SOPhiA 2017

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Conflict-Undermining Anti-Skeptical Strategies
(Epistemology, English)

Common sense has it that everyday empirical knowledge is abundant. The skeptic, in contrast, claims to have arguments to the effect that we cannot have such knowledge. In recent years, a number of semantic strategies have emerged, seeking to reconcile both views. Their advocates claim to be able to undermine the apparent conflict between common sense and skeptical argument, resulting in a no-fault view. In particular, variantist proposals such as contextualism and contrastivism have been advanced in this spirit. In my talk, I will inquire whether genuinely conflict-undermining strategies are available for a closure-based skepticism which denies that we can have any epistemic reasons for believing the denials of skeptical hypotheses. I shall give a negative answer. For conflict-undermining strategies generally collapse into revisionary strategies. In conclusion, I will outline the consequences that this finding has on the dialectical status of variantist proposals as anti-skeptical strategies.

Chair: Franziska Poprawe
Time: 15:40-16:10, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005

Max Timo Goetsch 
(Freie Universität Berlin, Germany)

Max Timo Goetsch is a graduate student of philosophy in the master's program at Free University Berlin. He holds a bachelor's degree in philosophy and linguistics from Albert-Ludwigs University Freiburg. Main areas of interest include epistemology (the analysis of understanding, skepticism, hinge epistemology), meta-epistemology (epistemic relativism and absolutism), as well as applied epistemology (especially, the analysis of expertise) and its connections to political theory (epistemic justification of democracy).

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