SOPhiA 2017

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Invalidating strategies of dealing with Chisholm's Paradox
(Metaphysics and Ontology, English)

Could my wooden table have been a golden table? If we have no principle to rule out a couple of possibilities, then virtually anything could have been anything else. This is what seems to be made clear by so-called "Chisholm's Paradox" which does not set up any restriction among de re possibilities interpreted by standard Kripke-style semantics for modal logic. Thinking about my wooden table, one restricted version Chisholm's paradox arises from the fact that we may be in a position to hold both i) the very same table could have been made of a slightly different hunk of wood and ii) the very same table could not have been made of a hunk of wood which does not overlap the original one at all. One interesting (and maybe underappreciated) way of dealing with the paradox is trying to look closer at the logic surrounding it. Supposing that we cannot accept the conclusion of Chisholm's paradox and we do acknowledge its premises as true, then only one sort of strategy is available: to try to demonstrate that there is something going wrong with the logic which recognizes the paradoxical argument as valid. The infamous logic underlying the paradox is the first-order modal logic with standard semantics for S5. Although there might not be so many of us willing to give up on first-order modal logic, that was exactly what both Forbes and Salmon have proposed. Two completely different implementations have been advanced by each one, so one of the main aims of this talk will be to evaluate which strategy might be the most the successful. On the one hand, Forbes' strategy is a mix of counterpart theory and many-valued modal logic. On the other hand, Salmon's strategy rejects transitivity on the relationship between possible worlds. Neither Forbes nor Salmon provide a simple solution but that was already known. So, let us check which one is the most plausible solution.

Chair: Tomi Francis
Time: 10:00-10:30, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003

Fernando Furtado 
(University of Lisbon, Portugal)

Fernando Furtado is a Brazilian young philosopher currently enjoying the beauty of living in Lisbon. He got his MA degree in philosophy at the Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil, in 2014, the same year that he joined the LanCong Group at the University of Lisbon and started his Ph.D research under the guidance of Professor João Branquinho. His Ph.D dissertation is focussed on issues related to modal metaphysics, mainly the relationship between logics and modality. Although Fernando is currently working on metaphysics, he is also interested in many different subjects in analytic philosophy. His main published works so far are "Quem Sabe Outra Hora" and "Teorias da Referência e Resposta Histórico-causal aos Contra-exemplos de Donnellan". And he has the forthcoming papers waited for the current year "Explicação Pré-semântica das Descrições Referenciais" and "Modal Paradox". Fernando has been working to increase popularity of analytic philosophy among Portuguese speakers community through his actions as a member of both Brazilian Society for Analytic Philosophy and Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy.

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