Modal Surveys: Molinism and the Grounding Objection
(Epistemology, English)
his paper explores how Molinism offers a plausible solution to the problem of theological fatalism within the analytic tradition, especially when conceptualised in terms of modern modal logic. It also clarifies a distinction between two different forms of the so-called ''grounding objection'' to counterfactual knowledge (warrant vs. truth), upon which Molinism is predicated, and offers a variety of solutions to the objection -- including a novel appeal to Timonthy Williamson's thesis on the indefinability of knowledge. In offering a range of possible solutions, this paper attempts to present Molinism as an attractive response to the problem of theological fatalism, particularly for philosophers in the analytic tradition.
Chair: Jakob Eichler
Time: 16:00-16:30, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004
Remark: CHANGE. The talk is cancelled!
Matthew Norris
(University of Cambridge, United Kingdom)
MPhil student at the University of Cambridge; embarking on PhD studies at the University of Reading in September 2018