SOPhiA 2017

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Closest Cases of Particularism: Moral Luck Disqualified
(Ethics, English)

Pair cases of moral luck (Levy 2015, 1) are essential to form the problem of moral luck. It has been argued that the existence of moral luck is against the principle stating that ''two people ought not to be morally assessed differently if the only other differences between them are due to factors beyond their control'' -- Control Principle-Corollary (Nelkin 2013). Similarly, Zimmerman, a leading figure of the moral luck debate writes that ''Georg would have freely killed Henrik but for some feature of the case over which he had no control. This being so, it seems that we must conclude here, as before, that Georg is as culpable as George.'' (Zimmerman 2002, 565) Traditional pair cases of moral luck are very much alike sharing all morally significant features except the luck factor. Moral particularism is the view that bounds morally similar cases and so ascribes moral judgment in accordance with the similarity that holds between cases (Dancy, 2004, 2013). Instead of the traditional pair cases of moral luck, I am going to argue, the particularist framework offers pair cases that are closer pairs (than the traditional moral luck cases). If this is right, the traditional pair cases of moral luck cannot be formed in accordance with particularism.

Chair: Katharina Anna Sodoma
Time: 15:40-16:10, 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007

Zsolt Ziegler 
(Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary)

Zsolt Ziegler a Research Assistant in the Department of Philosophy and History of Science at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics/Eötvös Loránd University where he has been a faculty member since 2010. Zsolt first completed his MA studies at University of Miskolc, then was a visiting student at University of Tortonto, after returning Hungary, he graduated at the Central European University. He also completed his studies at the doctoral school of Philosophy and History of Science at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics. Now he is a phd candidate and expected to receive his phd in summer 2017. His research interests lie in the area of free will and responsibility, ranging from theories of decision and rationality to general meta-ethical questions. His teaching experience has covered the following courses; Institutional Communication, Communication Skill Development, Techniques of Persuasion, Philosophy, Social Psychology -- The Social Animal, Epistemology.

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