand, if Caesar believes Caesar conquered Gaul, then this is not a self-belief.

There seem to be some difficulties in reconciling this account of self-beliefs with the idea that beliefs are propositional attitudes; i.e. that the objects of beliefs are propositions. The question arises what propositions these indexical self-beliefs correspond to.

After considering Kripke-models with centered worlds for self-beliefs proposed by Perry, Stalnaker and Lewis, which all turn out to be inadequate, an alternative account will be proposed. On this account, propositions which are the object of self-beliefs are themselves indexical; propositions will be evaluated at centered worlds, with the center indicating the reference of he*. In addition, a propositional calculus with a belief operator will be introduced. It will be shown that on this account, one can make sense of believes with occurrences of "he*", even though "he*" was found (by Castaneda) to be unanalyzable in coreferring terms.

Ultimately, it will be concluded that self-beliefs can be modelled and understood in a model of beliefs that is only slightly different from a ordinary model for non-indexical beliefs.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Michael Siegel
Date: 14:45-15:15, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 301

Daan Dronkers (Utrecht University, Netherlands)
Daan Dronkers is currently enrolled in the research masters program in philosophy at Utrecht University. His main focus, coming from a mathematics and physics background, is on metaphysics, logic and philosophy of science, although he on occasion find himself working on issues in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Next year, he will be writing his masters thesis, with the aim of acquiring a PhD-position in one of the aforementioned areas of philosophy.
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Corruption: An Institutionalised Exception. From Social Ontology to Normativity

Leonardo Ebner

1.1 How the "corruption-object" is done?
Following the theory developed by J. Searle (1995), I propose to apply the formula "x counts as y in context c" to analyse characteristics of corruption. From the social ontology point of view, we can argue that corruption has typical attributes of "social institutions", here understood in the Searlian sense. This approach reveals the relationship between the ontological and the normative dimension of corruption.

1.2 How can we distinguish it from other forms of backscratching or favouritism?
The creation of an "institutional fact" needs that collective intentionality assigns a function to a given "social fact" within a certain context (an y in c); therefore, that it accepts the institutional role of such fact. Concerning corruption, it is to define limits to what can be considered an "acceptable" form of favouritism, nepotism and abuse of authority: the function y of the object-corruption will be the possibility of breaking the law in order to obtain benefits.

2.1 Is corruption always wrong?
These limits establish the boundary between what we can accept in a liberal society and what is considered devoid of legitimacy in that context. In this way, we move from the ontological dimension to the normative extent. The ontological status of corruption contains an implicit normative assessment: in a liberal society, corruption is considered a fact wrong in itself, because it stands in opposition to the core values of political liberalism.

2.2 Are there some exceptions?
The argument I advance in support of this thesis is the paradox of the free rider. This kind of behaviour exemplifies the attitude we assume toward corruption: although we recognise that it is an "institutional fact" condemnable as such, we have the tendency to provide with a moral justification based on utilitarian rationality, which aims to achieve the greatest personal benefit possible. For this reason, we accept corruption only as "institutionalised exception".
Leonardo Ebner (College of Europe, Italy)
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Perceiving Mentality in its Expression

Jola Feix

How do we access the mental life of another? It seems natural to say that we sometimes see another’s anger in her face or hear her joy in her tone of voice. The perceptual thesis holds that one can indeed perceive some of another’s mental states directly, i.e. without recourse to further cognitive resources like inference or inner simulation. Put differently, the perceptual thesis is the claim that one sometimes accesses the mental states of others directly via perception.

The most popular defense of the perceptual thesis appeals to an embodiment thesis according to which some mental states are partly constituted by characteristic features of the bodily surface. The idea is
that we are able to see a mental state like joy because it – partly – is a surface level physical state (such-and-such movement of a face). The embodiment claim is highly controversial and often said to be faced with the threat of collapsing into behaviorism.

This paper provides an alternative defense of the perceptual thesis that is independent of the embodiment claim. I proceed from arguments for a rich picture of the contents of perception, according to which one can see high-level properties like causal efficacy or being a tree in addition to low-level properties like shapes and colors. By itself, though, these arguments do not suffice for a defense of the perceptual thesis. What we need in addition, I argue, is not the embodiment view, but that some behaviors is expressive of the relevant mental states. In my presentation I explicate the relevant notion of expression in order to distinguish between bodily states and bodily expressions where only the latter are bodily manifestations of mental states. I argue that expressiveness is a relational property of some bodily states but not others, and that perception of the relevent relation affords perception of the mental state. In combination with the relational account of expressions, PT is defensible.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Alfredo Vernazzani
Date: 12:15-12:45, September 5th, 2014 (Friday)
Location: HS 301

Jola Feix (CSMN, University of Oslo, Norway)
In her dissertation, Jola Feix explores different issues around our understanding of others and the knowledge about other minds. She is especially interested in the sources of such knowledge and understanding. In her current research, she explores the prospects for a perceptual account of the knowledge of other minds, and what a perceptual account might imply, if anything, for other areas of philosophy such as the philosophy of cognitive science and ethics. Since 2012, Jola is a doctoral research fellow at the Center for the Study of Mind in Nature at the University of Oslo, Norway. She received her MA in philosophy from the Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich.
E-Mail: jola.feix@csmn.uio.no
This talk is concerned with an intuitive contrast that arises when we consider sentences containing empty definite descriptions. While a sentence like "The king of France is bald" appears to be neither true nor false, sentences like "My friend was visited by the king of France", "Obama is the king of France" or "The king of France exists" induce clear intuitions of falsity. This is surprising, for one might think that all of these sentences carry the false presupposition that there is a unique king of France and should receive the same evaluation as a consequence. Recently, some authors have developed an account of this intuitive contrast (Lasersohn 1993, von Fintel 2004, Yablo 2006, 2009). According to them, all sentences that contain an empty definite description like "the king of France" carry a false presupposition and thus lack a truth-value but for some reason we still reject some of the sentences as false. I argue against these accounts and develop a Strawsonian alternative that vindicates our pre-theoretic truth-value judgments. According to the developed account, the two types of sentences actually differ in truth-value, since they differ in their presuppositions. Hence, pace recent literature, I develop an account according to which our truth-value intuitions are trust-worthy.

Katharina Felka (Universität Hamburg, Germany)
Katharina is a PhD student in the research project Nominalizations at the University of Hamburg. She works on the philosophy of language and linguistics and is particularly interested in those questions of philosophy of language and linguistics that have a bearing on ontology. Before joining the Nominalizations project, she studied at the University of Constance, the ILLC in Amsterdam, and the Humboldt University in Berlin. During her PhD studies, she also stayed about one year at MIT in Cambridge.
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In Defense of Model of Assertion as Undertaking of a Commitment

Grzegorz Gaszczyk

The main purpose of my paper is to defend social theory of assertion. To do this I, first, analyze debate concerning social nature of assertion, and, second, argue that we should characterize assertion in terms of commitment.

Pagin (2004) introduces a method for producing simple counterexamples to social theories of assertion. They have a form of utterances which do communicate its own social significance, but which, nevertheless, are assertions by the standards of these social theories (e.g. Brandom 1994). In other words, we can not make an assertion by using explicit performative utterances. Pagin argues that assertions based on commitment fails the "inferential integration" test (explicit performatives that count as assertions should be able to take the place of assertions in inferences).

In this point, I will argue that Pagin's theory is insufficient on three levels. Firstly, Pagin does not precise certain conditions which social theory must fulfill for making an assertion and his method refute theories which characterize assertions not wholly in social terms. I follow Pegan (2009) in claiming that Pagin's method is open to possibility that making an assertion involves intending some social effect, for example committing oneself to the truth of what one asserts or conveying a certain kind of impression. Secondly, following Garcia-Carpintero (2013), I defend view that explicit performatives are a kind of self-verifying indirect speech act, and therefore could be use as assertions. Thirdly, I show that there is another strategy to challenge Pagins problem with explicit performatives by applying Brandom's idea of expresivism of logical vocabulary. I show that we could pass inferential integration test on the level of material inferences for which explicit performative utterances are sufficient.

Finally, I present advantages of this model compared with another accounts to assertion.
References:


Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Arno Goebel
Date: 14:00-14:30, September 5th, 2014 (Friday)
Location: HS 302

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Indicative Conditionals, Probabilistic Relevance and Discourse Structure

Arno Goebel

On the basis of notorious triviality results suppositionalists about indicative conditionals (IC) argue that the meaning of those conditionals is not propositional. Explicating their theory in a probabilistic framework, the probability of an IC goes by the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. According to the suppositionalists, utterances of ICs do not have propositions as their conventional meanings but express high conditional probability and constitute conditional speech acts.

However, the suppositionalists' account of the meaning of ICs is more than vague. Moreover, it is unclear how such an account could fit into general frameworks of meaning and communication. Another problematic aspect is the reiteration of the second paradox of material implication in the suppositionalist framework: Certainty of the consequent C validates all conditionals A>C with arbitrary antecedent A with P(A) exceeding 0.

The intuition of natural language speakers regarding ICs seems to be that there has to be a connection between antecedent and consequent. In a probabilistic framework this connection can naturally be explained by the notion of epistemic probabilistic relevance. Surprisingly, this is ignored by the suppositionalists. Relevance measures to what extent the increasing probability of one proposition raises, lowers or leaves untouched the probability of another proposition.

In my talk I want to show that, first, with the notion of epistemic probabilistic relevance it is possible to account for the intuitions of a connection between antecedent and consequent. Second, probabilistic relevance captures the dynamics of probability distributions and thus should be understood as context change potential. Drawing on insights from current dynamic semantic frameworks and their explication of contexts, I would like to sketch a probabilistic model of discourse in which the relevance of an asserted proposition drives the discourse dynamics. In parallel to dynamic test conceptions of epistemic expressions, indicative conditionals express relevance relations thereby providing constraints on contexts with probabilistic structure.
Does Reflective Luck Undermine Knowledge?

Job de Grefte

In a recent work, Duncan Pritchard has begun on a thorough analysis of the concept of epistemic luck, its benign and malicious varieties, and the implications of different kinds of luck for knowledge. One of the central distinctions in Pritchard's book concerns the distinction between veritic luck (the kind of luck at play in Gettier-cases) and reflective luck, the kind of luck that results from our inability to reflectively distinguish between "benign" and "Gettiered" cases of justified, true belief.

Pritchard develops a Neo-Moorean approach to eliminate veritic luck from knowledge. Since neo-Mooreanism implies reflective luck, however, this latter kind of luck cannot be eliminated from knowledge. Nevertheless, Pritchard claims that this is not fatal for our possibility
of having knowledge, for the Neo-Moorean approach secures the possibility of externalist knowledge even in the presence of reflective luck.

So, Pritchard's position is that while the elimination of reflective luck from knowledge is desirable, it is not essential. The main aim of this paper is to cast doubt on this claim. It is argued that pure externalist knowledge, the only kind of knowledge compatible with reflective luck, is a kind of knowledge that is uninteresting from an epistemic point of view. This is so because, as Pritchard admits, pure externalist knowledge cannot be claimed. My main argument will be that an analysis of knowledge that means that we cannot claim some of our beliefs to constitute knowledge will not enable us to make progress in the project of maximising true beliefs while minimizing false belief, which I take to be the primary epistemetic goal.

The upshot will be that reflectively lucky first-order knowledge undermines second-order knowledge, and thereby our ability to claim knowledge. Thus, if we want to account for the value of the project of epistemology, we need an anti-reflective luck condition as well as an anti-veritic luck condition on first-order knowledge. Some further implications of the view proposed are considered.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Vlasta Sikimic
Date: 10:30-11:00, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 301

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The Problem of Divine Evil

Johannes Grössl

The Problem of Evil” is a label usually applied to questions like "Why does God allow infants to suffer?" or "Why does God allow horrible massacres?" The existence of an almighty and loving God seems to be incompatible with certain instances of suffering. But there is another "Problem of Evil", which has been somewhat neglected. It could tentatively be called the "Problem of Divine Evil", since the question is not why God does allow evil, but why God perpetrates evil, and evil of a special sort, namely endless suffering in hell. Can everlasting, endless suffering as punishment for the actions of a finite being ever be morally justified? David Lewis outlined a paper on the topic shortly before his death in 2001, which was completed and published by Philip Kitcher and Michael Tooley in 2007. In my talk, I will examine and systemize Lewis' argument and eventually scrutinize options to avoid his atheistic conclusion.

Undertaking this venue, I present a trilemma of divine evil: (1) God is fair, i.e. he penalizes only in a way such that (i) the penalty is adequate, (ii) actions of equal moral value are penalized equally, (iii) actions of unequal moral value are penalized unequally. (2) Eternal damnation is possible. (3) Eternal damnation is, in case it exists, inflicted by god. Common are rejections of the former two premises: Divine Voluntarists such as Duns Scotus and Martin Luther openly reject (1); Anselm of Canterbury, for instance, undermines (1) by levelling and thereby annulling moral value. Today, many theologians try to solve the problem by rejecting (2): However, the doctrine of apokatastasis or the weaker all-will-be-saved theory, seem to be incompatible with (1), if they is not extended by a theory of cosmic justice, purgatory, or reincarnation.

I will emphasize my analysis by focusing on a possible rejection of premise (3): There are reasonable theories explaining why God is not the perpetrator of eternal damnation and why it is logically impossible for him to save those how either do not want to be saved or commit other actions which make them incapable to enter into heaven. A central line of argument in such theories is that God's offer of an eternal loving relationship requires libertarian free will regarding the creature's response to this offer. This line suggests a position what I call Strong Voluntarism regarding Hell: A person can, similarly to what is assumed
in respect to angels, reject God's offer of eternal salvation despite full knowledge of the consequences. The dominating intellectualist tradition within Christianity, however, denies that persons can freely act in such an irrational way, since people always strive for what they believe to be a personal good. Therefore I want to promote a type of Weak Voluntarism regarding Hell which is strongly related to Aristotle's virtue theory as well as to Peter van Inwagen's and Robert Kane's Restrictive Libertarianism: During her life, a person can form her character in a way such that she destroys her free will, so that she is unable to freely accept (or unable to freely reject) God's offer after death. Accordingly, it is logically impossible for God to allow certain people into heaven; therefore God does not perpetrate eternal damnation and Lewis' argument of Divine Evil for the non-existence of a benevolent, almighty God fails.

Section: Philosophy of Religion
Language: English
Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher
Date: 16:45-17:15, September 4th, 2014 (Thursday)
Location: HS 203

Johannes Grössl (University of Innsbruck, Austria)
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The Wishful Thinking Problem for Non-cognitivism: Does It Really Make Sense?

Chengying Guan

In his notable article "Non-cognitivism and Wishful Thinking," Cian Dorr (2002) raises an objection against non-cognitivism, which he implies is (1) as devastating as the famous 'Frege-Geach problem' and (2) independent of it, namely, 'the wishful thinking problem.' The present paper explains Dorr's argument and suggests that the recent researches have showed that Dorr's argument fails because of an over-reliance on intuition. In section one, I introduce what non-cognitivism and the Frege-Geach problem respectively is, as the background knowledge. In section two, I explain how Dorr argues that the wishful thinking problem may arise following a successful solution to the Frege-Geach. In section two, I explain two recent analysis on Dorr's argument (Budolfson, 2009; Mabrito, 2013) and invoke them to demonstrate that the wishful thinking problem does not really make sense in the way that Dorr first thinks. In section four, I discuss a possible strong objection to my thesis from the angle of the proponents of Dorr and argue that this objection fails too.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Peter Koch
Date: 09:00-09:30, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 302

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Ein Leben, mit dem Du leben kannst

Svantje Guinebert

Untrospektiv und beim Beobachten Anderer, im Alltäglichen sowie in sozialpsychologischen Experimenten - immer wieder zeigt sich, dass Menschen zu Autoritätshörigkeit neigen und unter Autorität z.T. Handlungen begehen, von denen sie selbst behaupten, wenn es nach ihnen ginge, würden sie sie nie tun. Die Frage, was genau ein autoritätshöriger Akteur "falsch" macht, kann einerseits unter Rückgriff auf eine normative Theorie zu beantworten versucht werden, andererseits mit Fokus auf sein Verhältnis zu sich und seinen eigenen evaluativen Einstellungen. Letzteres und eine Analyse solcher Handlungen führt zur Unterscheidung zwischen Gehorsam und Hörigkeit: Während dies bei Gehorsam nicht der Fall ist, schreibt ein höriger Akteur irrtümlicherweise die letztinstanzliche normative Autorität einer anderen Person zu. Doch selbst wenn sich die Position vertreten lässt, dass ein solcher Akteur damit gegen eine Pflicht gegen sich selbst verstößt, stellt sich nicht nur die Frage danach, wie die Pflicht zur Selbstzuschreibung von Autorität zu verstehen und zu begründen ist, sondern auch, was es genau bezüglich des Verhältnisses zu den eigenen evaluativen Einstellungen bedeutet. Hannah Arendt schrieb, es ginge darum so zu entscheiden und zu handeln, dass man mit sich weiterleben wollen kann. Doch was heißt es, Entscheidungen zu treffen und Handlungen zu begehen, mit denen man leben kann?

In dem Vortrag soll eine eigene Lesart expliziert und zur Diskussion gestellt werden: Mit sich selbst weiterleben wollen können bedeutet, dass die in den für die Person einschlägigen Lebensbereichen geltenden Normen angenommen werden, so dass eine Person sich und anderen nichts vormacht. Durch die Selbstzuschreibung letztinstanzlicher normativer Autorität ist eine notwenige Bedingung erfüllt, um eine strukturierte Person zu sein. Strukturiert bedeutet hier, die Person kann - im Gegensatz zum "Stultus", wie er von Seneca beschrieben wird - Intentionen bilden und befolgen; ihre Ziele und Pläne sind dabei jeweils in einen normativen Rahmen eingebunden. Erhebe ich die Tätigkeit an einer Universität zu einem meiner Lebensinhalte, dann geht damit der Anspruch einher, keine Note gegen Bezahlung zu fälschen; andernfalls tue ich nur so, als ob. Erhebe ich den Anspruch, ein Mensch zu sein, der einem Unschuldigen niemals vermeidbare Schmerzen zufügen würde, dann geht damit einher, dass ich im Milgram-Experiment keine Voltstöße vergebe; andernfalls mache ich mir und anderen was vor.
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What Possible Worlds Do Not Tell us about De Re Modality

Patrik Hummel

Could object b have had property F? Counterpart theory (CT) says yes if there is a possible world in which a counterpart of b is F. Transworld identity accounts (TI) say yes if there is a possible world in which b is F. I raise a worry about the informativeness of such proposals.

CT refers to a contextually flexible similarity relation between b and certain possible things in order to determine whether b might have been F. I claim that it is a specification of the relevant similarity relation that informs us about such property possession, not just what is the case in other worlds.

Against authors like Kripke and Van Inwagen, I argue that a similar point applies to TI according to which b could have been F if b is F in
some possible world. They claim that per stipulation, we are thinking about b when we imagine a world in which b is F. No account of b's identity conditions is needed to entertain such a thought. In response, I grant that we can stipulate that there is some world in which b is F. But what if b has amongst its properties: being essentially such that it could not be F? The imagined world would then involve a contradiction: Per stipulation, b exists, and per stipulation, b is F. But because of its essential properties, if b exists, it is not F. So according to the imagined world, b is F and b is not F. Without any essence facts at hand, it is indeterminate whether the world in which b is F is possible.

I conclude that the accounts' informativeness about de re modality flows not just from possible worlds, but crucially from substantive commitments on relevant similarity and essence.

One might think that these are themselves given in terms of possible worlds: Essential properties are such that there is no world in which b or some suitable counterpart exists without having them. But here my worry recurs. If essential are just the properties b has in every world in which it exists, I ask: In which worlds does b exist? In particular, for any object in logical space that has b's essential properties as conceived in this way, in virtue of what is it b as opposed to some other object? And in virtue of which fact about b could anything that lacks these properties not be b? I take these difficulties to suggest that essential properties are more fruitfully conceived in terms of a competing account according to which a property is essential for b if it figures in b's real definition.
Manifestation Argument and Ontological Commitments

Karol Kleczka

One of the most fundamental aims of ontology is to analyse the metaphysical consequences of natural language. Hence it is essential to compare and evaluate which theory of meaning (truth-conditional or justificationism) provides a better explanation of some basic phenomena of natural language. Second step is to show how do we make ontological commitments in natural language. In order to reach foregoing objectives I will try to provide an analysis of the manifesting of the knowledge of meaning.

The first part is going to present the conditions which enable an agent to manifest the knowledge of meaning. In order to do that I will consider Dummett's famous argument from manifestation and its critique presented by Alex Miller. The crucial part will focus on the status of undecidable sentences which might possess an evidence-transcendent truth-conditions.

The second part will deal with partial-dependence of the meaning. The crucial consequence of manifestation argument is a question about dependence of truth-conditions. If a speaker can perform some practical abilities which manifest their knowledge of meaning, than the meaning in itself might be at least epistemically dependent on a subject. The dependence can be observed in evoking the closest evidence for a sentence which meaning is put under consideration.

I am going to argue that the speaker uses a meaning by presenting actual evidence for truth of a sentence (namely in asserting it) and does not have to acquire any evidence-transcendent conditions. In case of any problems with manifestation – i.e. with understanding by other speakers, the speaker is able to check evidence instantly, verify it and remove a non-functional one in favour of some new evidence. Natural language has a dynamical structure that can be observed in manifesting language competences. Final conclusion will cover the problem of the ontological commitments. I am going to argue that they are performed constantly and can be constantly evaluated.
Harm and Welfare in Medicine

Peter Koch

Much attention in recent analytic philosophy has been paid to theories of welfare, harm, and interests. Central to the debate are questions concerning experiential and non-experiential harms, the necessity of self-awareness for welfare, expressed and implied interests, and the relationship between the harm, welfare, and interests. The discourse has extensive implications in ethics as a whole, but it is of special importance in the development of a central concept within medical ethics: medical professionalism. Medical professionalism has been hailed as the new foundation around which medical education should be developed and the behavior of medical professionals should be gauged. While various members of the field...
have defended this concept, perhaps the most explicit endorsement of medical professionalism comes in the form of the Physician Charter, generated by the ABIM Foundation, ACP Foundation, and European Federation of Internal Medicine. The Charter is powerful in its transparency and succinctness, but its transparency also renders evident the shortcomings of medical professionalism. Just like generic codes of ethics that have appeared within the last few decades, the Physician Charter provides a general outline of principles which are meant to serve as foundations of medical professionalism: the primary principles of patient welfare, patient autonomy, and social justice. On the one hand, discussing medical professionalism under the umbrella of these three principles seems promising as it avoids the traditional problems that arise from relying solely on the Hippocratic principle of beneficence. However, the introduction of the three principles requires further and often overlooked philosophical commitments. In particular, a principle of respect for patient welfare requires an account of welfare. Drawing from contemporary philosophical discourse, I argue that popular yet conflicting accounts of welfare imply drastically different accounts of medical professionalism. In order to reconcile society's expectations of the physician with the various options of welfare, medical professionalism ought to be constructed around an Aristotelico-Thomistic account of the human person and the human good. It is only by adopting such an account that we can make sense of the interests, harms, and welfare of the patient population.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Svantje Guinebert
Date: 12:15-12:45, September 5th, 2014 (Friday)
Location: HS 203

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In this paper I examine William Ockham's notion of concept or mental term which is a core element of mental language in W. Ockham's account. According to the late Ockham's treatises, concept is both a sign and an act of understanding. This identification causes several difficulties in the analysis of his ideas. First is the general difficulty of his "mental language" conception. How can mental language have semantic and syntactic properties? And, thus, how can a composite mental term be both an act and a proposition? The other ambiguous question is the question about the reason for his final version of the definition of a concept. In this paper I am going to consider some Ockham's thoughts about the identification of a concept and an act of understanding by reference to his Commentary on Aristotle's treatise "De Interpretatione". I begin with the short description of the very idea of mental language and the relations between terms in written, spoken and mental language and real individual things. Then I will consider the notion of signification and finally I will try to show why a composite mental proposition can be an act of understanding.

Keywords: concept, mental term, act of understanding, mental language, Ockham

The cornerstone of William Ockham's semantics is the notion of mental language. Ockham is considered to be the first philosopher creating a detailed systematic conception of mental language although the very intention is not innovative. The creation of forward-looking theory of mental language became possible in large part with the help of the synthesis and revaluation of ideas about the meaning of a sign by Augustine, Boethius and, especially, Roger Bacon.

In fact, although Ockham borrowed canonical Boethius threefold division on spoken language, written language and mental language, he was a first philosopher to consider their relation in a completely different way.

According to Ockham, written and spoken languages are conventional languages unlike mental language is claimed to contain a number of signs which are naturally prior to conventional units. Moreover, he
points out, that it is a result of cognition.

The signification relation is primarily a psychological relation between concept and real object but also it is a semantic relation. Boethius asserts that signification relations necessarily establish an understanding of an object but it isn't so for Ockham. According to him, the signification is in some sense referring to a real object, so term signifies a thing x if and only if "This is (was, will or can) a t" is true, pointing to x. However the main difference between signification and supposition (the latter also could be understood as a some kind of reference) relations is the fact that signification is independent from a propositional context, it is primarily a relation between term and object. As Freddoso mentions, in "Summa of Logic" I.33, Ockham acknowledges four different kinds of signification, although the third and fourth kinds are not clearly distinguished. The free last kinds describe mediated secondary relations between terms and objects which they signify.

The notion of concept

Concept is both a sign and a term of mental language, as far as we appeal to logic and grammar. However neither logic nor grammar can reveal the genesis of concept and its connection with a human knowledge. Concept is a natural sign and thus every concept is in some way "naturally similar" to its object. This point seems to be rather ambiguous thereby we need to take a closer look at the origin of a concept. Concepts are obtained as a result of natural casual processes which are entailed empirical interaction with the real objects. The issue of an ontological status of concept seemed to Ockham as one of the most prominent. Another key point is that Ockham changed his mind in the course of his career. As far as Claude Panaccio mentions, "in the beginning of his philosophical career in the 1317-1319 he subscribed to the so-called fictum theory, according to which a concept in the mind is a purely ideal object, which has no reality other than that being the intentional correlate of a simple cognitive act of comprehension". Nevertheless subsequently in the 1320-21 he changed his point of view and began to consider concept as ultimately identical to the intellectual acts.

Ockham points out that those semantic functions which he extends to concept, may be accomplished by cognitive acts themselves. Claude
Panaccio pursues a penetrating investigation of this topic, namely, in the beginning of 2000th he has published a book, which in large measure reversed a traditional view of the most issues of Ockham's philosophy. Concept isn't a result of an act of understanding (intellectio) of a real object, thus we cannot describe it as a sequence: for example, firstly, there is a "grasp" and then we get a concept. According to Ockham, concept itself is identical to the cognitive act. I will point out only two essential cognitive acts: the intuitive cognition, owing to which we consider the existence of an object as evident or unevident, and the abstractive cognition. Notably, abstractive cognitive act is a categorical term itself and even a common term.

Gordon Leff asserts that, according to Ockham, concept is a similitude of the object it represents. Furthermore abstractive cognition constantly is a universal. Universal traditionally is defined as a predicate of many things, as far as Porphyry has introduced this definition. However in the ockhamistic approach only a sign can be a predicate of something, predication is possible only in the proposition. Thus, in order to be the predicate of many things universal, which is an act, ought to be a sign and, as a consequence, a term. This point is one of the causes why Ockham has to create a detailed construction of mental language. In other words, the existence of universal is possible, because universal is considered as a mental concept which simultaneously signifies plenty of things. For example, term "human" discretely signifies all humans severally rather than a set of people.

**Concept as an act of understanding**

First of all, in the Commentary to Aristotle's "De Interpretatione" Ockham suggests the some kind of the definition of passio animae (or concept in his terminology) or more precisely some kind of the apophatic version of this definition "Sed in proposito accipitur passio animae pro aliquo praedicabili de aliquo, quod non est vox nec scriptura, et vocatur ab aliquibus intentio animae, ab aliquibus vocatur conceptus". Hence Ockham determines passio animaeas something predicabili of something, and this idea makes us to think about propositional context, so the idea of predication already brings together the passio animae and mental proposition. Ockham considers different versions of something that concept could be:

1. Concept as a quilitas which is distinct from actus intelligendi
2. Concept as a genus (irrational opinion, according to Ockham
3. Passio animae is an actus intelligendi itself
4. Concept is a fiction (intentional object)
5. Conceptis an external object

I assert that one of the most important reasons for Ockham to decide what is concept is the Aristotle's account on the "existence" in the soul. Ockham refers to the "Nicomachian Ethics" where Aristotle claims that there are potentialities, habits and affections (potentias et habitus et passiones) in the soul, however Ockham adds to this list acts (He mentions that it is the original Aristotle's list where are four differ kind of "objects"). Intellectus, according to Ockham, is such kind of habitus. So, people have in their minds some mental propositions which are abstractive intellectual acts. They are not cognized themselves – but by them real individual objects are cognized. It is possible because of the act of apprehending a proposition which is simply is a proposition itself which consists of several simple acts of cognition of individual things. Ockham differentiates here between an act of apprehending a proposition and an act of knowing it. It is necessary to know the proposition which we have received in act of apprehension. Concept as intellectio is considered by Ockham as a real quality, because an act is a quality although concept is not a quality itself. In this point Ockham argumentation is based on the idea of signification – a quality doesn't signify distinct individuals.

Thus, my aim is to consider the Ockham's account on the notion of the passio animae, to scrutinize its connection or identification with the affection of soul and try to look how it is incorporated in Ockham's philosophy in two frameworks – logical and epistemological.
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A Tautological Desideratum for Probabilistic Measures of Coherence

Jakob Koscholke

Probabilistic coherence measures have been developed in order to provide a precise, quantitative notion of coherence. However, in this talk I demonstrate that almost every probabilistic coherence measure proposed so far falls victim to a logical contradiction by violating a simple yet intuitive coherence principle that above all is logically true. This principle merely claims that one and the same set of propositions should have one and the same degree of coherence. Although it can be shown that there are probability distributions such that some of the affected measures do not violate the suggested principle, I also present results of a Monte Carlo simulation indicating that these cases are rather unlikely to occur.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Vlasta Sikimic
Date: 09:00-09:30, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 301

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Why I Do Not Understand Why there is Anything at All. Three Remarks on Inwagen's Probability Argument for the Necessary Existence of Something

Sebastian Krebs

Peter van Inwagen claims in his 1996 essay "Why is there anything at all?" that it is necessary that something exists – or at least that it is highly improbable that nothing exists. I will analyze the mechanism of Inwagen's "probability argument" in section 1 of my paper, after which I will raise three questions to Inwagen's claim of the necessary existence of something. In section 2, I will question his metaphysical understanding of possible worlds. In section 3, I will question his interpretation of limiting values in probability theory, and in section 4, I will emphasize the distinction of subjective and objective probabilities – and their relevance for the metaphysical debate. This distinction is insufficiently explored in Inwagen's argument, which justifies my belief that Inwagen's answer to the central ontological question "Why is there anything at all?" is hard to understand.

In my conclusion, I will neither claim that there is anything at all nor that there is nothing at all. My main goal, rather, is to outline three points that facilitate understanding Inwagen. The points I will shed light on are not only relevant for Inwagen's probability argument, but also for the general metaphysical debate on what there is and, respectively, what there is not.

The probability argument for the necessary existence of something builds on the following four – simplified – premises:

– There are some beings.
– There are infinitely many possible worlds.
– There is at most one possible world in which there are no beings.
– For any two possible worlds, the probability of their being actual is equal.

Given these four premises, Inwagen concludes:

If logical space comprises infinitely many possible worlds, and if any two worlds are equiprobable – premise (4) – then the probability of
every world is 0. If a proposition is true in at most one world, and if the probability of every world is 0, then the probability of that proposition is 0. But then, by premise (3), the probability of there being no beings is 0.

Hence, the probability of there being no being is 0. (p. 61)

Hereby it is important to note that Inwagen understands "being" as "concrete being" and excludes merely abstract entities like numbers etc. In other words, Inwagen is interested in the question why it is necessary that something concrete exists.

After these introductory remarks, I will show that Inwagen's argument lacks a convincing modal metaphysics. Inwagen simply assumes in his first footnote (cf. 57) that a Lewisian "metaphysics of modality" is wrong and that he therefore prefers an "abstractionist" modal metaphysic as suggested by Stalnaker, Kripke and Plantinga. I won't go into detail by distinguishing the abstractionist views of these three authors, but in the case of Kripke, it is even hard to decide whether there is a modal metaphysic.

However, by taking a closer look at Inwagen's argument I will show that Inwagen rather presupposes a possibilist than an actualist interpretation – which is not the way Stalnaker, Kripke and Plantinga treat possible worlds. The way he formulates his third premise (see above) suggests that there are (or at least that it is possible that there are) merely possible entities which are not actualized, i.e. concrete beings, in this very possible world in which there are no (concrete) beings. I will try to shed light on this issue by rephrasing the "possibilism vs. actualism" debate in the terminology suggested by Timothy Williamson (2013) who prefers to speak of "contingentism vs. necessitism". Thereby I will point out that Inwagen lacks justification for his interpretation of possible worlds – not to mention that he does not define an underlying modal system and therefore does not establish accessibility relations between worlds – which also leads to Inwagen's misleading interpretation of the so-called "minimal-modal argument" for the necessary existence (cf. 59).

In the next section of my paper, I will raise a mathematical question about Inwagen's understanding of probability. It can be summarized in the following formula:

\[ \text{If } P(W_0) = 0, \text{ why } (k=1)\text{AnP}(W\ k) > 0? \]
Inwagen assumes that limiting value lim0 and 0 should be treated equally, otherwise his argument won't work. However, this interpretation is rather strange and can be used to twist his argument around. If the probability of the possible world in which there are no concrete beings is 0 and not lim0, then the probability of every single possible world in which there are concrete beings must be 0 as well. But then, the probability of the sum of all possible worlds in which there are concrete beings is 0, too. Therefore, Inwagen's argument also shows that nothing exists at all.

Finally, I will point out the difference between subjective and objective probabilities – or, as I prefer to call them in this case, epistemic and metaphysic probabilities. Inwagen ignores that it is merely an epistemic claim to say that the probability of every single world is lim0. In other words: since we do not know any better, we have to assume that the probability of every single possible world is the same – but metaphysically speaking it could be otherwise. Then, however, it is hard to see how he can come to the genuine metaphysical conclusion that it is necessary that something exists, only from this merely epistemic understanding of probabilities.

References:

- Inwagen, Peter van, 1993, Metaphysics, Cornell.
Handlungstheoretischer Interventionismus und Modelle

Alexander Kremling

Als Kausalitätstheorie gilt der handlungstheoretische Interventionismus (Gasking, von Wright, Menzies/Price u.a.) heute mit wenigen Ausnahmen (z.B. Gillies, Price) als unhaltbar. Einer zentralen Einwand lautet, dass insbesondere die Adäquatheitsbedingung nicht erfüllt sei, auch Kausalaussagen über nicht-manipulierbare Verhältnisse zuzulassen und dass, insofern die Beispiele über Manipulationen als Modelle eingeholt werden sollen, kein plausibles Kriterium für die Übereinstimmung von Modell und Kausalverhältnis angegeben werden kann.

Ich möchte dafür argumentieren, dass die vorgebrachten Beispiele durchaus für Argumente gegen ein bestimmtes Verständnis von Interventionismus taugen, in ihrer Diskussion aber wichtige wissenschaftstheoretische Aspekte nicht-manipulierbarer Verhältnisse marginalisiert werden. Die Wissenschaftsgeschichte zeigt, dass die Anerkennung eines nicht-manipulierbaren Kausalverhältnisses und insbesondere eine genauere und quantitative Beschreibung des Verhältnisses in vielen Fällen deutlicher als zugestanden auch von einem praktisch verfügbaren Verhältnis abhängt. Zudem belegen auch gegenwärtige, prognostisch wenig erfolgreiche Modelle, dass gerade ein Übergang vom verfügbaren in den unverfügbaren Bereich eine Erkenntnisgrenze darstellt, mit der zwar rational umgegangen werden kann, die aber kritisch berücksichtigt
werden muss. Die im Sinne des Einwandes vorgebrachten Beispiele stellen oft gerade komplexe und problematische Extrapolationen praktischen Wissens dar.

Nach der Darstellung der Begründungsstruktur mehrerer Beispiele in Argumentform möchte ich die Frage diskutieren, in welcher Hinsicht es doch sinnvoll sein könnte, Einsichten des handlungstheoretischen Interventionismus nicht aufzugeben.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: German
Chair: Florian Fischer
Date: 11:30-12:00, September 5th, 2014 (Friday)
Location: HS 202

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Knowledge of Value

Jonathan Norbert Krude

The paper examines the nexus between meta-ethics and epistemology. It argues that internalist certainty about value is needed for doing what is good. Control is defined as the relation between a person and an event, the probability of whose occurrence depends on the person's judgement of what should occur and where the person knows about the nature of the dependence: That
the light goes on is controlled by me if it depends on my manipulation of the switch, I can manipulate the switch simply by wanting so and I know that this is what needs to be done to make the light go on.

After arguing that that the increase of the probability of the good is what our actions ought to be aiming at (without identifying results with consequences), it is demonstrated that internalist and certain control (and thus, knowledge) is needed for this increase.

The minimal internalist criterion for knowledge demands that there is a phenomenologically accessible distinction between known judgements and other judgements. This distinction is needed in epistemologically dynamic contexts, where judgements are formed or assessed, to choose non-arbitrarily between different optional judgements. Since deciding about an action constitutes a dynamic context and arbitrary choice fails to increase the probability of success, internalist control is needed.

The knowledge needs a level of certainty: While probabilistic judgements about value can still be non-arbitrary, this is only possible where this probability is itself held fixed on the second epistemic level.

The implications of these considerations will be discussed. Good results are defined by what is relevant and ought to be done, and (certain and internalist) knowledge about value is the only way to increase the likelihood of good results. So, acquiring this knowledge is all that is relevant for our life. The impact this should have both on the way we do philosophy and the way we make our life-choices is suggested at the end of the paper.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Peter Koch
Date: 09:45-10:15, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 302

Jonathan Norbert Krude (Cambridge University, England)
The lecturer is Jonathan Krude (studying for the bachelor of philosophy) from Cambridge University. Thesis about Skepticism.
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One of the objections to classical hypothesis testing is a renowned problem known as Lindley's paradox (Lindley 1957). An account of standard Bayesian critique that relates to this paradox can be found in McCarthy's handbook "Bayesian Methods for Ecology" (2007) where the paradox is embodied into the ecological realm of testing the sex ratio of pouch young of koalas' mothers in poor physical conditions. McCarthy's main objection is based on Lindley & Phillips' (1976) "stopping rule problem", which directly relates to the paradox.

A researcher could collect the data with respect to either a fixed number of trials, or a fixed number of successes (males). In the case of Bayesian analysis, the result of testing will be insensitive to how a researcher decide to stop sampling. In the case of the point null hypothesis significance test, according to McCarthy it may be the case that "two different stopping rules for the sampling strategies lead to different conclusions about the null hypothesis, even though the actual data are identical" (McCarthy 2007, 33). This statement is challenging for the proponent of frequentist classical framework, unless she will show that there is no arbitrariness in her choice of the stopping rule. To do this she should provide a criterion for identifying which formula is epistemically favorable to be applied in the case of the specific hypothesis.

The aim of my argument is to provide a lucid frequentist solution for a manifestation of Lindley & Phillips stopping rule problem in the ecological realm. I deliver criteria for discerning a stopping rule an evidence and a model that are epistemically more appropriate for testing the hypothesis of the case studied.

First, I show the difference in the evidence taken into account in different frequentist sampling procedures presented in the problem. Next I discuss the inapplicability of the Carnapian (1947) principle of total evidence in deciding which of the evidence associated with a given sampling procedure and statistical model is epistemically more appropriate for testing the hypothesis in question. Then I propose a double-perspective (evidence and model) frequentist solution based on choice
of an evidence that better corresponds to the investigated ecological hypothesis, as well as on choice of a model that embraces less unrealistic ontological assumptions.

References:

- Carnap R. 1947, On the application of inductive logic, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8:133-148
On some Serious Flaws in Searle's Conception of Collective Intentions

Nicolas Lindner

With his paper Collective Intentions and Actions (1990) John Searle has made an early and highly influential contribution to the discussion of joint action and shared agency. His main idea is that collective intentions are a primitive form of intentionality and more than a mere summation of individual intentions. For Searle, collective intentionality does not rely on a certain set of intentions and interrelated beliefs but rather in a particular psychological mode of intending. Furthermore, Searle claims that – due to his naturalistic ontology – an account of collective intentionality must be consistent with the fact that any individual's intentionality must be independent of the fact whether the agent is right about what's going on around him. Following this, he concludes that both individual and collective intentionality could exist independently.

In my talk, I will show that Searle's conception has some serious flaws.

Drawing on a wide range of criticisms (cf. Vellemann 1997, Meijers 2003, Pacherie 2007), I suggest that a large part of what Searle presents as self-evident is far from clear. Even worse, his conception fails to capture the relevant questions concerning joint action altogether or passes them over to other disciplines, hence out of the range of philosophical reasoning. His contribution is a fruitful starting point for the overall debate. Yet, while offering helpful concepts for further theoretical reflections (e.g. the distinction between prior intention and intention-in-action), Searle's conception of collective intentionality doesn't suffice in giving a comprising account of human joint action.

References:


Section: Philosophical Action Theory
Language: English
Chair: Farbod Akhlaghi-Ghaffarokh
Date: 14:45-15:15, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 203

Nicolas Lindner (University of Düsseldorf, Germany)
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Comparativism About Mass
Niels C.M. Martens

The property of having mass is a determinable with two types of determinates: we think of an object with mass as having a determinate intrinsic property, but we also think it stands in determinate mass relationships with other massive objects. Absolutism is the metaphysical position that the intrinsic properties are fundamental; the mass relationships are then grounded in those intrinsic masses. Comparativism is the position that the mass relationships are fundamental; they are all there is to the property of having mass (Dasgupta, 2013).

The absolutism-comparativism debate is a debate about the correct counting of possibilities/possible worlds. The main (only?) argument in favour of comparativism claims that 1) intrinsic masses are, in principle, undetectable (i.e. they generate metaphysically distinct possibilities that are, in some sense, not physically distinguishable), and on top of that 2) comparativism is ontologically more parsimonious. Hence, we should choose comparativism over absolutism.

I first argue against claim 1, by discussing several modal arguments against comparativism, where I focus on developing Baker's "Earth/Pandora argument" (forthcoming). I argue that Baker's own analysis of the argument is mistaken. Comparativism recognizes less possible worlds than our (deterministic) physics requires. The argument – pace Baker – does refute comparativism, at least in its standard (non-mixed) form. I furthermore show that even Dasgupta's adaptation of Lewisian counterpart theory using mass-counterparts will not save the comparativist.

Even if claim 1 would hold, this would be insufficient, since comparativism – despite first appearances – is ontologically less parsimonious than absolutism. Although the non-locality, in the sense of non-seperability, of comparativism is an issue, what is fatal is that comparativism presupposes a miraculous conspiracy between all the mass relations of all the objects in the universe.
Nur ein Schritt zur Handlung? Über das Verhältnis zwischen absichtlichem Handeln und Versuchen

Ulrike Mürbe


Um Antworten auf diese Fragen finden zu können, muss unter anderem geklärt werden, in welches Verhältnis sich erfolgreiches, versuchtes und scheiterndes A-en genau bringen lassen. Eine entschiedene Antwort auf diese Frage liefert der sogenannte New-Volitionalism, indem er die These verteidigt, jedes absichtliche Handeln involviere ein Versuchen in Form eines inneren aktiven events, welches entsprechende Körperbewegungen verursacht. Scheiterndes und erfolgreiches A-en lassen sich derartigen Ansätzen folgend über das Versuchen als kleinstengeteilten Einheit beider Vollzüge verstehen. Das, wovon Subjekte absichtlicher Vollzüge wissen können, insofern sie Subjekte ebendieser Vollzüge sind, ist etwas, das in Fällen erfolgreichen Handelns ebenso wie in Fällen des Scheiterns ohne Unterschied vorliegt.

Ziel des folgenden Vortrages ist es, ein solches Verständnis mit einem
Ansatz zu kontrastieren, der davon ausgeht, dass jenes Wissen, das Subjekte erfolgreichen absichtlichen Handelns von ihren Vollzügen haben, sich sowohl von dem Wissen, über das Subjekte von Handlungsversuchen verfügen, als auch von jenem Wissen, das sich scheiternden Akteuren zuschreiben lässt, unterscheidet.

Ein derart disjunktives Verständnis von Handlungswissen macht nicht allein einen Vorschlag dafür, was es denn genau heißen kann, Wissen von den eigenen absichtlichen Vollzügen zu haben, sondern scheint überdies auch eine Antwort auf die Frage zu erlauben, inwieweit es angemessen ist, in Fällen absichtlicher Vollzüge überhaupt von Wissen zu sprechen, indem es unter anderem die Frage beantwortet, wie es möglich ist, to get it wrong. Damit wird ein Ansatz wie der in meinem Vortrag diskutierte der Forderung gerecht, dem Begriff des Wissens allein mit Blick auf solche Gegenstände Anwendung einzuräumen, mit denen auch die Möglichkeit des Irrtums gegeben ist. Zugleich scheint ein disjunktiver Ansatz der beschriebenen Art, anders als die zuvor erwähnten, erklären zu können, inwieweit derjenige, der absichtlich A-t, aber scheitert, ebenso wie der, der versucht zu A-en, dennoch absichtlich handelt, ohne von der These abrücken zu müssen, das, was absichtliches Handeln als solches auszeichnet, liegt mit einer besonderen Form der Bezugnahme ihres Subjekts auf dasselbe vor.

Section: Philosophy of Mind  
Language: German  
Chair: Alexander Gebharter  
Date: 16:00-16:30, September 4th, 2014 (Thursday)  
Location: HS 301

Ulrike Mürbe (Universität Potsdam, Germany)  
Ulrike Mürbe, (B.A. Philosophie); Universität Potsdam; 2012 Bachelor Sozialwissenschaften und Philosophie mit Kernfach Philosophie an der Universität Leipzig; Abschlussarbeit zum Problem der Willensschwäche und dem Begriff vernünftiger Fähigkeiten; Seit 2012 Master-Studium Philosophie an der Universität Potsdam; Anstellung als wissenschaftliche Hilfskraft am Lehrstuhl für Ethik und Ästhetik; Forschungs-Schwerpunkte: Handlungstheorie, praktische Rationalität, Meta-Ethik.  
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No Verbal Dispute Without the Notion of Analyticity

Anna Nuspliger

In ontology, there is a debate about whether some ontological disputes are verbal. In his paper "Ontology and Alternative Languages" Eli Hirsch considers the following dispute to be verbal:

Pedro: Objects have temporal parts. Edna: No, objects don't have temporal parts.

Pedro is a proponent of perdurantism, hence he believes that ordinary physical objects like trees are made up of a succession of temporal parts. Edna, on the contrary, is an endurantist and denies that objects have temporal parts. According to Hirsch, their dispute is verbal: There is nothing substantive at stake besides the correct use of language. Of course, many ontologists object to this idea, as they claim to answer substantive questions in presenting their positions.

It turns out to be difficult to characterize verbal disputes. For his account, Hirsch takes up Donald Davidson's idea of his principle of charity and claims that one should, if possible, interpret a person speaking a different language as speaking the truth in her language. He provides the following definition of a verbal dispute:

(VD) A dispute is verbal if the opponents find it plausible to interpret the other party as speaking a language in which the other party's sentences are true.

However, Brendan Balcerak Jackson criticizes Hirsch's position for relying on the notion of unrevisability that is closely related to the contentious analytic/synthetic-distinction (Jackson [2013]). Further, in Jackson's view, Hirsch isn't able to show that verbal disputes contain sentences that are unrevisable.

In my talk, I will first present Hirsch's characterization of verbal disputes. Thereafter, I discuss Jackson's objections and I show how Hirsch succeeds in giving rejoinders. Third, I argue that Hirsch faces another dilemma: Either his definition of verbal dispute is understood in an epistemic or in a metaphysical sense. If (VD) is meant to be an epistemic criterion, it only tells us whether opponents are justified
in engaging in a dispute. If, on the contrary, (VD) is understood in a metaphysical sense, Hirsch is no better off: Either (VD) has to be restricted to analytic claims, though, the thesis that a dispute about analytic true claims is verbal is rather trivial. However, if (VD) is applied to disputes involving synthetic true and a priori knowable sentences, it is not strong enough to show the dispute to be verbal.

References:


Section: Metaphysics & Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Sebastian Krebs
Date: 10:30-11:00, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 203

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Truth and Science

Tomáš Ondráček

There has been a long struggle between many philosophers, scientists, and other thinkers over science as a provider of truths about the world. The answers to this question seem to depend more on one's conviction than on science or truth itself. Maybe there is no solution and maybe we should ask from a different perspective: Do we need truth in science? To put it more clear: Do we need truth in science from the perspective of theory of science? Do we need truth for description of scientific theories, their evaluation or scientific practice?

I believe that from this perspective we can more simply evaluate the benefits or count the cost of conception of truth in science. We can revise our theories of science and see if it is necessary or worthy to have such a concept there.

In a presented talk I will argue against it. My position will be that any conception of truth is not needed in science. I will present three arguments supporting this proposition. First argument will be connected to a process of falsification as the most famous description of science. I will show that in this process there is no place for truth. Secondly, I will argue that science is better off without involving the conceptions of truth even in a practice. This will be presented on a problem of scientific misconducts, which is more than acute and currently there are debates over the definition of these misconducts and possibilities of their detection. Last argument will demonstrate the problems made by considering something as truth which is unchangeable in a theory of science or in scientific theories.

This does not mean that we should reject science or concept of truth. These arguments should justify the position that science can be described and can be functional without the necessity of being true, without the concept of truth.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Christian
Date: 16:00-16:30, September 4th, 2014 (Thursday)
Location: HS 202
Form and Function in the Metaphysics of Mechanisms: Toward an Aggregative Definition of Mechanisms

Francois Pellet

It has recently been argued by neo-mechanists that a naturalized metaphysics should admit mechanisms as fundamental units. Indeed, most mechanists who have embraced a kind of explanatory reductionism have also endorsed the relevant kind of ontological reductionism. This is explained by the fact that many but not all new mechanists have adopted an ontic account of scientific explanation, according to which (i) the explanans is the mechanism itself and (ii) the goal of biological explanations is to exhibit the causal structure of the world. An interesting kind of explanatory reductionism is weak mechanistic reductionism, according to which the explanandum phenomenon at one level is fully explained by the entities and activities situated at a lower level. The reduction stops here, because mechanisms are always more than the sum of their parts.

My goal in this talk is to challenge this view. After presenting the
above framework, I will argue that a compositional interpretation of weak mechanistic reductionism is nevertheless possible. For that purpose, I will develop a causal slingshot argument showing that entities understood as structured wholes (or forms) and their activities (or functions) exist, because their structured parts and activities exist, and the structured parts and activities, in turn, exist, because their structured parts and activities exist, and so on. I suggest we should postulate "structureless atoms", which are functions, as a terminating regress both for the case of structures and functions. If I am right, this is a strong argument in support of dispositional realism. Since these atoms are structureless, we can give an aggregative (or mereological) definition of mechanisms as being literally the sum of their parts. My causal slingshot argument, considered as a strong ontological reductionism, does not prevent us from adopting weak mechanistic reductionism, but only from adopting the corresponding weak ontological reductionism entailed by an ontic account of explanation.

Finally, after answering some obvious objections that my thesis involves an unstoppable proliferation of mechanisms, I will conclude by drawing the consequences of my argument for the general philosophy of science.

Section: Metaphysics & Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Sebastian Krebs
Date: 09:00-09:30, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 203

François Pellet (University of Geneva, Switzerland)
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Direct Perception and Naturalistic Intentionality

Natalia Anna Pietrulewicz

In the talk I am going to present "naturalistic approach to intentionality' conceived by Tarasiewicz (2013) and argue for its importance for current debate. However, I would also like to comment on it from the point of view of ecological psychology, especially, direct perception theory. Naturalistic intentionality, to the rough approximation, depicts intentionality (also explains how emerges intentionality of language expressions) as relational "directedness", "pointing at something". I am going to show that this stance presents intentionality as only seemingly similar to affordances. The latter being, to the rough approximation, directly perceived opportunities to act presented by environment to the subject.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Michael Siegel
Date: 14:00-14:30, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 301

Natalia Anna Pietrulewicz (University of Warsaw, Poland)
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Imagine that Sean is standing in front of a monochrome red painting that is being exhibited at the local art gallery. Having a skeptical personality, he expresses his worries, "What if the painting I'm looking at is white but illuminated by red lights?" The guard standing at the corner of the room replies, "Don't you see: it looks red, so it is red, so it's not white but illuminated by red lights." Surely, Sean would hardly be satisfied with this response, though, according to safety theorists at least, Sean knows that the painting is looking at is not white with red lights shining on it, for Sean's belief is safe; that is, roughly, in all sufficiently close nearby possible worlds in which Sean so believes, his belief is true. Yet, Sean's knowing that the painting is not white with red lights shining on it does not imply that he can properly assert, "This painting isn't white." In fact, I argue that whoever asserts some proposition p or that she knows that p can properly do so only if, from her reflective position, it is not a matter of luck that she knows that p. I take this to be a condition for proper assertion of knowledge claims. First, I think, doing so gives reason to defend a safety-based account of knowledge, for this condition seems to accommodate our intuition that sometimes (e.g., as in the above example) such an account makes knowledge too easy to come by rather neatly. Further, in turn, when coupled with a safety-based account of knowledge, it helps rescue a Neo-Moorean safety-based response to global and local skepticism.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Vlasta Sikimic
Date: 09:45-10:15, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 301

Francesco Praolini (Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, Belgio)
Francesco is studying philosophy at the University of Leuven. His main areas of interest are epistemology, philosophy of language and logic. He wrote his Bachelor's Paper with professor Christoph Kelp. Even though he is used to be very successful as a track and field athlete, he has decided to focus on his studies now.
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Suppose we begin with the sentence "Frege is astute" and replace one of its constituent expressions with another of a broadly different grammatical type. For example, we could replace the proper name "Frege" with the predicate "sings", or the predicate "is astute" with the noun "astuteness", yielding, respectively, "sings is astute" and "Frege astuteness". The latter are examples of "grammatical type confusions" (GTCs): strings whose constituent expressions are not even broadly of the right types to form a grammatical sentence. GTCs are widely held to be meaningless. This view, however, has recently been challenged by Ofra Magidor (2008), who argues that none of the reasons standardly adduced in its defence is convincing. She claims, in particular, that on several approaches to semantics—among them, the Fregean semantic framework—GTCs can naturally be assigned meanings.

In this paper, I focus on Magidor's argument that the Fregean semanticist ought to recognize GTCs as meaningful. I show that this conclusion would, in several respects, be a welcome result for Frege. Firstly, it promises to forestall the worst difficulties of Frege's famous paradox of the concept "horse". Secondly, it promises to vindicate aspects of Frege's own practice in expounding his semantic doctrines—namely, his use of the expressions "the True" and "the False", which appears independently to commit him to recognising certain GTCs as meaningful. I argue, furthermore, that several objections that might be raised on Fregean grounds against Magidor's argument are inconclusive. Nevertheless, my conclusion is that Magidor's argument is ultimately unconvincing from a Fregean perspective and therefore affords Frege no satisfactory response to the concept "horse" paradox. In fact, I suggest, in closing, that the foregoing discussion shows that the paradox presents itself in a form that has hitherto been largely neglected.
The Concept of Expertise: A Practical Explication

Christian Quast


Beim Begriff eines Experten handelt es sich in erster Linie um ein Konzept alltagssprachlicher Herkunft. Bei solchen ist häufig eine besondere Widerspenstigkeit gegenüber definitorischen, analytischen und explikatorischen Bemühungen zu beobachten. Sie besitzen scheinbar keine klaren Grenzen, sind mehrdeutig und vage. Auch der Expertisebegriff
bildet hier keine Ausnahme. Dies kann zugestanden werden, ohne wie einige Autoren die Flinte voreilig ins Korn zu werfen. Zum Teil wird nämlich allein die alltagssprachliche Provenienz als Beleg für die Behauptung in Anspruch genommen, dass sich der Expertisebegriff zum einen einer befriedigenden Definition prinzipiell entzieht und sich solche Versuche zum anderen als Hemmschuh für ein produktives Verständnis von Expertise erweisen.

Spielarten des Naturalismus

Bastian Reichardt

Trotz der anhaltenden Prominenz des naturalistischen Weltbilds innerhalb der Philosophie ist es auffällig unklar, was der Ausdruck "Naturalismus" eigentlich bezeichnet. Allenfalls besteht Einigkeit darüber, dass Naturalisten den Naturwissenschaften in der philosophischen Theoriebildung eine besondere Rolle zusprechen. Ob mit diesem Begriff jedoch eine ontologische oder vielmehr eine methodologische These verbunden ist, bleibt strittig. Allerdings herrscht ein immenser Unterschied zwischen der Ansicht, dass alles, was es gibt, durch die Naturwissenschaften erfassbar ist und der Ansicht, dass die Naturwissenschaften uns eine bewährte methodische Richtschnur zur Rechtfertigung wissenschaftlicher Überzeugungen an die Hand legen.


Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: German
Chair: Florian Fischer
Date: 15:30-16:00, September 5th, 2014 (Friday)
Location: HS 202

Bastian Reichardt (University of Bonn / Research Centre Jülich, Germany)

Bastian Reichardt (M.A.) is lecturer and researcher at the University of Bonn and at the Department for Ethics in the Neurosciences of the Research Centre Jülich. He is the editor of "Freges Philosophie nach Frege" (Münster: mentis 2014 – together with Alexander Samans) and "Juventas - Zeitschrift für junge Philosophie" (2011-2012).
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Treating the Enhancement Debate: Irrelevant Distinctions in the Enhancement Medicine Debate

Joseph Tarquin Foulkes Roberts

In much of the literature on enhancement medicine several distinctions are deemed relevant which, upon reflection, do not do the moral work attributed to them. These distinctions are the distinction between therapeutic and enhancement medicine and the distinction between biomedical enhancement and other forms of enhancement. The distinction between enhancement and treatment is neither clear cut or able to track the distinction between what is permissible and what is impermissible. The distinction between biomedical and non-biomedical enhancement, whilst clear, does not track the distinction between what is permissible and what is impermissible. The reasons given to argue that biomedical enhancements are impermissible do not exclusively pick out biomedical enhancements. Non-biomedical enhancements can also prove to be irreversible, have unintended bad consequences (which are not necessarily better than one's produced by biomedical enhancements) and modify our biology. This article concludes that, in benefit of clarity, the divisions should be abandoned as they do not do the moral work required of them and may prove harmful to the debate.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Svantje Guinebert
Date: 11:30-12:00, September 5th, 2014 (Friday)
Location: HS 203

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Kausalität ist ein reichhaltiger Begriff, der in unterschiedlichen alltäglichen, wissenschaftlichen und philosophischen Kontexten eine tragende Rolle spielt. Theorien der Kausalität entstehen meist in Auseinandersetzung mit einigen dieser zahlreichen Kontexte, und können oft nicht oder nur mit Mühe auf andere Kontexte ausgeweitet werden.


Ich argumentiere dafür, dass es angesichts der Lage der Debatte um Theorien der Kausalität äußerst unwahrscheinlich ist, dass sich eine Theorie entwickeln lässt, die erstens eine große Menge begrifflicher Intuitionen korrekt einfängt, und die darüber hinaus zweitens in einer großen Menge von philosophisch-theoretischen Kontexten fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. Der Leitfaden für die Bildung einer Theorie der Kausalität sollte eine Vorgehensweise sein, die mit Carnapscher Begriffsexplikation verwandt ist: Der Begriff wird immer mit Blick auf den jeweiligen philosophisch-theoretischen Kontext expliziert. Hierbei sind weitreichende Abweichungen von den Alltagsintuitionen erlaubt, solange dadurch ein Vorteil in der philosophischen Theoriebildung entsteht.

werden könnte, gibt es nicht.
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In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, religious faith and atheism are often identified with having a certain set of beliefs about the divine reality. In such an approach, which may be dubbed as "cognitive", attention of philosophers focuses on belief dimension of faith and atheism. Cognitive approach discusses truth-value, justification and content of religious claims. In my talk, I would like to show that this dominant approach to the subject is misguided. Faith and a lack of it should not be analysed as a cognitive phenomenon, but analogously to interpersonal relationships, such as love and friendship.

My speech is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the inadequacy of "cognitive" model of religious faith and atheism. This inadequacy will be shown by analysing the phenomenon of doxastic inertness of religious beliefs. I will argue that the phenomenon cannot be explained when we identify faith/lack of it with having a set of propositional attitudes. The second part tries to elucidate the notion of faith as a relationship, by comparing it to love and friendship. During my talk, I will refer both to contemporary analytic philosophers of religion and to philosophers such as Kierkegaard, Pascal, James and Nietzsche.

Section: Philosophy of Religion
Language: English
Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher
Date: 16:00-16:30, September 4th, 2014 (Thursday)
Location: HS 203

Stanisław Ruczaj (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
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Prior's Concept of Possible Worlds: between Wittgenstein and Łukasiewicz

Zuzana Rybaříková

Arthur Prior was one of the logicians who participated in the invention of the possible world's semantics. However, his modal ontology differs a lot from the classical one. Prior tried to reduce the number of abstract entities as much as possible. Hence he did not elect to introduce possible worlds and possibilia into his ontology. In addition, he held a reductionist view, which is called modal actualism by Fine or modalism by Melia. Prior was inspired by various authors but this paper mainly discusses the influence from two prominent logicians, Wittgenstein and Łukasiewicz. When Prior dealt with the origins of his concept of possible worlds he acknowledged Wittgenstein. On the other hand, when Prior's modal logic is considered Prior clearly confessed that he owed much to Łukasiewicz. Hence a comparison of the importance that Wittgenstein's and Łukasiewicz's logic had for the construction of Prior's concept of possible worlds will be carried out.

Section: Logic
Language: English
Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger
Date: 14:00-14:30, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 202

Zuzana Rybaříková (Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic)
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Habgier und Anerkennung

Alexander Samans

Im Vortrag soll Kants Argumentation in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft dargestellt werden. Die Interpretationen dieser Passage und dem in ihr enthaltenen "Depositum"-Beispiel gehen insbesondere in der Auffassung darüber auseinander, ob die von Kant leider kaum erläuterte Schlussfolgerung – daß es gar kein Depositum gäbe –, wenn Habgier als allgemeiner Grundsatz Geltung finden würde, auf einen logischen oder auf einen praktischen Widerspruch zurückzuführen ist.


Der Begriff "Depositum" bezeichnet einen Gegenstand, welcher sich im Rahmen eines Vereinbarungsvertrages nicht im Besitz des Eigentümers befindet, sondern von einer anderen Person, im Auftrag des Eigentümers, in Verwahrung genommen wird.

Auf Grundlage einer Analyse des Begriffs "Depositum" lässt sich folgende einfache Aussage formulieren:

Prämisse 1 (DEP): Wenn ein Depositum existiert, dann ist die intentionale Bedingung der Anerkennung des Eigentums erfüllt.

Auf Grundlage einer Analyse von "Maxime der Habgier" in Kants Verwendung lässt sich folgende Aussage formulieren:

Prämisse 2 (MAX): Wenn eine Person nach der Maxime der Habgier handelt, dann wird sie Eigentum nicht anerkennen.

Abschließend soll, mit Bezug auf Otfried Höffes Rekonstruktion des Beispiels, aus den Implikationen der Begriffe "Habgier" und "Depositum" ein logischer Widerspruch abgeleitet werden.
Euthanasia in Psychiatry - A Case from Treatment Resistant Depression

Lovro Savic

Tragically, Schumann suffered from a profound and periodically recurring depression. So profound in fact, that he starved himself to death in an asylum, where he had insisted that he be placed after a failed suicide attempt. He had jumped into the Rhine River." (Graham 2010, 20)

After initial and long period of "atmosphere of pessimism" (Musto, David F 2009, 18) characteristic to 19th century psychiatry (and subsequently to Schumann's time), advances of (bio)medical sciences have enabled treatment of previously seemingly incurable illnesses, both physical and mental. Unfortunately, the same (bio)medical and pharmaceutical advances led to as disappointing conclusion that certain psychiatric illnesses rank significantly high on a epidemiological scales, still remain profound, recurring and resistant to known methods of treatment. Consequently, as it is the case with general (physical/bodily) medicine, psychiatry became confronted with a problem of psychiatric euthanasia and psychisian assisted suicide in psychiatry. The first med-
ical, academic and public discussion about the matter occurred as early as 1970s (Gevers and Legemaate 1998, 72). Since then, opinions and arguments against this kind of practice varied in a slight degree: some authors argued that bioethics of bodily medicine could be of little use in the context of psychiatric euthanasia (Burgess and Hawton 1998), or simply that provision of physician assisted suicide for psychiatric illness alone "would be unwise" (Kelly and McLoughlin 2002, 279). However, the debate was most recently reanimated with a Christopher’s Cowley's journal article Euthanasia in Psychiatry can never be justified. A reply to Wijsbek (Cowley 2013). In my talk I would like to stress certain shortcomings of his position. I will try to show that it rests on a false assumption about an essential difference between physical and mental disorders – prospect of improvement. Cowley's main claim can be put forward as follows:

P1) If there is a prospect of improvement, we should not resort to a provision of euthanasia and it is morally impermissible

P2) In the cases of certain severe physical illnesses there is no prospect of improvement and it is morally permissible

P3) In all cases of mental illness, there is a prospect of improvement by means of several kinds of therapeutic treatment

K4) Therefore, in certain cases of severe physical illness euthanasia is morally permissible

K5) Therefore, in the cases of mental illness, euthanasia is never morally permissible

In order to explicit potential shortcomings of Cowley's argument and his position in large, I will proceed as follows:

In the first part of the talk, I will try to show that difference in the prospect of improvement is not the essential difference between physical and mental illness. However, it can be regarded as important to a significant degree. Second, eventhough his article is a response to a certain case in a history of psychiatry, namely "Chabot Case", I will try to explicit certain ambiguities in his use of the terms (and universal claims) such as: "psychiatric euthanasia", "Chabot-style cases", "euthanasia in the cases of mental illness" and offer a rather different reading of his argument, but one worthy of respect. Finally, and most
importantly, with the reference to most recent studies and surveys in psychiatric practice, I will try to offer a counterexample to his premise about prospect of improvement – an example of treatment-resistant depression.

References:


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Biomedical Moral Enhancement – Reconstruction of an Argument

Stefan Schlag

In the debate on human enhancement it is not only discussed whether enhancement is morally permissible but also if it might be obligatory. The second question is even more appealing since the debate turned from cognitive capacities and emotional states to the enhancement of moral capacities. Accepted that for societies it is not only desirable but even necessary that citizens act morally, it is harder to counter an obligation to enhance with a reference to e.g. freedom.

Persson/Savulescu (2012) rearticulated an earlier argument in favour of moral bioenhancement (2008) by referring to some kind of political necessity. In their view, climate change can cause ultimate harm and has to be countered urgently. The required global cooperation depends essentially on altruism and a sense of justice. Only biomedical means might overcome the limitations of these core moral capacities timely. As a consequence, moral bioenhancement seems to be a necessary element of all efforts to solve the problem of climate change. Independently from conceptual issues and questions of technological feasibility, my paper will reconstruct and analyse Persson/Savulescu's argument that moral bioenhancement is politically imperative in more depth. Based on the very same assumptions about cooperation that Persson/Savulescu apply, I will show that moral enhancement is politically not feasible.

In a second step, the paper examines chances to rescue the argument using weaker assumptions. But construed in this way, the argument faces a different problem. If moral bioenhancement as proposed by Persson/Savulescu is politically feasible, it is either dispensable or, in a more disturbing way, it might threaten democratic values like epistemic modesty, respect for pluralism, autonomy and reasonable cooperation itself. Therefore, from a political philosophy perspective, biomedical moral enhancement cannot be the most desirable out of a set of feasible options.

References:

Reduktiver Anspruch und Bestätigung von Klimamodellen

Riske Manuel Schlüter

Die am besten ausgearbeiteten Modelle der Klimawissenschaften machen Vorhersagen über die Entwicklung globaler Größen, insbesondere der global gemittelten Temperatur. Klimamodelle werden aus zwei verschiedenen Quellen entwickelt: Sie werden zum einen aus bekannten physikalischen Theorien, etwa der Strömungsdynamik, konstruiert, zum anderen anhand von empirischen Daten entwickelt, die etwa dazu dienen Modellparameter zu bestimmen. Modellparameter werden auch dazu eingesetzt nicht im Detail modellierte Mechanismen per Parameter zu repräsentieren.

Dazu hat Paul Edwards festgestellt, dass die vornehmliche Entwicklung anhand von empirischen Daten nicht dem reduktiven Anspruch der physikalischen Wissenschaften entspreche. Dagegen, dass dies die
Stützung der Modelle gefährdet, hat Elisabeth Lloyd argumentiert, dass verschiedene Aspekte der Modelle einzeln überprüft werden können. Auf diese Weise könnten auch empirische Parametrisierungen auf ihre Adäquatheit überprüft werden.


Literatur:

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: German
Chair: Florian Fischer
Date: 10:45-11:15, September 5th, 2014 (Friday)
Location: HS 202

Riske Manuel Schlüter (Universität Münster, Germany)
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Logical and Mathematical Thought Experiments in Wittgenstein

Dorothee Schmitt

In my paper I would like to investigate the role that examples of deviant logical and mathematical practices play in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, specifically in the Philosophical Investigations and the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Two interconnected questions will constitute the focus of discussion: First, what exactly the function of these examples in Wittgenstein's argumentative strategy is – are they supposed to support a skeptical conclusion regarding logics and mathematics, akin to an application of Kripke's reading of the rule-following problem to these two domains, or are they employed to suggest a relativist (or even conventionalist) view of logics and mathematics? The second question addressed will be, whether Wittgenstein is, by his very use of these examples, committed to the claim that the language-games he is describing are conceivable and intelligible to us – or whether he could regard his descriptions of them as nonsense, as e.g. a Resolute Reading would have to suggest. It will be argued that only if the examples are held to be intelligible they can be interpreted as supporting a relativist or conventionalist view; if they are deemed nonsensical they can at most establish a purely negative skeptical conclusion.

Section: History of Analytic Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Johannes Grössl
Date: 11:15-11:45, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 202

Dorothee Schmitt (University of Bonn, Germany)
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This lecture will make detailed review of Wittgenstein’s "fideism". Fideism claims that (religious and ethical) belief cannot be expressed by rationality. Wittgenstein claims that he is not able to understand religious sentiments 'my normal technique of language leaves me' (Wittgenstein 1966: 55). Sentiments are unspeakable in the meaning that language should present only facts. Belief and moral sentiments are supernatural therefore it is not possible putting them in logical structures of a sentence.

I will present three counter arguments against Wittgenstein’s religious philosophy,

1. I claim the falseness of Wittgenstein’s argument belief and ethics cannot be expressed. If that would be true, one could not speak about feelings with each other, which are belief and ethics. The ultimate appeal of Wittgenstein to not speak is impossible as in practice, one cannot forbid oneself to communicate only with rationality.

2. arguing with communitarist Michael Sandel that the ethical "good" needs to be discussed to develop one scheme of life in a civil society. If everybody stops discussing about belief and ethics as Wittgenstein claims, we could not discuss his about aims of a good life and his belief we can never find out if other people believe in the same which can create a much stronger form of believing as alone.

3. Wittgenstein thinks, that the absolute good – the highest form of ethics and religion - has to be supernatural. I argue, that religion and ethics cannot be solemnly supernatural, as they determine our way of behaving in practical life. While leading our life we aim at a certain imagination of the notion "good". What we think is good is demonstrated in our daily actions, therefore ethics or religion always becomes manifested in the reality and is not only supernatural. Regardless of our own subjective aims of what is good or not, there is a "absolute" good common to all humans which is the avoidance of violence.

Section: Philosophy of Religion
Language: English
Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher
Date: 17:30-18:00, September 4th, 2014 (Thursday)
Location: HS 203
'The number of Jupiter's moons is four' as a Higher-Order Identity Statement

Robert Schwartzkopff

In par.57 of Grundlagen, Frege famously proposed that a sentence like

A  The number of Jupiter's moons is four.

be analysed as a first-level identity statement, i.e. as a sentence in which 'the number of moons of Jupiter' and the numeral 'four' function as singular referring expressions and 'is' expresses first-level identity aka identity between objects. Recent years have seen the advent of anti-Fregean analyses of (A) who are united in the claim that 'four' in (A) is not a referring expression but rather has the same, non-referring semantic function as it has in:

B  Jupiter has four moons.

One of the advantages of these anti-Fregean analyses is their ability to subserve a straightforward semantic explanation of the apparent equivalence of (A) and (B) that is blocked by the Fregean analysis.
In my talk, I explore the possibility of a novel kind of anti-Fregean analysis. It will be argued that (A) is a second-level identity statement in which 'the number of Jupiter's moons' and 'four' are first-level expressions and 'is' expresses second-level identity aka identity between first-level concepts. In particular, it will be argued that 'the number Jupiter's moons' is a first-level definite description that accordingly denotes a first-level concept. My argument will be based on three claims. First, that 'four' in (B) is certain first-level expression, viz.a predicate much like say, 'volcanic' in 'Jupiter has volcanic moons'. Second, that a phrase like 'an even number of ' as it occurs in a sentence like, for instance:

\[
(C \text{ Jupiter has an even number of moons.})
\]

is a complex third-level non-nominal quantifier, standing in the position of a numeral such as 'four' in (B), in which 'number (of)' is a second-level predicate which applies to numbers conceived of as first-level concepts. Third, that as used in (A), the semantic function of 'number (of)' is intimately related to the one it has in (B). After having defended these claims and developed my analysis in more detail, I will close with briefly comparing it to its extant anti-Fregean alternatives and argue that it is a viable alternative.

**Robert Schwartzkopff** (University of Hamburg/Oxford, Germany)


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Der Traum der abbildenden Vernunft gebiert Ungeheuer. Trugwahrnehmungen als (vermeintliches) Argument für repräsentationalistische Theorien des Geistes

Michael Siegel


In diesem Zusammenhang werden von Repräsentationalisten häufig Trugwahrnehmungen wie Träume oder Halluzinationen als Argument in Anschlag gebracht (vgl. u.a. Prinz 2013 und Lycan 2013). Demnach können (Fehl-)Wahrnehmungen, die ohne äußere Ursache ebenso reichhaltig seien wie tatsächliche Wahrnehmungen, nur dadurch erklärt werden, dass wir uns die Welt eben nicht unmittelbar vergegenwärtigen, sondern in Form mentaler (und manchmal eben falscher) Abbilder.

Der Vortrag nimmt diese Gemengelage zum Anlass, das in der Philosophie des Geistes durchaus nicht neue Halluzinationen-Argument zu untersuchen und infrage zu stellen. Demnach bilden diese keine tragfähige Grundlage um einen methodischen Solipsismus zu rechtfertigen. Vielmehr werden wir durch entsprechende Settings überhaupt erst in eine epistemologische Zuschauerrolle gezwungen, in der es dann in der Tat nicht länger möglich ist zwischen Sein und Schein zu unterscheiden.

Relativ offensichtlich ist dies im Fall von Träumen, wo die enaktivistische Grundannahme, Wahrnehmungen würden erst durch motorische Fähigkeiten zu solchen, nicht greifen kann. Ähnliches lässt sich aber auch im Bezug auf Halluzinationen zeigen. Faktisch sind diejenigen Halluzinationen, die für psychisch Kranke Realitätscharakter haben, überwiegend akustische – und diese bieten, wie Strawson (1972) gezeigt hat, unter Absehung von Einzeldingen in der Tat keine stabile Basis für unser Begriffssystem.
Remarks on What is Structural in Logic

Vlasta Sikimic

In (Gentzen 1969), Gentzen introduced the sequent calculus for the technical purpose of providing constructive consistency proofs using the cut elimination theorem. The novelty of his sequent calculus was differentiation between operational and structural rules, where structural rules are about manipulation of structures inside a proof. Paradigmatic structural rules are actually the identity axiom, weakening, contraction, permutation and cut rules. Our strong intuition is that structural rules of logic are more basic than operational ones. The main contribution in the research of structural rules is the so-called Došen's principle (Došen 1988). Namely, by adding or subtracting structural rules one can obtain different substructural logics. In this fashion intuitionistic logic can be defined by restricting all sequents to the single-conclusion sequents, linear logic by subtracting both weakening and contraction rules, affine logic by subtracting contraction, etc.

The methodological question arising in modern proof theory is whether there might be more candidates for structural rules and ways
of defining the structural part of logic. One attempt of defining more structural connectives for the sake of modularity is Belnap's display calculus (Belnap 1982) together with its current enrichments with syntactic types (Greco et al. 2014) for the purpose of capturing the whole space of dynamic logics, which belong to non-standard substructural logics.

The question of defining the structural part of logic is relevant both for the fundamental philosophical questions of understanding what logic is and for the methodological questions of evaluating different proof systems. In the talk we will introduce the historical development of the structural rules in logic and contrast it with a multi-type display calculus; conjecturing that the answer to the question of what is structural in logic, lies in the variety of methodological purposes that different proof systems have.

References:


Section: Logic
Language: English
Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger
Date: 14:45-15:15, September 6th, 2014 (Saturday)
Location: HS 202

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Conventional versus Temporally Maximal Four-Dimensionalism

Mattia Sorgon

Perdurance theory claims that material objects are four-dimensional concrete entities which perdure through time by having different temporal parts. Therefore four-dimensionalism assumes that an object, called also an occurrent, is a 4-D worm composed by the mereological sum of all its own temporal parts, one for each time at which it exists.

Following these assumptions, this theory is able to solve the main metaphysical puzzles related to the problem of change attributing two different and incompatible properties to two different temporal parts and identifying a single object as the sum of the two parts. Nevertheless, this theory shows two different versions that differ about the notion of "sum of temporal parts": the conventional four-dimensionalism (Quine (1976), Sidelle (1989), Heller (1990), Hudson (2001, 2006)) and the temporally maximal four-dimensionalism (Hawley (2001)).

The first account claims that any sum of temporal parts is an occurrent. In that way this view assumes a conventional notion of material object: according to which sum of temporal parts we are focusing on, we can identify a different object. Since every sum of temporal parts identifies an object, every occurrent can hence be a proper part of a more extended one. The second account claims instead that a sum of temporal parts, in order to be identified as an occurrent, must satisfy the principle of temporal maximization, which states that a proper temporal part of an occurrent cannot be an occurrent itself. Thus, this view rejects the conventional notion of material object to assume a more specific formulation of what is a 4-D worm: only a temporally maximal sum of temporal parts can be identified as an object. Since only the complete (in temporal terms) sum of temporal parts is an object, we cannot identify an occurrent in any mereological sum but we have to focus only on the larger sums.

The aim of this talk is to compare these two versions of perdurance theory in order to show the problems entailed by the temporally maximal view and to argue consequently in favor of the conventional view. Through the appeal of the thought experiment of "Lara's amphora" (Varzi (2001)), it will be pointed out that the temporally maximal sums
need a sortal criterion and the assumption of sortal 4-D worms in order to be composed. Finally, this talk will conclude claiming that only the conventional version of four-dimensionalism is able to solve the problems of persistence referring exclusively to the theory's assumptions and avoiding the reference to other external elements.

References:

Counterfactual Reasoning

Benjamin Sparkes

The difficulties in explaining which properties of the world are relevant when making counterfactual assumptions are well known. The paper opens with a variation on the Jones scenario from (3) which illustrates the complexity of this task, and serves as a counterexample to a number of well-known theories, such as Kratzer (1) and Lewis (2). Veltman (3) discusses the latter, and I offer a polemic against the former in the paper. The theory of Veltman (3) is a notable exception. However, I present a simple, but decisive, counterexample to Veltman's theory through a small change to the scenario.

This establishes the ground for a new approach to the problem of counterfactuals.

I develop an epistemological analysis of counterfactual reasoning, this leaves the semantic underpinnings aside, and focuses on the role of inferential rules.

The approach of the paper focuses on the acceptability, and not the truth conditions, of counterfactuals. Still, the theory has a significant semantic parallel, for it builds on the basic idea of premise semantics (1, 3) by determining a 'premise set' from which maximal subsets consistent with the antecedent of a counterfactual can be derived, and against which the consequent can be tested.

The central argument of the paper is that laws and facts are the essential determiners in this process, and the original argument of the paper focuses on the role of laws and how these are understood from an inferential point of view. I give a precise formalisation of the position argued for through a series of definitions which determine a system for analysing counterfactuals, which is shown to be adequate for a variety of scenarios found in the literature.

References:


Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Farbod Akhlaghi-Ghaffarokh
Date: 10:45-11:15, September 5th, 2014 (Friday)
Location: HS 302

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Against Continuous and Topological Versions of Sorites Paradoxes

Jan Štěpánek

All sorites paradoxes formulated up to present time are formulated in a discrete environment – i.e., these paradoxes are based on either adding or removing small, yet discrete elements like grains, hairs or millimetres. Mark Colyvan and Zach Weber in their 2010 article "A Topological Sorites" propose a few versions of the sorites paradox which are formulated in a cohesive environment. They consider their version, so called topological sorites, to be the most general version of the sorites paradox. In my critical reaction to their paper I will defend two standpoints. First I will provide arguments in favour of a claim that the most general version of the sorites paradox cannot be the topological version, which is loosely based on a mathematical induction, but it is in fact the conditional version. Secondly I will show that while Colyvan and Weber tried to present new versions of the sorites paradox, paradoxes proposed by them cannot be counted as sorites paradoxes.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Robert Schwartzkopff
Date: 16:45-17:15, September 4th, 2014 (Thursday)
Location: HS 302

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Does The Zombie Argument Depend on The Content of Concepts?

Dávid Gábor Such

David Chalmers's argument against physicalism relies on the premise that zombies are possible, that is such creatures, which are indiscernible from normal humans in their physical aspects, yet they don't have phenomenal experiences. The possibility of zombies threatens the physicalist supervenience thesis, namely that every mental fact are metaphysically determined by physical facts. However, the intuition according to which everything that is conceivable is also possible has been called into question by a bunch of semantical considerations. If Kripkean semantical approach is sound, mere conceiving is not a reliable guide to possibility; according to a famous example it is conceivable that water is not H2O, but it is not possible metaphysically. Chalmers's answer to this problem is the introduction of the two-dimensional semantics, which states that if the primary intensions (the a priori knowable reference fixing description) of the terms coincide with their secondary intensions (the reference which remains constant in every possible world) in a statement, those statements are immune to such dissociation of conceivability and possibility. He claims that by both phenomenal concepts like pain, and theoretical concepts like H2O this coincidence holds. H2O characterizes a property which is defined by a chemical description, and it is not possible that something else, which is not H2O can fill the role of H2O, contrasted with "water", where something else what is not water (e.g. XYZ) could fill the role of water. Or it is only conceivable when structural monism (aka Russellian monism) is true.

In my presentation I would claim that although it is plausible in the case of phenomenal concepts, by theoretical concepts it is on the contrary: to formulate empirical concepts we should retain some kind of discrepancy between what can be incorporated into the reference fixing description and the actual process of reference picking.
Metaphor and Method – Wittgenstein's Concept of Therapy

Peter Tarras

Expressions like 'illness', 'confusion', 'uneasiness', 'treatment', 'therapy' and so on – i.e. expressions belonging to the lexical fields of medicine and psychology - recur repeatedly throughout Ludwig Wittgenstein's work since the 1930s. He uses this therapeutic vocabulary almost exclusively in the context of metaphysical reflections or, more precisely, in the context of reflections about the activity of philosophizing: "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness". But how exactly are we to understand such remarks?

By now, characterizing this or that aspect of Wittgenstein's thought as therapeutic has become a common place within secondary literature. In contrast, attempts of making his concept of therapy itself an object of analysis are scarce. Moreover, even though some interpreters admit the
metaphorical nature of Wittgensteinian therapy, the methodological background of using figurative language has hitherto been neglected concerning this matter.

In this talk, I argue that Wittgensteinian therapy is what G. Lakoff and M. Johnsen have termed a "structural metaphor". Structural metaphors are correspondences between two conceptual domains. A conceptual domain is a (cognitive or linguistic) representation of our knowledge of any coherent segment of experience. In cognitive linguistics, conceptual domains are models for concepts. By mapping one conceptual domain onto the other we obtain an understanding of one concept in terms of the other. Normally, concepts that make up the target domain of structural metaphors are more abstract and apart from experience than those, which make up the source domain.

I shall argue that Wittgenstein uses the more familiar concept of therapy to structure the more abstract concept of philosophy. I will exemplarily base my analysis on the therapeutic vocabulary to be found in the first part of the Philosophical Investigations. Moreover, I try to show that the use of figurative language is part of Wittgenstein's specific methodology of using pictoral devices. Especially, when it comes to metaphilosophy this methodology plays a prominent role.
On Deferential Concepts

Julia Telles de Menezes

In the dispute about metaphysics of the mind, some physicalists mobilize phenomenal concepts in order to respond to anti-physicalist arguments such as the Knowledge Argument (Jackson 1982). Those physicalists accept the epistemic premise of the knowledge argument, the premise that states a gap between physical and phenomenal domains. Nonetheless they hold the existence of a conceptual gap and instead an ontological (as the dualists wish to conclude). This is the phenomenal concept strategy (Stoljar 2005). This strategy consists in distinguishing between two kinds of concepts: phenomenal and physical concepts. Phenomenal concepts are essentially different from physical concepts. Although they are essentially different, both denote physical properties. Such difference is what should solve the physicalist-dualist quarrel, according to phenomenal concept strategists. The difference between those two kind of concepts relies on the fact that phenomenal concepts have special possession conditions: A subject must undergo the appropriate experience in order to acquire some phenomenal concept C. A blind sighted person cannot possess color concepts unless he has had color experiences. The phenomenal concept strategy consists of two steps, one is to say that phenomenal concepts conceptually independent from physical concepts and the other one is to ground this difference into special possession conditions: One needs to undergo the appropriate experience in order to possess the concept.

I want to defend the phenomenal concept strategy against a well-known objection posed by Michael Tye and Derek Ball. Ball and Tye think that phenomenal concepts hold no special feature vis-a-vis physical concepts, they attack the experience thesis intending to deflationate the phenomenal concept strategy. Ball and Tye want to show that phenomenal concepts have deferential possession conditions by applying social externalism thesis (originally developed by Tyler Burge) to analyze phenomenal concepts.

Social Externalism thesis: It is possible to possess a concept not solely in virtue of one's intrinsic properties but also in virtue of relations to one's linguistic community.

Of course a blind sighted person might be able to exercise color
concept in his thoughts by, for example, ascribing color-experiences to someone who is not blind. Of course his conception of red is impoverished. But to possess an impoverished conception of C does not mean that one lacks C. It means that the subject defers to experts regarding the extension of terms one uses. As it happens, we do defer most of our ordinary concepts. The general idea is that I can possess some concept C even if my conception of c is impoverished. I can possess the concept of ELECTRON, but as I do not know much about physics, I usually defer to experts regarding the concept's extension. This alone contradicts the experience thesis. If the experience thesis is false, then there is no special feature of phenomenal concepts, then the phenomenal concept strategy fails. Tye and Ball's argument:

1. If a concept C is deferential, S can possess C even if C is only partially understood.

2. If S can possess C even if C is only partially understood, it’s not necessary to undergo the relevant experiences to possess C.

3. All phenomenal concepts PCs are deferential.

4. C. It's not necessary to undergo the relevant experiences for S to possess any PCs

If it is not necessary to undergo the appropriate experience in order to possess concepts about experience, then there is no difference between phenomenal concepts and physical concepts, so the strategy fails.

I argue in this presentation that phenomenal concepts cannot be deferential. First, we have full authority of knowing in which state we are, in this sense, it is highly implausible that some expert on pain, say, a doctor, might be able to correct us on that matter. Second, a few observations on how the reference of those concepts are fixed promise to make impossible for phenomenal concepts like PAIN to have a deferential use. Concepts about conscious experience, such as our concept of pain, refer to its extensions not via its contingent properties but via its essential properties. Contrary to other physical concepts, such as water. We know through Kripke that the reference of water (H2O) is fixed via its contingent properties, that is, its superficial features, such as being odorless, clear, fills river and lakes etc. And because it is fixed via contingent properties, we can be mistaken about its reference. Because it is fixed via contingent properties there is a possibility
of a misconception of such concepts. But with pain-cases there is no possibility of being mistaken about its reference. Because pain is an immediate phenomenal property, there is no possibility of possessing such a concept but a deeply impoverished conception of such concept. What would be the impoverished conception that allows us to poorly deploy the concept of "pain"? My aim in this paper to point which difference in versions of phenomenal concept strategy yields different results and which is better suited to address the special features of phenomenal concepts.

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Representations and Sensorimotor Explanation

Alfredo Vernazzani

The sensorimotor approach to vision and visual perception stands out as one of the prominent theories in vision research. According to the sensorimotor approach, vision would not rely on internally generated representations of the external world. Vision would be constituted by the skillful exercise of the sensorimotor contingencies determined by both the organism's motor reactions and changes in distal stimuli. Accordingly, Alva Noë and Kevin O'Regan maintain that visual perception is non-representational in character. However, a closer reading of their work will show that Noë and O'Regan seem to accept the existence of representations. Hence, how should we make sense of the claim that vision does not rely on representations? In short, my thesis is that Noë and O'Regan have not provided arguments against representations. What is at stake is the explanatory role of representations within the sensorimotor theory. I therefore try to unearth what kind of explanation is provided by the sensorimotor account, and show that it implicitly relies on a form of covering law model.

Sensorimotor contingencies are of two kinds: the first kind is sensory specific, whilst the second kind is feature specific. Both of them obey a set of sense-specific "laws" (laws specific to the sense of vision) which, correspondingly, are of two kinds. Since the sensorimotor laws determine the sensorimotor contingencies, to explain vision means to show how a sensorimotor reaction follows from a set of given sensorimotor laws. This characteristic seems to legitimate a covering-law model interpretation of sensorimotor explanation. Yet, there are two consequences with this sort of interpretation: firstly, it generates the question of the role of representations within the cognitive system; secondly, it leaves out the problem of how sensorimotor reactions are effectively triggered.

I discuss two examples of sensorimotor laws, and show that what Noë and O'Regan define as "laws" are actually better described as mechanisms. A mechanistic reading of the sensorimotor contingencies help us solving the two problems mentioned in the foregoing discussion. Firstly, representations are included as explanatory relevant; secondly, the mechanistic reading provides a better account of how sensorimotor responses are triggered.
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Forking and Nonforking worlds: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Robyn Repko Waller & Russell Lawrence Waller

The aim of this paper is to challenge libertarian accounts of free will. Libertarianism is the conjunction of incompatibilism and the claim that free will exists. Incompatibilists hold that if determinism is true of a world, then no one ever acts freely in that world. In particular, most incompatibilists require indeterminism in a particular location in the action-production process – at the time at which an agent decides what to do (or a suitable earlier time at which the agent decided what to do) – in order for an agent to have ever acted freely. In this paper, we discuss the intuitive picture that the future is a garden of forking paths and its relation to the libertarian conception of the ability to do otherwise. Here we define the notions of forking and nonforking worlds. Using these notions, we establish that there is an irreconcilable tension between the way in which philosophers motivate the libertarian ability to do otherwise and the
way in which they formally express it: The future as a garden of forking paths involves forking worlds, possible worlds that have a last point of coincidence. In contrast, according to the requirement of libertarian alternative possibilities as popularly formulated, the relevant possible worlds are non-forking – have a first point of noncoincidence. Given that libertarians (and incompatibilists more broadly) cannot maintain a commitment to both conceptions of alternative possibilities, we outline each potential incompatibilist option. We argue that neither a purely non-forking model of libertarian (basically) free decision making nor a purely forking model of libertarian free decision making is without major flaws. We do not claim that indeterminism simpliciter is incompatible with free will, but rather that any libertarian account that requires that an agent have (indeterminism-involving) alternative possibilities at the point of a basically free action fails.

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Was ist eigentlich eine Handlungsmöglichkeit?

Matthias Warkus


Dieser Vortrag möchte im Anschluss an das handlungstheoretische Erbe des amerikanischen Pragmatismus und des Erlanger Konstruktivismus einen Definitionsvorschlag für das Wort "Handlungsmöglichkeit" machen, der nicht nur in trivialen Fällen zugkräftig ist und der ohne modalrealistische Kunstgriffe auskommt.

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Location: HS 203

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Does a Sapiential Dimension of Science Exist? Some Remarks on Nicholas Maxwell's Conception of a New Paradigm of Doing Science

Konrad Zaborowski

In this article, I present the conception of the paradigm of doing science developed by Nicholas Maxwell, who for nearly thirty years taught philosophy of science at University College London, and where he is Emeritus Reader in Philosophy of Science now. Nicholas Maxwell's conception is the proposal to change paradigm of doing science. This change of the paradigm should consist in the transition from science focusing on the acquisition of knowledge to science aiming at the acquisition of wisdom. The starting point of the project is an empirical observation. Modern science has found itself in a strange position: it is seen at the same time as a benefactor, and as a mortal threat. On the one hand we admire the triumphal march of science – its great achievements, great discoveries and increased use in various areas of human life (by way of examples taken from the journal Science: the role of junk DNA, precision cosmology, water on Mars, gene therapy, microbiome of human). On the other hand science is constantly subjected to criticism, even to the point that one speaks about a crisis of trust in science. Reasons for this criticism are different – from the claim that too much resources are directed to science when compared to benefits gained from research, to the fear that the technoscientific progress threatens personal and social values, and even the existence of humankind. Although no one suggests to stop science, harmonizing its further development with the elimination of negative effects, and even supporting humanistic and social values is sometimes seen as one of the greatest challenges of our time. This article shows Maxwell's detailed position on the place of wisdom in the paradigm of doing science.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Florian Fischer
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In Search of the Holy Grail of Epistemology

Paweł Zięba

Duncan Pritchard describes his epistemological disjunctivism as "the holy grail of epistemology, in that it is offering a bona fide internalist conception of knowledge which is able to nonetheless allow that the rational support that one's belief enjoys can be genuinely truth-connected and thus skeptic-proof" (Pritchard, 2009). What the "holy grail" metaphor means here is that the acceptance of epistemological disjunctivism would bring the internalism-externalism debate to an end, thanks to satisfaction of intuitions standing behind both sides.
According to epistemological disjunctivism, there is a fundamental difference between two subjectively indistinguishable experiences, one of which is a perception, and the other is a hallucination. Only perception equips the subject with an epistemic justification that is both factive (externalist intuition) and reflectively accessible (internalist intuition). Hallucination cannot serve as a source of such justification, even if its phenomenal character is exactly the same (Pritchard, 2012).

Simultaneously, Pritchard decidedly emphasizes that embracing epistemological disjunctivism does not commit him to metaphysical disjunctivism (Pritchard, 2012). He refers to a group of authors (Byrne & Logue, 2008; Millar, 2007; Snowdon, 2005) who argue that epistemological disjunctivism is compatible with the causal theory of perception – a theory that stands in contradiction with metaphysical disjunctivism.

However, the theoretical construction merging epistemological disjunctivism with causal theory of perception shoves our understanding of epistemic justification from the "golden mean" to the externalist side of the debate and hides the "holy grail" from us. This is why I argue that the only way to get the "holy grail" is to ground epistemological disjunctivism in its metaphysical counterpart. It is true that both claims do not imply each other. Nonetheless, only the assumption that an object perceived is a constituent of a perceptual experience can plausibly motivate the claim that such experience endues the subject with an epistemic justification that is externally grounded and reflectively accessible at the same time.

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