SOPhiA 2019

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

How Naive is the Naive View?
(Philosophy of Mind, English)

One form of Extensionalism, namely the Naïve View (Phillips 2014) purports to account for the phenomenology of motion and change in a very simple way: experiences unfold and the order and duration of the experiential phases mirror those of the perceived events phases.

The Naïve View has problems with Postdictive Phenomena. These show that the eventual presentation of a later stimulus to my experience may affect the experience of a former stimulus: If the later stimulus had not occurred, the former one would have been experienced differently. This represents a challenge: at the moment of the presentation of the first stimulus (thus before the presentation of the second stimulus) there is no way for the occurring experience to ''decide'' the way in which it has to be presented.

In order to avoid costly extra-delays in subpersonal elaboration, the answer provided by Phillips (2014) is a ''whole-first'' conception of experience. Phillips argues that: 1) What a subject perceives at a certain instant is metaphysically dependent on the whole extended experience encompassing that instant. 2) There are two different whole experiences in postdictive scenarios (either the later stimulus is presented or it is not). 3) Given 1 and 2, it comes to be no surprise that the phenomenology of the former stimulus is different in the two cases.

In this paper, I will show that this strategy is metaphysically very demanding. My aim will be to show that, following this suggestion by Phillips, at each instant a subject is presented with infinite many experiences not sharing any numerically identical parts. This, I will demonstrate, is the direct upshot of assuming the whole-first strategy and the idea that experiences have an unfolding character. Finally, I will illustrate that in case of postdictive scenarios these experiences are even contradictory.

My conclusion will be that the cost of a naïve view is a very dubious metaphysics of experience.



Phillips (2014), The temporal Structure of Experience, in Arstila, V, and Lloyd D, Subjective Time, the philosophy, psychology and neuroscience of temporality, The MIT press


Chair:
Time: 14:40-15:10, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007

Daniele Mario Cassaghi 
(University of Milan, Italy)

I am a Phd Student at University of Milan (Dept. of Philosophy) and the Centre for Philosophy of Time (supervisor Prof. Giuliano Torrengo). My research focuses on perception of temporal properties and temporal flow. I am currently a visiting Phd student at Warwick University, under the supervision of Prof. Christoph Hoerl. A secondary project of mine is about Moods and how they are related to intentionality.

Testability and Meaning deco