SOPhiA 2018

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

SOPhiA ToolsDE-pageEN-page

Programme - Talk

On the Relation Between Metaphysical Anti-Haecceitism and Modal Haecceitism
(Metaphysics and Ontology, English)

In this paper I discuss Kit Fine's views on the relation between haecceitism and anti-haecceitism. He distinguishes a modal and metaphysical haecceitism from its anti-haecceitic counterparts and argues that the metaphysical variants of both theories are independent from the modal ones. That results in a view that it is possible both to be a modal haecceitist and to accept metaphysical anti-haecceitism. According to that combination of views one can claim that there are haecceitic possibilities without making a commitment to the existence of haecceities that would ground these possibilities. I think that this view is incorrect. Below I present an outline of my argument against it.

According to the metaphysical anti-haecceitism all possible worlds (including actual world) have purely qualitative metaphysical structure. In turn, according to the modal haecceitism when we talk about possible individuals we can introduce singular propositions that represent haecceitic possibilities for possible individuals. However, if singular propositions are structured and their propositional elements like proper names, demonstratives or predicates refer to worldly entities such as individuals, haecceities or properties, then singular propositions about possible individuals have to refer to possible individuals, their haecceities or properties. But, if possible worlds have purely qualitative metaphysical structure (given the metaphysical anti-haecceitism), then it is not possible to introduce genuine singular propositions that would be about possible individuals. Thus, all singular propositions would be ersatz singular propositions for all their supposed non-qualitative constituents (individuals or haecceities) would reduce to purely qualitative ones (qualitative properties and relations). Thus, it seems to be impossible to believe in genuine (irreducible) singular propositions about possible individuals and at the same time accept purely qualitative metaphysics of possible worlds. As a result, the modal haecceitism seems to be incompatible with the metaphysical anti-haecceitism. In the remainder I resist some objections directed towards presented argument.

Chair: Bogdan Andrei Dumitrescu
Time: 18:20-18:50, 12 September 2018 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006

Karol Lenart 
(Jagiellonian University, Poland)

I am a PhD student and teaching assistant in the Department of Philosophy at Jagiellonian University in Krakow. The main field of my interest is analytic metaphysic, especially issue concerning haecceitism, essentialism individuation. Currently I work on a paper that investigates the relation between haecceitism and actualism. I am a managing editor at Polish Journal of Philosophy

Testability and Meaning deco