SOPhiA 2018

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Skepticism and the Closure of Knowledge -- What are the Possible Objections to the Skeptical Challenge?
(Epistemology, English)

Skepticism about the external world is an ancient criticism of our ordinary knowledge. The skeptical challenge has evolved over the time and was able to always be a threat for the term 'knowledge' used in ordinary circumstances. As most philosophers defend themselves against this critique, a lot of different strategies were used to avoid Skepticism, while being plausible the strategies were still not able to rule out the skeptical challenge conclusively. This paper demonstrates how the skeptical challenge, which uses the closure principle, works and what the possible responses could be. It should give an insight how philosophers have tried to reject fundamental premises of the Skeptic's argumentation. Even if the skeptical challenge does look like its issue can not be fixed, because the plausible premises create an antinomy, it shows that, including the Skeptics reasoning, four premises are able to be refuted. Dretske is introduced as one example for rejecting the closure principle by establishing heavyweight implications. Chalmers on the other hand uses the idea of stages of reality to oppose that the Brain-in-a-Vat-scenario implies that our perceived world is not real. As the examples show this does not seem to be impossible, but maybe changes some fundamentals about our term 'knowledge', what can be known or our relation to the external world as such.

Chair: Wout Bisschop
Time: 14:00-14:30, 12 September 2018 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.004

Frenzis Herbert Scheffels 
(Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany)

Frenzis H. Scheffels B.A. is a master student of Philosophy at the Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf. His research interests are mostly in Epistemology, Ontology, Ethics and Methodology of Thought Experiments.

Testability and Meaning deco