SOPhiA 2018

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Knowing What one is Doing -- An Argument for the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasons
(Epistemology, English)

Are there epistemic norms for practical reasons? That is, do I need justification or even knowledge for my beliefs about what reasons I have in order to be (fully) rational? The debate concerning epistemic conditions for practical reasons gives a positive answer to these questions, but disagrees over which epistemic norm is the correct one.
In this talk I argue for the knowledge norm with respect to practical reasons. I propose a further consideration in favour of the knowledge norm as opposed to (various forms of) the justification norm. The central idea connects the knowledge norm, practical knowledge, and action guidance.
The knowledge norm is supported by the following idea: Rationality requires of us to be efficacious, to be effective in pursuing our ends. We act in order to bring about our desired ends. The successful completion of action requires that we take control of our movements, that is, action guidance. A central aspect of action guidance is that we are epistemically well attuned to our immediate practical situation. That is, we need to track the facts pertinent to the success of our actions. Among those facts we need to track is whether we act, what action we perform, and why we do it. I argue that anything less then knowledge of these facts does not have the features required by action guidance in order to achieve stably successful completion of actions.

Chair: Robert Pal
Time: 10:00-10:30, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004

Paul Tucek 
(University of Vienna, Austria)

I am a member of the Vienna Forum of Analytic Philosophy. My main interest in philosophy concern matters of practical rationality and metaethics.

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