Programme and Abstracts

Organisation: Department of Philosophy
University of Salzburg

Date: September 12–14, 2018

Venue: University of Salzburg
Unipark, Erzabt-Klotz-Straße 1, 5020 Salzburg

Languages: English and German

Website: http://www.sophia-conference.org
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Preface

In recent years the opportunities for keeping track of science-business for students of philosophy have increased. The raising number of essay competitions and graduate conferences support this claim.

In 2018, the Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy is, once again, joining the midst of these events. The title of the conference already reveals some details about the organisers, the contributors and the conference’s guiding principles. To avoid misunderstandings, we want to add the following remarks: (i) Because of the high number of international participants, ‘Salzburg’ stands for the location of the conference only. (ii) One of the conference’s distinctive features compared to similar events is that we do not make any constraints regarding the topic of presentations. (iii) On the contrary, every philosophical discipline – as long as it is carried out in an analytic way – has its place at SOPhiA.

By combining (ii) and (iii) we want to demonstrate, in contrast to some voices which claim that Analytic Philosophy constrains our intellectual life, that all traditional topics can be advantageously examined in Analytic Philosophy. It is our utmost concern to unite analytic philosophers from all around the world (cf. (i)). This is also in the sense of Carnap, who claims in his early work *The Logical Structure of the World*:

“The new type of philosophy has arisen in close contact with the work of the special sciences, especially mathematics and physics. Consequently they have taken the strict and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their guideline for philosophical work, while the attitude of the traditional philosopher is more like that of a poet. This new attitude not only changes the style of thinking but also the
type of problem that is posed. The individual no longer undertakes to erect in one bold stroke an entire system of philosophy. Rather, each works at his special place within the one unified science.”

In spirit of this motto, we wish you an interesting conference, fruitful discussions and stimulating thoughts.

The Organising Committee

The Organising Committee:

Special thanks to our sponsors:
General Information

**Timeframe and General Information.** From September 12–14 2018 the ninth Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy (SOphiA 2018) will be held at the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The conference is public and attending it is free of charge. The official languages of the conference are English and German. Contributed talks will be given by philosophy students (pre-doc). The conference is hosted by members of the University of Salzburg’s Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The organisers can be contacted via organization@sophia-conference.org.

**Mission Statement.** In the conference, problems of all areas of philosophy should be discussed. The conference has no specific topic. The presentations should rather set themselves apart by a methodological limitation to the tradition of Analytic Philosophy by usage of clear language and comprehensible arguments. The conference is meant to be a common effort to clearly formulate and critically assess some of the problems of philosophy. No individual is expected to construct “a whole building of philosophy” all by himself; rather, the conference hosts expect everyone, as Carnap proposes, to bring the undertaking forward “at his specific place within” philosophy.

**Procedure.** The speakers are from institutions of the following 28 countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and USA.

There are three types of talks:

- Plenary talks: held by invited speakers
- Workshop talks: held by invited speakers
- Contributed talks: held by student speakers
INVITED SPEAKERS.

- Elisa Aaltola (University of Eastern Finland, Finland): *Moral Psychology and Animal Ethics*
- Helen Beebee (University of Manchester, UK): *Peer Disagreement and Philosophical Commitment*
- Wolfgang Künne (University of Hamburg, Germany): *Literally or Figuratively? – Reflections on Bolzano’s Philosophy of Religion and his Hermeneutics (Bolzano Lecture 2018)*

WORKSHOP SPEAKERS.

Affiliated Workshop: *Bolzano and Contemporary Metaphysics*

- Anna Bellomo (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands): *Bolzano, Geometry, and the Part-Whole Principle*
- Kevin Mulligan (University of Geneva, Switzerland): *Grounding in Austro-German Philosophy (1890–1927)*
- Benjamin Schnieder (University of Hamburg, Germany): *Bolzano on Atomism and Fundamentality*

Affiliated Workshop: *Der gegenwärtige Augenblick*

- Florian Fischer (University of Siegen, Germany): *Zur Präsenz des Augenblicks*
- Caroline Haupt (University of Konstanz, Germany): *Engrammatische Bildrhetorik des Augenblicks. Ernst Jüngers ‘konzise’ Momentfotografien der 1930er Jahr*
- Alexandra Heimes (Center for Literary and Cultural Research Berlin, Germany)
- Philipp Ritzen (HHU Düsseldorf, Germany): *Gegenwärtigkeit bei Kleist*
- Giuseppina Cimmino (Bonn, Germany): *Zwischen Aktualisierung und Aufhebung. Gegenwartskonzepte in den nachhegelschen Ästhetikentwürfen*

Affiliated Workshop: *Didactics of Philosophy*

- Nils Höppner (Muenster): *Plato’s early dialogues – On the Origins of Philosophical Bildung*
• Sebastiano Moruzzi & Luca Zanetti (Bologna): Which truth for philosophy with children?
• Sandra Prinz (Salzburg): Philosophy with children: A development of competence-oriented methods
• Luca Zanetti (Bologna): Existential questions in Philosophical Inquiry with Children

Affiliated Workshop: Popularizing Philosophy

• Sascha Aulich (Düsseldorf): Popularisierungsversuche in der Philosophiegeschichte
• Oliver Victor (Düsseldorf): Existenzialismus und Popularisierung. Die Rolle der Philosophie bei Albert Camus
• Frauке Albersmeier (Düsseldorf): Philosophers as moral experts?
• Alexander Christian (Düsseldorf): Popular Culture and Philosophy: Possibilities and Limitations

Affiliated Workshop: Biological Individuality and other Issues in Contemporary Philosophy of Biology

• Steve Elliot (Arizona): An Account of Research Problems in Science
• Thomas Reydon (Hannover): What does “individuals thinking” solve?
• Isabella Sarto-Jackson (Klosterneuburg): Using Cognitive Biology to Tackle Individuality
• Adrian Stencel & Agnieszka Proszewska (Kraków): Some theoretical insights into the hologenome theory of evolution
• Javier Suárez (Barcelona & Exeter): A stability of traits model for the evolution of holobionts
• Özlem Yılmaz (Klosterneuburg): ‘Individual Plant’ Why it matters?
Practical Information
Conference Venue

Internet Access

1. Eduroam is available at the whole university campus.

2. In case you have no eduroam access, you can also use the university Wifi free of charge:

   Network name: Plus_Event
   Username: sophia
   Password: zeqntR7

Printing

You have the opportunity to print at the registration and information desk. Please note that we can only print a few pages (e.g. flight tickets, no handouts).

Venue Accessibility

All rooms are wheelchair accessible. There are also wheelchair accessible toilets available. For support just contact our crew at the registration desk.

Confirmations of Attendance

If you need a letter confirming your attendance, please come to the registration desk (by Friday, 2 p.m., at the latest).
City Map (© OpenStreetMap contributors)
Money, Food, and more

ATM

The nearest ATM is located next to the venue (Hypo Bank, Petersbrunnstraße 3).

Coffee and Refreshments

Coffee, tea, and finger food will be served during the refreshment breaks. All refreshments are served in the first floor.

Bakeries & Grocery Stores

There is also a cafeteria (UnikumSky) at the roof-deck of the venue. A bakery within walking distance is Bäckerei Holztrattner (Schanzgasse 8). Two grocery stores (Billa and Spar) can be found a few minutes’ walk away, in Kaigasse 28–30 and 32, respectively.

Restaurants

There are several restaurants for lunch and dinner close to the venue (downtown). Directly next to the venue is, e.g., ARGE Beisl (Ulrike-Gschwandtner-Str. 5; international, vegetarian, vegan). The Green Garden (Nonntaler Hauptstraße 16; vegetarian, vegan), Lemonchilli (Nonntaler Hauptstraße 24; Mexican), and SOG (Erzabt-Klotz-Straße 21; French) are nearby options. Information about the closing dinner will be provided at the closing session.

Public Transport

A route planer for Salzburg’s public transport system is available at: https://fahrplan.salzburg-verkehr.at

Police and Medical Assistance

If you need to call the police or the ambulance, the emergency number is 112.
Schedule
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<th>Time</th>
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<td>10:00-10:15</td>
<td>HS E.002</td>
<td>SR 1.003</td>
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<td>SR 1.007</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:15-11:45</td>
<td>Plenary Lecture</td>
<td>Helen Beebee</td>
<td>Peer Disagreement and Philosophical Commitment</td>
<td>Chair: Pascale Lötscher (Location: HS E.002)</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:45-14:00</td>
<td>History of Philosophy</td>
<td>Chair: Rares Fogaș</td>
<td>Affiliated Workshop</td>
<td>Chair: Florian Fischer, Philipp Ritzen</td>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>Chair: Wout Bisschop</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:00-14:30</td>
<td>Petter Sandstad</td>
<td>Aristotle's Posterior Analytics: Euclidean Axiomatic Sciences or Husserlian Regional Ontologies?</td>
<td>Giuseppina Cimmino &amp; Florian Fischer &amp; Caroline Haupt &amp; Alexandra Heimes &amp; Philipp Ritzen Der gegenwärzigte Augenblick</td>
<td>Frenzis Herbert Scheffels</td>
<td>Skepticism and the Closure of Knowledge -- What are the Possible Objections to the Skeptical Challenge?</td>
<td>Deniz Sarikaya</td>
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<td>16:00-16:30</td>
<td>Eka Gamrekelashvili</td>
<td>Reasonable Doubt as the Possibility of Accepting Certainty as the Basis</td>
<td>Bogdan Andrei Dumitrescu</td>
<td>Time Travelling in the Block Universe: Is There Room for Free Will?</td>
<td>Katharina Anna Sodoma</td>
<td>On Functionalist Conceptions of Moral Progress</td>
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<td>16:30-17:00</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
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<td>17:00-17:30</td>
<td>History of Philosophy</td>
<td>Chair: Petter Sandstad</td>
<td>Affiliated Workshop</td>
<td>Chair: Florian Fischer, Philipp Ritzen</td>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>Chair: Victoria Lavorero</td>
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<tr>
<td>19:00-19:30</td>
<td>Rares Fogaș</td>
<td>Not a matter of what happens but of what is: One Hundred Years from Frege’s “Der Gedanke.”</td>
<td>Eleanor Gwynne</td>
<td>The Uniqueness Problem for Transparent Self-Knowledge</td>
<td>Miłosz Maziarz</td>
<td>The Presuppositions behind Causal Inferences in Economics</td>
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<td>Philosophy of Science</td>
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<td>Vanja Subotic</td>
<td>Victoria Lavorero</td>
<td>Färber Gian Andre</td>
<td>César Frederico dos Santos</td>
<td>Alexander Christian</td>
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<td>SR 1.005</td>
<td>Robert Pal</td>
<td>Till Gallasch</td>
<td>Timo Meier</td>
<td>Jan Philip Vogelsang &amp; Ina Gawel</td>
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<td>Faulty Attitudes and Disagreement</td>
<td>Evidence-based Medicine, Evidence and Medical Knowledge</td>
<td>Against an Identity Criterion for Fictitious Ersatz Realism</td>
<td>An Analysis of ACEs-Studies and Their Implications for Philosophy and Public Health</td>
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<td>SR 1.006</td>
<td>Valeria Zaitseva</td>
<td>Ina Gawel</td>
<td>Claudius Berger</td>
<td>Julia Mirkin</td>
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<td>Peerhood and Epistemic Character</td>
<td>Are Methods of Disease Managing Pseudo-scientific Methods?</td>
<td>The Neutrality of Relations: Not Unidirectional, but Bidirectional</td>
<td>Social Responsibility and Mercenary Scientists</td>
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<td>SR 1.007</td>
<td>Bendik Hellem Aaby</td>
<td>Stefan Guggerell</td>
<td>Anna Folland</td>
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<td>A Biological Approach to the Explanatory Gap</td>
<td>Near Death Experiences: Operationalization and Definition</td>
<td>The Disjunctive View of Harm: Problems in Combination</td>
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<td>12:30-14:00</td>
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<td>14:00-15:30</td>
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<td>Plenary Lecture</td>
<td>Elisa Aaltola</td>
<td>Moral Psychology and Animal Ethics</td>
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<td>Chair: Alexander Gebhardt</td>
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<td>16:00-20:00</td>
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<td>Chair: Alexander Christian, Frauke Albersmeier</td>
<td>Chair: Bettina Bussmann</td>
<td>Chair: Stefan Roski</td>
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<td>Frauke Albersmeier &amp; Sascha Aulich &amp; Alexander Christian &amp; Oliver Victor</td>
<td>Nils Höppner &amp; Sebastiano Moruzzi &amp; Sandra Prinz &amp; Luca Zanetti</td>
<td>Anna Bellomo &amp; Benjamin Schnieder &amp; Kevin Mulligan</td>
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<td>Popularizing Philosophy</td>
<td>Didactics of Philosophy</td>
<td>Bolzano and Contemporary Metaphysics</td>
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<td>20:00</td>
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<td>Dinner: on your own</td>
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14 September 2018 (Friday)

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<th>SR 1.005</th>
<th>SR 1.006</th>
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<td>10:00-10:30</td>
<td>Thomas Mitchell</td>
<td>Philosophy of Language Chair: Nadja-Mira Yolcu</td>
<td>Philosophy of Mind Chair: Giulia Lorenzi</td>
<td>Epistemology Chair: Robert Pal</td>
<td>Philosophical Methodology Chair of Science</td>
<td>Logic Chair: Stefan Forster</td>
<td>Political Philosophy &amp; Philosophy of Law Chair: Martina Valkovic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A Problem with Sense</td>
<td>Olga Kosyrev</td>
<td>Strawson’s Objection to the Narrative Personal Identity and The Problem of the Privacy of the Self</td>
<td>Paul Tucek</td>
<td>Knowing What one is Doing – An Argument for the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasons</td>
<td>Silvan Hungerbuehler &amp; Pauline van Wierst</td>
<td>Disagreement in Logic and the Meaning of Logical Constants</td>
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<td>10:40-11:30</td>
<td>Antonina Jarzoeva</td>
<td>Philosophy of Language Chair: Nadja-Mira Yolcu</td>
<td>Philosophy of Mind Chair: Giulia Lorenzi</td>
<td>Epistemology Chair: Robert Pal</td>
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<td>Logic Chair: Stefan Forster</td>
<td>Political Philosophy &amp; Philosophy of Law Chair: Martina Valkovic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Principle of Compositionality, Context Principle and Inferential Role Semantics -- Are They All Compatible?</td>
<td>Jessica Stuehrhold</td>
<td>Understanding Others: Why We Can Learn From Invisible Friends</td>
<td>Roman Heil</td>
<td>Knowledge, Action and Partial Belief</td>
<td>Aleksandra Gomulkiewicz</td>
<td>Critical Objectivity Against a Naturalistic Explanation of Logical Validity</td>
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<td>11:20-11:50</td>
<td>Janek Guernini</td>
<td>Philosophy of Language Chair: Nadja-Mira Yolcu</td>
<td>Philosophy of Mind Chair: Giulia Lorenzi</td>
<td>Epistemology Chair: Robert Pal</td>
<td>Philosophical Methodology Chair of Science</td>
<td>Logic Chair: Stefan Forster</td>
<td>Political Philosophy &amp; Philosophy of Law Chair: Martina Valkovic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A New Semantic Interpretation of ‘Fak’t</td>
<td>Katsiaryna Suryna</td>
<td>Don’t Abide by Intuition but Explain It: Illusionism as a Successor to Eliminativism</td>
<td>Aurora Georgina Bustos Arellano</td>
<td>The Three Axes of Epistemic Injustice in the Testimony of Sexual Violence and Rape Culture Victims</td>
<td>Petar Srdanovic</td>
<td>Scientific Realism - Antirealism Debate and Kulh’s Incommensurability Thesis</td>
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<td>12:00-12:30</td>
<td>Karen Bröcker</td>
<td>Philosophy of Language Chair: Pascale Lötcher</td>
<td>Philosophy of Mind Chair: Giulia Lorenzi</td>
<td>Epistemology Chair: Robert Pal</td>
<td>Philosophical Methodology Chair of Science</td>
<td>Logic Chair: Stefan Forster</td>
<td>Political Philosophy &amp; Philosophy of Law Chair: Martina Valkovic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Justifying the Evidential Use of Linguistic Intuitions</td>
<td>Niccolò Negro</td>
<td>The Science of Consciousness</td>
<td>Jakob Eichler</td>
<td>The Shaping of Epistemic Resources</td>
<td>Aleksa Topšak</td>
<td>Scientific Theories and their Alternatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:30-14:00</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
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<td>14:00-14:30</td>
<td>Dorijan Dobric</td>
<td>Philosophy of Language Chair: Pascale Lötcher</td>
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<td>Epistemology Chair: Robert Pal</td>
<td>Philosophical Methodology Chair of Science</td>
<td>Logic Chair: Stefan Forster</td>
<td>Political Philosophy &amp; Philosophy of Law Chair: Martina Valkovic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rationality in Language</td>
<td>Petar Nurik</td>
<td>Pseudodoxia between Descriptive and Normative in Process of Belief Formation</td>
<td>Haktan Akin</td>
<td>What’s Really Wrong with Ontic Structural Realism? On the Possibility of Reading off Ontology from Current Fundamental Science</td>
<td>Sara Ayhan</td>
<td>Why “Tank” is Nonsensical – and Paradoxes aren’t – on Approach in a Typed Sequent Calculus System</td>
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<td>14:40-15:10</td>
<td>Felipe Morales</td>
<td>Philosophy of Language Chair: Pascale Lötcher</td>
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<td>15:20-15:50</td>
<td>Nadja-Mira Yolcu</td>
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<td>Epistemology Chair: Robert Pal</td>
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<td>Logic Chair: Stefan Forster</td>
<td>Political Philosophy &amp; Philosophy of Law Chair: Martina Valkovic</td>
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<td>Explicit Conceptuality of Conversational Implicatures</td>
<td>Isabelle Kellens</td>
<td>“Epistemic Frankfurt Cases” against the Backdrop of the Original Frankfurt Case</td>
<td>Angelika Mus-Nojak</td>
<td>Does Contemporary Physics Compel Us to Reuse Metaphysics? The critique of Ontic Structuralist Realism</td>
<td>Marco Grossi</td>
<td>Tense and Logicality</td>
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<td>16:00-16:30</td>
<td>Karim Baraghith</td>
<td>Philosophy of Language Chair: Pascale Lötcher</td>
<td>Philosophy of Mind Chair: Giulia Lorenzi</td>
<td>Epistemology Chair: Robert Pal</td>
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<td>Political Philosophy &amp; Philosophy of Law Chair: Martina Valkovic</td>
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<td>Emergence of Public Meaning from a Telesemantic and Game Theoretical Perspective</td>
<td>Matthew Norris</td>
<td>Modal Semantics and the Grounding Objection</td>
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<tr>
<td>17:00-18:30</td>
<td>Plenary Lecture</td>
<td>Wolfgang Künne</td>
<td>Literally or Figuratively? -- Reflections on Bolzano’s Philosophy of Religion and his Hermeneutics (Bolzano Lecture 2018)</td>
<td>Chair: Edgar Monsch (Location: HS E.002)</td>
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<td>18:30-</td>
<td>Closing Dinner (Restaurant)</td>
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15 September 2018 (Saturday)

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<td>10:00-16:00</td>
<td>Affiliated Workshop</td>
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<td>Chair: Karim Baraghith &amp; Gregor Greslehner</td>
<td>Steve Elliot &amp; Thomas Reydon &amp; Isabella Sarto-Jackson &amp; Adrian Stencl &amp; Agnieszka Proszewiska &amp; Javier Suarez &amp; Ozlem Yilmaz</td>
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Plenary Talks
Moral Psychology and Animal Ethics

Elisa Aaltola

The rationalist stance, according to which reason is both the necessary and sufficient ground for moral agency, has been contested by the “affective turn”. Echoing David Hume, Adam Smith and Arthur Schopenhauer, this turn suggests that moral ability is largely based on emotive or experiential conceptualisation, such as anger, guilt or empathy. The talk explores how “affective moral agency” impacts how we normatively define, value and treat nonhuman animals. First, it maps out the descriptive relevance of emotions such as pride, guilt and shame, and second, it asks the following prescriptive question: if emotions impact our moral take on other animals, which emotions should we cultivate so as to broaden our ability to morally respond to other-than-human creatures?

Section: Plenary
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 14:00-15:30, 13 September 2018 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002
Peer Disagreement and Philosophical Commitment

Helen Beebee

The fact of endemic peer disagreement in philosophy – and, more importantly, the degree of choice we have between equally reasonable options we have between different methodological principles that often generates such disagreement – leads inevitably, I claim, to scepticism about many, indeed perhaps most, substantive philosophical theses. Where does this leave us, as working philosophers? What kind of epistemic (or other) attitude to philosophical claims does such scepticism permit, and what role does argument – the bread and butter of philosophical discourse – have to play, given that justified belief is not a viable aim for us to aspire to?

Section: Plenary
Language: English
Chair: Pascale Lötscher
Date: 10:15–11:45, 12 September 2018 (Wednesday)
Location: HS E.002
More than once Bernard Bolzano declared that he regarded it as “the main purpose in his life to restore, as much as possible, the ever more declining reputation of religion”. His sincerity is beyond any reasonable doubt, so I think analytic philosophers should not simply shrug off this confession of their ‘great-grandfather’ (as Dummett called him) even if they find it embarrassing. I shall focus on two central contentions in Bolzano’s philosophy of revealed religion that are apparently incompatible. On the one hand, he declares that a divine revelation that deserves its name is always an attempt to communicate something that is true. On the other hand, he maintains that many if not all revealed doctrines are to be taken as figurative (bildlich), “that is, as doctrines that represent their subject matter not as it is but rather as it is most beneficial for us to think of it”. Obviously, one has to ponder Bolzano’s conception of figurative speech if one wants to find out whether the appearance of incompatibility is deceptive. I, for one, find it hard to imagine that the greatest logician between Leibniz and Frege overlooked a glaring contradiction at the very centre of his philosophy of religion that so much mattered to him.
Workshops
Bolzano and Contemporary Metaphysics

Anna Bellomo & Benjamin Schnieder & Kevin Mulligan & Stefan Roski

Analytic Philosophy's great grandfather Bernard Bolzano is well known for his contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics. It is less well known that Bolzano also made significant contributions to metaphysics, in particular to mereology and to the theory of objective non-causal dependence. Both fields have gained increasing attention in current analytic metaphysics, and it can be shown that Bolzano's ideas often contain important and original contributions to the contemporary debate. The workshop will bring together recent work on Bolzano's metaphysics from historical as well as from systematic perspectives.

Section: Affiliated Workshop
Language: English
Chair: Stefan Roski
Date: 16:00-20:00, 13 September 2018 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005

Schedule

16:00–16:05 Welcome
16:05–17:20 Anna Bellomo: Bolzano, Geometry, and the Part-Whole Principle
Short break
17:25–18:40 Benjamin Schnieder: Bolzano on Atomism and Fundamentality
Short break
18:45–20:00 Kevin Mulligan: Grounding in Austro-German Philosophy (1890-1927)
Abstracts

Anna Bellomo (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands): Bolzano, Geometry, and the Part-Whole Principle

Set theory, the current foundation of mainstream mathematics, originated in the mid 19th century. It is uncontroversial among historians of mathematics that some of Bolzano’s mathematical ideas anticipated set theoretic concepts (see e.g. [1], p. 75). It is controversial, however, to which extent exactly Bolzano anticipated set theory. One of the points of controversy is whether or not Bolzano accepted the principle of equality of size which is at the heart of set theory. In set theory, two sets $A$ and $B$ are considered equally big just in case there is a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of $A$ and the elements of $B$, that is to say, if for every element $a$ in the set $A$, there is exactly one element $b$ in the set $B$, and vice versa.

It has been argued in the literature that Bolzano accepted this set-theoretic principle of equality of size only in some parts of mathematics. More precisely, it is argued that Bolzano accepted this principle in what he calls “pure mathematics” (that is, arithmetic and analysis), but not in geometry. We will call this view “Mancosu’s hypothesis”, after [2]. Our aim in this talk will be to evaluate Mancosu’s hypothesis.

If Mancosu’s hypothesis is true, then Bolzano must have adopted in geometry a principle of equality of size which is different from the set-theoretical principle of one-to-one correspondence. The obvious candidate is what we will call the part-whole principle, which says that the whole is bigger than a proper part of it. The part-whole principle is a reformulation of one of Euclid’s five common notions, and it is known that Bolzano’s geometrical work was essentially of Euclidean inspiration.

Maintaining two separate criteria for comparisons of size – one-to-one correspondence in pure mathematics and part-whole in geometry – runs against Bolzano’s overall preference for general and unifying treatments of mathematical concepts such as size. However, our hypothesis is that the necessity of adopting two different criteria for equality of size stems from Bolzano’s views on pure mathematics versus geometry, and in particular on the objects that they are dealing with. To be more precise, our hypothesis is that the “pure quantities” (reine Größen) which are the subject matter of pure mathematics in Bolzano’s view call for one-to-one correspondence, whereas the special quantities such as those
in geometry (i.e. quantities in space) call for the part-whole principle.

The aim of this talk is thus to evaluate Mancosu’s hypothesis by investigating Bolzano’s views on pure quantities versus special – in particular geometrical – quantities. We will focus on Bolzano’s later mathematico-philosophical production (from the 1830s onwards), that is, his mathematical views as spelled out in the Wissenschaftslehre, Paradoxien des Unendlichen and Mathematische Schriften. Our philosophical analysis will be aided by computational methods to collect and analyze textual evidence for or against Mancosu’s hypothesis.

References:

Kevin Mulligan (University of Italian Switzerland, Lugano; University of Geneva): Grounding in Austro-German Philosophy (1890–1927)

This paper looks at some claims employing grounding and related notions such as foundation between 1890 and 1927: logical truths ground logical norms; facts ground truths & correctness of attitudes; essence grounds modes of being; causal order grounds temporal order; values ground oughts; non-normative facts ground in a sui generis way values.
Der gegenwärtige Augenblick

Giuseppina Cimmino & Florian Fischer & Caroline Haupt & Alexandra Heimes & Philipp Ritzen

Section: Affiliated Workshop
Language: German
Chair: Florian Fischer, Philipp Ritzen
Date: 14:00-14:30, 12 September 2018 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.003

Schedule

14:00–14:40 Florian Fischer: Zur Präsenz des Augenblicks
Short break
Short break
15:50–16:30 Alexandra Heimes
Coffee break
17:00–17:40 Philipp Ritzen: Gegenwärtigkeit bei Kleist
Short break
Short break
18:50–19:30 final discussion

Please check the SOPhiA website for further information.
The didactics of philosophy is concerned with the foundations, aims, content and methods of teaching and learning philosophy. Depending on the various national educational systems, the didactics of philosophy has various different goals in different countries. But no matter to which extent philosophy is implemented in the schools – as a regular subject, as an elective or as philosophy for children – it faces central questions that transcend national and regional peculiarities. These questions are rooted in

a) metaphilosophical questions: Which understanding of philosophy should serve as the framework for doing philosophy in democratic societies?

b) the rapid transformation of our lifeworld: intercultural classrooms, digitalization and globalization, international education standards and all sorts of societal challenges affect our understanding of education and Bildung and entail the need to reflect on fundamental didactical questions.

The aim of the workshop is to bring together research fellows from different countries to discuss some of these central questions.

Section: Affiliated Workshop
Language: English
Chair: Bettina Bussmann
Date: 16:00-20:00, 13 September 2018 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004
Schedule

16:00–16:15  Bettina Bussmann: Introduction to Teaching Philosophy (Five proposals)

16:15–17:00  Sebastiano Moruzzi & Luca Zanetti: *Which truth for philosophy with children?*

Short break

17:15–18:00  Nils Höppner: *Plato’s early dialogues – On the Origins of Philosophical Bildung*

Short break

18:15–19:00  Sandra Prinz: *Philosophy with children: A development of competence-oriented methods*

Short break

19:15–20:00  Luca Zanetti: *Existential questions in Philosophical Inquiry with Children*

Abstracts

Nils Höppner (Muenster): *Plato’s early dialogues – On the Origins of Philosophical Bildung*

Why and when did educational philosophy begin? What were the reasons for and first signs of the reflections on philosophical Bildung? And of course, how do we know anything about these origins? I want to undertake a historically and systematically oriented attempt to reconstruct the origins of philosophical reflections on philosophical Bildung.

In my talk I intend to reveal the dismantled discursive structures that define teaching and studying philosophy in Ancient philosophy (see Buchheim; Martens). For this purpose, it is important not to underestimate the philosophical significance or, more precisely, the scope of philosophical Bildung in Plato’s early dialogues (see Lampert). In an exemplary reading of Plato’s *Protagoras* I want to show the developmental stages at work in the implementation of the thinking about philosophical Bildung. This text is not only a dramatic spectacle or philosophical strike against the sophists and their manipulative rhetoric (see Coby). It is even more an intellectual debate between Socrates and Protagoras, the founder of Greek Enlightenment (see e.g. Hegel). Above all, the
discussion is a critical reflection on the ontological, epistemological, and ethical assumptions about teaching and studying philosophy. Obviously, no one would deny the pedagogical and didactical content: Socrates and Protagoras talk *expressis verbis* about teaching and studying *arete*, that is human excellence (see van Ackeren; Manwald; Wolf). The textual manifestations, however, also suggest a specific course of philosophical *Bildung* in the underlying structure. In order to understand this immanent logic one cannot apply exogenous methods or categories. For this purpose, I intend to follow the movement of these concepts of thought immanently by reconstructing the inwardness of the textual figures. This will allow me to work out this implicit dynamic and its relevance to our own concepts of teaching and studying philosophy. The analysis of this dimension is a desideratum in the Plato scholarship and in philosophical and didactical studies more broadly.

**Sebastiano Moruzzi & Luca Zanetti (Bologna): Which truth for philosophy with children?**

This paper argues for two theses: first, the quest for truth is an inescapable aim of inquiry, and as such it is a constitutive aim of philosophical inquiry with children; second, the inescapability of the quest for truth poses some constraints on the theory of truth and knowledge that should be put at the background of the practice of philosophical inquiry with children.

In the first part of the paper, we argue that inquiry constitutively aims at truth. Inquiry is the process of asking questions and answering them in the form of judgment. To ask a question is to aim at receiving a true answer, and to judge is to take the content judged as true. In this minimal sense, to inquire is to seek for the truth. The aim of truth is also dialectically inescapable (Ferrero 2009) because any judgment and doubt about inquiry and our capacity for truth and knowledge would be a move within inquiry. The inescapability of truth allows us to argue against those who take philosophical inquiry with children as not aimed at discovering the truth and supports those (e.g., Gardner 1995) who contend that truth as the aim of belief is at the centre of philosophical inquiry with children.

In the second part of the paper we focus on the following question: does the inescapability of truth pose any constraint on the theory of
truth and knowledge that should support and orient one’s philosophical inquiry with children? Lipmanian P4C is defended and vindicated within a broadly pragmatist framework. Some (e.g., Bleazby 2011) have recently argued that only a pragmatist conception of truth (and knowledge) can make sense of P4C. We argue against this fairly widespread view. First, we argue that the intelligibility and point of the practice is compatible with several accounts of truth and knowledge. Second, we argue that some accounts of truth and knowledge are incompatible with the inescapability of truth. Third, we argue that some motivations for weakening the realist and objectivist features of truth and knowledge can be captured by endorsing a pluralist account of truth and knowledge which countenances the differences between, say, empirical truths and moral truths without downplaying the role of truth across all domains of discourse. A pragmatist view of truth and knowledge is therefore not necessary in order to vindicate philosophical inquiry with children.

References:


**Sandra Prinz (Salzburg): Philosophy with children: A development of competence-oriented methods**

The practice of doing philosophy with children as it is known today has its roots in Matthew Lipman’s Philosophy for Children (P4C) programme which he developed together with Ann Margaret Sharp, in the 1970s. Since then P4C has been discussed controversially, Lipman’s ideas have been developed further and viewed from different perspectives. The term P4C is still used but more and more replaced by Philosophy with Children (PwC), as this term highlights the active participation of the children. However, the terms are connected and the concepts have the same basic ideas.
Numerous arguments about the positive effects of PwC can be found in the literature and studies have shown that philosophy with children “leads to an improvement of the student’s reasoning skills” (Moriyon & Colom, 2005: 13). Moreover, when engaging in a philosophical conversation, children are encouraged to ask questions, to express their own opinion, to think critically, to take part in a discussion, to reformulate what they have said, to come up with new ideas and maybe even to change their point of view. To prove that, more research has to be conducted and convincing arguments have to be found that Philosophy with Children “as a discipline, has something distinct to offer” (Gatley 2017) and that implementing it in the curriculum is important and worthwhile.

In my talk I would like to present and discuss some parts of my MA thesis entitled Philosophy with children using picture books: A development of competence-oriented methods. I aim at developing a toolkit of methods and at the same time point out the competence that can be trained with a specific method. By doing that I would like to show on the one hand that PwC has distinct features and that on the other hand the trained skills can have positive effects on the child’s performance in other subjects, like mathematics. In March and April 2018 I had the chance to put a lesson plan that I developed into practice. I philosophized with 121 1st graders of the Musische Gymnasium Salzburg. Among other methods I used tables to structure philosophical content. The idea behind it was that completing the table should help the students to summarize and analyze the plot of the picture book we worked with. In my talk I am going to point out some advantages and disadvantages this method has, reflect on my work with the students, and raise questions for further discussion.

References:


Luca Zanetti (Bologna): Existential questions in Philosophical Inquiry with Children

In this paper I argue that Lipmanian philosophy for children (P4C) hasn’t provided enough resources to address children’s existential questions, that is, roughly, questions that concern the meaning of existence, death, the nature of the self and the existence of free will.

In the first part of the paper I argue that P4C’s curriculum doesn’t focus on existential questions. I defend the claim by exploring the texts that constitute the curriculum and the corresponding manuals. I will point out that only very few passages address existential questions, and that most of these passages address them only obliquely. Moreover, I will argue that the corresponding manuals don’t provide methodological and philosophical support for discussing existential themes.

In the second part of the paper I argue that the overall aim which provides the motivation for P4C overlooks the centrality of existential questions in children. Many P4C practitioners justify their practice by arguing that its overall aim is to educate future citizens of a democratic society, and/or by insisting that practicing P4C helps children to build their capacities for multidimensional thinking. Yet, existential questions don’t have a natural place within this educational agenda. I will tentatively suggest that this omission is in partly due to the pragmatist framework within which P4C has been standardly conceived and developed.

In the third and last part of the paper I will raise some new challenges for P4C that emerge once the centrality of existential questions in children is taken into account. First of all, should we rethink the formation of the facilitator so as to provide her with a background to deal with existential questioning with children? Second, should we introduce texts and manuals explicitly aimed at addressing existential issues? Third, are there special philosophical questions (like existential ones) that deserve special attention? Relatedly, should we avoid some questions and discussions, or should we rather insist on some questions (like existential ones) which are perceived as central by the children?
Nils Höppner (University of Muenster, Germany)
Nils Höppner is teaching and research assistant at the Institute for Philosophy of the Westfälische-Wilhelms University in Muenster. His fields of interest are Philosophy of Bildung and Didactics of Philosophy, Plato and the Sophists, Hegel and the analytic tradition (Brandom, Pippin), Neo-Pragmatism and Critical Theory.

Sebastiano Moruzzi (University of Bologna, Italy)
Sebastian Moruzzi is Lecturer at the Philosophy and Communication Department of the University of Bologna. His research areas are: philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy for children. He is currently working on pluralism (alethic, ontological and logical), relativism, faultless disagreement, hinge epistemology, vagueness, meta-ontology, and the philosophical foundations of the philosophy for children and the techniques for practicing philosophy with children in the classroom.

Sandra Prinz (University of Salzburg, Austria)
Sandra Prinz is a student of Psychology/Philosophy and English at the University of Salzburg. Subject of MA Thesis: Philosophy with children: A development of competence-oriented methods.

Luca Zanetti (University of Bologna, Italy)
Luca Zanetti obtained a PhD in Philosophy in 2018 at the University of Bologna, Department of Philosophy and Communication Studies. His research areas include epistemology, philosophical methodology, phenomenology, philosophy of education, and philosophy for children. He is currently working on certainty, hinge epistemology, the value and normativity of truth, nihilism and existential questions in children, spirituality and philosophy with children, the philosophical foundations of the philosophy for children and the techniques for practicing philosophy with children in the classroom. He is a member of Cogito – Research Centre in Philosophy, and FarFilò – Research Centre on Philosophy and
Childhood. He also works with children in classrooms, and has recently funded an association that promotes philosophical practices with children.
Popularizing Philosophy

Frauke Albersmeier & Sascha Aulich & Alexander Christian & Oliver Victor

The history of philosophy is abundant with attempts to popularize philosophical thinking. In order to make philosophy accessible to a wider audience without a formal training various authors have tried to translate opaque philosophical terminology into ordinary language, illustrate philosophical ideas with didactic poems and plays, written novels with a philosophical narrative, and engaged in public discussions about pressing moral problems. Attempts to popularize philosophy were often met with apprehension by academic scholars worrying that complex philosophical ideas would be misconstrued by breaking them down for a lay audience. But isn’t successful popularization of philosophy a sign of a healthy discourse between the ivory-tower of the philosopher and the market place of philosophical laypersons?

Bringing together perspectives from philosophy of science, existentialism, meta-ethics and the history of philosophy, this workshop will investigate the merits and problems of popularizing philosophy.

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Section: Affiliated Workshop
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Christian, Frauke Albersmeier
Date: 16:00-20:00, 13 September 2018 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003

Schedule

16:00–16:05 Introduction

16:05–16:50 Sascha Aulich: Popularisierungsversuche in der Philosophiegeschichte

16:50–17:35 Oliver Victor: Existenzialismus und Popularisierung. Die Rolle der Philosophie bei Albert Camus

17:45–18:30 Frauke Albersmeier: Philosophers as moral experts?

Abstracts

Sascha Aulich (Düsseldorf): Popularisierungsversuche in der Philosophiegeschichte


Oliver Victor (Düsseldorf): Existentialismus und Popularisierung. Die Rolle der Philosophie bei Albert Camus

Die Philosophie Albert Camus' wird gemeinhin, trotz widersprüchlicher Aussagen seiner selbst und abweichender Interpretationen, der Wirkungsgeschichte Kierkegaards und somit der Existenzphilosophie bzw. dem Existentialismus zugeordnet. Der Existentialismus zählt zu denjenigen philosophischen Strömungen, die einen spürbaren Einfluss auf das breite kulturelle Umfeld ihrer Epoche ausübten. Gerade im Kreise der französischen Existentialisten (Camus, de Beauvoir, Sartre etc.) wurde er zu einer Art Modeerscheinung und Lebensgefühl einer ganzen Generation, was ihn...

Der Vortrag möchte aufzeigen, wie sich aus einem bestimmten Philosophieverständnis, nämlich das der existenzialistischen "Philosophie als Lebensform", eine gewisse Notwendigkeit von Popularisierung ergibt, um den eigenen Anforderungen Rechnung zu tragen. Dies geschieht nicht zuletzt unter Rekurs auf das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Literatur in Camus' Œuvre.

Frauke Albersmeier (Düsseldorf): Philosophers as moral experts?

Public interest in philosophy focuses on the issues dealt with in practical philosophy much more than on those addressed in theoretical philosophy. Philosophers might have been superseded by physicists and other natural scientists as experts on the nature of the outside world, and more recently by psychologists and cognitive scientists as experts on the human mind – but when it comes to questions of what to do, of right and wrong, obligation and moral excellence, they are still recognized as likely candidates for fulfilling an expert’s role. However, it is not always clear what they are expected to deliver and what they take themselves to be providing: expertise in moral philosophy or the insights of a moral authority. If the moral expertise that is requested from the philosopher is expertise in moral philosophy – i.e., if her task is to popularize moral philosophy – is there a requirement that she do so as comprehensively as possible, i.e. should she always go beyond popularizing her own take on the philosophical problem at hand and provide information on the larger theoretical landscape and all kinds of divergent positions? Some moral philosophers themselves suggest that publicly promoting their personal
position would exceed their philosophical expertise, while others readily assess the latest moral topics.

In this talk I will discuss examples of public performances by practical philosophers addressing the moral claims of nonhuman animals and argue that the reluctance to take a (reasoned) stand is more likely to constitute a failing in presenting moral philosophy to the general public than the choice to focus attention on one’s own philosophical position.

Alexander Christian (Düsseldorf): Popular Culture and Philosophy: Possibilities and Limitations

Attempts to popularize philosophical thinking are present throughout the history of western philosophy. Plato wrote fictitious philosophical dialogues while his contemporaries authored didactic poems. Roman philosophers translated Greek philosophical terminology into Latin terms. Marcus Aurelius and Augustine of Hippo wrote philosophical autobiographies meant to be read as a philosophical prose for a wider audience—in dire need of a source of personal guidance and self-improvement. Nicholas of Cusa even invented a game to illustrate philosophical and theological ideas important to him (De ludo globi, 1463). In modern times, Niccolò Machiavelli devoted Il Principe (1513) to the Duke of Urbino Lorenzo de’ Medici, Encyclopédistes like Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert intended to advance science and also spread the ideals of enlightenment among the folk. In contemporary philosophy, the popularization of philosophical thought is not uncommon either: Jean-Paul Sartre wrote several existentialist plays, philosopher of science Karl Popper participated in public debate after the second world war with his The Open Society and Its Enemies and one of the last so-called Volksbücher of philosophy was written by Theodor W. Adorno (Minima Moralia, 1951). Peter Singer influenced the debate about the moral consideration of nonhuman animals outside of academia with his Animal Liberation (1975). These philosophers tried to make philosophical thinking – its theories, concepts, terms, and arguments – accessible to a broader readership and a common implicit assumption was that philosophical thought should take precedence over the mode of depiction. That is, philosophical ideas should be popularized, yet not trivialized.

Since the early 2000s, a new way of popularizing philosophical think-
ing has emerged. Philosophers like William Irwin (The Blackwell Philosophy and Culture Series) and Georg Reisch (Open Court Popular Culture and Philosophy Series) began to edit volumes on seemingly disparate cultural domains, that is popular culture on the one hand and academic philosophy on the other hand. Bridging the gap between these two realms, philosophers illustrate and explain philosophical ideas with the help of popular TV series, movies, song lyrics and video games. Today you can find books entitled The Simpsons and Philosophy or Star Trek and Philosophy in most well-sorted book stores. Addressing laypersons with no formal training in philosophy, these books attract a readership interested in philosophical investigations into their favorite format of pop-cultural entertainment. While readers obviously have enjoyed such volumes, some academic philosophers have attacked the format. Lamenting pseudo-intellectual fandom, a lack of argumentative, conceptual and terminological precision, and an overall lack of cultural criticism, the critics’ verdict was clear: Popular culture and philosophy is just pseudoscientific dumbed-down philosophy. But according to William Irwing, “philosophy needs to be popularised, as science needs to be popularised, and philosophy professors should be involved in the popularisation of philosophy, rather than leaving the task to well-meaning amateurs” (Irwing 2010, p. 48). In this talk, I will first depict various attempts to popularize philosophical thinking in the history of western philosophy and outline intellectual aspirations associated with popularized philosophy. Then I will provide a brief overview on some outstanding, original and thought-provoking philosophical contributions to popular culture and philosophy (Christian 2017a, 2017b, 2018; Christian & Albersmeier 2018) and identify some common characteristics of works in this field. Finally, I discuss possibilities and limitations of this new literary genre in philosophy. I will argue that its value does not consist in spreading philosophical wisdom but in evoking philosophical wonder.

References:

Open Court.


Frauke Albersmeier (HHU Düsseldorf, Germany)
Frauke Albersmeier MA is a research fellow at Heinrich Heine University, Duesseldorf, working in project A05: “Presuppositions of frame theory in the history of philosophy” of the DFG-funded Collaborative Research Centre 991: “The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition, and Science”. Her research focus is on philosophical methodology as well as animal ethics. She is currently writing her dissertation on “The Concept of Moral Progress”.

Sascha Aulich (HHU Düsseldorf, Germany)

Alexander Christian (HHU Düsseldorf, Germany)
Alexander Christian MA is the assistant director of the Düsseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science and a research fellow at the
Chair of Theoretical Philosophy at the Heinrich Heine University in Düsseldorf, Germany. He is working in general philosophy of science and research ethics, with a particular focus on scientific misconduct, questionable research practices, and bias in medical research. He has published about the suppression of medical evidence, the demarcation problem, and values in science, and has also written about veganism, human animal studies and popular culture and philosophy.

Oliver Victor (HHU Düsseldorf, Germany)
Biological Individuality and other Issues in Contemporary Philosophy of Biology

Karim Baraghith & Steve Elliot & Gregor Greslehner & Agnieszka Proszewska & Thomas Reydon & Isabella Sarto-Jackson & Adrian Stenczel & Javier Suárez & Özlem Yılmaz

The goal of this workshop is to provide a platform for international researchers and scholars in philosophy of biology, with particular emphasis on the issue of biological individuality. It is a major topic in philosophy of biology as well as biology itself.

Among the questions that will be addressed during the workshop are the following: What are the conditions for being a biological individual? What does being a biological individual imply? How can ‘biological individual’ be best defined? How to account for microbiota and their interactions in relation to an organism and its biological individuality? How is biological individuality preserved through time?

This workshop brings together leading experts and young researchers from philosophy of biology and other areas of philosophy of science, thus promising to advance the philosophical and scientific debates surrounding the issues mentioned above.

Section: Affiliated Workshop
Language: English
Chair: Karim Baraghith, Gregor Greslehner
Date: 10:00-16:00, 15 September 2018 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.006
Schedule

10:00–10:15  Karim Baraghith & Gregor Greslehner: Introduction
10:15–10:45  Thomas Reydon: What does “individuals thinking” solve?
10:45–11:00  coffee break
11:00–11:30  Özlem Yılmaz: ‘Individual Plant’ Why it matters?
11:30–12:00  Isabella Sarto-Jackson: Using Cognitive Biology to Tackle Individuality
12:00–14:00  lunch break
14:00–14:30  Adrian Stencel & Agnieszka Proszewska: Some theoretical insights into the hologenome theory of evolution
14:30–14:45  coffee break
14:45–15:15  Javier Suárez: A stability of traits model for the evolution of holobionts
15:15–15:30  coffee break
15:30–16:00  Steve Elliot: An Account of Research Problems in Science

Abstracts

Steve Elliot (Arizona State University): An Account of Research Problems in Science

Heather Douglas (2014) has recently critiqued distinctions between pure and applied science as conceptually, historically, and practically ill-founded. She further argues that if we focus less on the explanatory functions of science, and more on other functions such as prediction and intervention, then we might develop a sense of progress in science that survives issues of major theory changes or paradigm shifts, especially if those functions are socially and ethically contextualized. How to do so remains an open project, and I here suggest one route by which to pursue it. I focus on the level of research projects, which scientists and philosophers widely conceptualize as addressing research problems, and which they judge as successful partly when those problems have been in fact addressed. How do scientists conceptualize and evaluate research problems? Traditional accounts of
research problems focus only on problems to theories (Kuhn 1962, Laudan 1977, Nickles 1981). Given Douglas’s critique of the pure/applied distinction, those accounts fail to capture the diverse range of problems pursued in science. I propose a new conceptual framework of problems that accounts both for theory-focused problems and for so-called practical problems, and I illustrate the account with a case from evolutionary biology. The account fits problem-solving practices within Douglas’s critique, shows how projects are socially and ethically contextualized, and underwrites senses of success for individual projects and of progress across projects. I close by indicating how this account could influence debates about biological individuality.

Thomas Reydon (Hannover): What does “individuals thinking” solve?

Philosophy of biology is seeing an increasing “enthusiasm for individuality”. Not only has the concept of individuality (in biology as well as in other sciences) itself become a topic of investigation (e.g., Guay & Pradeu, 2016; Lidgard & Nyhart, 2017), but it is also increasingly argued that things that we hadn’t seen as individuals actually are best thought of individuals. Perhaps the most famous case is Ghiselin’s (1966; 1974) and Hull’s (1976; 1977; 1978) suggestion that species are individuals and not kinds, a view that was presented as a “radical solution to the species problem” (Ghiselin, 1974). More recently, Rosenberg (2006) argued that genes (that is, gene types) are individuals, not kinds, and presented this view as a solution to the quest for a definition of the gene category. And Mariscal & Doolittle (2018) recently argued that life is an individual and not a kind of entities (i.e., the kind of living entities), presenting this as a radical solution to the search for a definition of life.

In all three cases, the strategy is the same: A term (‘life’, or ‘living being’) or collection of terms (the various names of species, the various names of genes) are thought to be kind terms, and the problem is what makes entities into members of particular kinds. The problem turns out to be persistent, as no agreement is reached on the necessary and sufficient conditions for kind membership. Then, the suggestion is made that the reason for the persistent failure to solve the problem is that we had gotten the metaphysical category wrong: life, species, and
genes are individuals, not kinds. This suggestion, then, is taken as a radical solution to the problem, because the search for conditions for kind membership has ended.

While such “individuals thinking” clearly solves the old problem (i.e., the search for conditions of kind membership), it raises new issues that are at least as hard to solve as the old problem – or so I want to argue. In particular, these solutions replace questions about kind-member relations by parallel questions about individual-part relations, that are as hard to resolve as the original questions. For example, the claim that something is an individual by itself strongly underdetermines the relation between the individual and its parts (e.g., the individual called Drosophila melanogaster and the many fruit flies that allegedly are parts of this individual; the individual called ‘life’ and the many living beings that are part of this individual). Thus, the question arises what, exactly, makes a fruit fly a part of its species or a gene token part of its gene type (lineage). What the cases mentioned above suggest, I will argue, is that at least in some cases in biology “individuals thinking” is not a feasible alternative for “kinds thinking” and we might need both perspectives to make sense of the metaphysics of the things under study.

References


The basic tenets of cognitive biology (Kovac 2000; 2015) hold that living systems strive to continue to exist and keep their onticity thereby continuously undergoing a process of knowledge acquisition (i.e., cognition). In order to persist, living systems must incessantly perform ontic work. This means, a system self-organizes, maintains stability, and remains distant from equilibrium by dissipating energy gradients and constructing kinetic barriers that prevent or retard destruction and dissipation. Onticity is accompanied by epistemic work, e.g., sensing, measuring, recording, and in some (more cognizant) cases, anticipating properties of the surroundings. Evolution of cognition can thus be seen as thermodynamic deepening, and the process of continuous increase of the distance from equilibrium reflects a measure of epistemic complexity. Epistemic complexity enfolds two processes: firstly, of the evolutionary past, and secondly, of the total set of potential actions to be performed in future.

According to cognitive biology, all levels of epistemic complexity in living systems – from molecules, cells, tissues and organisms, to social institutions and culture – represent embodied knowledge that has accumulated over evolutionary times and has been retained by natural selection. By contrast, nomic interactions of individual atoms and molecules, such as chemical reactions in the inanimate world, with no evolutionary history, are deterministic, timeless, and do not represent cognition.

Along this line of arguments, evolution of cognition is a unidirectional, cumulative process that voraciously dissipates all available energy gradients, uses them to increase its knowledge, and uses the knowledge to search for new gradients. Most importantly, data of the surroundings can be transformed into knowledge in a specific, subject-dependent way. This transformation process can be understood as in-
formation that is used by a system to reduce uncertainty (Kovac 2007). The acquired knowledge is embodied in the construction of individuals, suggesting that individuals can be described as "copies" of the same ontic and epistemic system. Therefore, biological individuality is assumed to be hierarchically nested, from molecular sensors up to organisms, communities, species, an individual at each level of hierarchy being a distinct cognitive subject engaged in ontic and epistemic work.

This idea of individuality converges with Krakauer et al. (2014) who have argued that biological individuality can be usefully understood in terms of informational individuality. Here, individuality is not formulated as binary, but continuous. Consequently, there may be multiple degrees of individuality at all levels of biological organization and some processes may possess greater individuality than others. Essential to individuality is the propagation of information forward in time and the concomitant reduction in uncertainty.

Following Krakauer et al., I will argue that information theoretic language can be used to quantify a system's degree of individuality. This approach relates individuals to statistical mechanics and thermodynamics without falling prey to physical reductionism (i.e., without explaining features of biological science through first principles of physics).

References:
Research on symbiotic communities (microbiomes) of multicellular organisms seems to be changing our understanding of how species of plants and animals have evolved over millions of years. The quintessence of these discoveries is the emergence of the hologenome theory of evolution, founded on the concept that a holobiont (a host along with all of its associated symbiotic microorganisms) acts as a single unit of selection in the process of evolution. Although the hologenome theory has become very popular among certain scientific circles, its principles are still being debated.

In this talk, we argue, firstly, that only a very small number of symbiotic microorganisms are sufficiently integrated into multicellular organisms to act in concert with them as units of selection, thus rendering claims that holobionts are units of selection invalid. As a background for the discussion we chose the debate about the units of selection as presented by Godfrey-Smith, which is, as we believe, the most detailed elaboration of this sort. Then, we argue that holobionts do not fulfill requirements distinguished by Godfrey-Smith and, thus, should not be generally considered units of selection. Secondly, we present the idea that, even though holobionts are not units of selection, they can still constitute genuine units from an evolutionary perspective, provided we accept certain constraints: mainly, they should be considered units of co-operation. This can be achieved by analysing the idea idea of holobiont based on the concept of organismality, developed by Queller and Strasmann.
ently developed the "hologenome concept of evolution," according to which holobionts are units of selection in evolution (Rosenberg & Zilber-Rosenberg 2013, 2015; Theis et al. 2016; Roughgarden et al. 2017). This claim has been recently criticized by many, who argue that holobionts cannot be considered units of selection because the entities that compose a holobiont are not faithfully transmitted intergenerationally as a unit and, therefore, their influence in the holobiont is not evolutionarily constant. As inheritance is taken as a necessary condition for a biological entity to be a unit of selection, critics argue, the fact that inheritance is intergenerationally disrupted undermines the conceptual possibility of holobionts being units of selection (Moran & Sloan 2015; Douglas & Werren 2016).

In this talk, I contest this argument by distinguishing between the notions of stability of species and stability of traits. Stability of species demands that the different species that integrate a holobiont are faithfully transmitted every generation for the holobiont to be a unit of selection. Stability of traits, however, is based on the concept of group selection and it only requires the existence of a statistical correlation among the traits that are identified across generations of holobionts for holobionts to be units of selection: whether (or whether not) the species that are responsible for the appearance of the traits reoccur every generation is conceptually irrelevant for holobionts to be units of selection. I defend that the arguments that have been offered against the role of holobionts as units of selection assume the idea of stability of species, which I argue to be conceptually mistaken for representing the concept of units of selection. I further argue that the idea of stability of traits is more suitable for capturing the role of holobionts as units of selection, as it identifies the minimal properties that must be discovered for any entity to evolve by natural selection. Finally, I conclude presenting the relationship between the two notions and speculating about how the notion of stability of traits would affect the conceptualization of the units of selection.
Özlem Yılmaz (KLI, Klosterneuburg): ‘Individual Plant’ Why it matters?

Plant Science involves many areas of biology. First, I will talk a bit on Phenomics and Genomics in Plant Science and why Plant Phenomics has been getting more and more attention recently. Then I will argue: it is very clear that plant scientists are dealing with “processes not things” (Dupré 2012) and thinking life as processes is a very good way for our understanding of plant life. I will give example cases from Plant Physiology area and I will emphasize: ‘individual plant’ is very important in these experiments.

Phenome of an individual plant is a process that is constituted from many complex interacting processes: evolutionary, developmental, ecological, physiological, molecular. Although scientists are usually concerned about a phenotypic trait through one area of biology, they consider other processes too in their experiment designs. For example: C3 and C4 plants have different leaf anatomies than each other; along with those anatomies, they also have some different physiological activities in photosynthesis. Both the leaf anatomies and the physiological activities are some kinds of stabilized processes that have been obtained and have been actively sustained through many kinds of interacting processes. C4 plants have evolved as having a carbon-concentrating mechanism. C4 and C3 plants have also different kinds of interactions with their environments than each other. When we observe, or measure a phenotypic trait, related to photosynthetic activity, of a plant, we are aware that: the fact if it is a C3 or C4 plant affects that trait. There are many other factors that we should consider: species, sub-species, cultivar etc. of the plant (about its genome; so, affecting its phenome), at which stage of development it is in, what kind of environment it is living in, what kind of environments it has lived in (affecting its phenome and epigenome), what kind of environments its parents – recent ancestors – lived it (about its epigenome; so, affecting its phenome). Another very important factor is plant microbiota, which is in interaction (directly or indirectly) with all the processes of the individual plant (we may even say they are part of the individual plant). For example, there are many species of bacteria that is living in and around the roots of plants. They may affect plants in many ways, for example: they usually make it easy for plants to acquire nutrients from the soil (e.g. some of these bacteria, like Rhizobium, do nitrogen fixation) and they affect adaptation and acclimation to the stress conditions.
Some of the references:


Contributed Talks
A Biological Approach to the Explanatory Gap

Bendik Hellem Aaby

The explanatory gap between matter and experience is a central problem for contemporary philosophy of mind. One of the main questions we must meet in order to come closer to bridging the gap is what it takes for something to have subjective experience. On this question philosophers of mind have radically different views. On the one hand we have panpsychism, which holds that everything has some sort of experience, and on the other we have views like Global Workspace Theory (GWT) which holds that a cognitive architecture is needed for subjective experience. Recently, philosophers of biology have entered the debate.

Peter Godfrey-Smith argues that between panpsychism and approaches like GWT there is an alternative view, which he dubs the transformation view (Godfrey-Smith 2016). On this view, subjective experience is possible in relatively simple organisms, while the evolution of more complex sensory and cognitive features will transform the character of subjective experience, but not bring it into being. The benefits of this view are that subjective experience can be thought of as coming in degrees and that we can look to evolutionary- and sensory biology for clues as to the necessary conditions for a minimal account of subjective experience, i.e. what makes subjective experience come into being. If for example, an organism with a nervous system that exhibits sensory input and behavioral output is sufficient, then it is argued, we are one step closer to bridging the gap.

In this talk I will go through Godfrey-Smith’s arguments and see if it does indeed improve on the other views available. My main worry is that the explanatory gap will reappear in a different guise. Specifying the conditions for minimal subjective experience might be just as difficult here as in the other views.

References

Bendik Hellem Aaby (KU Leuven, Belgium)
I am a Norwegian PhD student at KU Leuven, Belgium. My current research lies at the interface between the philosophy of evolutionary biology, mind, and animal psychology. I am one year into a four year PhD.

I did my MA on Mechanistic Explanation at the University of Oslo, and my BA in history, focusing on two 18th century texts that justified the absolute monarchy in Denmark-Norway in the age of enlightenment. E-Mail: bendik.aaby@kuleuven.be

What’s Really Wrong with Ontic Structural Realism? On the Possibility of Reading off Ontology from Current Fundamental Science

Haktan Akcin

argue that the central conflict between epistemic (ESR) and ontic (OSR) versions of structural realism concerns whether it is possible to read off ontology from current fundamental science. After I set up this fundamental conflict, I look at two challenges for the ontic version in the philosophy of physics. The first one is due to Ainsworth. According to him, there is no interpretation of modern physics that shows the ontological superiority of structures over objects. Although I find Ainsworth’s criticism quite convincing, for the sake of argument, I assume that advocates of OSR could somehow show that relations are ontologically prior to relata in modern physics. However, endorsing this priority relation might not be sufficient to justify the ontic structuralist claim that there are just structures “all the way down”. This second challenge is related to a realist interpretation of quantum entanglement provided by Bub. The crucial idea is that entanglement should be taken as a new physical primitive in the sense
that it does not supervene on any other physical source. After I explain why the conclusion of Bub’s argument is a challenge for OSR, I again assume that proponents might find a way out to show that Bub’s discussion does not deal a blow to OSR. Finally, I claim that even if it is considered that OSR survives both challenges, this assumption still does not say anything about the possibility of reading off ontology from current fundamental science. After I write down premises and conclusions of OSR and ESR, I show that the conclusion as regards to the possibility of reading off ontology from modern science in the ontic version is already assumed in one of the premises; hence the argument begs the question. As a result, the problem of ontological discontinuity throughout radical theory changes in the history of science remains intact in the ontic version.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Aleksandra Gomułczak
Date: 14:00-14:30, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005

Haktan Akcin (Lingnan University, Hong Kong)
I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Philosophy at Lingnan University, on a Research Fellowship from Hong Kong Government. In my PhD thesis, I try to find out fundamental characteristics of Naturalized Metaphysics that would be suitable for the Epistemic version of Structural Realism.

Prior to my current post at Lingnan, I was a master’s student in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bristol. My MLitt thesis “Structural Realism as an Argument for Scientific Realism” was supervised by James Ladyman. Before that, I obtained BA and MA degrees in philosophy from Middle East Technical University in Turkey. E-Mail: hakcin@ln.edu.hk
Können Regelsysteme Kapazitäten sein?

Färber Gian Andri

Nancy Cartwright vertritt die Ansicht, dass in der Wissenschaft die Anwendung der sogenannten analytischen Methode typisch ist. Gemäß dieser Methode ist ein Geschehen zunächst in seine einzelnen Faktoren zu zerlegen, um die jeweiligen Effekte zu untersuchen, die eintreten, wenn diese Faktoren alleine wirken. Das hierbei erlangte Wissen ist sodann zu verwenden, um das betreffende Geschehen und weitere Situationen, in denen die untersuchten Faktoren operieren, zu erklären. Die Pointe der Cartwrightschen Rekonstruktion dieser Methode ist die These, dass deren Anwendung Wissen um Kapazitäten generiert und folglich die Realität von Kapazitäten implizit voraussetzt.

Ihre Überlegungen hat Cartwright bis anhin vor allem an Beispielen aus der Physik und der Ökonomie illustriert. Doch lässt sich ihre These auch auf die Linguistik übertragen? Das Ziel meines Vortrags besteht darin, eben dies für die Linguistik Noam Chomskys zu bejahen.


Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: German
Chair: Mariusz Maziarz
Date: 10:00-10:30, 13 September 2018 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005
The Three Axes of Epistemic Injustice in the Testimony of Sexual Violence and Rape Culture Victims

Aurora Georgina Bustos Arellano

In 1997, a group of nine Mexican men went public with accusations that they had been abused as children and youngsters by Marcial Maciel, the founding leader of the catholic congregation Legion of Christ, while studying under him in Spain and Rome in the 1940s and 1950s. The group lodged formal charges at the Vatican in 1998 and published an open public letter in which they claimed being “doubly victimized” both for the sexual abuse, committed by Maciel, and for the discredit of their testimony by the Vatican authorities. I focus on a Mexican case of moral injustice related to the testimony of the victims of sexual violence and the rape culture in which they develop. Based on such a case, the particular aim of this research is to bring together knowledge and justice.

From a philosophical approach, victims of several forms of sexual violence often face epistemic obstacles at three stages: when they try to “speak out” about the alleged experience, when they render testimony to the legal authorities, and when they are trying to make intelligible to themselves, and others, the experience of violence itself. Such obstacles are instances of epistemic injustice and are conceptually understood as examples of silencing, testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, respectively. Thanks to the groundbreaking work of Lorraine Code, Rae Langton, Miranda Fricke, Kristie Dotson, Jos Medina, Gaile Pohlhaus and Ian James Kidd we now understand the phenomena of epistemic injustice as the wrong to someone in their capacity as a knower. My research shows that the instances of epistemic injustice in the sexual violence victims’ testimony, due to rape culture, are framed into three axes. Those three axes are: structural oppression, social and epistemic
position (or location) of the victims, and the unjust distribution of credibility in the testimonial exchange. The testimonies of Maciel's victims exhibit this frame and let us understand how structural processes, like oppression and social positionality, has epistemological consequences. Nevertheless, my proposal also intend to point out, as the result of the epistemological study of the Maciel's victims' testimony, the confluence aspects to which philosophy can respond proactively towards social justice issues.

That's why I suggest that one way to eradicate instances of epistemic injustice based on rape culture and sexual violence testimony consists in our understanding of testimonial exchange from an epistemic injustice framing to a new epistemic justice framework based on three principles: epistemic empowerment, fair distribution of credibility, and epistemic empathy. This new framework of epistemic justice would allow us to protect the knowledge of sexual violence victims and to establish epistemic justice as a right of its own. The framework of epistemic justice proposed cannot work by itself. Epistemic justice frameworks must incorporate aspects of the C.A.R.E. (Communication, Accountability, Respect and Empathy) culture to testimony. C.A.R.E. have been used in young activism to identify manifestations of violence within specific communities and to empower agents through the creation of their own epistemic resources to fight against the inequalities faced by the members of under privileged groups – such as women and children.

The presented paper can be seen as a proposal within Feminist epistemology which seeks to make a contribution in the achievement of social justice by denouncing and eradicating cases of epistemic injustice such as the Maciel victims testimony and others.
Aurora Georgina Bustos Arellano (Autonomous National University of Mexico / Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico) is a graduate student from National Autonomous University of Mexico at Philosophy Graduate School. Her main philosophical interests are Feminist Epistemology, Analytic Epistemology, Epistemology of Testimony and topics related to epistemic injustice toward disadvantaged groups, such women and children. She also works as philosophy high-school teacher and promotes SexEd and Teen Activism towards to eradicate any form of sexual violence and gender discrimination in classroom.
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Why “Tonk” is Nonsensical – and Paradoxes Aren’t: an Approach in a Typed Sequent Calculus System

Sara Ayhan

Tonk is the notorious connective Prior used in his famous paper from 1960 (“The Runabout Inference-Ticket”) to give a reductio ad absurdum-argument against the idea of proof-theoretic semantics, i.e. the idea that all there is to the meaning of logical connectives are the rules of inference that govern their use. If that was true, Prior argues, we could just as easily invent a connective with completely arbitrary rules and state that this connective was meaningful, after all we had its rules. In the case of tonk the rules consist of an introduction rule which resembles the one for disjunction (“from A one can derive A tonk B”) and an elimination rule which resembles the one for conjunction (“from A tonk B one can derive B”). Thus, it would be possible to derive arbitrary B from arbitrary A, which would trivialize the notion of logical consequence and, in the view of proof-theoretic semantics, the notion of meaning. As this posed a serious threat, in the following decades a vast amount of literature was published that tried to make out a necessary condition for rules, which would keep the “good” connectives while ruling out connectives like tonk.

There is another reason why tonk is a challenging connective: it displays proof-theoretic parallels to paradoxical connectives since with both it is possible to derive absurdity with a proof that is in principle non-normalizable. However, although both are non-standard connectives, intuitively we want to ascribe some meaning to paradoxical connectives,
whereas tonk is plain nonsense by its own definition. Therefore, it would be desirable to spell out this intuition proof-theoretically. In this talk I will show how this is possible not only for natural deduction systems but also for sequent calculi where the distinction between tonk and paradoxes is not as easy to draw because notions like reduction procedures are missing. These can be retrieved, though, by creating typed rules for sequent calculus and thus, by using the notion of term reduction from lambda-calculus. Thereby, we are able to show the proof-theoretical distinction between meaningful and not meaningful non-standard phenomena and thus, combine syntax and semantics in a fruitful way.

Sara Ayhan (Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany)
Since March 2018 I am a PhD student supervised by Heinrich Wansing at the “Logic and Epistemology”-department at the Ruhr-University Bochum. Before that I obtained the degree of 1st state exam in philosophy, English and history in 2015 with a thesis about Donald Davidson’s conception of truth and the Master of Arts degree in philosophy in 2018 at the RUB. During these studies I also spent a semester abroad at the University of Adelaide, South Australia. I wrote my Master’s thesis about the treatment of paradoxes in proof-theoretic semantics and continue this work in my PhD project with the focus on consequence relations and identity of proofs.
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New Mechanistic Debate: The Devil Is in the Details

Vito Balorda

I address the question of abstraction and detailing in the new mechanistic debate, namely, the explanatory role that they perform, and their importance for the understanding of mechanistic explanation. I argue that the abstraction has its merits
as a representational tool, i.e., a role in helping scientists and general public to better understand complex phenomena. However, the explanatory power appears to be contained in the details, namely, in the details that mechanisms are made of. I argue that there are three explanatory steps in that regard: (1) collecting all the data or the data that are collected by scientific projects such as HGP or ENCODE in genomics; (2) extracting all the relevant data, i.e., the explanatory relevant data for the corresponding phenomena; (3) abstracting, i.e., sketches or models that are used as representations of a mechanism (see Craver and Kaplan (2018)).

The present paper emphasizes the importance of (2). (3), or the abstracting procedure, refers to “black-boxes” or areas in the models that are left vague in order to represent broad range of phenomena. (2), on the contrary, contains all the relevant data that are responsible for the explanation of the corresponding phenomenon by referring to different levels and grains of biological organization. I argue that the procedure of a mechanism detailing is more explanatory than the abstracting procedure. Nevertheless, there is a pressing issue of the criterion for the explanatory relevant data, which I address with regard to (3).

The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 1, I briefly present recent trends in the mechanistic debate. In Section 2, I lay out the notion of abstraction in that debate, in particular, as advocated in Levy and Bechtel (2013). Finally, in Section 3, I argue for the explanatory power based on the detailing procedure, namely, by emphasizing step (2) in the abovementioned account.
my BA, also on the same Faculty. My BA thesis was about the biological functions debate in the area of philosophy of biology. My research interests are focused on the discussions in philosophy of science, particularly in philosophy of biology. Currently, my main interest is on the new mechanistic debate within the frame of the scientific explanation debate.

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Emergence of Public Meaning from a Teleosemantic and Game Theoretical Perspective

Karim Baraghith

The generalized theory of evolution suggests that evolutionary algorithms apply to biological and cultural processes like language alike. Variation, selection and reproduction constitute abstract and formal traits of complex, open and often self-regulating systems. Accepting this basic assumption provides us with a powerful background theory for this investigation: explaining the emergence and proliferation of semantic patterns, that become conventional. A teleosemantic theory of public (conventional) meaning (Millikan 1984; 2005a) grounded in a generalized theory of evolution explains the proliferation of public language forms in terms of their adaptive proper function. It has also been suggested, that the emergence of meaning, can be formalized with game-theoretical tools (Skyrms 2010) within signaling systems of coordination. I want to show how closely related these approaches are, both in terms of explanandum and of outcomes. To put it in a nutshell: If the emergence of public meaning can be satisfactorily explained in terms of signaling games, then the cultural evolutionary dynamics will serve as an adequate model to describe their proliferation. Public or conventional meaning (in contrast to personal meaning) can be fully understood in terms of its evolutionary function in a population of communicators.
Karim Baraghith (HHUD, Germany)
Currently I am a PhD student and research fellow at the chair of Prof. Gerhard Schurz (Heinrich Heine University Duesseldorf). My fields of research and interests are generalized Darwinism from a philosophy of science perspective, evolutionary game theory, teleosemantics and philosophy of biology.
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Neutrale Relationen: bidirektional, nicht adirektional
Claudius Berger

Der Sachverhalt, dass Eloise Abelard liebt, ist ein anderer, als die Liebe von Abelard zu Eloise. Dies ist eine Besonderheit nicht-symmetrischer Relationen. Der Standardansatz der Relationen erklärt diesen Unterschied mit der Richtung, die eine Relation aufweist: Im einen Fall geht sie von Eloise zu Abelard und im anderen Fall von Abelard zu Eloise. Kit Fine attackierte diesen Ansatz zuletzt, da er eine Übergenerierung von Sachverhalten zur Folge hat: Wenn ein Block, a, sich über einem anderen, b, befindet, dann gibt es einen Sachverhalt, dessen Konstituenten a, b und die Relation "über" sind. Doch wenn Relationen in eine bestimmte Richtung verlaufen, dann gibt es immer auch eine andere, konverse Relation, die entgegengesetzt verläuft, in diesem Fall die Relation "unter". Doch was ist der Sachverhalt, der durch a, b und "unter" konstituiert wird? Ist er derselbe? Dann scheint es zu viele ihn konstituierende Relationen zu geben, wo wir nur eine erwarten. Oder gibt es zwei Sachverhalte? Auch dies scheint unplauisibel, denn es gibt nur diese eine Konstellation der Blöcke mit ihren relativen Positionen. Fines Konsequenz ist, dass Reihenfolge und Direktionalität aus Relationen verschwinden müssen, damit diese seine Forderung nach "Neutralität" erfüllen. Wenn keine Richtung eine Bevorzugung gegenüber einer anderen erhält, dann gibt es auch keine Konflikte bei der Generierung von Sachverhalten.

Ich möchte Russells Standardansatz mit Richtungen retten, indem ich Neutralität durch Bidirektionalität erreiche. Relationen verlaufen nicht nur von einem Relat zu einem anderen, sondern einige von ihnen inkludieren auch die Umkehrrichtung, allerdings mit unterschiedenem relationalen materiellen Inhalt.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology  
Language: German  
Chair: Alexander Gebhardt  
Date: 11:20-11:50, 13 September 2018 (Thursday)  
Location: SR 1.006

Claudius Berger (Universität Tübingen, Germany)  
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Criticism against a Naturalistic Explanation of Logical Validity

Mathieu Berteloot

from “chess pieces are either black or white”, “the piece is not black”, we infer by deductive logical reasoning that “the piece is white”. How can we justify that a logical rule is indeed deductively valid? An elaborated attempt to justify deductive logical validity has been developed by Penelope Maddy (2007). Broadly speaking, she offers a naturalist solution to this justification problem of logic. Her hypothesis is that we are endowed with an ability to make valid deductive inferences. We, as cognitive species, have acquired mechanisms for retrieving true information about the world in a reliable way; making deductively valid inferences is a useful tool in that respect. The theory of natural selection and learning abilities provide the causal link between the general truths of the world and our
cognition. The main aim of this talk is, however, to make a case against a naturalistic explanation of logic. I will draw from Thomas Nagel’s The Last Word (1997), in which he, inter alia, takes up the case of logical reasoning and criticizes naturalistic explanations for it. There are several issues, but one crucial objection against naturalism of logic is that it is circular. Naturalistic explanations build on scientific evidence, but sciences in turn commit to or presuppose certain logical principles. I hold that this circularity is vicious. I will discuss possible strategies that a naturalist can take to avoid the circularity problem. One notable candidate is Bayesian epistemology. I will argue that such strategies will inevitably fail. I will offer a diagnosis of why a naturalistic account seems generally insufficient in the particular case of logic. Finally, I will raise the question, if naturalistic explanations are unsatisfactory, whether there even is a solution to the justification problem of logic or we should turn to scepticism about logic instead. I will speculate about possible stances or solutions to the problem of the justification of logical validity.

Section: Logic
Language: English
Chair: Stefan Forster
Date: 10:40-11:10, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006

Mathieu Berteloot (KU Leuven, Leuven)
Mathieu Berteloot has obtained a MA in Literature and Linguistics from Ghent University (2010); a MA in Philosophy from KU Leuven (2017); and now is finishing a Research MA in Analytic Philosophy at KU Leuven. He is broadly interested in Analytic Philosophy, but he has been particularly focusing on topics in the Philosophy of Logic.
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One of the most popular comments on the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is Max Black’s article (1952) written in a manner of dispute between A – the supporter of PII – and B who tried to reject it. In one of the arguments B asks to imagine the universe that contains nothing but two exactly similar pure-iron spheres of the diameter of one meter, with this same color, temperature etc. He claims that they are a counterexample of PII. Moreover, he argues that this reasoning works also with all symmetrical objects (e.g. with two mirror-reflected Napoleons) and mentions point and axis reflections. The goal of this talk is to provide rigorous definitions and mathematical background for this considerations, which will allow to present that B was wrong.

B’s considerations seem to be rather unclear. Firstly, he does not provide definition of the space in his argument. I will consider several possibilities equipped with mathematical description, e.g. some versions of absolute and relational spaces: oriented, non oriented and non orientable ones with different numbers of dimensions. After the analysis of their symmetries it will turn out that for some of them B’s argument does not work. In order to prove my statement I will provide my own variants of the argument in different spaces. The majority of them takes advantage of the notion of incongruent counterparts naively defined in famous Kant’s argument (1768). I will provide their rigorous definition (that refers to isometry and rigid motion) that will allow to show on mathematical ground which pairs: spaces and objects, fails to support B’s view and indicate the reason of such situation. Finally, I will provide some more complicated variants of the argument (e.g. two hands on Mobius strip) that are contradictory to PII.

This considerations will show that B’s argument is incorrect in some cases; the mathematical background will explain the reason of this failure. Considering different spaces is interesting, because it may lead to the conclusion that although PII can be rejected in B’s ideal universe, it works perfectly in our physical reality – depending on the nature of our space.
Marta Emilia Bielińska (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
Marta Emilia Bielińska is an undergraduate student in Interfaculty Individual Studies in the Humanities (main division: Philosophy) and Studies in Mathematics and Natural Sciences (main division: Theoretical Physics) at Jagiellonian University in Cracow. She is interested in philosophy of physics (especially in context of symmetries and orientation of space), metaphysics of modalities and temporal logic.
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Text Interpretation as a Source of Knowledge

Wout Bisschop

Readers frequently find themselves wondering what a piece of text means. They seek to find out the meaning of particular words, sentences, and stories. They try to characterize the locutionary, illocutionary, or perlocutionary intentions of a text's author. They aim to find out what argument exactly is propounded by a text, to characterize the genre of a text, to characterize the structure of a text, or to describe implied assumptions of the author (e.g. conversational implicatures). These examples provide us with an ostensive definition of processes called ‘text interpretation’. The result of such processes we may call ‘interpretive statements’, and, when believed, ‘interpretive beliefs’.

Interpretative statements are often considered to be non-factual and merely representing one out of many perspectives on some issue. ‘Room for interpretation’ is, in common parlance, due to absence of known facts, and ‘matters of interpretation’ are such in part because they are not ‘matters of fact’. In contrast, however, some interpretive statements seem to be claims for knowledge, for example: ‘Rex’ means ‘king’ in particular context C, and neither ‘queen’ nor ‘strawberry’. Or: ‘Anselm
assumed a neo-platonic metaphysics in developing his ontological argument for the existence of God'. This warrants further inquiry into the epistemology of text interpretation.

This paper addresses two questions concerning the epistemology of text interpretation. (1) Suppose we want to consider the question whether these kinds of interpretive statements could amount to knowledge; what would an account of interpretational knowledge look like? And (2) can text interpretation be a source of knowledge?

An account of interpretational knowledge can align with a standard analysis of knowledge: S knows p based on the interpretation of text T iff (i) S believes p based on the interpretation of text T, (ii) p is true, and (iii) S belief p based on the interpretation of text T is warranted (with ‘warrant’ referring to that on which true belief is knowledge). On this approach ‘interpretational knowledge’ is understood to be knowledge from interpretation, with interpretation as a source of knowledge. But interpretation is not included among the standard knowledge sources, like perception, reasoning or intuition, memory, introspection, and testimony, and even not among the less commonly suggested sources, such as proprioception, reading, aesthetic sense, moral sense, and the sensus divinitatis. Assuming interpretive statements can be objects of knowledge, should we individuate the process of text interpretation as a knowledge source?

I argue that a ‘source of knowledge’ is something x yielding propositional content (or: a proposition) that, in virtue of being yielded by x, can amount to knowledge, namely when the conditions for a propositional knowledge are met. For the individuation of knowledge sources (the ‘something x’ in our definition) there only are pragmatically motivated criteria. It seems reasonable not to individuate x as a knowledge source if (I) x does not cover an interesting number of belief and potentially knowledge forming processes, if (II) x is a token of a single type of knowledge source already acknowledged, or if (III) x is reducible to a combination of other, already acknowledged types of sources of knowledge. I argue that interpretation is a source of knowledge because even if it consists in a combination of other, more commonly individuated knowledge sources, it is only a very specific range of combinations of such sources that would account for processes of text interpretation.
Wout Bisschop (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands)
I obtained BA and MA degrees in both Theology as well as Philosophy, did a non-degree year graduate work in philosophy in the US, and am currently a PhD candidate at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam with a project on the epistemology of text interpretation.
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Libertarianism and Collective Action: Is there a Libertarian Case for Mandatory Vaccination?

Charlie Thomas Blunden

Non-vaccination can lead to harmful outbreaks of preventable disease: currently there are a rising number of measles cases in Europe, and Italy has measles vaccination rates as low as 85%. Mandatory vaccination could be used to prevent such outbreaks, and so powerful political arguments in favour of mandatory vaccination would be very useful. In his paper “A libertarian case for mandatory vaccination”, Jason Brennan argues that even libertarians, who are very averse to coercive measures, should support mandatory vaccination. He argues that libertarians should accept the clean hands principle, which would justify mandatory vaccination. The principle states that there is a (sometimes enforceable) moral obligation not to participate in collectively harmful activities. Once libertarians accept the principle, they will be compelled to support mandatory vaccination.

I argue that the cases Brennan uses to justify this principle are disanalogous to the case of non-vaccination, and that they are not compelling to libertarians. The cases Brennan offers can be explained by a libertarian using what I call the individual sufficiency principle: which states that if an individual’s action is sufficient to cause harm then there is a (sometimes enforceable) moral obligation not to carry out that action. I
argue that this principle is more appealing to libertarians than the clean hands principle, and more appropriate for Brennan’s examples. In order to get libertarians to accept the clean hands principle, I present a modified version of one of Brennan’s cases that is analogous to the case of non-vaccination. Using this case, I argue that whether the clean hands principle will justify mandatory vaccination is dependent on whether the herd immunity rate in a given population is approaching a threshold after which a collective risk of harm will be imposed onto others. While making this argument, I consider the collective action structure of non-vaccination and the complexities of theories of acceptable risk.

Section: Political Philosophy & Philosophy of Law
Language: English
Chair: Martina Valkovic
Date: 11:20-11:50, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007

Charlie Thomas Blunden (Utrecht University, Netherlands)
My name is Charlie Blunden, I am originally from the UK, and am currently a student at Utrecht University, studying for the Research Master in Philosophy. I obtained my BA in Philosophy at the University of Reading, writing my thesis under the supervision of Dr. Nat Hansen. My thesis topic was on the ethics of nudging, particularly with reference to value pluralism and the philosophy of Isaiah Berlin. I am interested in ethics and political philosophy, but my research interests are still evolving: recently I have become very interested in Bernard Williams, David Hume, and empirical moral psychology. I hope to pursue a PhD in Philosophy after my RMA, or otherwise to work in policy formation in the UK public sector.
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A Nietzschean Account of Valuing

Charles Boddicker

In this paper I give an account of Nietzsche’s conception of valuing. I address the descriptive question of what it means for someone to value something, rather than the normative question of whether what someone values is in fact valuable. I argue that, for Nietzsche: valuing X means having a positive affective orientation toward X induced by one’s strongest drives. I develop my view in response to Katsafanas’ 2016 account. Katsafanas improves upon previous accounts by incorporating drives and affects into a single account of Nietzschean value. Previous accounts had only incorporated either one or the other. Nevertheless, I will identify two problems with his view. I argue that since my view avoids the two problems in Katsafanas’ account, in addition to three further problems that he identifies in the secondary literature, it marks an improvement on existing accounts of Nietzschean valuing.

Katsafanas argues that an agent values X if the agent (1) has a drive-induced positive affective orientation toward X, and (2) does not disapprove of this affective orientation. My two criticisms correspond to Katsafanas’ conditions (1) and (2) respectively. The first criticism is that the condition that only drive-induced affects count as values does not carve out a genuine subset of affects. I provide textual evidence to show that all affects are drive-induced for Nietzsche. The second criticism is that disapproval in condition (2) is ambiguous. I show that condition (2) becomes redundant when we have an adequate grasp of what disapproval means for Nietzsche.

My account addresses the two problems with Katsafanas account in addition to three problems that he finds in Richardson, Poellner, and Clark & Dudrick’s accounts. Firstly, unlike Richardson’s account, my account does not imply that we value the ends of all of our drives, only the ends of our strongest drives. Secondly, unlike Poellner’s account, it does not include fleeting attractions as values, since our strongest drives induce affects that structure our behaviour over long stretches of time. Thirdly, unlike Clark & Dudrick’s it does not require that we reflect on the justificatory status of all of our values and it allows us to have values of which we are unaware. Finally, it accounts for the way in which Nietzsche thinks that drives explain our consciously espoused values.
**Charles Boddicker** (University of Southampton, United Kingdom)

I am a third year PhD student at the University of Southampton. My research focuses on Nietzsche’s accounts of the drives and affects and how these relate to what he thinks it means to value something.

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**Justifying the Evidential Use of Linguistic Intuitions**

Karen Bröcker

Intuitive judgements about the well-formedness of sentences is the data type of choice in generative linguistics. Despite this, there is little discussion within the field over what makes these intuitive judgements good evidence. In the philosophy of linguistics, on the other hand, this question has been hotly debated. One answer, the *Voice of Competence* view, as named by Michael Devitt, is that the speaker’s linguistic competence delivers the propositional content of judgements. This proposal commits us to very immodest cognitive assumptions, and no one has come forward to defend it. Instead, Georges Rey (2013), among others, argues that the speaker’s competence produces a signal which is fairly directly translated into the content of an intuitive judgement. This begins to answer the question, but these accounts are criticised for not cashing out how such signals could plausibly be translated into the propositional content of judgements.

On the other side of the debate, Devitt (2006) argues that intuitive judgements are theory-laden, central processor judgements. On Devitt’s account, these judgements are made according to concepts from either folk linguistics or linguistic theory. Critics reply that this type of theory-laden judgements could not play the evidential role that intuitive judgements have in linguistics.
In this paper, I defend an account that combines elements from both sides of the debate. On this account, sentence processing is accompanied by an affective evaluation of the sentence (Luka, 2005), and this serves as the competence-based signal which a judgement is based on. The concept applied in the judgement, rather than being from (folk) linguistic theory, is built on the subject’s experience with processing sentences and the accompanying affective evaluations. The result is a cognitively plausible account of linguistic intuitive judgements on which, in contrast to on Devitt’s view, the content of judgements is mainly due to the speaker’s linguistic competence.

Karen Bröcker (Aarhus University, Denmark)
Karen Bröcker is currently a PhD fellow at the Centre for Science Studies at Aarhus University, Denmark. Her work focuses on the philosophy of linguistics, specifically the assumptions underlying the use of intuitive judgements as evidence in linguistics. She is part of a research group investigating the evidential use of intuitions in science, philosophy, and linguistics.
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Historicism and Ahistoricism: The Limits of Popper’s Political Thought

Jan Buran

Considering the vast influence of “The Open Society and Its Enemies”, Karl Popper is without a doubt one of the most important exponents of liberalism in the twentieth century. I will, nevertheless, argue that Popper’s political philosophy is not always quite self-consistent. The aim is not to destroy his conception, but to “repair” it. That is possible because, with some minor exceptions, the inconsistencies are caused by Popper not inferring all the logical consequences of his own postulates, and not by contradiction in the postulates themselves. I will look at Popper’s political theory from the perspective of its own bases, criticizing its surface conclusions and loose additions to it. Particular attention will be given to a) the incompatibility between Popper’s projection of modern liberalism into antiquity and his conception of interaction between people and institutions of their making (between “world 2” and “world 3”); b) his unacceptable confusion of the concept of “liberalism” with those of “egalitarianism” and of “democracy”. In both cases, an important inspiration for critique is provided by the ideas of Isaiah Berlin. These ideas, often better than Popper’s own conclusions, answer the demands of “critical dualism of facts and norms” which is, according to Popper, the basis and a necessary condition of “the open society”. R. M. Hare’s “Language of Morals” will be used for the sake of conceptual clarification. The combination of Hare’s logic and Berlin’s emphasis on the fact that human needs often contradict one another will illustrate the inevitability of pluralism from which (provided the shared aim to minimize violent conflicts) representative democracy and the rule of law can be deduced as not only most advantageous in a long run, but also as the only political system which can potentially answer the demands of Popper’s “open society”.

Section: Political Philosophy & Philosophy of Law
Language: English
Chair: Martina Valkovic
Date: 12:00-12:30, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007
Jan Buran (Palacky University Olomouc, the Czech Republic)

Jan Burán was born in Prague, Czech Republic, in 1991. He studied philosophy and film studies at Palacky University Olomouc, where he now continues to pursue a PhD. His main interest being political philosophy, he wrote his bachelor’s thesis on the subject of ideological bases of the Jesuits’ “reducciones” in Latin America and his master’s thesis on Karl Popper’s interpretation of Antisthenes as an opposite of Plato’s totalitarianism. Mainly based on Popper’s and Isaiah Berlin’s ideas, his dissertation project is a critique of Carl Schmitt and his contemporary followers.

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Moral Judgements about Professional Conduct in Science

Alexander Christian

The ideal of value neutrality in science generally appeals to epistemic integrity of research processes and research results. Closely related to this ideal is the assumption, that scientists qua scientists have no special moral expertise with regards to moral judgements about the object of their research, which goes beyond the moral judgement of sufficiently informed laypersons. The aim of this paper is to mitigate this line of reasoning, while simultaneously upholding the ideal of value neutrality understood as an integral component of process objectivity in science. I defend the view that scientists qua scientists – that is qua their empirical and methodological knowledge gained through academic education and professional experience – are moral experts with regard to moral judgements about their scientific peers conduct and character.
Alexander Christian (HHU Düsseldorf, Germany)
Alexander Christian is the assistant director of the Düsseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science and a research fellow at the Chair of theoretical Philosophy at the Heinrich Heine University in Düsseldorf, Germany. He is working in general philosophy of science and research ethics, with a particular focus on scientific misconduct, questionable research practices, and bias in medical research. Alex published about the suppression of medical evidence, the demarcation problem, and values in science. He also wrote about veganism, human animal studies and popular culture and philosophy.

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Intuitionism, Skepticism, and Utilitarianism

Intuitionism had been one of the most prominent ethical approaches over two hundred years, especially on the British Isles. In the first third of the 20th century it started losing its power; however, in the last few years several philosophers have been trying to renew this approach, which has made it one of the most discussed topics of contemporary metaethics. The very heart of
intuitionism consists of two kinds of claims – ontological and epistemological – which are closely interconnected. Almost everyone supporting intuitionism agree with moral realism, e. i. holds that there are objective moral facts existing independently on human mind and being completely different from natural facts. The epistemological assumption is that, in general, basic moral propositions, e. i. intuitions, are self-evident and do not need any supporting arguments. For some intuitionist these intuitions present a basis for a construction of moral principles. The paper will consist of five parts. First, I will present intuitionism and its basic assumptions. Second, I will explain skeptical arguments against intuitionism. As skeptics fancy use the evidence of empirical research concerning the reliability of moral intuitions, in the third part, I will briefly outline this issue. Some of the proponents of intuitionism try to react to these objections and create a less awed version of this approach. Such an attempt is Michael Huemer’s revisionary intuitionism, which I will describe in the fourth part. Huemer claims that the methodology he offers would probably lead to some form of utilitarianism. Finally, I will explain how we may reach the same conclusion also from the position of moderate skepticism, which seems to be less problematic than intuitionism.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Julia Mirkin
Date: 15:20-15:50, 12 September 2018 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.007

Petra Chudárková (Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic)
Petra Chudárková is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts at the Palacký University in Olomouc. She specializes in ethics and philosophy of language. Her current research focuses on the problem of reliability of moral intuitions and its implications for the realm of normative ethics. Her doctoral thesis deals with utilitarianism from the philosophical and scientific perspective.
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Rationality in language

Dorijan Dobrič

The main thesis of this paper is to defend rationalistic approach to understanding, learning and using language; the main feature of language is its creative nature and that creativeness is in its core rational. In a nutshell, this means that language enables us to create infinite number of sentences via limited number of rules and limited vocabulary. This feature cannot be easily explained by behaviorist or other empiricist approaches to language. Main critique will be focused on work of Quine, and Tomasello's paper “Language is not an instinct”, where theory of Generative Grammar is confronted. In “Word and Object”, Quine states that children learn language by listening and responding in presence of certain stimuli, and society rewards or punishes accurate or false usage of induced words. I will argue that this is only partial explanation of phenomenon of language, since Quine does nothing to expand his explanation and that is as far as his explanation goes: in early age, children need stimuli and that is how children learn. Everything else in language is rationally sub-based.

Similar critique goes to Tomasello: the main argument against Generative Grammar that he offers is that Chomsky was extremely influenced by the very nature of English language and that is why that theory cannot achieve goals of universality. I will argue that Tomasello did not support that argument in rightful manner and even if he did, it wouldn’t affect the idea of Generative Grammar. As alternative, he listed Cognitive and Functional views of language, which will later appear problematic in my critique.

I will argue that even though for understanding one complicated phenomenon as language acquisition, we need to study both the linguistic input that the child is exposed to, as well as relevant experiences: it is nonetheless essential to emphasize that formal approach, the approach that Chomsky initiated is the one that should have explanatory advantage in our approach to language. This will be accomplished by stating that syntax and semantics are two completely separated aspects of language and that they exist independently, can be researched independently, and that whenever they are connected or their existence is intertwined, that is solely accidental, even though prima facie it seems that they appear as univocal phenomenon.
Dorijan Dobrič (University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, Serbia)
I was born and raised in Belgrade. Besides philosophy, which is my main occupation, I am also a musician, and since 2005, I played in several bands, traveled across Europe and Serbia thanks to music and it is safe to say it is my inevitable passion. I have a background of a linguist and classical philologist - both studied in high-school and on faculty. Currently I work as a DJ and music producer, profession that I do for a living.
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Time Travelling in the Block Universe: Is There Room for Free Will?

Bogdan Andrei Dumitrescu

In the discussions regarding free will and determinism there was a proposal given by Carl Hoefer in the article “Freedom from the Inside Out” (2002) which suggested that free actions are compatible with determinism if we accept the Block Universe theory. However, recently, in a paper by Francisco José Soler Gil and Manuel Alfonseca (2016), a thought experiment about time travelling agents has been proposed as a difficulty to Hoefer’s theory. I will attempt to briefly analyze this thought experiment and maintain that the objection raised by Soler Gil and Alfonseca may be answered in a satisfactory way without denying the compatibility between free will and the Block Universe.

Hoefer did not consider that the problem of free will was with determinism, but with our conception of time. Thus he uses the distinction between A series time and B series time given by John Ellis McTaggart (1908) in order to illustrate his view. We perceive time as an A series: we think that the present is all that exists, that the past is somehow
fixed and unchangeable and that the future is open to many possibilities. It is this common sense view of time that conflicts with our concept of free will, not determinism. If we view time as a B series, then we may find free will to be compatible with it. (Hoefer 2002, pp. 203) Since B series time can work only in a Block Universe theory (consisting of three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension), Hoefer proposes that we accept free will as being compatible with it.

In light of this, Soler Gil and Alfonseca wish to show that within the Block Universe, there are specific cases in which the actions of an agent in the future are logically entailed by previous states of the world, namely, the behaviour of that agent in the present. They propose a thought experiment in the form of two scenarios that involve time travelling agents and the entanglement of actions. Through these scenarios they attempt to prove that unavoidable determination of actions does indeed occur in the Block Universe. (Soler Gil, Alfonseca 2016, pp. 94)

My proposal would be that a Lewisian account of time travel paradoxes could help with formulating a response to this objection.

References:

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Bogdan Andrei Dumitrescu (University of Bucharest, Romania) I am an MA student at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Bucharest, Romania. I have started my BA studies in 2014 and I have graduated in June 2017. Currently, I am in the first year of the MA Programme “Analytic Philosophy”. My research interests are in the
fields of metaphysics, ontology and meta-ethics. I am focused on the problem of free will, determinism and causality and also on emotivism in meta-ethics.
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The Shaping of Epistemic Resources

Jakob Eichler

The concept of epistemic injustice, which addresses a wrong in one’s capacity as a knower, has received widespread recognition since its introduction (Fricke 2007). While many argued to widen its extension, Fricke restricts the concept to a wrong where there is no purpose to wrong (Fricke 2017). Thereby, she opposes the concept of willful hermeneutical ignorance (Dotson 2012, Pohlhaus, Jr. 2012) which addresses the refusal of epistemic resources by dominantly situated knowers.

I aim for two interwoven projects: (1) I utilize the concept of hermeneutical injustice to give an analysis of addiction in gaming contexts, and (2), based on this analysis, argue against Fricke’s restriction.

I consider two actors participating in gaming contexts: The players, including addicted players, and the video game industry. I identify a dysfunctional concept of addiction in these contexts, obscuring the social experiences within. I trace back that dysfunction in the community’s efforts to repel stigma attached to addiction or to appropriate the concept, reverse its pathological connotation. I analyse the dysfunction utilizing the concept of hermeneutical injustice.

Subsequently, I shift to the video game industry and follow their attempts to influence epistemic resources regarding video games. Since the label of addiction may lead to law restrictions, the video game industry has an economic interest in shaping epistemic resources by denying any relation of games to addiction. I analyse the industry’s stance utilizing the concept of willful hermeneutical ignorance.

The concept of epistemic injustice aims not only to identify but to change problems it addresses. I claim that in order to understand the problem in the former analysis we need an understanding of the latter and vice versa. Thus, it would be insufficient to merely operate with hermeneutical injustice. A wholesome account on the social situation
of addiction in gaming contexts has to include both actors and both analyses in a unified account.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Robert Pal
Date: 12:00-12:30, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004

Jakob Eichler (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany)
Jakob Eichler’s research interests concern philosophical perspectives on addiction apart from questions of autonomy, capability or anthropology. He implements concepts from feminist philosophy, social epistemology and critical theory to provide structural explanations for the phenomenon of addiction. Identifying himself as affected, he is always interested in application-oriented and interdisciplinary solutions for the problems prompted by the analysis.
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On Griffin’s Personhood Account: The Agent-Restriction

Anton Emilsson

Although Griffin’s On Human Rights (2008) makes for an intriguing piece of work, I argue that he is inconsistent and mistaken about the set of cases which constitutes infringements on the right to liberty. More specifically, I argue that “the agent-restriction” is mistaken in precluding “large-scale economic or social events” and that his conception of the restriction and its implications exhibits an inconsistency with respect to the claim that infringement implies moral criticism – which I show to underlie his discussion. The argument is foremost based on cases discussed by Griffin, concerning structural (potential) infringements of liberty – such as a child’s paucity of options as a native member of a fundamentalist community, or society’s culturally-historically moral ignorance with respect to same-sex couples’ right to marry – which plausibly lack an appropriate
blameworthy agent as perpetrator; sometimes even lack an appropriate agent. Implicitly, I suggest that agent-produced events may constitute violations of liberty, without there being any agent with sufficient control as to render the agent culpable for the violation. The talk also include a short general presentation of Griffin’s theory of human rights, more thoroughly on the right to liberty – in order to make the argument available for the unfamiliar reader.

Section: Political Philosophy & Philosophy of Law
Language: English
Chair: Martina Valkovic
Date: 10:00-10:30, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007

Anton Emilsson (Lund University, Sweden)
Anton Emilsson, aspiring philosopher, part-time dock worker; currently pursuing a M.A. in Practical Philosophy at Lund University (Sweden), where he also earned his Bachelor, titled: “On the Appeal to Individual Indifference with respect to Anthropogenic Global Climate Change”. Focused on Political Philosophy, problems concerning (individual as well as collective) Responsibility and Blame, and Climate Ethics – especially, the intersection of the interests, the political responsibility of the unstructured global community for the (current and expected) harm of climate change.
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Problems in Pleasants’ Wittgensteinian Idea of Basic Moral Certainties

Jordi Fairhurst

Pleasants (2008b, 2009, 2015) argues in favour of the idea of basic moral certainties. Analogous to Wittgenstein’s (1975) basic empirical certainties, basic moral certainties are universal certainties that cannot be justified, asserted or meaningfully doubted. They are a fundamental condition of morality as such, thus allowing us to carry out other moral operations. Brice (2013) and
Rummens (2013) have criticized Pleasants’ proposal, arguing that basic moral certainties are significantly disanalogous to Wittgenstein’s basic empirical certainties. Brice argues that Pleasants does not differentiate between a bottom-up and a top-down approach to basic certainties nor does he acknowledge the difference that this distinction constitutes in the foundational role of a certainty. Meanwhile, Rummens claims that basic moral certainties are not universal. Conversely, they are moral hinges embedded in certain culturally and historically specific moral language-games. Pleasants (2015) has provided a response to these criticisms, whilst defending the universality and naturalism of basic moral certainties. In this paper, first, I single out the problems in Pleasants’ response to the criticisms introduced by Brice and Rummens. On the one hand, I will argue that Pleasants must present further arguments in order to demonstrate that basic moral certainties are analogous to basic empirical certainties. On the other hand, I will argue that the existence of basic moral certainties that coalesce with numerous exceptions and suspensions generates significant problems in Pleasants’ proposal. Second, I advance two cases regarding euthanasia that meaningfully challenge and doubt Pleasants’ central basic moral certainty: the wrongness of killing innocent human beings. Additionally, both cases are employed to meaningfully doubt and challenge Pleasants’ basic moral certainty of the badness of death.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Julia Mirkin
Date: 14:00-14:30, 12 September 2018 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.007

Jordi Fairhurst (Universidad de las Islas Baleares (UIB), Spain)
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Not a matter of what happens but of what is: One Hundred Years from Frege’s “Der Gedanke”

Rares Fogaș

The editors of Frege Synthesized (1986), a classic of Fregean scholarship, recall that “[s]omeone - it was probably Burton Dreben - once said that the worst-known period in the history of philosophy is always the time fifty to a hundred years ago”. This year, Frege’s “Der Gedanke” reaches its hundred year anniversary, so, following (probably) Dreben, it is about time that we get to know it better.

Even if Frege is now regarded as one of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy and his work has been thoroughly studied in the last century, we are yet to reach an agreement concerning some of Frege’s views on the central topics of his philosophy. One of these is his conception of logic and its relation with rationality. For instance, one the one hand, Field quotes from the preface to Grundgesetze and writes that “[t]he quotation may suggest that something is a law of logic if and only if it is a law of rational thought” (Field 2009, p. 251; Field’s emphasis), attributing to Frege the extreme view that logic is essentially tied with rationality. On the other hand, Goldfarb reckons that, for Frege, “[l]ogical laws are as descriptive as physical laws, but they are more general” (Goldfarb 2010, p. 68).

Starting from these conflicting attributions of views to Frege, I follow his writings on logic from the mature period of his work (as identified by Sluga 2002), especially the Logik manuscript of 1897, part of Frege’s project of writing a logic textbook and the essay “Der Gedanke”, the first of what we now know as his Logical Investigations. In doing so, I highlight his criticism of psychologism and physicalism about logic and I put an emphasis on his doctrine of thoughts. What I regard as a good question on elucidating Frege’s conception of logic is whether “laws of logic” are thoughts themselves. I claim that the introductory paragraphs of “Der Gedanke” and the arguments of the aforementioned writings offer important suggestions for framing an answer to this question.
Rares Fogaș (University of Bucharest, Romania)
Currently, my main areas of interest are early analytic philosophy (especially Frege and Wittgenstein), logic and philosophy of logic (especially logical pluralism and the relation between logic and rationality) and philosophy of mathematics. I also did some work on Kripke’s puzzle about belief, which I intend to outline in a published paper soon enough.
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The Disjunctive View of Harm: Problems in Combination

Anna Folland

How should we understand the nature of harm? The standard, comparative, view is that an event E harms a subject is she is made worse off by E. This view is simple and intuitive, but also associated with serious problems – among them the famous Non-Identity problem and the preemption problem (Bradley, 2012; Parfit, 1984). To avoid such problems, an alternative, non-comparative, tradition has grown in the debate. According to such views a subject can, for instance, be considered harmed if she is in an intrinsically bad state. These views avoid the issues just mentioned, but they have other serious problems. They seem unable to explain “the greatest harm of all”, namely the harm of death – since deprivation of life cannot be captured in non-comparative terms.

Recently, there is an increased interest in the idea that to avoid serious problems with strict views we should combine a comparative and a non-comparative condition (McMahan, 2013; Meyer, 2016; Woollard, 2012). The most promising type of combinatory view is the disjunctive view, since it can explain the harm in non-identity cases by reference to the non-comparative condition. Similarly, the disjunctivist can explain
the harm of death using its comparative component.

However, this paper argues that adopting a disjunctive view in order to account for the problem cases is unsuccessful, due to “problems in combination”. That is, as long as one of the conditions fails to accommodate a certain type of case (for example, preemption) and the other condition cannot capture the harm of another type of cases (death, for example), then it cannot capture the harm in cases where these aspects are combined (such as “deadly preemption”). This paper shows that this issue applies to different versions of the disjunctive view and concerns most combinations of the aspects that are problematic for views that are strictly comparative or non-comparative.

Anna Folland (Uppsala University, Sweden)
I am a PhD candidate in practical philosophy at Uppsala University since January 2018. My main interests lie within value theory, metaethics and normative ethics. My research focuses on questions about the concept of harm and its normative relevance.
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Evidence-based Medicine, Evidence and Medical Knowledge

Till Gallasch

evidence-based medicine (EBM) has become extremely popular in medicine since the 1990s, albeit its agenda has been the subject to critique from different philosophical positions (cf. Marcum 2016). In my talk I will attempt to clarify EBM’s agenda and some of its notions.

I will firstly introduce the agenda of evidence-based medicine (EBM) and some of its proposed evidence hierarchies. Secondly, I will attempt to characterise EBM’s understanding of evidence. Thirdly, I will introduce Sadegh-Zadeh’s definition of ‘evidence’ in medicine and his theory about the communal origin of medical knowledge (cf. Sadegh-Zadeh 2015). I will use this definition and theory to reformulate and classify EBM’s agenda and its evidence hierarchies. In this context I will examine the role of RCTs in medicine.

With my talk I hope to contribute to the philosophical discussions about medical practice and clarify notions as ‘EBM’ and ‘evidence in EBM’.

Literature:
Till Gallasch (Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany)
Till Gallasch is a master's student at the Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany. During the winter semester 2017/2018 he was an exchange student at the Prais Lodron University of Salzburg. Philosophy of language, philosophy of medicine, epistemology and metaphysics are his main interests. He is currently writing his MA-thesis about philosophy of medicine.
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Reasonable Doubt as the Possibility of Accepting Certainty as the Basis

Eka Gamrekelashvili

I argue that the problem of certainty and reasonable doubt are the main themes in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. These are the main problems and all the philosophical views developed by Wittgenstein are united in them. Also I argue that the problem of certainty is not based on belief but it is being based on reason, or reasonable doubt.

I think that Wittgenstein’s semantic viewpoint is based upon our activity. I think from this type of semantics reaching the epistemological problems should be special.

Doubting is affordable only in particular language game, at the same time language game is not dependent upon us, it exists “there”, independently from us.

It is very important to understand what is the connection between language game and certainty. Language game has some certain statements as the bases toward which asking questions is not reasonable. It follows that language game and reasonable doubt are in some connection with each other, in particular cases they serve as basis for another.
According to Wittgenstein, in the basis of all knowledge lies the system of some beliefs; Doubt presupposes certainty.

I think problem of certainty necessarily should be discussed in pairs with the theory of language game. Also I think that statements are considered as certain in particular language game and this should not be what Wittgenstein claims belief but there should be put more rationality in this moment. I think we consider some statements as certain not because our believing in them but this is belief based on more justified and various causalities which can easily not be named as belief.

I think Wittgenstein unites his theory of meaning and epistemology by the problem of doubting. Here are united also theory of language game and problem of certainty. The basis of language game is presented by the certain statements which are the basis of our knowledge. Reasonable doubt is the possibility of accepting certainty as the basis; I think this is the most important moment to understand Wittgenstein’s philosophy and generally to comprehend the connection between epistemology and theory of meaning.

Eka Gamrekelashvili (TSU, Georgia)
I have finished Medical University (Specialty of General Medicine) and received BA in philosophy parallel. I have MA degree in Late antique and medieval philosophy. I am making my PhD about Wittgenstein’s epistemology and theory of meaning.

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Are Methods of Disease Mongering Pseudo-scientific Methods?

Ina Gawel

In this paper, I survey the question if typical methods of disease mongering are equal to para-scientific, pseudo-scientific or bad scientific practice. I refer to policies of disease mongering after Lynn Payer and epistemological characteristics according to Schurz, Löb, Shamoo and Resnik. Patients’ guidelines are in use as case studies. Under the terms of therapeutic imperative, methods of disease mongering infringe the principles of best scientific practice. Criteria, which are characteristics of para- and pseudo-science, do not apply to this. As a conclusion, this paper reaches the fact that – under terms of philosophy of science – disease mongers operate precisely.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Mariusz Maziarz
Date: 11:20-11:50, 13 September 2018 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005

Ina Gawel (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Germany)
Ina Gawel is a master’s student at the Heinrich-Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany. She finished her B.A. in 2015 (Major Philosophy, minor German language and literature studies). Her thesis was a rational reconstruction of traditional chinese medicine, focused on ear-acupuncture. Main interests are biomedical ethics and scientific practices in pharmaceutical and medical research.
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The Tractatus on the Unity of the Proposition and the Variety of Logical Categories

Jonathan Gombin

It is commonly held that while from 1903 to 1913, Russell fails to solve the problem of the unity of the proposition, Wittgenstein either solves or avoids it in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus by conceiving the proposition as a fact. But what, exactly, the nature of factual unity is remains a much discussed topic. It is this very question that gave rise to nominalist versus realist readings of the Tractatus, the former holding that the unity of the proposition rests on the exclusive existence of particulars, while the latter asserts that Wittgenstein’s understanding of a proposition suggests an implicit distinction between particulars and universals. I will argue, with others, that this exegetical debate is misguided and that what is important is that Wittgenstein abstains from dividing objects into logical categories. But the reasons for this abstention are yet to be elucidated. This paper aims at doing so by showing that the Tractatus carefully distinguishes, contra Russell, the problem of the unity of the proposition from that of the identification of logical categories. The unity of proposition is to be understood by appeal to the form of the proposition, which although being written within its very constituent, does not relate to their belonging to this or that logical category. If this is correct, then my last task will be to show that the identification of logical categories is required only in order to determine how actual propositions gain their particular truth-conditions at elementary level. Yet, the Tractatus does not engage with it because at that time Wittgenstein thought that the task of logic was not to discover which logical categories there are by identifying the particular forms of elementary propositions – which are not truth functional – but only to identify the general form of the proposition – which is truth functional.
Jonathan Gombin (University Bordeaux Montaigne, France)
Jonathan Gombin is a first-year p.h.D student in philosophy at Université Bordeaux Montaigne, France, where he was granted a three-year doctoral scholarship in 2017.

His dissertation aims to show that despite the central role given to the idea of a complete analysis of language into elementary propositions in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, the early Wittgenstein does not promote any form of logical atomism. Its relationship to Russell’s and Frege’s work on the one hand, and to his latter philosophy on the other is thus reassessed in this light.

Jonathan Gombin is interested in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of logic and the history of early analytic philosophy. He also enjoys teaching these topics to bemused undergraduate students at Université Bordeaux Montaigne.
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Paraphrastic Analysis in Kazimerz Ajdukiewicz’s Critique of Idealism

Aleksandra Gomułczak

The term ‘paraphrastic analysis’ was introduced by Michael Beaney (King’s College, London). He claims that there are three core modes of analysis from which the most important for analytic philosophy is the interpretive mode, which is concerned to ‘translate’ something into particular framework. Interpretive analysis includes numerous conceptions. One of them is paraphrastic (resp. transformative) analysis. Beaney takes under consideration the works of Frege, Russell and Carnap. However, this kind of analysis also played an important role as a method used and developed in Lviv-Warsaw School of Philosophy.

We can speak about paraphrastic analysis in the works of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Alfred Tarski. Paraphrase is fundamental for Ajdukiewicz’s project of semantical epistemology. Jan Woleński (Jagiellonian University, Cracow) shows that Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is a formal paraphrase of the classical Aristotelian conception of truth. Kotarbiński’s project of semantic reism is also based on paraphrasing (very similar to Carnap’s method of explication).
In this paper I want to concentrate on Ajdukiewicz’s approach to paraphrase, since his method has a great philosophical potential. He developed, what he called, semantic paraphrase. The basic procedure here is to specify the language in which the given problem is formulated (e.g. the main theses of the considered system), so that it could be reformulated in a formal language. Then, the problem can be solved within the framework of the latter language. This method has various applications. The best examples of paraphrasing are Ajdukiewicz’s critiques of both metaphysical and epistemological idealism. I am going to present arguments from his three papers on the topic. I want to show how fruitful can paraphrastic analysis be, but I am also going to point out some of the essential problems associated with this method (of some of them Ajdukiewicz was well aware of).

Section: Philosophical Methodology  
Language: English  
Chair: Albert Anglberger  
Date: 10:40-11:10, 14 September 2018 (Friday)  
Location: SR 1.005

Aleksandra Gomułczak (Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland)
I was born in 1989 in Poland. I am a student of philosophy and art history. My main interest lies in analytic philosophy and methodology of philosophy.
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Tense and Logicality

Marco Grossi

This paper is about time and logicality: which tense-operator, if any, is logical? Tarski proposal is that logicality can be captured by invariance under arbitrary permutations of objects of the universe. The first part of the paper will show how to extend standard invariance criterions for logicality to tense operators, looking at transformations of times. It will be shown what tense operators are logical, under this extended conception of invariance. The
second part of the paper is an indirect defence of the first part. MacFarlane (2000) proposed an argument against the invariance test: for him, the test is too exclusive, since he defends the logicality of tense operators sensitive to the ordering of times, like the past or the future operator. I will defend the plausibility of the results of the first section, against MacFarlane’s contention. I will show that any theory that makes such operators logical will distort the set of logical truths, making them sensitive to some physical/metaphysical aspects of time, like its density, infinity or linearity. This is not acceptable, if one wants to keep logic “topic-neutral”. I will back up my claim, by exploring different accounts of logical truths, following Etchemendy’s (1990) distinction between “interpretational” and “representational” accounts of models. In both accounts, theories like MacFarlane’s tend to overgenerate logical truths. This gives indirect support to standard invariance theories.

Section: Logic
Language: English
Chair: Tobias Koch
Date: 15:20-15:50, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006

Marco Grossi (University of St Andrews, Uk)
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A new Semantic Interpretation of ’fake’

Janek Guerrini

In formal semantics of natural language, the subsective interpretation works for most adjectives: from ‘x is an excellent lawyer’ you can infer ‘x is a lawyer’. Not so for ‘fake’ and other so-called non-subsective adjectives (alleged, putative). You can however say ‘that gun is a fake gun’ and in fact it is often noted that a fake gun is not a gun, but also not a mere non-gun. Hence, ‘fake’ must be a modifier that changes some properties of the head and leaves others unaffected. I propose, in a formalism for the semantics
of 'fake' based on this intuition, that every noun is a structured set of properties divided into the set of essential (E) and the set prototypical (P) properties, both intensionally determined. 'Fake' changes some of the essential properties (the choice of which is based on a context c) and leaves unchanged P

\[ f(E, P) : \{ \text{is built with the intention/ has the intention of fooling x into thinking that e and cannot e: e \in E', P-E'} \] \]

The function 'fake':

- carries intensionality: every fake a is built or used with the goal of fooling an observer into thinking that it e.

- It carries a peculiar observer: x is a judge parameter that in absence of argument gets filled with a generic human being.

I then show how this account is generalizable to other non-subsective adjectives: 'alleged' and others similarly modify only some essential properties. I also show how this accounts for sentences like 'that gun is fake' and 'that lion is a stone lion': when the modifier clashes (leads to contradictions) with some properties of the head, these are lost by the head and the extension gets broadened in function of how many properties were clashed out. I then compare my account with the two principal ones, and show in particular that:

- My account provides an underlying and more fine-grained structure that explains why Partee's general principles of Head Primacy and Non-Vacuity work. Moreover, unlike in Partee's account, in mine the Head-Primacy is never violated.

- My intensional account has some advantages compared to Del Pinal's similar but extensional one.
Janek Guerrini (Ecole Normale Supérieure, France)

My background is in philosophy of science. For my undergraduate, I wrote a thesis on spatial representation and non-classical geometries with Achille Varzi. I am now studying at Ecole Normale Supérieure, attached at the department of philosophy but completing the master in cognitive science. I focus mostly on philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of language, and formal semantics of natural language. The project I would like to present was supervised by Salvador Mascarenhas, professor of linguistics at ENS.
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Nahtoderfahrungen – Operationalisierung und Definition

Stefan Gugerell

Im Jahr 1975 analysierte Moody in einer qualitativen psychologischen Studie Berichte von Menschen, die klinisch tot waren und reanimiert wurden. Die Interviewten gaben an, sich an Erfahrungen während ihres Herzstillstandes erinnern zu können (=Nahtoderfahrungen bzw. NTE). Heute werden NTE mit quantitativen psychologischen Instrumenten wie Rings Weighted Core Experience Index oder Greysons Near Death Experience Scale empirisch untersucht.

Für empirische Nahtodforscher spielt auch die ontologische Interpretation von NTE eine wichtige Rolle. Nach einer reduktionistischen Interpretation (Braithwaite oder Jansen) sind NTE Halluzinationen, die durch ein sterbendes Gehirn verursacht werden. Nach einer realistischen Interpretation (Parnia oder van Lommel) haben NTE eine reale Basis außerhalb des Bewusstseins.

Ich werde in meinem Vortrag zeigen, warum neben der Operationalisierung von NTE auch angemessene Definitionen nötig sind und u. a. folgende mehrstellige Prädikate definieren:

(1) Person x hat in der Zeitspanne z eine NTE im engeren Sinn (Asystolie)/im weiteren Sinn (Koma)

(2) Person x hat zum Zeitpunkt t eine Nahtoderinnerung

(3) Satzmenge m ist ein Nahtodbericht

Die Unterscheidung und Definition dieser Ausdrücke ist notwendig, um überhaupt verständliche ontologische Behauptungen über NTE aufstellen zu können (reduktionistisch oder realistisch). Ferner kann dadurch das generelle Diskussionsniveau in der Nahtodforschung gehoben werden.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: German
Chair: Mariusz Maziarz
Date: 12:00-12:30, 13 September 2018 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005

Stefan Gugerell (Universität Salzburg, Österreich)
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The Uniqueness Problem for Transparent Self-Knowledge

Eleanor Gwynne

My paper is concerned with developing an objection to Moran’s influential transparency account of self-knowledge (2001), according to which a rational agent can acquire knowledge of her own belief by reflecting upon reasons relevant to its subject-matter, as opposed to reflecting on her own psychology. On Moran’s view, the question ‘do I believe p?’ is treated by agents as equivalent to the question ‘is p true?’, and an agent is warranted in self-attributing a doxastic attitude towards p once she has reached a judgement about p.

In the paper, I build upon an objection to Moran proposed by Jonathan Way (2007). Way persuasively argues that the account cannot apply to self-knowledge of intentions due to the fact that it endorses the controversial ‘uniqueness’ thesis. I contend that we should extend this objection to theoretical reasoning. Broadly stated, the uniqueness thesis is the view that any given body of evidence supports only one rational conclusion. In the doxastic case, Moran’s account is committed to a version of the uniqueness thesis insofar as it relies on deliberation over the question of ‘whether p’ yielding a single rationally acceptable answer, which provides the subject with an answer to the question of what her attitude towards p is.

I argue against Moran’s transparency account by appealing to specific cases, such as those of testimony, in which a subject could take her reasons to rationally permit both the belief that p and the suspension of judgment regarding p. This is because testimonial evidence which warrants a subject in forming the belief that p does not rationally require her to believe p. Such cases therefore demonstrate the plausibility of some doxastic states conforming to a subject’s reasons without also being knowable via the transparency procedure.

I thus defend a version of permissivism, the view that there can be more than one rationally permitted response to a body of evidence. This represents a significant problem for the transparency account, since it means there are likely to be rational doxastic states which a subject could not come to know about via the procedure it describes. In other words, it suggests that the transparency procedure for acquiring self-knowledge, as described by Moran, will sometimes lack the power to generate an answer to the question of what one’s doxastic attitude is.
Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification

Jonathan Egeland Harouny

According to epistemic internalists, facts about justification supervene upon one’s internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, externalists think that the supervenience base of justification isn’t exhausted by one’s internal reasons for believing certain propositions. In the last decade, the internalism-externalism debate has made its mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer’s testimonial justification for believing that p supervenes upon his internal reasons for thinking that the speaker’s testimony that p is true. Recently, however, several objections have been raised against this view.

In this paper, I present a novel argument providing intuitive support for internalism about the epistemology of testimony. The argument is analogous to Lehrer and Cohen’s (1983) New Evil Demon Scenario, but instead of focusing on perceptual beliefs, it focuses on testimonial beliefs. It presents a scenario involving a pair of epistemic agents who share the same internal reasons, but who differ with respect to external conditions like reliability and truth. Moreover, the agents appear to be equally justified in believing the same propositions. And the best explanation for why this should be so is that the facts about testimonial
justification supervene upon one’s internal reasons, or so I will argue. I also defend the argument against three objections offered by Wright (2016a; 2016b) in a couple of recent papers. According to the first objection, justification is the same as Plantinga-warrant, and since the agents in my argument differ with respect to Plantinga-warrant, they also differ with respect to justification. My response is that this objection begs the question against the internalist by assuming (without argument) that justification is an externalist condition – namely, that it is Plantinga-warrant.

According to the second objection, responding in the manner above by denying that justification is Plantinga-warrant devalues justification insofar as it detaches it from knowledge. My response is that the objection fails since (i) the internalist still can say that justification is closely attached to knowledge insofar as it is a necessary condition of it, and (ii) that justification can be valuable as a means to satisfying some other (epistemic) property.

According to the third objection, internalism about testimonial justification isn’t able to account for our intuitions about certain cases involving circular testimony. My response is that the cases under consideration are underdescribed, and when the necessary details are in place they actually provide intuitive support for internalism.

The upshot of my discussion is that external conditions do make an epistemic difference when it comes to our testimonial beliefs, but that they cannot make any difference with respect to their justificatory status – i.e., they are justificationally irrelevant.
Jonathan Egeland Harouny (Stockholm University, Sweden)
I did my B.A. and M.A. in philosophy at the University of Bergen. Now I work as an Early Stage Researcher (i.e., PhD student) at Stockholm University. My work is primarily in epistemology, where I focus on topics having to do with rationality and justification.
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The Mathematician vs. the Computer. On the Surprising Dislike for Computer-Assisted Proofs in Mathematics

Paul Hasselkuß

Computer-assisted proofs have produced outstanding results in mathematics. Surprisingly, these proofs are not well received by the mathematical community. Often, this behaviour is grounded in claims about the complexity of the computer-assisted proof, whereas the goal of mathematics is taken to be the search for elegant and beautiful proofs.

In my talk, I will analyse the connection between the acceptance of a proof technique and mathematical “beauty-talk” to understand (1) why mathematicians dislike computer-assisted proofs, and (2) whether this dislike is well-founded.

I will first draw upon examples to argue that “beauty-talk” is widely used to apply to a standard of value. As such, mathematicians rely on it to evaluate research results, to explain why they are motivated to work on a project, and to justify choices made within ongoing research processes. Therefore, “beauty-talk” is not limited to computer-assisted proofs, but can be found everywhere in the mathematical practice.

Then, I will turn to the nature of “beauty-talk”. Empirical evidence suggests that mathematicians count different features as relevant for constituting the beauty of a proof. Since all of these different features yield statements of “beauty-talk” which are accepted by the mathematical community, I will conclude that “beauty-talk” is a pluralistic phenomenon, which allows for multiple different, yet successful concepts of mathematical beauty, each grounded in different features of the proof.

On this view, it is perfectly clear that these concepts may change over time. Thus, with regards to computer-assisted proofs, I will conclude
that these proofs simply tack the features mathematicians are currently valuing when talking about a proof’s beauty. But since these concepts are not set in stone, this may (and perhaps will) change in the future.

Paul Hasselkuss (Heinrich Heine University, Germany)
I am a graduate student at the department of philosophy at the Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany. I am interested in history and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics and aesthetics.
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Knowledge, Action and Partial Belief

Roman Heil

It has been prominently argued that knowledge plays a guiding role in our decision-making. According to the knowledge norm for action, knowledge is the epistemic standard we must adhere to in our practical reasoning (Williamson 2000; Hawthorne 2004, Stanley 2005, Hawthorne & Stanley 2008). A severe objection to this proposal is the so-called problem of partial belief. We do often seem to rationally make decisions under uncertainty based on doxastic states, such as our credences, that fall short of knowledge. Proponents of the knowledge norm have suggested various different replies to this problem. It has been argued that decisions under uncertainty are based on our knowledge of chances, on our background knowledge or on modal knowledge such as that it might be that p (Stanley 2005; Hawthorne and Stanley 2008; Weisberg 2013). In my talk, I will evaluate the prospects of these replies. In particular, I will argue against Mueller and Ross’ (2017) most recent discussion of the issue, according to which all of the suggested replies are open to counterexamples. A common feature of these counterexamples is that the safety requirement for knowledge
is violated, but we still seem to be able to make a rational decision based on our (mere) doxastic states. I will develop a positive account that tackles the problem from two directions. First, I will argue that, based on trembling hand reasoning known from game theory, one should not make decisions based on unsafe credences or unsafe beliefs about chances. Second, I will propose an independently plausible notion of safety for modal knowledge that undermines Mueller and Ross’ charges.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Robert Pal
Date: 10:40-11:10, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004

Roman Heil (Universität Hamburg, Germany)
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A Computational Look at Bolzano
Silvan Hungerbuehler & Pauline van Wierst

How can computers be employed to support philosophical research? My work seeks to advance the understanding of methodological assumptions as well as technical prerequisites of computer-supported philosophy. This effort is firmly embedded within a larger research project which unites experts in philosophy, artificial intelligence (AI), and computational linguistics to combine logic-based modeling of expert knowledge about philosophical domains with natural language processing (NLP) techniques. Besides its
philosophical importance, the present project pursues a methodological goal: Demonstrating the viability of harnessing computational power for philosophical research, an approach currently taken by very few researchers.

Specifically, I propose ways to use description logics (DL) together with automated theorem provers (ATPs) to support exegetical philosophy. DL are decidable fragments of first order logic, widely used in AI to model knowledge, and powerful reasoners are available for them. Additionally, I can rely on a clean, machine-readable corpus of Bernard Bolzano’s philosophical writings. Combining formalization in DL, ATP, and NLP techniques, I will use these techniques to compare two conflicting interpretations of Bolzano’s notion of grounding (Abfolge), that is, of explanatory proof.

Importantly, my approach goes beyond a mere formal redescriptions of the contentious issue. Instead, it is used to obtain computationally testable implications from an interpretation. The process looks as follows:

First, I formalize an exegetical dispute in DL as gleaned from Bolznanian scholarship.

Second, I apply ATP to the formalizations, thus obtaining its deductive closure, that is, everything that is implicitly implied by the interpretation.

Third, using NLP techniques on the Bolzano corpus, I link the output of the ATP back to the original text in order to obtain evidence regarding the interpretation and assess it.
Silvan Hungerbühler (ILLC, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Netherlands)

Silvan Hungerbühler did his undergraduate studies at the Universität Zürich where he read Philosophy and Economics, and at the Universidad de Buenos Aires where he read Philosophy. He then moved on to the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation in Amsterdam where he is in the process of finishing with a MSc in Logic. He followed the specialization on Computation and is currently writing his master thesis at the the intersection of Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence.

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Pauline van Wierst (Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Italy)

Pauline van Wierst completed her Master’s at the VU University Amsterdam with a thesis on the concept of analitycity in Bolzano and the application of computational tools in philosophical research. She spent three semesters as a visiting student and research assistant at the University of Notre Dame, South Bend (IN), to specialize further in philosophy of mathematics. She is currently finishing her PhD at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa with a dissertation on infinite idealizations in physics, and recently started a post-doc position at the ILLC in Amsterdam within the project e-Ideas, which is dedicated to developing digital humanities tools for the history of philosophy.

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Principle of Compositionality, Context Principle and Inferential Role Semantics – Are They All Compatible?

Antonina Jamrozik

The principle of compositionality, according to which the meaning of a complex expression is fully determined by the meanings of its component parts and the way of their composition, is taken to be the most obvious explanation of the two distinguished features of natural language: productivity and systematicity, both explaining the phenomenon of learnability.
It is this principle that the attack launched by Jerry Fodor and Ernest LePore on the Inferential Role Semantics is based on. They argue that since the proponent of IRS cannot explain how inferential roles of simple expressions are compositionally tied to the inferential roles of complexes without appeal to the analytic/synthetic distinction (which, since Quine's quest against it, is not something widely endorsed in philosophy), this particular metasemantic theory tells us nothing about how language actually works.

Their argument has provoked a range of controversy around the subject. In the first part of my talk I am planning to give an analysis of the answer given to Fodor and LePore by Pagin and McCullagh. Each of them is in fact proposing two strategies of resistance – I will first compare the introductory ones, which point out to the assumptions that Fodor and LePore make and show what problems they can pose. I will then pass to the more complex ones, which are in each case based on the framework of set theory. I will point out the similarities and differences between these two approaches, placing them in the wider context of the problem of decomposition in IRS.

The Principle of Compositionality, as defined at the beginning, and the Context Principle, according to which it is only sensible to ask about the meaning of a simple expression in context of the complex expression of which it is a part, are both being said to originate from the writings of Frege. They have also been said to be inconsistent with each other. I am planning to show how, using the apparatus discussed earlier, one can reject this apparent incompatibility.

**Bibliography:**


Chris Kelp and Linda Zagzebski both present “epistemic Frankfurt cases” in which an agent acquires a true belief that $p$ through the use of cognitive ability in the actual world; where in close possible worlds $p$ would be false but a counterfactual-intervener would ensure that the agent believes that $p$ nonetheless. Kelp and Zagzebski intuit that the agent knows that $p$ in the actual world.

I critically examine these “epistemic Frankfurt cases” against the backdrop of the original Frankfurt case. Here, an agent decides to perform action $\varphi$ and then does $\varphi$ in the actual world; in close possible worlds in which she would decide differently a counterfactual-intervener would somehow make her perform $\varphi$ nonetheless. As Frankfurt intuitions that she is responsible for her action in the actual world, his case serves as a counterexample to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), which claims that we can only be responsible for an action, if we could have done otherwise.
The analogy between the moral and the epistemic cases hinges on a parallelisation of moral responsibility and epistemic credibility – that is, being responsible in a relevant way for the truth of one’s beliefs. I argue that the parallelisation of moral responsibility and epistemic credibility is not as unproblematic as it might seem at first glance. Difficulties surface when we try to formulate an adequate epistemic equivalent to PAP. It becomes apparent that Kelp’s and Zagzebski’s cases don’t disprove such a principle. Their “epistemic Frankfurt cases” are not analogous to the original in all relevant respect. Based on my analysis, I raise some doubt as to whether the agents in such cases should be considered to have acquired knowledge. At any rate they cannot be said to deserve epistemic credit for the same reason the moral agent is morally responsible, as Zagzebski holds.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Jakob Eichler
Date: 15:20-15:50, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004

Isabelle Keßels (Heinrich-Heine-Universität, Germany)

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Disagreement in Logic and the Meaning of Logical Constants

Tobias Koch

There are two ways in which disagreement between two logicians can turn out to be merely apparent. For the first such way consider a classical logician and one who uses $\land$ (conjunction) in just the same way that the classical logician uses $\lor$ (disjunction), and vice versa. We are inclined to say that there is no real disagreement at stake here; that the two are making the very same claims in different vocabulary. For the second case, consider a classical and paraconsistent logician who disagree about whether ex falso quod libet, $(A \land \neg A) \rightarrow B$, is a theorem; in other words, whether conjunction, negation, and the conditional obey this principle. Quine (1970) argued that in such a case the disputants are not discussing the same subject matter anymore and must be seen as merely talking past each other.

I give a definition of what genuine disagreement in logic comes down to by discussing the two possible sources of mere apparentness. To rule out the first, I define a notion of notational variance between two logical systems based on the notion of a consequence and structure-preserving translation between two logics (which can also be found in Humberstone, 2000). The first necessary condition for genuine disagreement thereby being that the logics in question must not be notational variants of one another.

To rule out the second possible source of mere apparentness I block Quine’s argument by giving what I call a bi-aspectual view on what logical constants (including the sentential connectives) and their meanings are, positing two meaning constituents for each of them. For two logicians to be in genuine disagreement with regard to a certain connective, they must agree on its first and disagree over its second meaning constituent.

The first meaning aspect – which needs to be agreed on – I argue is a relational modal truth-condition in the style of Kripke semantics. The second one – the actual source of disagreement – is a set of properties on the accessibility relation figuring in these truth-conditions.

I conclude by giving an outlook on how my solutions to either variety of merely apparent disagreement can be exploited for debates outside of logic.
References:


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Strawson’s Objection to the Narrative Personal Identity and the Problem of the Privacy of the Self

Olga Kozyreva

The problem of personal identity is a cluster of issues about the philosophical concept of person. The question “What does it mean to be the same person through time?” concerns the conditions of personal identity over time. This question has mostly dominated analytic philosophy of mind.

The Narrative approach proposes the way to deal with the problem of personal identity in non-mentalistic terms. This approach departs from the Psychological continuity view by refuting the concept of re-identification and Parfit’s Extreme claim. According to Schechtman, one needs to postulate a subject who can exist across time and have a consistent narrative of oneself in order to be a person.

Strawson objects the Narrative view by pointing out that not all persons experience their life as narrative. For proving that, he suggests
to distinguish between episodic and diachronic self-experiences. A diachronic experiences himself as a self that exists from the past to the future whereas an Episodic does not experience himself this way. The last is aware he has past and will have future as well as the moral responsibility for his actions but he is a not any self. If we can conceive the possibility of Episodics, then the Narrative view is false.

In this paper, I reply to Strawson’s objection by paying more attention to the concept of narrative. What Strawson calls the Episodic experience of life it might be nothing but another self-narrative. The narrative is constructed and reproduced by means of language, which influences perception and representation of oneself. Being Episodic is a socially acquired way of telling the story of experiencing of oneself. First-person reports are linguistic entities and not psychological, introspectively accessible only to its owner.

I argue that Strawson’s objection is based on his conception of private self-experience. In contrast, the Narrative view is based on the conception of non-private self-experience influenced by language and social interactions.

Section: Philosophy of Mind  
Language: English  
Chair: Giulia Lorenzi  
Date: 10:00-10:30, 14 September 2018 (Friday)  
Location: SR 1.003

Olga Kozyreva (Ural Federal University, Russia)  
Olga Kozyreva is a PhD student in Philosophy at Ural Federal University. She has received her B.A. and M.A. (both with honors) in Philosophy from the same university. Her research interests lie in the intersection between contemporary French philosophy and Analytic philosophy. She investigates the problem of subjectivity and first-person perspective as well as the problem of self and personhood. She has published several articles on these issues and has given different talks on conferences. She has won the RFBR grant (“The Problem of Privacy in Analytic and Post-structuralist Philosophy”) for 2018-2020. E-Mail: olgakozyreva@mail.ru
SOPhiA 2018

Berkeley’s Temporal Simples - Towards a Subjectivist Theory of Time

Nick Küspert

Subjectivist theories of time are commonly disregarded. However, I claim that Berkeley’s subjectivist theory of time can be supported by arguing for the existence of temporal simples. Towards this end, Berkeley proposes an argument which, though providing a valid general structure, lacks essential premises. I reconstruct the argument as a reductio argument which shows that the claim that there are no temporal simples leads to absurd consequences and must hence be false. I improve the argument by supplying the essential premises and reconstruct it accordingly as follows:

1. There are no temporal simples.
2. Any two ideas are separated by infinitely many moments of time without an idea.
3. If the mind can exist at moments of time without ideas, the mind exists at infinitely many moments without an idea.
4. If the mind cannot exist at moments of time without ideas, the mind is annihilated after any idea.
5. Either the mind can exist at moments of time without ideas or it cannot.

Hence, Berkeley concludes the reductio argument. The assumption of (1) in conjunction with premise (2) leads to the conditionals (3) and (4). According to (5) either the antecedent of (3) or the antecedent of (4) is true. Since (5) is trivially true either the antecedent of (3) or the antecedent of (4) is satisfied. Therefore, the consequent of (3) or the consequent of (4) follows, either leading to an absurdity of which neither can be accepted. Therefore, (1) is false and the claim that there are temporal simples is justified.

Subscribing to Flage’s (2001) distinction of archetypes, ontological ectypes and epistemic ectypes, I suggest that temporal simples are best understood as ontological ectypes. Finally, I explore properties of ontological ectypes and demonstrate why they are suitable fundamental components for Berkeley’s project. Thus, even though subjectivist theory of time are commonly disregarded, I can provide a starting point for a consistent, subjectivist theory of time.
Nick Küspert (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany)
Nick Küspert studies at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and is currently writing his thesis in which he reconstructs and defends Berkeley's theory of time. His research interests are philosophy of time, contemporary metaphysics and metaphysics in the early modern period as well as analytic feminist philosophy.
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The Fundamental Model of Deep Disagreements

Victoria Lavorerio

Disagreements have been a chief concern for epistemologists for some time now; but recently there has been a budding interest in a certain kind of intractable disagreement: deep disagreements. I start this presentation by characterizing what deep disagreements are in a theoretically neutral way. I do this by pointing to the most used characteristics found in the literature to describe deep disagreements. Roughly, deep disagreements are thought of as clashes between different worldviews, which generate a kind of disagreement that is intractable and for which no adjudication procedure is available. I then introduce three desiderata I believe any theory of deep disagreements should be able to meet. In the second part of the presentation, I analyze what I take to be the most prevalent group of views of deep disagreements in epistemology: The Fundamental Model. The theories included in the Fundamental Model conceptualize deep disagreements as clashes between fundamental epistemic resources (epistemic principles, sources, methods, etc.), hence the name. Finally, I state the challenges theories based on epistemic fundamental differences face when trying to meet the desiderata mentioned. My goal in this presentation is twofold. First, I draw a rudimentary metaepistemological landscape in which theories of deep disagreements can be evaluated. Second, I
highlight the shortcomings that views based on fundamental differences have, and thus motivate a moderate scepticism towards such a model.

Section: Epistemology  
Language: English  
Chair: Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla  
Date: 10:00-10:30, 13 September 2018 (Thursday)  
Location: SR 1.004

Victoria Lavorerio (University of Vienna, Austria)  
I am a second-year PhD student at the University of Vienna, under the supervision of Univ-Prof. Dr Martin Kusch. My dissertation project concerns the epistemology of deep disagreements; what they are, why they occur, and how they are to be resolved. I aim to develop a Wittgenstein-inspired novel account of deep disagreements where his notion of pictures (Bild), as used in his later thought, plays a crucial role. I did my Master in Analytic Philosophy at the University of Barcelona and completed my B.A. in philosophy at the University of the Republic in Uruguay, where I am originally from.  
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On the Relation Between Metaphysical Anti-Haecceitism and Modal Haecceitism

Karol Lenart

In this paper I discuss Kit Fine’s views on the relation between haecceitism and anti-haecceitism. He distinguishes a modal and metaphysical haecceitism from its anti-haecceitic counterparts and argues that the metaphysical variants of both theories are independent from the modal ones. That results in a view that it is possible both to be a modal haecceitist and to accept metaphysical anti-haecceitism. According to that combination of views one can claim that there are haecceitic possibilities without making a commitment to the existence of haecceities that would ground these possibilities. I think that this view is incorrect. Below I present an outline of my argument against it.
According to the metaphysical anti-haecceitism all possible worlds (including actual world) have purely qualitative metaphysical structure. In turn, according to the modal haecceitism when we talk about possible individuals we can introduce singular propositions that represent haecceitic possibilities for possible individuals. However, if singular propositions are structured and their propositional elements like proper names, demonstratives or predicates refer to worldly entities such as individuals, haecceities or properties, then singular propositions about possible individuals have to refer to possible individuals, their haecceities or properties. But, if possible worlds have purely qualitative metaphysical structure (given the metaphysical anti-haecceitism), then it is not possible to introduce genuine singular propositions that would be about possible individuals. Thus, all singular propositions would be ersatz singular propositions for all their supposed non-qualitative constituents (individuals or haecceities) would reduce to purely qualitative ones (qualitative properties and relations). Thus, it seems to be impossible to believe in genuine (irreducible) singular propositions about possible individuals and at the same time accept purely qualitative metaphysics of possible worlds. As a result, the modal haecceitism seems to be incompatible with the metaphysical anti-haecceitism. In the remainder I resist some objections directed towards presented argument.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Bogdan Andrei Dumitrescu
Date: 18:20-18:50, 12 September 2018 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006

Karol Lenart (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
I am a PhD student and teaching assistant in the Department of Philosophy at Jagiellonian University in Krakow. The main field of my interest is analytic metaphysics, especially issue concerning haecceitism, essentialism indituation. Currently I work on a paper that investigates the relation between haecceitism and actualism. I am a managing editor at Polish Journal of Philosophy
E-Mail: karol.lenart@doctoral.uj.edu.pl
Can a physical account of sounds provide a good foundation for the understanding of listening to music?

Giulia Lorenzi

Traditionally, philosophers of perception have focused their attention on vision, considered as the primary sense modality. The rapidity and the wealth of information supplied by vision explain this near-exclusivity. However, recently, a growing interest in studying the other sensory modalities (Casati and Dolic 1994, O’Callaghan 2007, Richardson 2011, Richardson 2013, Matthen 2014) and their interaction (O’Callaghan 2015) can be traced both in philosophical and scientific literature. Lately, auditory perception in particular becomes an important field of research.

Many issues are raised by investigation of hearing. They mainly concern the objects of audition and its phenomenology and spatiality. Also, the study of similarities and dissimilarities between hearing and vision supplies interesting results. Philosophy of auditory perception contemplates also research into speech perception and musical listening.

Scruton (2009, 2010) offers an original account of sounds to answer the question about the nature of the objects of audition. He affirms that sounds are secondary objects and pure events. In this view, sounds can be heard as entities unrelated to their causal sources. Scruton calls it the acusmatic experience of sounds and claims that is essential to listening to music. According to this view, physical theories of sounds are unmotivated and they can’t explain “the internal logic of the music line” (Scruton 2009, 64).

The aim of my talk is to demonstrate that accepting an account of sounds as secondary objects and pure events is not necessary for a good understanding of listening to music. I argue that supporting one or other physical theory of sounds does not involve ignoring the aesthetic and social values of music.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Katsiaryna Suryna
Date: 11:20-11:50, 13 September 2018 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003

Giulia Lorenzi (University of Bergamo, Italy)
I am a young researcher with first degrees and master degrees both in philosophy and music. My final dissertation for the philosophy master centres on distal theories of sounds as events. I am generally interested in philosophy of perception, in particular in philosophy of auditory perception. My interests concern the metaphysics of sounds and silence, the perception of space and time through audition and vision, the interaction and the analogy among the sensory modalities and their functioning, the conceptual content of perception and the perception of speeches and words.

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Taking Citizens Seriously: Towards a Pragmatist Justification of Property Rights

Mario Josue Cunningham Matamoros

We can cluster the main philosophical justifications of property rights into two major groups: i) self-ownership justifications, and ii) agency justifications. The former lays its foundations in modern philosophy and the natural law discourse, and the latter in an abstract concept of agency link with some idea of human flourishing or human good. Beyond its differences, the two groups carry out what John Dewey called the fallacy of classical liberalism, that is, that they both assume a false division between individual and society. Namely, that individuals have a natural endowment of rights whose full potential is endangered by society. Thus, the role of institutions and law is to remove every social obstruction that limits individuals enjoyment of their natural rights.

Justifications about property rights also display a known fact in the history of modern thought: that liberalism and democracy had not always go hand in hand. On the contrary, there has always been a tension between liberal rights (individual) and democratic legitimacy (societal legitimation). I claim that thinking about rights from a citizenship centered approach could help loosen that tension.

Drawing from Dewey’s insight according to which we must take democracy as the central concept of political theory, I will study the role of democratic citizenship in the justification of property rights. This means that I will assume as a premise that there cannot be a proper justification of property rights without consideration of the po-
political context in which they are inset – or that allows them to exist.

As a current hypothesis, I assume that the study of property rights in light of the idea of democratic citizenship will show that the self-ownership justification of property rights is untenable and the agency justification is insufficient. This last claim refers to what democracy demands as essential to citizenship, that is, political equality.

Section: Political Philosophy & Philosophy of Law
Language: English
Chair: Martina Valkovic
Date: 10:40-11:10, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007

Mario Josue Cunningham Matamoros (Utrecht University, Netherlands)
I’m a Costa Rican graduate student at Utrecht University, where I’m enrolled in the Philosophy Research MA Program. My main interests are political theory and democratic theory.
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The Presuppositions Behind Causal Inferences in Economics

Mariusz Maziarz

Claveau and Mireles-Flores (2014) analyzed a case study (an OECD report on causes of unemployment) with the aim of describing presuppositions on causality held by economists. Their article concludes indicating that causal inferences in economics are relatively poorly researched and further research is needed. For instance, the question which of the philosophical theories of causality is held as true (Claveau and Mireles-Flores 2014). Maziarz (2017a) reviewed the philosophy-of-economics research on causality and indicated that, with few exceptions, the methodologists focus on conducting normative analyses. Contrary to the hopes of economic methodologists, such normative considerations have an insufficient influence on the practice of economists (Hutchison 2000). In fact, the debate whether
the mainstream-economics models should be interpreted causally or, in contrary, operate by means of functional dependencies is far from being settled (cf. Verreault-Julien 2017). The recently widely discussed “Growth in a Time of Debt” (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010) controversy showed that grounding economic policy-making in unjustified causal claims can lead to severe misunderstandings (Maziarz 2017b).

To address the questions (1) what methods are employed by economists for causal inferences? (2) which of the philosophical theories of causality is preferred by economists? moreover, (3) what philosophical presuppositions underlie the methods of causal inference employed by economists, I conducted the following research. First, from the sample consisting of articles published by American Economic Review (AER), Journal of Political Economy (JPE) and Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE) since 2005 until 2015, I have chosen those analyzes that conclude causally, i.e., they either use one of the terms labeled by Hoover (2004) “causal family”, or use pseudo-causal terms listed by Reiss (2015), i.e., produce, result in, effect, etc. Second, I have analyzed and classified the methods employed by the authors of chosen articles. In line with Hamermesh (2013), the dominance of empirical research in the ways of causal inference is visible. Fourth, I have reconstructed the philosophical presuppositions underlying the methods of causal inference and attempted at indicating which of the philosophical theories of causality is acknowledged by economists.

Third, I have operationalized main philosophical theories of causality in the context of economic research. There are six main theoretical approaches (families of theories) to causality in philosophy that are relevant for the context of economics: regularity theories, probabilistic theories, counterfactual theories, mechanistic theories, interventionist and manipulability theories, and power/capacity approach. Each method of causal inference justifies a specific approach to causal inferences and is connected to different philosophical presuppositions on causality and economic reality. For instance, the Granger-causality tests (Granger 1969; 1980) employ the definition of causality promoted by the probabilistic account (e.g., Sims 1972), cf. Maziarz (2015). Additionally, the project of theoretical macroeconometrics (for instance: the reduced-form vector autoregression models) is also grounded in this approach (cf. Cooley and LeRoy 1985). In contrary to these recent developments in the theoretical econometrics, the usual Cowles Commission approach is grounded in the regularity approach to causality that dates back to
the Humean stance. The Cowles Commission approach was developed by Simon (1977) who employed the manipulationist approach to causality and argued in favor of using interventions to solve the indeterminacy of causal direction by data.

The primary results are as follows. First, the mainstream economists draw causal conclusions mainly from observational data. To do so, they usually employ econometric techniques (atheoretical econometrics) that are grounded in the probabilistic approach to causality. A new trend is applying the Bayesian networks (DAG) methods that hitherto was identified with other social sciences. Additionally, several analyses are grounded in either experimental or quasi-experimental methods or case studies. They employ Woodward’s (2005) interventionist account.

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**Mariusz Maziarz** (Wroclaw University of Economics, Poland)

I am a philosopher interested in the philosophy of economics (as a principal investigator of a research grant “Causal inferences in the contemporary economics”) and an economist (Ph.D. student) interested in the methodology of the discipline.

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**Metaphysical Grounding and Positivist Theory of Law – How Social Facts Can Ground Legal Facts**

Szymon Mazurkiewicz

The main thesis of legal positivism is the social source thesis (SST) which states that legal facts are ultimately determined by social facts alone (Shapiro, 2011). Whereas the relata of this thesis (social facts and legal facts) have been widely discussed, the relation of determination remains highly unclear. Some try
to apply metaphysical grounding and claim that SST can be understood as legal facts are (fully) grounded in social facts (Plunkett, 2012; Gizbert-Studnicki, 2016). However, such a claim must face a problem of how social facts, descriptive in their character, can ground legal facts, which are normative.

The aim of this presentation is to study whether social facts can ground legal facts with strong emphasis on analysis of metaphysical grounding itself. Firstly, there will be presented some detailed aspects of SST, also with comparison to non-positivism theses. Secondly, I will shortly present the relation of metaphysical grounding, especially discussion on grounding and necessity, as well primitive, essentialist and metaphysical-law versions of grounding. Next, there will be analysed normative grounding, which is grounding relation that grounds normative facts in descriptive facts (Vayrynen, 2013; Leary, 2017).

The third part will involve applying considerations on grounding into SST. I claim that that social facts can ground legal facts only with another ground, which must be some normative fact since it is impossible to fully ground normative facts on descriptive facts alone. However, in the case of SST it cannot be a moral fact as (1) it would violate SST and (2) this moral-normative fact would need another moral-normative fact to be a moral-normative fact etc., which leads into infinite regress (cf. Vayrynen, 2013). For that reason my thesis is that the best solution is to apply metaphysical-law version of grounding, where A grounds B holds because there is such a metaphysical law that A grounds B (Leary, 2017). In the context of applying grounding into SST this metaphysical law must be a principle connecting descriptive and normative sphere. After short study of some possible principles (Kant's Categorical Imperative, Habermas's Discourse-Principle (Pavlakos, 2017)). I will argue that such principle is instrumental rationality, which is able to (1) give normative character to legal facts and (2) is not explained via other normative facts, what does not lead to infinite regress.

Section: Political Philosophy & Philosophy of Law
Language: English
Chair: Jan Buran
Date: 15:20-15:50, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007
Against an Identity Criterion for Fictional Ersatz Realism

Timo Meier

Fictional ersatz realism is the metaphysical stance that abstract fictional entities exist and are dependent on fiction and literary practices. Everett (2005) tackled the position of ersatz realism by claiming that the ersatz realist cannot provide an identity criterion for fictional entities that is at the same time faithful to the story and not open for a contradiction on an ontological level. First off, I will outline the current debate about identity criteria in ersatz realism up until the most recent refinements on behalf of the ersatz realist made by Woodward (2017). Based on Everett’s primary argument, I will argue that even past the most recent defense, ersatz realism is no tenable position as it cannot provide a consistent identity criterion for fictional entities. To arrive at this conclusion, I will present a base frame for identity criteria available to the ersatz realist and show that to any identity criteria the ersatz realist may propose there is a story such that the fictional entity corresponding to a fictional character of this story is not self-identical, imposing a contradiction to the metaphysical account of ersatz realism. Eventually, I will introduce three possible answers to this argument to the effect that the ersatz realist (a) needs to insist on indeterminate interpretation of certain aspects of fiction and a specific logical form of the identity criterion (b) gives an additional account of reference such that she can make sense of extra-fictional sentences involving characters that appear inside a kind of non-fictional text or (c) to explain why fictional entities deserve a special treatment with regard to identity as the identity relation is not reflexive. I conclude that only reaction (a) is attractive as it is the only reaction that may be motivated independently of avoiding the problems imposed by the presented argument.
Timo Meier (Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany)

Timo Meier studied psychology, mathematics and philosophy at the University of Hagen and the Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz. He attained a Bachelor of Education in 2016 and is currently a graduate student (Master of Arts) in philosophy at the Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz. Besides studying, he teaches introduction courses on formal logic and conducts the teaching and learning project “DenkSport” at the Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz. His research revolves around the intersection of logic, metaphysics and the philosophy of language where he is especially concerned with the metaphysics and ontology of fictional entities and the logics of fiction. Currently, he is working on his master thesis, seeking to implement the fundamental idea of fictionalism into a logic of fiction.

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Social Responsibility and Mercenary Scientists

Julia Mirkin

Scientists are required to act in a socially responsible way. This requirement roots not only in their profession with its freedom and duties, but also in them being part of the society and therefore like every other of its members being responsible to do well when it can reasonably be expected (Shamoo / Resnik 2015). In my talk I want to face the question whether the case of deceiving mercenary scientists – paid experts – counts as scientific misconduct or rather as a questionable research practice and where this classification of the problem might lead us in the discussion concerning possible regulations and quality management.

Philosophers like Hoynigen-Huene point to the ambiguity of social responsibility in its concept and application. Others like Reiser und Bulger highlight seemingly uncontroversial examples for the acceptance of
social responsibility. Such as public communication, which contributes
to better informed decision making, both on the individual and on the
political level. However, industry and mercenary scientists are occasion-
ally manufacturing doubt concerning valid research. Examples for
the deliberate construction of scientific disagreement can be found in
the context of the discussion of carcinogenic chemicals (e.g. asbestos,
benzene, beryllium). Consequently, necessary regulations are not im-
plemented and the goal of protecting the public health is not achieved.

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York: Oxford University Press.

Julia Mirkin (Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany)
Julia Mirkin is a masters student at the Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düss-
dorf. She finished her B.A. 2018 with a major in Philosophy and a
minor in Political Science. Her bachelor thesis was about “Value Neu-
trality, Social Responsibility and the Production of Disease”. She works
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A Problem with Sense

Thomas Mitchell

In this essay, we will examine Frege’s notion of sense and find it to be inconsistent. On the one hand, it will be found to be an externalist notion: the sense of a term is not determined by the psychological state of the user. This result is found when we consider Frege’s method of definition and apply it to Hilary Putnam’s famous Twin Earth thought experiment. Frege claims that the sense of a term is given by application of an equivalence relation. For instance, “The number of Fs” is defined as “The class of concepts that are equinumerous with the Fs”. Putnam uses a similar technique, arguing that when we say that something is water, we claim that it bears the relation same liquid as to the substance normally called “water” by members of our linguistic community. Since it is an empirical matter whether that relation in fact holds (whether what we are pointing at is really H2O), the meaning of “water” is not exhaustively determined by the user’s psychological state. Putnam is thus an externalist about meaning. Parallel remarks apply to Frege’s notion of sense, given his method of definition. Thus, sense is found to be an externalist concept.

On the other hand, it can also be shown that sense is an internalist notion, exhaustively determined by the user’s psychological state. We find this when we look at Frege’s solution to the problem of identity substitution within the scope of propositional attitudes. If John believes that Hesperus is bright and Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus, it does not follow that John believes that Phosphorus is bright; he may not know that Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same celestial body. Frege explains this by pointing out that the referents of “Hesperus” are different in each case. When it occurs in a propositional attitude, “Hesperus” refers not to a celestial body, but to the sense of “Hesperus” as it is usually used. But this only solves the problem if sense is taken to be internalist. If John’s psychological state does not exhaustively determine the referent of “Hesperus” within the scope of his propositional attitudes, then cases can be constructed in which “Hesperus” can be substituted with “Phosphorus” (or “the evening star”, etc.) without John knowing the two to be identical.

So sense, as Frege understands it, implies an inconsistent epistemology. His method of definition requires a term’s sense to be determined by factors other than the subject’s psychological state; his use of sense to solve the identity substitution problem requires the opposite.
Thomas Mitchell (University of Oxford, UK)
I am currently studying for a BPhil at Oxford, though will hopefully have finished by the time of the conference. Previously, I was an undergraduate at the University of Birmingham, also studying philosophy. In due course, I hope to move on to doctoral work.

Although my current paper is in epistemology and philosophy of language, my main interests lie in moral theory. Occasionally, they even tell the truth.
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The Global Embedding Problem for Expressivism about Modality

Felipe Morales

Contemporary expressivists about modality aim to show that modal claims express the attitudes or mental states of the speaker who utters them, rather than describe modal facts to which the speaker presumably has access to. Here, I will focus on Schnieder’s (2010) version of expressivism.

In his account, epistemic modals signal the speech act of utterances. Modal claims are not assertions. To account for certain embeddings, two different strategies are used. The first is to appeal to the possible ambiguity of modal expressions: certain embeddings are be admissible because they allow for non-epistemic readings. The second consists in showing that the complexes in question express admissible composites of speech-acts.

I want to raise a problem with the first strategy. Schnieder only defends a “local” version of expressivism about epistemic modals, but the massive ambiguity in modals he appeals to puts raises the question
of how this class of modal expressions embeds in the broader context of modal language. If modal language bifurcates into epistemic and objective dimensions, the problem is to specify their relation. I call this the “Global Embedding Problem about Modality”. It mirrors the even broader problem of giving an account of the interaction between expressivist and non-expressivist language.

Schnieder’s motivation for expressivism suggests that expressivist language exists to fulfill the role of giving “a way of putting forward the content of a belief without the detour of explicitly ascribing the belief to oneself”, but it is unclear that this cannot be accounted for in purely descriptivist terms. Schnieder himself observes it is possible to assert the information that could be conveyed through expressivist idioms. If they only offer alternative ways to do this, the distinction is pragmatic, rather than semantic.


Section: Philosophy of Language  
Language: English  
Chair: Pascale Lötscher  
Date: 14:40-15:10, 14 September 2018 (Friday)  
Location: SR 1.003

**Felipe Morales** (KU Leuven, Belgium)  
I am a PhD student at KU Leuven, working on modal epistemology broadly conceived. I did my MPhil on KU Leuven, with a thesis on the epistemology of understanding, and previously, did my Bachelors and Masters at Universidad de Chile (Santiago, Chile).  
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Does Contemporary Physics Compel Us to Revise Metaphysics? The critique of Ontic Structuralist Realism

Angelika Mus-Nowak

The aim of the paper is to present a critique of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) – the view according to which all we can know, and all there is in the world, is the structure. Ontic Structuralists ground their position on the findings of modern physics, mainly quantum mechanics and General Relativity. They assert that, taking into account the form of contemporary physical theories, metaphysics should be purged of talk of individuals. Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that scientists often postulate existence of objects in order to explain phenomena. OSR tries to justify this fact by claiming that objects play only “a heuristic role allowing for the introduction of the structures which then carry the ontological weight” (French 1999). In its less eliminative form, OSR admits existence of objects which should be reconceptualised in purely structural terms. That means that the claim that only relations exist should be read as asserting that there are relata, but they are structures themselves.

Furthermore, Ontic Structuralist point out that: “there are objects in our metaphysics but they have been purged of their intrinsic natures, identity, and individuality, and they are not metaphysically fundamental” (Ladyman, Ross 2007). But does such an evasion make OSR more intelligible? It is still hard to understand how we can make sense of objects without their intrinsic properties. After all, once we admit that objects exist, it is hard to insist that this position is structuralist and differs from traditional realism.

Can we reasonably talk about the object that is deprived of intrinsic properties and individuality? Does contemporary physics compel us to revise metaphysics and to abandon objects as metaphysically fundamental? The above questions will constitute the main issue of my speech. I will show that OSR consists mainly in creating incomprehensible labels that are supposed to solve problems in modern science. Ontic Structuralists began with strong claims, however they were forced to admit the existence of objects and since that moment they have nothing better to offer than a standard realist.
References:


Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Aleksandra Gomułczak
Date: 15:20-15:50, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005

Angelika Mus-Nowak (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
I am a PhD candidate in philosophy working in the Department of Philosophy of Natural Sciences at the Jagiellonian University. My research interests focus on philosophy of science, especially on philosophy of physics. I have worked extensively on scientific realism (mostly on the position of Stathis Psillos) and structural realism in version advocated by James Ladyman. Starting from the beginning of 2016 I teach students of medicine, biology and computer science. My classes are dedicated to philosophy of science and methodology of science. I have published several articles concerned with scientific realism and structural realism.
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IIT and the Science of Consciousness

Niccolò Negro

My talk is divided into four parts and is driven by one main question: is Integrated Information Theory (IIT) (Oizumi et al. 2014) what we expect as a proper scientific theory of consciousness? In the first part, I explore both some of the most important proposals within the literature about the science of consciousness, and the philosophical troubles they have to deal with. Therefore, after a brief summary of the Crick and Koch’s theory (Crick & Koch
Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (Dehaene et al. 1998), and Neural Darwinism (Edelman 1987), I present some philosophical problems stemming from these accounts, in particular, the knowledge argument against physicalism (Jackson 1986), and the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995). After that, a brief introduction of IIT will be provided. But why should IIT succeed where other (neuro)scientific theories have, according to the above-mentioned philosophers, failed? The second part of the talk is concerned with this question, and I shall argue that IIT’s strength consists in three points: i) it individuates a clear explanandum, structured in the theory’s axioms; ii) it tries to define what consciousness is via a mathematical method, by considering both the quality and the quantity of it; iii) it has informed the delineation of a practical method (Perturbational Complexity Index) for measuring the capacity of consciousness in a brain, since this index hinges upon two conceptual pillars of IIT, namely integration and differentiation.

Nevertheless, in the third section, I consider the philosophical troubles with IIT, arguing that the main problem lies in the assumption that consciousness is identical to an informational structure. This starting point would lead the theory towards a form of panpsychism and a very controversial account of the link between mind and life. Instead, I suggest that, even though IIT’s epistemological structure is what we want from a scientific theory of consciousness, its ontological assumptions do not allow the theory to explain consciousness. Then, in the fourth and conclusive part, I propose considering consciousness not as an intrinsic property of the matter, but as a biological phenomenon. Exploring the notion of information integration only within a biological context, I suggest, would be a decisive improvement in the science of consciousness.


Niccolò Negro (University of Milan, Italy)
I studied philosophy at the University of Siena, at the University of Milan, and, as an exchange student, at Central European University, Budapest. I am interested in philosophy of mind and neuroscience. In particular, I am focused on consciousness and its relation to the physical world. I am also interested in general philosophy of science and in neuroaesthetics.
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Modal Surveys: Molinism and the Grounding Objection

Matthew Norris

This paper explores how Molinism offers a plausible solution to the problem of theological fatalism within the analytic tradition, especially when conceptualised in terms of modern modal logic. It also clarifies a distinction between two different forms of the so-called “grounding objection” to counterfactual knowledge (warrant vs. truth), upon which Molinism is predicated, and offers a variety of solutions to the objection – including a novel appeal to Timothy Williamson’s thesis on the indefinability of knowledge. In offering a range of possible solutions, this paper attempts to present Molinism as an attractive response to the problem of theological fatalism, particularly for philosophers in the analytic tradition.
Matthew Norris (University of Cambridge, United Kingdom)  
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Pseudogap between Descriptive and Normative in Process of Belief Formation

Petar Nurkic

Difference between normative and naturalistic approach to epistemology can be summarized in answering the following questions:

(a) How do we arrive at our beliefs?
(b) How ought we to arrive at our beliefs?
(c) Are the processes by which we do arrive at our beliefs the ones by which we ought to arrive at our beliefs?

We could use traditional approach and say that question (a) should be answered by the psychologist, question (b) by philosophers and answer to question (c) should be a combination of those two answers.

Completely different is naturalistic approach which suggests that the answering (b) cannot be accomplished without answering (a). There are, of course, different lines of thought in naturalistic epistemology. There are radical theses such as Quine's. His replacement thesis suggests that all of philosophical questions should be answered by psychology (Quine, 1969). There is a stronger and a weaker form of replacement thesis (I will argue in favor of the latter).

I will take somewhere neutral psychologistic perspective in dealing with issues in question. Psychologism is the view that the processes by which we ought to arrive at our beliefs are the processes by which we
do arrive at our beliefs (Kornblith, 1993). Nevertheless, I will argue that epistemology keeps its autonomy by highlighting pseudo-conflict between epistemology and psychology. There are different questions and different methodologies in stake. Division between normative and descriptive (more naturalistic approach) is misguided by bad question form - question that arise from stronger form of replacement thesis, that I will try to reject and accept weaker form. If my endeavours show to be correct, epistemology should not fear that it will be replaced by descriptive psychology.

If the thesis under discussion is true, the psychology of belief acquisition and epistemology are two different fields which ask different, but equally legitimate questions.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Jakob Eichler
Date: 14:00-14:30, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004

Petar Nurkic (University of Belgrade, Serbia)
Masters thesis: Cognitive Aspects of Naturalising Epistemology
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Ontic Structural Realism as an Plausible Answer to the Problem of the Applicability of Mathematics in Science

Leonardo Ortiz-Arcuna

In this paper, I will argue in favor of a kind of realism respect to the applicability of mathematics in physical theories. For this, first, I will establish that it has been a mistake to argue for realism appealing to the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument, we should draw upon to the no miracles argument. The former focus on an unnecessary and insufficient discussion about mathematical entities while the latter is more intuitive and allows us to go straight
to the problem of the applicability of mathematical in scientific theories through the debate between realism-antirealism. Then, I propose a realistic approach to the applicability problem, arguing that Ontic Structural Realism is the most straightforward scheme to think it because it can face the most significant objections to the realism derived from the no miracles argument.

Leonardo Ortiz-Arcuna (Instituto Tecnologico de Costa Rica, Costa Rica)
Bachelor degree in Philosophy from the University of Costa Rica (2014), he has completed complementary courses in natural sciences (physics) and mathematics.
Currently working in Technological Institute of Costa Rica since 2016. He is currently pursuing a Master’s Degree in Philosophy from the University of Costa Rica.
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Faulty Attitudes and Disagreement

Robert Pal

‘faultless disagreement’ is a disagreement between at least two parties where neither party has made a mistake or is at fault. These types of disagreements are usually thought to amount to conflicting beliefs. Relativists like Kölbl (2004) have tried to argue that they can make sense of faultless disagreements by relativizing the truth-value of propositions to the perspectives of the disputants. Thus, they claim to be able to capture the idea that the disputants in question have a genuine disagreement whether p or not-p, as well as, at the same time not being at fault since both p and
not-p can be true from their respective perspectives. Torfinn Huenes (2014) have argued that one does not have to take refuge in relativism to make sense of faultless disagreement. He does this by claiming that disagreements sometimes involve 'non-do xastic attitudes' e.g. desires, preferences, likings etc. Furthermore, he claims that the mere fact that two parties have conflicting non-do xastic attitudes does not entail that anyone is making a mistake.

In this paper I argue against Huenes' position by way of showing that there are good reasons to accept that non-do xastic attitudes can be appropriate or inappropriate in light of some evaluative property of the object of the attitude in question. Thus, if agent A has a non-do xastic attitude vis-a-vis an object x which is in fact inappropriate to have, then A will be at fault, in some sense at least. If agent B on the other hand has an appropriate non-do xastic attitude to the very same object as A, then A and B will be in a state of disagreement insofar as they have conflicting attitudes. However, it seems incorrect to hold that A is not at fault when having the attitude towards x as well as B not being at fault when having a conflicting attitude vis-a-vis the same object x. Clearly, A must be at fault here if there is some evaluative property in light of which A's attitude is inappropriate. Hence, if there is some attitude which is appropriate to have in light of some evaluative property of the object of the attitude, then the appropriateness of that attitude should exclude the appropriateness of the conflicting attitude. Consequently, the position held by Huenes – I argue – can only secure disagreement at the expense of faultlessness.

References:


Robert Pal (Lund University, Sweden)
My name is Robert Pal and I am currently writing my master thesis at Lund University in Sweden under the supervision of professor Toni Rannow-Rasmussen. I have a bachelor's degree in practical philosophy from Lund University. This abstract is taken (and adjusted) from a paper I wrote in an advanced course at Umea University in Sweden. The course was about “disagreement”. The paper was examined by Torfinn Huvenes whose position I argue against. I have also taken some advanced courses at Umea University and a course in Continental Philosophy at Södertörns Högskola in Sweden. My main area of interest is philosophy of emotions and attitudes and value theory.
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Metatheory for Computational Complexity Theory

Iaroslav Petik

Complexity theory is a young science which appeared from the cooperation of mathematical logic and computer science. It studies classes of the computational complexity – sets of decision problems that can be solved using similar amount of computational power (units of memory) and time resources. These classes are connected into a multileveled branching hierarchy with some problematic places (such as famous P versus NP problem). Every complexity class has an according logical formal system which represents formal tools needed to solve the problems from this particular class. For each class this logical formal system is different which makes relations between classes quite problematic.

Formal logic is also famous for building metatheories for formal systems since Russell’s and Whitehead’s project for mathematics. It is possible to build a special logical formal system not as an according system for a particular complexity class but rather as a metatheory for the entire hierarchy. “Principia Mathematica” shows that relatively simple propositional logic can serve for purpose of modeling many different areas of mathematics which are different from each other just like complexity classes are.

For these purposes certain modification of the propositional modal logic can suite as a good candidate. Modal semantics is intuitively good model for such an hierarchy as worlds represent particular classes
and varying accessibility relation specifies the relations between classes implying the according modal operators. Epistemic logic may be the alternative candidate as the knowledge operator is a good representation of oracle-strings in Turing Machines for example. However general modal logic can be better for global hierarchy case when epistemic logic serves better for local cases.

The problem with applicability of modal semantics to complexity theory case concerns the completeness and soundness of such a formal system.

Section: Logic
Language: English
Chair: Tobias Koch
Date: 14:40-15:10, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006

Iaroslav Petik (Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Ukraine)
Born in Russia 1992.
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Revisiting the Cobham-Edmonds Thesis: A Quantum Perspective

Agnieszka Proszewska

The theory of computation is a very dynamically evolving field within theoretical computer science. Nowadays, the most widely accepted approach to computability is the one introduced in the form of the Church-Turing thesis. This approach identifies the class of effectively computable functions as equivalent to the class of functions computable by a Turing machine. The fact is, however, that the original thesis justifies only one of its implications (→): that every effectively computable function is computable by some
Turing machine. The second implication (←) is quite obviously doomed to fail if we want to adopt computability in any practical sense. Such considerations have finally led to the emergence of the concept of feasible computability. Just like the notion of 'effective' computability from the Church-Turing thesis, the concept of 'feasibility' also seems to be a more intuitive than mathematical one. Over the years various researchers have proposed different approaches to define feasibility, embodying different philosophical and formal intuitions. Today, it is common to use the definition proposed by the Cobham-Edmonds thesis and identify the class of feasible functions with the class containing functions computable in polynomial time (P, PTIME).

Birth of the idea of applying extraordinary quantum effects to speed-up computational process dates back to Feynman and Deutsch. It began to gain even more interest after the quantum factorization algorithm introduced by Shor in 1994, giving a glimpse of the real quantum speed-up one can achieve, compared to all known classical algorithms. Quantum computing has, without doubt, broadened our understanding of the nature of computing and our cognitive limitations. Recent advances made in the field of computation and complexity theory have soon lead to the - in some sense anticipated - question which quantum algorithms can be regarded as "practical".

Presented results allow us to formulate a conjecture that the problem of feasibility in theory of computation should today be discussed within the broader context of quantum computing. In the light of conducted discussions, we draw a conclusion, that to attack the problem of feasibility it may not be sufficient just to simply "translate" Cobham's and Edmonds' ideas into the quantum world and one has to take into account problems specific for operating on quantum matter.
Agnieszka Proszewska (Jagiellonian University, Polska)
Agnieszka Proszewska is a PhD candidate and teaching assistant in the Faculty of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, where she teaches logic and set theory, computation theory and philosophy of science. She received a MA in Philosophy and a MA in Swedish Philology from Jagiellonian University and is currently working on her Master’s thesis in theoretical computer science at the Faculty of Physics, Astronomy and Applied Computer Science. Her research interests focus on the philosophy of natural sciences, structural frameworks, mathematical logic and theories of complexity and computation.
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Does True Belief entail Knowledge?

Mahdi Ranaee

Mahdi Ranaee offers a counterexample to Timothy Williamson’s conjecture that knowing is the most general factive stative attitude. He criticises two counterexamples offered by Ernest Sosa and Baron Reed based on Williamson’s own remarks and argues that his counterexample is immune to that objection. In this paper, however, I argue that this counterexample is an unnecessary detour and his response to Williamson’s objection can be used equally forcefully both by Sosa and Reed. Pressing the argument against Williamson’s objection, however, I try to show that the problem in Williamson’s account is much deeper than what both Sosa and Reed anticipated. That is, Williamson has to abandon either his Distinct Concepts Argument (DCA) in favour of the unanalysability of knowledge, or his abovementioned conjecture.
Mahdi Ranaee (University of Potsdam, Germany)

I come from Hamedna, Iran. In Iran I studied social communication and philosophy of religion, and started a PhD programme in analytic philosophy and completed successfully my course work. Based on my reading of Sellars and McDowell, I started to become interested in Kant’s philosophy, and since there were no Kant specialist in Iran, I decided to withdraw from the PhD programme and come to Germany to work on Kant and also complete my German language.

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Metaphysically Opaque Grounding and Constitutive Metaphysical Explanations

Henrik Rydéhn

Recent metaphysics has seen a great deal of interest in grounding – a relation of non-causal determination whereby a fact obtains in virtue of the obtaining of some other fact or facts. There has been a great deal of controversy over the nature of grounding itself, but one recurring and largely unquestioned theme in much of the literature is that grounding is, in some sense, a particularly intimate metaphysical relation. Thus, for example, Kit Fine calls grounding “the ultimate form of explanation.” An arguably related idea is that grounding has some necessary connection with the most core features of things, such as their essences or natures – those features that constitute the identities of things and make them what they are.

In this talk, I will be concerned with these ideas about how grounding works. I argue that certain interesting and widespread philosophical views are implicitly committed to a notion of what I call “metaphysically opaque grounding” (or just “opaque grounding”) – grounding that constitutes a less intimate connection than what is commonly thought, among other things because it does not go together with any connections of essence, reduction or “consisting in”. I illustrate the importance of the notion of metaphysically opaque grounding by arguing that if there are cases of opaque grounding, the idea (associated, most notably, with Kit Fine) that grounding is constitutive explanation cannot be right. The picture that emerges suggests instead that if there are cases of opaque grounding, grounding explanation at least sometimes looks much more like the more mundane relation of causal explanation than like the “ultimate form of explanation” envisaged by Fine and others.
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics: Euclidean Axiomatic Sciences or Husserlian Regional Ontologies?

Petter Sandstad

Since the commentary of Philoponus, Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (APo) has been interpreted as an account and defence of axiomatic sciences, most notably Euclid's axiomatization of geometry. This is still a popular interpretation (cf. Scholz 1930; Betti & Jong 2010). I argue that Aristotle's APo is not best interpreted as defending Euclidean axiomatic sciences. Rather, it is closer to Husserlian regional/material ontologies.

While the two interpretations are similar, they also differ on some important issues. Both aim at a systematization of the special sciences (e.g., geometry, algebra, biology). For both, this systematization involves a hierarchical structure. Both are (mainly) concerned with generalizations and laws, rather than particular individuals. Last, both involve deductive reasoning not only in the construction but also in the application of the system.

First of the differences is that in an axiomatic science the nodes (i.e., any axiom, postulate, thesis, definition, etc.) are propositions (or facts, or states of affairs), such as “a point is that which has no part” and “if in a triangle two angles equal one another, then the sides opposite the equal angles also equal one another”. In contrast, in a Husserlian regional ontology the nodes are universals, such as Triangle, Angle, and Point.
Second, in an axiomatic science the relation connecting the nodes is that of deducibility, along the lines of proof-theory. In contrast, a Husserlian regional ontology includes several distinct relations which can connect a node to several other nodes. E.g., Isosceles is a species of Triangle (taxonomic relation), Isosceles has part two equal angles (parthood relation), and Isosceles encloses an area (spatial relation).

An upshot of this is that while the axiomatic view of sciences (e.g., Hilbert’s view) is generally held to have been a failure, in contrast the Husserlian program (cf. Arp, Smith, & Spear 2015) is a recent and very promising scientific program.

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**Section:** History of Philosophy  
**Language:** English  
**Chair:** Rareș Fogaș  
**Date:** 14:00-14:30, 12 September 2018 (Wednesday)  
**Location:** HS E.002

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**Petter Sandstad** (Rostock, Germany)  
Petter Sandstad is a doctoral student at the University of Rostock. He is a research assistant in the DFG-project, Formal Causation in Aristotle and in Analytic Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science (2018-2020). He has published both on ancient philosophy and on contemporary metaphysics. And most importantly, he has presented papers at two previous SOPhiA-conferences.  
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**Easy, But Not That Much: How Easy Ontology Can Get Complicated**

César Frederico dos Santos

In “Ontology Made Easy” (2014), Amie Thomasson claims that recalcitrant ontological problems can be solved through trivial and straightforward inferences from uncontroversial premises. In her approach, answers for existence questions take the form of so-called easy-arguments, which rely heavily on the rules of use of the terms involved in asking and answering these questions, fixed by
ordinary language usage. In this talk, I argue that, even if we fully adhere to Thomasson’s methodology, we cannot expect to answer disputed existence questions by easy-arguments. The problem is that putative easy-arguments leave room for contentious issues for which there are no trivial answers, even if metaphysical concerns are put aside. To illustrate this, I discuss some aspects of debates about the existence of two quite different ontological categories with regard to ordinary language usage: human races and numbers. Racial terms do not have stable and fixed rules of use, neither in ordinary language nor in science. Therefore, even if metaphysical concerns are put aside, there is no hope of establishing whether races exist or not trivially. When it comes to numerical expressions, though, their rules of use are stable and fixed, both in ordinary language and in mathematics. The problem, however, is in establishing what are these rules. The assumption that expressions of the form “the number of xs” are singular terms that refer to numbers is not trivial, as Thomasson claims. The work of linguists such as Heike Wiese suggests that in ordinary language some numerical expressions may not refer to numbers. Again, even if metaphysical concerns are put aside, there is no hope of establishing whether numbers exist or not without establishing in advance whether numerical expressions refer or not, and what they refer to. And these latter questions do not have trivial answers. To sum up, the controversies I raise about the existence of races and numbers, which would be accepted as legitimate by the easy-ontologist, show that existential questions are more difficult and contentious than Thomasson would like them to be. Easy-arguments can be straightforward answers for existence questions only when everything else – the side issues that may legitimately arise from them – has already been settled.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebhardt
Date: 10:00-10:30, 13 September 2018 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006
César Frederico dos Santos (University of Groningen, Netherlands)
César F. dos Santos is a Ph.D. student in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Groningen. His research interests focus on the question of the existence of mathematical entities, and he believes that an approach to this issue can benefit from a combination of cognitive science and conceptual analysis. He is also an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at the Federal University of Maranhão, Brazil, where he teaches Logic and Epistemology.
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Naturalizing the Mind: Intrinsic Nature, Misplaced Concreteness and where the Russelian Monist Goes Wrong

Marta Santuccio

In an attempt to produce an account of how consciousness fits within the causally closed physical world, the Russelian Monist relies on Russell’s argument for intrinsic natures and Whitehead’s fallacy of misplaced concreteness, to argue against the structuralism of physics and towards the claim that consciousness constitutes the intrinsic nature of matter. However, she fails to produce such an account. In my presentation I enquire whether the Russelian Monist fails in virtue of relying on Russell and Whitehead’s arguments or, conversely, whether a more adequate analysis of Russell and Whitehead’s positions can provide us with some valuable suggestion as to how to naturalize the mind. I distill two main points common to both arguments: (i) a neutral approach to the “stuff” of the world and (ii) event based ontology. I argue that these are the most valuable contribution that Russell’s argument and Whitehead’s fallacy provide us with and that the Russelian monist fails in virtue of leaving these features out of her account.
Marta Santuccio (Central European University, Hungary)
I am a PhD candidate at Central European University in Budapest. My curiosity for the Universe and consciousness is the driving force of my work, as well as an interest of mine from an early age. In my research I aim to develop a process based account of consciousness, that overcomes the problems generally associated with more traditional views, in the hope of pushing the consciousness debate forward. Before deciding to pursue philosophy more rigorously in an academic environment and hence taking the MLitt at the University of Glasgow, I focused on studying consciousness from a more practical perspective. I obtained a Masters in Art and Science at Central Saint Martins in London. My practice focused on the creation of immersive environments aimed at creating spaces for visitors to experience various states of consciousness through perception. I continue to make art and my philosophical work feeds strongly on the more practical aspect of my research.
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Leibniz’ Traum und seine Grenzen in interlinguistischen Projekten

Mira Sarikaya

Der Vortrag beschäftigt sich mit der Lingua Characteristica und der Frage, inwiefern wir diese als Vorgänger späterer Projekte künstlicher Sprachen betrachten können. Es wird an einigen Sprachprojekten sowohl aus dem Bereich der philosophischen Sprachen als auch der
Plansprachen exemplarisch dargestellt, dass sich in den meisten Projekten künstlicher Sprachen deutliche Parallelen zu Leibniz' Ausführungen wiederfinden. Darauffolgend sollen die Kriterien, an denen sich sowohl Leibniz als auch Folgeprojekte orientieren, kritisch auf ihre Funktionalität überprüft werden. Die Schwierigkeiten dieser Kriterien werden unter anderem daran aufgezeigt, dass diejenigen Projekte, die sich an ihnen orientierten, nicht die erhofften Ziele erreicht haben und die Kriterien darüber hinaus teilweise schon in ihrer theoretischen Form zu Konflikten führen. Es wird sich zeigen, dass sich einige Problematiken ergeben, die den Nutzen dieser Kriterien – zumindest für Sprachen zur zwischenmenschlichen Kommunikation – gänzlich in Frage stellen.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: German
Chair: Petter Sandstad
Date: 17:40-18:10, 12 September 2018 (Wednesday)
Location: HS E.002

Mira Sarikaya (Universität Hamburg, Germany)
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Theory Choice and Formalization: On the Paper-thin Difference between Formal and Informal Notions in Mathematical Practice

Deniz Sarikaya

This talk investigates the selection of axioms for (newly formed) mathematical disciplines and argue that the vocabulary developed within the “theory choice” debate in Philosophy of Science offers fruitful concepts for a finer philosophical analysis of the section-process.

There are competing axiomatizations and it is not clear which one does capture the intuitive notion the best and which one yields to a fruitful new field. We want to investigate how we choose a fitting axiomatization. Theory choice in physics is not solely rational, so the status of axiomatizations gets a little relativized, we could have decided to investigate slightly different mathematical theories.

We want specially to focus on what it should mean that an axiomatization fits to the data. We argue that the informal notions predating axiomatized fields can deliver such data and that an axiomatization needs to fit to informally proved cornerstone results of the new field, including those results which deliver fruitful techniques. We focus on inner mathematical thoughts (and less on philosophical reflection on the concepts, which also play a role) and test our ideas in a case-study, namely the shift to transfinite, especially in infinite combinatorics and set theory.

There is an open debate on criteria for new axioms in set theory, some of the so called extrinsic values of axioms fit to the picture the talk is drawing. Joel D. Hamkins refers directly to experiences which were made with (partly due to contingent reasons) established theories. Those theories are often not considered to capture all aspects of the notion of sets (if there is only one such notion).

All in all, this talk can be read in two ways: As a general plea for the incorporation of the mathematical practice in philosophy and second for pluralistic positions in philosophy of mathematics, importing some of the underdeterminations of physical theories to the selection of axiomatizations of (informal) fields of mathematical research.
Skepticism and the Closure of Knowledge – What are the Possible Objections to the Skeptical Challenge?

Frenzis Herbert Scheffels

Skepticism about the external world is an ancient criticism of our ordinary knowledge. The skeptical challenge has evolved over the time and was able to always be a threat for the term ‘knowledge’ used in ordinary circumstances. As most philosophers defend themselves against this critique, a lot of different strategies were used to avoid Skepticism, while being plausible the strategies were still not able to rule out the skeptical challenge conclusively. This paper demonstrates how the skeptical challenge, which uses the closure principle, works and what the possible responses could be. It should give an insight how philosophers have tried to reject fundamental premises of the Skeptic’s argumentation. Even if the skeptical challenge does look like its issue can not be fixed, because the plausible premises create an antinomy, it shows that, including the Skeptics reasoning, four premises
are able to be refuted. Dretske is introduced as one example for rejecting the closure principle by establishing heavyweight implications. Chalmers on the other hand uses the idea of stages of reality to oppose that the Brain-in-a-Vat-scenario implies that our perceived world is not real. As the examples show this does not seem to be impossible, but maybe changes some fundamentals about our term ‘knowledge’, what can be known or our relation to the external world as such.

**Frenzis Herbert Scheffels** (Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany)

Frenzis H. Scheffels B.A. is a master student of Philosophy at the Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf. His research interests are mostly in Epistemology, Ontology, Ethics and Methodology of Thought Experiments.

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**Should We Respond Correctly to Our Reasons?**

Sebastian Schmidt

argue that we should not always respond correctly to our reasons. This is because there are no normative reasons for attitudes (I focus especially on belief and intention). My argument calls into question recent defenses of the normativity of rationality. Furthermore, its conclusion implies that we are never directly responsible for our attitudes.

My first step relies on cases in which we ought to cause ourselves not to respond correctly to our decisive reasons for attitudes. An example is the case of an eccentric billionaire who offers you money for believing against your decisive evidence. The central argument is this:
(1) Sometimes, you ought to act in such a way that you thereby cause yourself not to respond correctly to your decisive reasons for attitudes.

(2) If you ought to cause yourself not to $\varphi$, then it cannot be the case that you ought to $\varphi$.

(3) Thus: sometimes, it is not true that you ought to respond correctly to your reasons for attitudes.

The alternative to (2) would be to claim that there are cases in which we ought to cause ourselves not to $\varphi$, but at the same time ought to $\varphi$. In such cases, we would necessarily have to flout at least one normative requirement when we obey to the other. But it seems that we are reacting to the situation in the right way if we are doing what we ought to (causing ourselves), rather than forming the attitude.

I reject objections against (2). In the course of this, I defend two claims that are currently often disputed: first, that only one response is normatively required in a situation as described in (1) (namely, the response of causing oneself not to $\varphi$); secondly, that irrationality is not necessarily criticizable. Furthermore, I argue that cases of rational irrationality, as described by Parfit (1984/87, 12–13), pose no problem for (2).

In a second step, I argue that the conclusion of the argument above is incompatible with reasons for attitudes being pro tanto normative reasons. If they were, we would either commit us to the possibility of weighing reasons for actions against reasons for attitudes, or to incommensurable normative directions when deciding how to respond to reasons, all things considered, in a situation like (1).

I finally defend my understanding of “decisive reasons for attitudes” that is central to the argument. There I criticize a recent conception of decisive reasons put forward by Kiesewetter (2017).
Sebastian Schmidt (Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany)

Sebastian Schmidt is a PhD student and Research Assistant at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg (FAU). There he also finished his M.A thesis in 2015, which was supervised by Gerhard Ernst at FAU and David Owens at the University of Reading. The thesis was awarded with a prize of the FAU. He also received two essay prices from the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie). His PhD project on the “ethics of mind” is funded by the German National Academic Foundation (Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes). He was main organizer of the conference on “Ethics of Mind. Responsibility, Normativity, and Rationality” in July/August 2017 at FAU. Two of his articles (one on irrationality, and one on believing at will) appeared in the journal Grazer Philosophische Studien, and he wrote reviews for Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung and Tierstudien. For more information see: https://www.philosophie.phil.uni-erlangen.de/lehrstuehle/lehrstuhlI/schmidt-s.shtml

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On Functionalist Conceptions of Moral Progress

Katharina Anna Sodoma

According to “functionalist” accounts of morality, morality is a human creation that fulfills a certain function. Examples of functionalist accounts of moral progress include Philip Kitcher’s view in “The Ethical Project” (2011), David B. Wong’s position in “Natural Moralities. A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism” (2006) as well as J. David Velleman’s account in “Foundations for Moral Relativism” (2015). Such accounts of morality imply a certain conception of moral progress: any change that allows a system of moral norms to better fulfill its function counts as progressive. Functionalist conceptions of moral progress are interesting for a number of reasons:

(1) They allow for a pluralistic conception of progress because different moral systems can fulfill the same function equally well.

(2) They are metaphysically “parsimonious” because they do not rely on controversial assumptions about a mind-independent “moral reality”.

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(3) They undercut skeptical worries about moral progress because they allow for judgments about progress without reference to an ideal end-state.

However, functionalist conceptions of moral progress also face difficulties. In particular, proponents of a functionalist conception of moral progress face the following questions:

- Is there really a single function morality is supposed to fulfill?

- Does the claim that morality serves a certain function itself rest on unjustified normative assumptions?

- Does the inference from the premise that people have constructed a system of norms in order to serve a certain function to the conclusion that fulfilling this function is the aim of morality constitute a kind of "naturalistic fallacy"?

In addition, some functionalist accounts of morality are explicitly developed as versions of moral relativism – a position that is typically met with a number of further objections. In my contribution, I develop an argument in favor of functionalist conceptions of moral progress based on the above listed advantages. I will look at how proponents of functionalist accounts of morality address the questions their accounts raise and argue that these challenges can be met.

Katharina Anna Sodoma (Universität Wien, Österreich)
Katharina Anna Sodoma is a PhD student in Philosophy at the University of Vienna writing a dissertation on “Moral Relativism and Moral Progress” as part of the ERC Advanced Grant Project “The Emergence of Relativism - Historical, Philosophical and Sociological Perspectives” (PI Martin Kusch).
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Pluralities, Sets and Indefinite Absolutism

Hans Robin Solberg

Assume that we can quantify over everything there is. Accept further unrestricted plural comprehension, so we can take a trivial condition (such as ‘x = x’) to get the universal plurality of every object there is. If there are at least two things, we get from the plural version of Cantor’s theorem that there are more pluralities than objects. So, there is no injective mapping from pluralities to objects. But, if you accept universal singularization, there is a unique object (for example a set) for each distinct plurality. Thus, there is an injective mapping from pluralities into objects. This is inconsistent!

Assuming that the plural version of Cantor’s theorem is unproblematic, there are three ways of avoiding this inconsistency. The two more common responses are to deny either the possibility of absolute generality or universal singularization. The former position leads to what is called generality relativism, defended by for example Kit Fine. The latter position is to is called definite absolutism, defended by for example Timothy Williamson.

In recent work, Salvatore Florio and Oystein Linnebo have defended the third option, restrict the plural comprehension scheme, a position that may be called indefinite absolutism. The indefinite absolutist faces the challenge of answering the question of what pluralities there are in a non-arbitrary manner. The strategy of Florio and Linnebo is to develop for plural logic something similar to an idea from set theory known as “limitation of size”. The resulting theory is named “critical plural logic”.

Is the use of a conception from set theory to justify critical plural logic legitimate? I show how this use might be problematic given that we want to use plural logic to illuminate set theory. I argue that this way of justifying restrictions on plural comprehension introduces the need for more care in laying out the explanatory relationships between set theory and plural logic.
Hans Robin Solberg (University of Oslo, Norway)
I am from Oslo, Norway. I have just finished a master’s degree in philosophy at the University of Oslo, supervised by Oystein Linnebo and Peter Fritz, on the topic of set theoretic pluralism. My BA is also in philosophy with a minor in linguistics. Fall 2018 I will start my studies towards a DPhil at the University of Oxford.
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The Mereological and the Anti-Mereological View of the Matter-Form Compound. Two Readings of the Regress Argument

Mattia Sorgon

The Regress Argument, discussed by Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z.17, provides the solution to the problem of unity of a matter-form compound. Focusing on composite things, wholes and heaps are indeed distinguished in virtue of a principle of unity which is present in the formers and absent in the latters. Among what can be neutrally called totalities, Aristotle distinguishes indeed between wholes, which show a oneness, such as his examples of the flesh and the syllable BA, and heaps, totalities of elements which lack any sort of unifying principle, such as a heap of sand.

Being metaphysically different from the basic elements composing both wholes and heaps, the principle of unity is understood as corresponding to the form of the compound. The Aristotelian argument aims basically at avoiding any consideration of a material principle of unity, which, leading to an infinite regress, would result unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, the argument still permits two opposite readings of the compositional relationship between the elements which characterizes the principle of unity. Once analysed and developed, these two readings would provide two corresponding divergent views of the relationship between form and matter within a compound. On one hand, the mereological view (Koslicki 2006, 2007) defines a unique parthood relation and considers a whole as having both vertical and horizontal parts. On the other hand, the anti-mereological view (Harte 2002) defines two different relations, one concerning the mereological composition of whole and elements and another regarding the metaphysical composition of form and matter.
Confronting these two views with the Aristotelian lexicon in Met. Δ .25 and Δ .26, each reading will be then considered in its limits and virtues. The mereological reading of the Regress Argument will then finally result the only interpretation able to support the analysis of the Aristotelian text.

References


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On Certainty, Doubt and Confidence

Sergiu Spatan

A popular idea is to treat confidence, doubt and certainty as metacognitive epistemic feelings/emotions (Proust 2013, Arango-Munoz 2014). But what is the precise relation between the two? According to one account (Lutrell et al 2013, Moon 2018), psychological certainty represents the strongest form of confidence, which can vary from extreme doubt to absolute certainty. Thus, Certainty1: S is certain that p iff S has the highest degree of confidence that p, where confidence is defined on an interval between 0 and 1. But this account faces a serious problem with the fact that, presumably, one’s confidence is influenced by one’s newly gathered evidence and, given that one can gather more and more evidence for a certain belief, the highest degree of confidence (confidence 1) is hardly achieved.

My proposal is to treat certainty as the total absence of doubt, but not the highest degree of certainty. One can be more or less confident, but certainty can occur at any level, as long as the subject is doubtless. Thus, Confidence: S believes that she is justified to believe p. Doubt: S believes that she is justified to disbelieve p. Certainty: S is highly confident that p and does not have doubts that p. Namely, S believes that she is highly justified to believe p, and not at all justified to disbelieve p. This account can solve both the puzzle about confidence and doubt presented by Moon (2018), and can have significant consequences for the way we take into consideration (or not) skeptical scenarios. According to this account, a salient skeptical scenario makes one doubt that p only if one believes she is justified to disbelieve p. But this second-order belief usually comes about only to the more conspiratorial people, and not to all of us. For most of us, learning about the matrix and evil demons hypotheses does not induce much doubt about daily propositions. I am still certain this sort of propositions, precisely because I am very confident about them, and I lack any doubts.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Wout Bisschop
Date: 15:20-15:50, 12 September 2018 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.004
Sergiu Spatan (Universität Hamburg, Germany)
I am a 1st year PhD student and research associate at the University of Hamburg. Previously I did my master degree at Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. I did my bachelor in my home-country, Romania, at West University of Timisoara.
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On the Duty to Love Everyone

Lotte Spreeuwenberg

In this paper I aim to fill a gap in contemporary analytic philosophy on love, by arguing that we have a duty to love everyone. Love is, like respect, a response to the dignity of persons, a response to the incomparable value of every human being (Velleman, 1999). Love and respect are different modes of responding to the same value. Love arrests not our self-love, like respect does, but rather our emotional self-protection.

1. Since love is, like respect, a response to the incomparable value of a particular person, which compulsorily warrants respect for everyone, it seems to follow that we have reason to love everyone. In this way a Kantian framework provides the argument that we ought to love everyone because we ought to find everyone’s incomparable value.

2. Love is a way of really looking, an outward attitude away from the self (Murdoch, 2001, 2013), that calls for our own ego to put aside many of our own desires and to be responsible to an independent reality in a way that makes us open to a kind of enlightenment. We ought to love because we morally ought to redirect our attention outside ourselves.

3. These arguments are compatible with an argument from virtue ethics, as we can take a loving attitude to be a virtuous character trait (Nussbaum, 2013, 2016), that allows us to become better persons as we actively cultivate this trait. A loving attitude is aimed at the future; it invokes trust and requires vulnerability. It can help us understanding others, with which negative emotions could dissolve.

Although I situate arguments within different traditions, I submit they are more fitting than just being compatible different strategies. We have a duty to love, because we ought to redirect our attention outside ourselves, thereby recognizing the incomparable value of others.
Cultivating this loving attitude allows us to become better persons.

But how can love be personal if love is an impartial response to the dignity of persons? We should take up a loving attitude in our encounter with anyone, but that does not mean that we should treat or value everyone the same within this loving attitude and that love cannot be personal. Moreover, the duty to love and personal love are not just compatible: the duty to love necessarily is a duty to recognize each other as a person.

Bibliography:

Lotte Spreeuwenberg (University of Antwerp, Netherlands)
I am a PhD student in my second year, working on the topic love in ethics and moral psychology.
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Scientific Realism - Antirealism Debate and Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis

Petar Srdanovic

One of the most popular topics in the contemporary philosophy of science is the debate between scientific realism and scientific antirealism. Scientific realism claims that all scientific theories’ goal is to provide an accurate description of the world. Moreover, for any scientific theory, it is possible, at least in principle, to say if it is (probably) true or (probably) false. The term “scientific antirealism” is usually used to refer to various philosophical viewpoints which deny previously mentioned theses of scientific realism.

I shall argue that one idea from Thomas Kuhn’s book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” provides a strong argument in favor of scientific antirealism. The idea in question is that scientific theories which belong to different paradigms are incommensurable, i.e. fundamentally different on a conceptual, methodological and metaphysical level. I will focus on the so-called metaphysical level because it is the most important for the realism-antirealism debate.

According to Kuhn, metaphysical incommensurability appears because each scientific paradigm separately “decides” what does and what does not count as a scientific phenomenon. Hence, there is no such thing as “objective scientific reality”, independent of scientific change, which can be used as a background for an assessment of any scientific theory T in any moment t. The scientific reality is rather something flexible and scientists of different paradigms live, metaphorically speaking, in different worlds. Therefore, it does not make much sense to ask if a particular theory is true or not. In the best case, this can be asked in the scope of one scientific research tradition (paradigm). Since scientific realism presumes that theories are true or false in the most literal sense, regardless of paradigm to which they belong, metaphysical incommensurability obviously stands in the opposite to scientific realism.

Of course, even if all of this is true so far, various important questions remain unanswered: Are theories which belong to different paradigms really incommensurable? Do scientists really live in different worlds? How does it affect scientific rationality? What arguments can scientific realists give? I shall stress these questions by giving some examples from the history of science.
How Research on Microbiomes is Changing the Concept of the Organism in Biological Sciences

Adrian Stencel & Agnieszka Proszewska

Multicellular organisms contain numerous symbiotic microorganisms, collectively called microbiomes. Recently, microbiomic research has shown that these microorganisms are responsible for the proper functioning of many of the systems (digestive, immune, nervous, etc.) of multicellular organisms. This has inclined some scholars to argue that it is about time to reconceptualise the organism and to develop a concept that would place the greatest emphasis on the vital role of microorganisms in the life of plants and animals. We believe that, unfortunately, there is a problem with this suggestion, since there is no such thing as a universal concept of the organism which could constitute a basis for all biological sciences. Rather, the opposite is true: numerous alternative definitions exist. Therefore, comprehending how microbiomics is changing our understanding of organisms may be a very complex matter. In this paper we will demonstrate that this pluralism proves that claims about a change in our understanding of organisms can be treated as both true and untrue.
Mainly, we assert that the existing concepts differ substantially, and that only some of them have to be reconsidered in order to incorporate the discoveries of microbiomics, while others are already flexible enough to do so. Taking into account the plurality of conceptualisations within different branches of modern biology, we will conduct our discussion using the developmental and the cooperation-conflict concepts of the organism. Then we will explain our results by referring to the recent philosophical debate on the nature of the concept of the organism within biology.

### Section: Philosophy of Science
### Language: English
### Chair: Till Gallasci
### Date: 18:20-18:50, 12 September 2018 (Wednesday)
### Location: SR 1.005

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**Adrian Stencel** (Jagiellonian University, Polska)
Adrian Stencel is a PhD candidate in philosophy at Jagiellonian University. He works mainly in philosophy of biology, with strong interest in the conceptual and foundational issues surrounding the theory of evolution, population biology and microbiology.
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**Agnieszka Proszewska** (Jagiellonian University, Polska)
Agnieszka Proszewska is a Ph.D. student and teaching assistant in the Department of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, where she teaches logic and set theory, epistemology and theory of computation. She graduated from Philosophy and Swedish Philology at the Jagiellonian University and currently she is also working on her Master’s thesis in theoretical computer science at the Department of Physics, Astronomy and Applied Computer Science. Her research interests focus on the philosophy of natural sciences, structural frameworks and mathematical logic.
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Constraints and You (In This Action)

Bastian Steuwer

Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them." This quote captures an understanding of rights as side constraints that is widely shared among deontologists. It is impermissible to violate rights even if we thereby prevent more violations of the same right from happening. But this view is subject to a powerful criticism. Given that we care about the moral values behind side constraints, isn’t it irrational to refuse to prevent as many violations as possible?

Almost all justifications of side constraints focus on the victim and what makes it impermissible to kill him. I defend however an agent-based justification that focuses on the agent and what makes it impermissible for her to kill. Imagine a sadist has pushed a trolley towards five persons who will die unless you push an innocent bystander in front of the trolley. By pushing you would minimize the amount of rights violations. However, if you push it is you who is violating the right, in the first case it is someone else. If we accept, as I argue we should, that there is a morally relevant difference between killing and letting die, then we can explain why we are not justified in killing the person.

There is a powerful objection to this view. Frances Kamm expressed this objection with her Guilty Agent Case. In this case you would prevent yourself from killing five people by killing one. It seems that you have the option between killing five and killing one. But at the same time the deontological constraint against killing does not suddenly disappear.

In my paper, I respond to Kamm’s objection. I do not think that Kamm’s interpretation of the case is the correct one. In her case there are two different actions that we perform. The first action is to initiate the threat against the five, the second is the killing of the one. If we fail to perform the second action, we would be letting the five die by omitting the action. Before the second action we therefore still face a problem of killing versus letting die. I argue further that the fact that in this situation the five will be killed by yourself is not morally relevant. While your past action puts you in a special normative situation, this does not give you license to kill the one. It is precisely the transgression of the constraint against killing that gave rise to the special situation in the first place.
Understanding Others: Why We Can Learn From Invisible Friends

Jessica Struchhold

In my talk I’d like to discuss alternative models to Theory of Mind (ToM) as the basis for understanding oneself and others. The more traditional theory-theory (TT), for example, states that we know what others think or feel on the basis of inferences. Simulation theory (ST), on the other hand, states that we do not understand other minds on the basis of inferences or folk psychology; rather we mentally project ourselves into the shoes of others and simulate their reasoning and decision-making (Goldman 2006).

In recent years Gallagher and Hutto (2008) have argued for a joint account which combines Interaction Theory (IT) and Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH). According to their view, our understanding of others is ordinarily not based on mentalistic inference or simulation, rather we understand others in a narrative way and in environmental contexts. The question I will address is which role narrative competency actually plays by looking at some pretend play scenarios. When children engage in pretend play they are creating a situation where there is more going on that what is literally happening, for example, they invent invisible friends. My aim is to discuss to which extent these kind of pretend play scenarios can be viewed as support for Gallagher and Hutto.
Jessica Struchhold (Heinrich-Heine-University, Germany)
Jessica Struchhold is a master’s student at the Heinrich-Heine-
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a major in Philosophy and a minor in German Literature. Her thesis
was about Jerry Fodor’s Language of Thought Hypothesis.
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Philosophy of Perception Naturalized: A Take on
Burge/Campbell Debate

Vanja Subotić

In the series of his papers from 2005 to 2014, as well as in his
book from 2010, Tyler Burge criticizes positions within the
philosophy of perception which are not in accordance with
the existing knowledge of perceptual psychology, a “mature”
at the basis of this critique is that the philosophers supporting naïve
realism cannot incorporate within their respective theories the perception of animals and children. Furthermore, naïve realists also cannot provide an adequate explanation for the sensory experience of adults, since they do not represent the psychologically realistic understanding
of perception due to their excessive intellectualization of sensory experience. According to Burge’s assessment, the reason for the above can be found in the fact that no naïve realist has ever attentively and informedly considered empirical results.

Tout au contraire, John Campbell (2010) based his defense of naïve realism, or more precisely, of relationism, on the considerations from visual science and cognitive science, with an accompanying naturalistic critique of Burge’s naturalistic moves when providing argumentation. Campbell wants to show that Burge’s theory of perception does not have a good answer to George Berkeley’s riddle: how experience allows our concepts of objects to be independent of our consciousness and mental states (Campbell, 2002a: 127–128). His relationism has an immediate answer due to the reference to a direct relation of acquaintance that connects the perception of the subject to the perceived object.

I will be demonstrating that it seems that Campbell uses the examples from empirical science to the extent it suits him, and when he cannot illustrate his own position with other examples from the same empirical science, then this is because this very empirical science has problems that it can not solve at this moment. These considerations will lead me to conclusion that debates such as Campbell/Burge debate are philosophically underdetermined. I will define philosophical subdetermination as a thesis that describes the case when philosophers, in order to confirm their own arguments, invoke a set of empirical data from the same scientific field, or thematically and methodologically related scientific fields, so it is difficult to judge the validity of arguments only on the basis of such set of empirical data. What I shall be sketching throughout this talk is that results of empirical research do not and cannot provide conclusivity to philosophical arguments, just sheer plausibility. But, The greater empirical plausibility of the arguments in such debates is important, but not decisive for assessing their validity.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Katsiaryna Suryna
Date: 10:00-10:30, 13 September 2018 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003
Vanja Subotić (University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, Serbia)  
I am MA Candidate in Philosophy & MA Student in Computing in Social Sciences. I am currently working on my two interrelated theses:  
“Natural Language Processing and Linguistic Competence: A Connectionist Approach” and “Explorations Into Competence: Pro et Contra The Expert View on Intuitions”. My main fields of specialization on MA level of studies are philosophy of linguistics & language and philosophy of mind & cognition, but I shall be pursuing PhD in experimental philosophy, since I am interested in bridging the gap between formal and experimental semantics and in experimental testing of theories of reference.  
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Don’t Abide by Intuition but Explain it: Illusionism as a Successor to Eliminativism

Katsiaryna Suryna

Illusionism, which has crystallized in philosophy relatively recently (Metzinger 2003, Humphrey 2013, Frankish 2016, Dennett 2016), attributes our resistance to identifying consciousness with neural processes to the illusions our experience abounds in. I approach illusionism as a successor to eliminativism for it dismisses an epistemological significance of our pre-theoretical understanding of ourselves and calls for a revision of psychological concepts. Yet unlike eliminativism, illusionism does not propose to eliminate our pre-theoretical understanding but includes it in its explananda phenomena. In this paper, I show that the illusionist’s doubt about experience does not hold. I do that based on a series of articles on M-autonomy by Thomas Metzinger (2013, 2016, 2017), in which he claims that mind-wandering is a conscious yet subpersonal process, a predicate of the brain, and introduces the illusions of agency and ownership of mind-wandering as what makes us committed to the myth of cognitive agency. Illusionism relies on the Puzzling Representation Thesis to argue that our experience is a functionally adequate but epistemologically unjustified representation. I contend that the Puzzling Representation Thesis results from a mischaracterization of experience. Specifically, the puzzling character of our cognitive phenomenology and pre-theoretical understanding of mind-wandering is not a matter of conflict with the best available scientific data. Rather, it is consequent on the assumptions,
operative in Metzinger’s definition of the explananda phenomena, that preserve the revisionary claim at high methodological and theoretical costs. These assumptions are (i) the introspective supervision model of mental self-control and the actualism about introspection; (ii) unintelligibility of mind-wandering; and (iii) the identification of ability with a feeling, or a phenomenal character of being able.

Katsiaryna Suryna (Central European University, Hungary)
I am a PhD candidate at the Department of Philosophy, Central European University (Budapest, Hungary). I specialize in philosophy of science and philosophy of cognitive neuroscience in particular, philosophy of mind, and phenomenology. I work on my dissertation project currently entitled “Prospects of improvement and integration of multilevel explanations in the sciences of naturalized mind by means of phenomenology” under the supervision of professor Maria Kronfeldner. Recently, I have also been interested in matters of the relationship between art and science, art and research, and the use of AI in the study and production of art. I proposed and organized the conference “Art IN Academia” (January 18–19, 2018) and the group exhibition, which I also curated (January 18-February 5, 2018).
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The Good, The Normative, & The Rational

Tom Swaine-Jameson

In Principia Ethica, Moore claims that the concept of goodness cannot be analysed or equated with any other concept or set of concepts. For the most part, I agree with him, but I will argue that none of Moore’s claims amounts to the universal negative that there cannot be any conceptual analysis of the good
whatevers. I will argue that there is one such analysis that is not fallacious and is well motivated, namely the equation of the good with the rational. I will also discuss an upshot of this, specifically the possibility of non-intuitionistic knowledge of intrinsic goodness.

I accept a number of claims made by Moore in PE as constraints, and I hope to vindicate my conclusion in the context of these constraints to ensure its vindication absent them. First, I accept that the project of defining goodness must be a project of conceptual analysis. Second, I accept that the naturalistic fallacy is present in the ethical positions Moore discusses insofar as he paints an accurate picture of them. Third, I accept that goodness is unique, irreducible, and cannot be identified with any non-normative concept.

These claims, however, do not amount to the claim that Moore desires, namely that no conceptual analysis of goodness whatsoever is available to us. Moore's argument for this claim involves an assumption that any analysis of goodness must involve a reduction of goodness to a non-normative concept which is identified as the sole intrinsic good. But he fails to consider the equation of goodness with some other normatively rich concept, defined non-independently of the concept of goodness, in a relation of non-reductive synonymy. This is what I will propose in the case of the good and the rational: it is not that rationality is the sole intrinsic good, but rather that for something to be intrinsically good just is for it be intrinsically rational.

Moore invites us to imagine whether, for any analysis of the good into some concept or set of concepts, it would be impossible for a rational person to deny its validity. But Moore misunderstands conceptual analysis when he equates validity with obviousness – indeed, for a conceptual analysis to be interesting it must be non-obvious. Rational misgivings about some conceptual analysis ought not in themselves give us reason to doubt it, provided the analysis is plausible, as I hope to show it is.
**Tom Swaine-Jameson** (University of Liverpool, UK)

I began my philosophical education at the University of Sussex in 2008, starting a BA in Philosophy which I completed in 2011. I proceeded to an MA in Philosophy in 2011, focusing on ethics and metaethics, and graduating in 2013 with a Distinction grade. I then applied for research funding, and I won a studentship with the NWCDTP branch of the AHRC for full-time doctoral study at the University of Liverpool, where I have been since 2016.

I have given two talks at the University of Liverpool Graduate Conference, in 2017 and 2018, and at the Institute of Philosophy in Zurich in 2017. I attended the Summer School in Zurich that same year, and will be attending the Summer School in Budapest this coming summer at CEU, where I will also be speaking. I have also been employed to teach first-year undergraduates Political Philosophy since January of this year.

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**Are the Modal Properties of Coincidents Really Primitive? Towards a Biologically-Oriented Solution to Grounding Problem**

Artur Szachniewicz

The coincidence of distinct ordinary objects is possible. Objects are said to coincide whenever they share their matter and space at a given time, presumably, throughout the time they exist (Gibbard 1975). The coincidents are shown to differ in terms of de re modal properties, a fact which calls for explanation, known as the grounding problem. The presentation takes on the view presented by Karren Bennet (2004), according to which there is nothing in virtue of which the coincidents have their modal properties. She offers a disjunctive argument to the effect that the facts about modal properties' distribution are brute, for their distribution is accounted neither by the non-modal properties of objects nor by our intentional states. She backs up her point with what I call a plenitudinous modal property primitivism (PLP). Bennet claims that “the debate about the status of spatio-temporal coincidence should become a debate about the status of that position” (Bennet 2004: 342). I argue against (PLP), showing that it leads to contradiction in case one accepts a metabolic
view of organisms and an immunological conception of organismic individuality (Pradeu 2010). The rejection of (PLP) does not force us to jettison the coincidence though, for the disjunctive argument behind primitivism can be challenged. It can be shown that assuming mereological universalism, the view of masses of matter as mereological sums and the property of life as a property rooted outside the time at which it is exemplified (Chisholm 1976: 100) the property of being alive can be used as the non-modal ground for the modal properties of organisms. Since the argument applies only to organisms, it’s upshot is that it requires an ontology that: accepts organisms as individuals, is eliminativistic towards objects of inanimate kinds and accepts mereological universalism.

Literature:


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Artur Szachniewicz (Jagiellonian University, Poland)

Artur Szachniewicz is a second year Phd student from the Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland. His interests lay in the ontology of material objects, particularly of organisms, and the possibility of panpsychistic ontology.

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Epistemological Dogmatism and the Problem of The Criterion

Guido Tana

In this presentation I offer a critique of epistemological Dogmatism and its anti-sceptical credentials, by investigating its handling of the sceptical Problem of the Criterion. Dogmatism is the neo-Moorean position defended by James Pryor, Michael Huemer, Brit Brogaard and others which holds that we have prima facie defeasible justification due to the phenomenological presentation of ordinary perceptual experience. While dogmatism is usually considered as engaging scepticism mainly on the terrain of the external-world problem, by arguing that the sceptical scenario is an eminently unreasonable one, I will claim that the dialectical exchange on this Cartesian issue is fundamentally uninformative, and dogmatism’s proposal actually bears on whether we can redeem our claims to have perceptual warrant in general. On this sceptical level a different threat arises from the Basic Knowledge/Easy Knowledge objection as proposed by Stewart Cohen, which concerns a more reasonable question about the possibility of settling how perceptual justification is achieved. Dogmatism allows for basic perceptual knowledge in order to avoid the so-called Problem of the Criterion and its justificatory scepticism. However, the way Dogmatism sidesteps this problem directs it within the grip of the Agrippan modes of disagreement, hypothesis, circularity and regress, following the classic Pyrrhonian dialectic. Dogmatism is committed to fall within the mode of hypothesis to defend its claim of basic perceptual justification in the face of rational disagreement about legitimate sources of knowledge, and to avoid regress. This however results in dogmatism allowing for generation of knowledge in an arbitrarily easy way. Why this Easy Knowledge result is fundamentally problematic will be shown through recourse to the related Cognitive Penetration objection devised by Susanna Siegel and Peter Markie. This objection shows that the methodology acquired by choosing the hypothetical mode commits Dogmatism to circular reasoning – falling therefore within the mode of circularity – leading to the collapse of dogmatism as a compelling theory of perceptual justification. Replies from the stands of dogmatism are ultimately not able to either preserve the naturalness of the position, or to tackle the Problem of the Criterion in a satisfactory way.
The idea that logic is normative for the reasoning process is a standard assumption in philosophy. However, this assumption is not uncontroversial; it has been famously questioned by Harman (1984; 1986), who provides four objections to argue that “there is no clearly significant way in which logic is specially relevant to reasoning” (1986: 20). In an unpublished paper, MacFarlane (2004) argues that the normativity of logic is best articulated via “bridge principles” that connect facts about logical entailment with norms for managing one’s beliefs. The most recent literature on the normativity of logic (Field 2009; Field 2015; Steinberger 2017) has been focusing on how to articulate bridge principles that are in good standing against Harman’s objections.

My aim in this talk is to focus on a related topic; that is, on what the source of the normativity of logic might be, and, in light of this, what the status the bridge principles is. I distinguish between two ways one can conceive of the bridge principles. The first option, which I take to be MacFarlane’s, is to take the concept of logical validity as having itself a normative component. On such ground, the bridge principles emerge directly from the practice of reasoning, and elucidate the normative aspect of logical consequence. An alternative option is to take
the normativity of logic to have its source in human rationality. I argue that being subject to a standard of formal coherence is constitutive of being a rational agent. Formal coherence is preserved, fundamentally, in the laws of logic. In this latter picture, the bridge principles can be taken as descriptions that articulate the more general normative requirement of logical coherence.

Section: Logic
Language: English
Chair: Stefan Forster
Date: 11:20-11:50, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006

Elena Tassoni (University of Bologna, Italy)
Elena Tassoni is a PhD student in the Department of Philosophy and Communication Studies at the University of Bologna. Her research interests lie mainly in the philosophy of logic. In particular, her thesis focuses on two main topics: the normativity of logic and logical pluralism. Before starting her PhD in Bologna, she completed and M. Litt. in Logic and Metaphysics at the University of St. Andrews.
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Scientific Theories and their Alternatives

Aljoa Toplak

The notion of (empirical) success in science providing a warrant for the belief in the – at least approximate – truth of our scientific theories is intuitively pleasing. As famously argued by Putnam, this is the only position that can explain this very success without having to resort to miracles. Surely, if a scientific theory is entirely false but still displays predictive success, this has to be a miracle? Looking at the history of science, however, we see once successful theories that were later refuted. Moreover, it seems that the history of science reveals a recurring problem – once successful theories were always superseded by substantially different and better alternative theories. Some realists argued that the paradigm shifts of the past
provide justification for the belief in current theories, since eliminative inference rules out alternatives, one by one, until only one or few remain. With each elimination, we are closer to the truth. Often this strategy has been rejected, since philosophers of the 20th century assumed that there are always unlimited alternatives to a given theory. Eliminating one or even more theories does not make a difference. But where lies the burden of proof – are there such alternatives or not? Starting from vast historical observations, Stanford (2006) formulated the problem of unconceived alternatives, an argument that effectively shifts the burden of proof onto the realist via a historical induction. This article will examine the validity and potential problems of his argument, before taking up a closer examination of the possibility of eliminative inference in regards to our scientific theories.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 12:00-12:30, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005

Aljoa Toplak (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia)
Aljoa Toplak is a student of philosophy at the University of Ljubljana. His main fields of interest are philosophy of science and epistemology. He shows excellent pedagogical skills, since he deems the art of making complex ideas accessible and interesting to wider audiences important. He is currently working on a paper about the relationships between the no-miracles argument, scientific realism and the pessimistic meta-induction in the history of philosophy of science.
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The Moving Spotlight via Temporal Logic

Eric Tremolanti

The Moving Spotlight Theory of time (MST) is, next to presentism, eternalism and the growing block theory of time, one of the main theories in the metaphysics of time. Actually, it may be legitimately claimed that it is the most neglected: formulated by one who did not sustain it (C.D. Broad), it has recently received new attention, being the subject of two books, but it is curious that one of them has been written by an eternalist (B. Skow), and the other by one who holds such a non-standard version of MST to call it ‘enriched presentism’ (R.P. Cameron). In my talk, I aim at exploring the plausibility of MST, not just by arguing in its favor, but by seeking an accurate and satisfying formulation of it.

To do that, I will employ the tools of temporal logic, which to my mind offer a deep insight into metaphysical theories. The crucial methodological idea, with respect to this, is that a metaphysical theory can be developed by

(i) firstly identifying the fundamental facts to be accounted for,

(ii) then building abstract mathematical structures which can be said to capture such facts, and which can be described by means of properly construed formal languages interpreted on them,

(iii) and finally interpreting such structures on real structures, for instance by arguing for an isomorphism between them.

Following this procedure, I will firstly present the fundamental facts which I believe to be essential to MST, in the sense that every development of the theory must maintain their truth; then I will try to capture them by semantically developing a system of dynamic temporal logic in such a way that an isomorphism can be said to obtain between a dynamical model of the semantics and spatiotemporal reality in its temporal structure, on condition that MST is true. I will finally point out that, as a consequence of (a properly developed version of) MST, spatiotemporal reality is dynamical, i.e. the totality of spatiotemporal facts is not fixed.
Knowing What one is Doing – An Argument for the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasons

Paul Tuček

Are there epistemic norms for practical reasons? That is, do I need justification or even knowledge for my beliefs about what reasons I have in order to be (fully) rational? The debate concerning epistemic conditions for practical reasons gives a positive answer to these questions, but disagrees over which epistemic norm is the correct one.

In this talk I argue for the knowledge norm with respect to practical reasons. I propose a further consideration in favour of the knowledge norm as opposed to (various forms of) the justification norm. The central idea connects the knowledge norm, practical knowledge, and action guidance.

The knowledge norm is supported by the following idea: Rationality requires of us to be efficacious, to be effective in pursuing our ends. We act in order to bring about our desired ends. The successful completion of action requires that we take control of our movements, that is, action guidance. A central aspect of action guidance is that we are epistemically well attuned to our immediate practical situation. That is, we need to track the facts pertinent to the success of our actions. Among
those facts we need to track is whether we act, what action we perform, and why we do it. I argue that anything less then knowledge of these facts does not have the features required by action guidance in order to achieve stably successful completion of actions.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Robert Pal
Date: 10:00-10:30, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004

Paul Tucek (University of Vienna, Austria)
I am a member of the Vienna Forum of Analytic Philosophy. My main interest in philosophy concern matters of practical rationality and metaethics.
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Tarski’s Definition of Logical Consequence: Why Etchemendy’s Criticism is Based on False Assumptions

Shota Uka

What does it mean that a sentence A is a logical consequence of a set of sentences B? What are the essential characteristics by which a valid argument can be distinguished from an invalid one? In his 1936 paper “On the Concept of Logical Consequence” Tarski answered these questions by giving precise definition of the notion of logical consequence; according to this definition, a sentence A is a logical consequence of a set of sentences B iff every interpretation that makes all sentences of B true also makes A true. In other words: A sentence A is a logical consequence of a set of sentences B iff every model of B is a model of A. Likewise, a sentence A is logically true iff A is true in every interpretation, i.e. iff every model of the empty set of formulae is also a model of A.

Even though this definition of logical consequence proved to be very fruitful, in his book “The Concept of Logical Consequence” Etchemendy
claims that Tarski’s definition of logical consequence is flawed. He concludes that Tarski’s account is not to be seen as an adequate definition of the notion of logical consequence, neither conceptually nor extensionally, since – as he points out – Tarski’s definition does not capture the essential features of logical consequence and therefore leads to wrong results. In my talk I will not be able to discuss the whole book, so I will mainly focus on Etchemendy’s epistemological argument and on the counterexamples he offers in order to show that Tarski’s account fails extensionally.

My talk consists of three parts: In the first part I will explain Tarski’s definition of logical consequence. In the second part I will present Etchemendy’s epistemological argument and his counterexamples against Tarski’s definition. Finally, I want to argue that Etchemendy’s criticism on Tarski’s account is based on a misinterpretation of this account and a misunderstanding of his aims.

Shota Uka (University of Salzburg, Austria)
After finishing her B.A. in Philosophy at the University of Graz (Austria) in 2016, Shota Uka joined the master’s programme in Philosophy at the University of Salzburg (Austria) in order to focus on analytic philosophy. Currently she is working on her master thesis, discussing Tarski’s definition of logical consequence. She is mainly interested in logic, philosophy of logic and mathematics, and also philosophy of language.
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Normativity in Lewis’ and Bicchieri’s Accounts of Conventions and Norms

Martina Valkovic

In her influential book *The Grammar of Society* (2006), Cristina Bicchieri argues that social norms give rise to normative expectations, which distinguishes them from the so-called descriptive norms and conventions, which generate only empirical expectations. Bicchieri’s account of conventions differs from the one proposed by David Lewis (1969), who claimed conventions are a species of norms, drawing their normativity from the normativity of instrumental rationality and normativity of “external” moral principles or norms. According to Bicchieri, there is also a third kind of normativity that applies to social norms, which is neither rational nor moral.

The aim of this paper is to compare Bicchieri’s and Lewis’ conceptions of conventions and social norms and the expectations they generate, together with the concepts of normativity they employ. One of the reasons to investigate this is the wish for conceptual clarity – to see how similar Lewis’ and Bicchieri’s terms are, and in which exact aspects they differ. However, what makes the topic especially interesting is that it may shed some light on the origin of normative expectations and how we should understand the normativity in question. I argue with Lewis that conventions are a type of norms that draw their normativity from instrumental rationality and other independent other-regarding or moral principles or norms, such as not to harm other people, and that it is not clear what further normativity, i.e. that which is not rational nor moral, there could be. Furthermore, if no other kind of normativity is needed to account for the normativity of norms, it might be good to do away with that elusive concept.
I am a Research Masters student of Philosophy at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. My primary interest is in the area of analytic social philosophy, with a special emphasis on social conventions, norms, coordination, evolution of cooperation. My other interests are history of philosophy, in particular the social contract theories, and philosophy of science, especially problems related to confirmation. E-Mail: mvalkovic@gmx.com

Condorcet’s Jury Theorem: General Will and Epistemic Democracy

Miljan Vasić

In my talk I will discuss what is Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (CJT) and in what way is it related to epistemic democracy and Rousseau’s idea of general will. CJT says this: If we assume that every voter has the same level of competence (i.e. a probability of making a correct decision when choosing between a pair of alternatives) which is greater than 0.5, then, if the voters choose independently of each other, their collective competence (i.e. a probability that the group deciding on the basis of majority rule will make a correct decision) will be greater than the competence of any individual voter.

There are many assumptions in the background of such formulation, and I will summarize them in the following way: (1) Correctness - among the alternatives there is exactly one which is correct; (2) Independence - voters decide independent of one another; (3) Homogeneity - competence of all voters is the same; (4) Minimal competence - competence of every voter is larger than 0.5; (5) Majority rule - the winner is the alternative which scores more than a half of the votes; (6) Binarity - the choice is made between two alternatives.

In the second part I will look into every assumption in more details. I will examine the connection between assumption of correctness and independent standard in epistemic democracy proposed by Cohen (1986), and connection between assumption of independence and Rousseau’s notions about negative influence of factions on voting outcomes. In the end I will look at the assumption of binarity. CJT assumes that we choose between two alternatives, while in democratic elections we are
usually faced with multiple options. Condorcet himself proposed that the majority voting method should be replaced with one that requires of voters to rank all of the options according to their preferences, and then declares the option which is preferred over any other by a majority of voters as a winner. The second solution is proposed by List and Goodin (2001) who argue that CJT could be applied to the situations with multiple options, as long as minimal average competence of the voters is larger than $1/k$, where $k$ stands for number of options, and majority rule is replaced with plurality rule. I will try to show that their solution implicitly leads to rejection of assumption of correctness and is therefore unsuitable for epistemic democrats.

Section: Political Philosophy & Philosophy of Law
Language: English
Chair: Jan Buran
Date: 14:00-14:30, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007

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An Analysis of ACEs-Studies and Their Implications for Philosophy and Public Health

Jan Philip Vogelsang & Ina Gawel

Childhood traumata have a great impact on the psychic constitution and on the subsequent mental health of the adult concerned. Furthermore medical studies, so-called ACE-studies (Adverse Childhood Experiences) have shown that childhood traumata also have a great impact on the future physical health. Thus children, who have an increased ACEs value, which means that they have undergone one or even more childhood traumata, develop twice as often the risk to e.g. get a heart disease or cancer.
This work tries to deliver thought-provoking impulses by analysing these studies in the light of philosophy of science, as well as critically examining implications of these results for the practical aspects of the debate. We will analyse one ACE-study and refer to its method. For this purpose we will examine, whether it can be characterized as a good scientific practice. Additionally we will examine whether the results are valid and what significance the results imply. In the second part the results are applied to the field of practical philosophy and we will analyse the influence of the results on the debate about the rights of children and parents and what consequences there are for the public health system.

We will support the thesis that the results of the ACE-studies may have severe consequences for the public health system and may open up new prospects of the debate about children's rights. One should think about the question if hitherto existing practices, which are commonly used as educational measures, and existing parental rights must be reformed.

Jan Philip Vogelsang (Heinrich-Heine Universität Düsseldorf, Germany)

Jan Philip Vogelsang is a bachelor's student at the Heinrich-Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany. He wrote his bachelor thesis “Conscientious Objections in Medicine” in 2018. His focus was the clash between professional duties in medical practice and the individual conscience of professionals. His main interests lie in Biomedical Ethics, Ethics of Science, as well as the analysis of Pseudoscience.

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Ina Gawel (Heinrich-Heine Universität Düsseldorf, Germany)

Ina Gawel is a master’s student at the Heinrich-Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany. She finished her B.A. in 2015 (Major Philosophy, minor German language and literature studies). Her thesis was a rational reconstruction of traditional Chinese Medicine, focused on ear-acupuncture. Main interests are biomedical ethics and scientific practices in pharmaceutical and medical research.

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Infinite Utility and Risk

Hayden Wilkinson

How should we evaluate worlds containing infinite populations? This is a crucial question for ethical consequentialists – their judgements of acts are determined by evaluations of worlds, and some of our best physical theories now predict that our world will inevitably contain an infinite population (see Knobe et al., 2006; Gott, 2008; Carroll, 2017). It is also not an easy question to answer – after all, standard analysis does not allow us to say that any infinite total value is greater than any other (of the same order of infinity).

Another crucial question is: how should we evaluate options involving infinite worlds, when we are not certain of which world will be produced? After all, we live in a risky and uncertain world, and ethical theories which judge only in cases of certainty are of no use to us (Jackson, 1991).

We have various answers to each question separately, but only one attempt has been made to answer both – Arntzenius (2014) describes a principle which, first, takes expected utilities over finite regions (e.g., groups of people) and only then performs an expansionist aggregation.

In this paper, I demonstrate a substantive problem for Arntzenius’ approach. There exists a decision scenario in which Arntzenius’ method diverges sharply from the intuitively correct judgement – one in which the method recommends that we favour an option which, for every probabilistic state of the world, has less total value.

To avoid this conclusion, we must reject expected utilities taken locally. We need a cardinal value for the world as a whole, or else we
necessarily face this problem.

I show that we can develop a probabilistic criterion with a formal apparatus similar to Arntzenius and to Vallentyne & Kagan (1997). I present both a weak and a strong form of this criterion. The weak form is necessary to preserve our basic intuitions in finite cases. The strong form is far more complete but implies that evaluations are relative to the physical location of the agent.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Katharina Anna Sodoma
Date: 18:20-18:50, 12 September 2018 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.007

Hayden Wilkinson (University of Oxford, United Kingdom)
Hayden Wilkinson is a Researcher at the Global Priorities Institute at the University of Oxford and a current PhD student at the Australian National University. His work focuses on moral decision-making in an infinite cosmos, particularly under a consequentialist framework.
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Things in Themselves and the Number of Worlds for Kant

Sachin Yadav

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant makes a distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves. This paper is largely concerned with the philosophical significance of this distinction, rather than the correct interpretation of Kant. With that in mind I follow, without going into heavy exegetical detail, a sympathetic “one-world” interpretation of Kant’s distinction offered by Rae Langton (1998). In section (I) the key interpretive points of Langton’s understanding of Kant will be outlined. In section (II) it will be argued that a proper appreciation of the consequences of Kant’s claims (as interpreted by Langton) shows that, Kant is committed to the possibility of “two-worlds”; i.e. to the possibility of
there being two-types of non-overlapping objects: one knowable (spatial) type and one unknowable (non-spatial) type. In conclusion I argue that the result of this possibility is, epistemological scepticism.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Bogdan Andrei Dumitrescu
Date: 19:00-19:30, 12 September 2018 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006

Sachin Yadav (Masaryk University, Czechia)
I am a doctoral student from India doing research at Masaryk University, Brno, under the Erasmus Mundus project. My area of specialisation is Kantian metaphysics. I did Bachelors in philosophy from Hindu College, Delhi University in 2010. For Masters in Philosophy I attended Catholic University (KU, Leuven), Belgium in 2011. I went back to India and did advanced Masters in Philosophy at Delhi University. There I was teaching philosophy to undergraduates in 2013-14. Since 2014, I have been in Brno. I would love to be a part of this conference because I believe that this is a great opportunity to interact and learn from my contemporaries and also from experts of philosophy
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Explicit Cancellability of Conversational Implicatures

Nadja-Mira Yolcu

Recent literature has proposed to reject, weaken or change the explicit cancellability principle (EC) of conversational implicatures. The paper particularly discusses Weiner’s (2006) and Akerman’s (2015) example cases as unsuccessful in arguing against the explicit cancellability of conversational implicatures. As I show there are admissible and successful cancellation clauses for Akerman’s and Weiner’s cases. If explicit cancellation leaves the speaker with a retroactively infelicitous utterance the (theoretic) cancellability test is not concerned by that. However, in the actual speaker situation mere cancellation does not suffice if one does not want to make a
pointless or infelicitous utterance. In addition to cancellation, one needs to retract the due to cancellation retroactively infelicitous or pointless original utterance and will then arrive at a felicitous and sensible utterance again. Thus, the paper’s main thesis is that we need to distinguish a theoretical level on which EC* (introduced by me) and the cancellability test operate and a level of real conversation. It is, furthermore argued that Grice’s cancellability test is disjunctive and EC therefore in need of reformulation. Combining this argument with the observations made discussing Weiner’s cases, EC* is introduced as ‘A putative conversational implicature q implicated in C by an utterance P is explicitly cancellable in C if it is admissible to add to P the form of words ‘but not Q’ or ‘I do not mean to imply that Q’ sincerely and they cancel the speaker’s commitment to q.’

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Pascale Lötscher
Date: 15:20-15:50, 14 September 2018 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003

Nadja-Mira Yolcu (, Germany)
I am a doctoral researcher in the research project “Mind the Meaning: The Philosophy of Psychological Expressivism” (PI: Prof Dr Wolfgang Freitag, University of Mannheim). Under Prof Freitag’s supervision I am working on a dissertation on disavowals and expressive negation. I obtained my Bachelor’s degree from the University of Heidelberg and a BPhil from the University of Oxford. My main research interests are Philosophy of Language and Epistemology.
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Peerhood and Epistemic Character

Valeria Zaitseva

In the epistemological debate on peer disagreement the central questions are ‘what may we believe in light of disagreement with a peer’. The question of what features exactly characterize an epistemic peer therefore has the utmost importance if
this concept is to guide our theoretical normativity not just in disagreement scenarios, but within philosophical inquiry and in real life.

In this talk I will regard a central interpretation of the concept of epistemic peerhood consisting in the claim that peers are those who are our evidential and cognitive equals. I will try to show that of the two characteristics, one, namely cognitive equality, is primary and greatly influences the manifestation of the second characteristic, while this does not occur the other way around. I will propose that cognitive equality could be explicature as epistemic character and specified via epistemic virtues and vices.

I will then argue that while epistemic virtues and vices may "balance" each other out in an individual's epistemic character as well as on an interpersonal level there still seem to be some basic level of virtuousness that needs to be present to qualify for peerhood, all other things being equal. Elaborating on this I will argue that the presence of certain vices might disqualify from peerhood, even in cases where evidential equality obtains (and even a significant degree of epistemic virtuousness is present), not just due to their especially stubborn negative truth-conduciveness, but also due to their representation of a person's intellectual character (at least with regards to the relevant question).

I will close by giving an outlook on whether such an interpretation of peerhood could be useful for solving the primary puzzle of peer disagreements and provide some normative guidelines.

Valeria Zaitseva (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany)
Valeria Zaitseva has studied B.A. Philosophy and Sociology at the Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg. She is currently finishing her Master in Philosophy at the Humboldt-Universisty of Berlin. Her M.A. Thesis focuses on the significance of epistemic peer hood in the Deep Disagreements debate. Her philosophical interests include, but
are not limited to, epistemology, especially social epistemology, moral psychology, especially questions of the self, action and decision theory, as well as the free will debate.
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