SOPhiA 2017

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Notes on Kripke's Puzzle about Belief
(Philosophy of Language, English)

On one hand, Kripke (1979) holds that the puzzle about belief challenges our common practices of belief ascription, since they lead us to ascribing contradictory beliefs to an agent that, in fact, lacks such beliefs. On the other hand, Salmon (2011) argues that our practices of belief ascription are correct, so we have to accept that the agent, Pierre, has contradictory beliefs. I consider the possibility that the practices are correct, but incorrectly applied (to Pierre). Using the principles employed by Kripke in his formulation of the puzzle, I derive the only belief that Pierre could not have. The conclusion of my paper is that if the principles are correctly applied, then they are flawed, and if they are correct, then they are incorrectly applied. Either way, Pierre does not have contradictory beliefs.

Chair: Till Gallasch
Time: 14:35-15:05, 15 September 2017 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005

Rares Fogas 
(University of Bucharest, Romania)

I am a third-year undergraduate student of philosophy from the University of Bucharest, writing my B.A. thesis on what I call the two 'dogmas' one can encounter in Kripke's philosophy of language. My interests are mainly in the area of theoretical philosophy, especially philosophy of language, Early Analytic Philosophy and philosophy of science. For the next two years of graduate studies I plan to advance with regard to philosophy of physics in general and history of philosophy (Kant, Frege, Carnap, Quine and Wittgenstein).

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