SOPhiA 2019

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

In which sense does Kant's categorical syllogistic differ from classical logic?
(History of Philosophy, English)

This talk aims at offering a reconstruction of Kant's theory of categorical syllogistic in his general logic. The reconstruction shall highlight the differences between Kant's syllogistic and a possible formalization of it in classical first-order logic.

The structure of the talk will be the following. Firstly, it will be given a fairly general assessment of Kant's syllogistic and a reconstruction of Kant#s version of the so-called dictum de omni et de nullo that is based on his published works (__1); then it will be examined in more detail a reconstruction of the syllogistic moods Baroco's and Bocardo's possible reduction to syllogisms in first figure in which a proof by contradiction, whose use is forbidden by Kant, it is not employed, but rather some alternative logical devices not mentioned by Kant himself (quantification in concepts, obversion, transposition of premises); subsequently, it will be taken into account the reduction of the syllogistic moods that seemingly make use of the immediate inference known as conversio per accidens, which implies a relation of subalternation between terms which does not hold in classical first-order predicate logic; (__2).

It will be claimed that the issues connected with these accounts, amongst the others the ones related to the existential import of singular and universal judgements in Kant's theory (__3), could support in principle the problems that we encounter in giving a satisfactorily account of Kant's categorical syllogistic and of the difficulties we face in proving some specific syllogistic moods.

It will be concluded however that neither subalternation, nor the exclusive negation involved in the reductio proof, seem to be so problematic from the point of view of Kant's theory of categorical syllogisms in his general logic, but rather that the difficulties lie in the restriction on inferential rules theorized by Kant.

Following this argumentative line, it shall come out that, for these reasons, Kant's syllogistic as a logical theory shows a behaviour which is somehow divergent from its possible formalization in classical first-order predicate logic.

Chair: Raimund Pils
Time: 10:40-11:10, 19 September 2019 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005
Remark: CHANGE. The talk is cancelled!

Davide Dalla Rosa 
(University of Padova, Italy)

I am currently a PhD student at the University of Padova (Italy). The topic of my dissertation is Kant's general logic, with special attention to some recent non-classical interpretations of it.

During my PhD I have been graduate visiting student at the UCI Irvine and at the University of Oxford.

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