SOPhiA 2018

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

SOPhiA ToolsDE-pageEN-page

Programme - Talk

Does True Belief entail Knowledge?
(Epistemology, English)

Mahdi Ranaee offers a counterexample to Timothy Williamson's conjecture that knowing is the most general factive stative attitude. He criticises two counterexamples offered by Ernest Sosa and Baron Reed based on Williamson's own remarks and argues that his counterexample is immune to that objection. In this paper, however, I argue that this counterexample is an unnecessary detour and his response to Williamson's objection can be used equally forcefully both by Sosa and Reed. Pressing the argument against Williamson's objection, however, I try to show that the problem in Williamson's account is much deeper than what both Sosa and Reed anticipated. That is, Williamson has to abandon either his Distinct Concepts Argument (DCA) in favour of the unanalysability of knowledge, or his abovementioned conjecture.

Chair: Jakob Eichler
Time: 14:40-15:10, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004

Mahdi Ranaee 
(University of Potsdam, Germany)

I come from Hamedna, Iran. In Iran I studied social communication and philosophy of religion, and started a PhD programme in analytic philosophy and completed successfully my course work. Based on my reading of Sellars and McDowell, I started to become interested in Kant's philosophy, and since there were no Kant specialist in Iran, I decided to withdraw from the PhD programme and come to Germany to work on Kant and also complete my German language.

Testability and Meaning deco