SOPhiA 2017

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Immunity to Error through Misidentification and Episodic Memory
(Philosophy of Mind, German)

I will discuss whether first-person past-tense judgments based on episodic memory are immune to error through misidentification (IEM). To answer this question I start giving a brief overview of the discussion of IEM mostly focusing on Sydney Shoemakers account. Shoemaker was first to introduce the notion of IEM in 'Self-Reference and Self-Awareness' in 1968, mostly to shed a light on Wittgenstein's distinction between uses of 'I as object' and 'I as subject'. But if we have a closer look at first-person past-tense judgments based on episodic memory, it is not clear whether they are immune as well. Shoemaker concludes in his paper ''Persons and their past'' (1970) that the possibility of quasi-memory shows that first-person judgments based on memories are not immune to error through misidentification - at least they are not necessarily immune.
After presenting a brief overview of Shoemaker's argument, I want to add some critical remarks mostly held by Gareth Evans (1982) and McDowell (1997), who both criticize that it is not necessary for quasi-memory to causally originate in a property that is the subject's own. Last but not least I want to question how intuitive the notion of quasi-memory is.

Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Time: 12:25-12:55, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004

Jessica Struchhold 
(University of Düsseldorf, Germany)

Jessica Struchhold is a master's student at the Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany. She finished her B.A. in 2016 with a major in Philosophy and a minor in German Literature. Her thesis was about Jerry Fodor's Language of Thought Hypothesis.

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