SOPhiA 2019

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

On Duties Regarding Nonhumans
(Ethics, English)

In the field of environmental ethics, the concern of moral status is keenly debated. In this study, I aim to discuss two capacity-based proposals of moral status. I start with a discussion of the rationality criterion, followed by the sentience approach. I take up this issue in order to show the ethical and environmental implications of deciding on moral standing on the basis pre-determined set of subjective capacities. I will try to establish whether the plausibility of the capacity-based proposals is weakened if entities that should qualify as having moral standing are excluded, and on what basis the ''should'' is determined. While capacity-based proposals have some merits, I argue that not only are they inconsistent and irrelevant to why we should confer obligations on any entity; they also do not fully address the different drivers of loss of biodiversity.

Chair:
Time: 10:00-10:30, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004

Olusegun Steven Samuel 
(University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia)

Olusegun Steven Samuel is a doctoral candidate at the School of Humanities and Languages, University of New South Wales, Sydney. Samuel's research in environmental ethics/philosophy is currently funded through the University International Postgraduate Award (Australian Commonwealth Government) and the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Top-Up Scholarship (UNSW Sydney). One of his co-authored papers ''Africa versus the West on Reparation'' appeared in Peace Review: Journal of Social Justice (2014), Vol. 26 (3), Taylor and Francis.

Testability and Meaning deco