SOPhiA 2019

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Properties Still Exist Eternally and How About Musical Works?
(Metaphysics and Ontology, English)

In their article, Can a Musical Work be Created, Caplan and Matheson raise three worries about one of the premises of Julian Dodd's argument against the creationist view of types. The premise says; "Any property exists at all times(if it exists at all)". (Caplan and Matheson, 2004, p.126). According to them, Dodd's account of the existence of properties comes from what they call by following D. M. Armstrong, The Principle of Instantiation which says that "a property exists at a time t* such that t* is either before, after, or identical to t and F is instantiated at t*"(Caplan and Matheson, 2004, p.126) and this principle is at the center of their objections. In my paper, I will argue that in Dodd's book, Works of Music An Essay in Ontology which was released three years after Caplan and Matheson's article, one can find an answer for each of three objections, although he does not explicitly reply to their objections. In his book, Dodd adopts a different principle for the existence of properties than The Principle of Instantiation. According to Dodd, "a property F exists at t if and only if there is some time t? such that t? is either before, after, or identical with t, and at which it is (metaphysically) possible for F to be instantiated" Dodd, 2007, p.61). In this paper, will show that Caplan and Matheson's objections do not apply to the principle adopted by Dodd in his book. On the other hand, in the same book, Dodd claims that the premise(of the same argument which Caplan and Matheson refer to) "For any type K and any time t, K exists at t if and only if a corresponding property, being a k, exists, at t." is extremely plausible(Dodd, 2007,p.60). In my paper, as a last point, I will argue that this explanation does not really explain why this premise is plausible, rather it gives another formulation of the same premise.


Caplan B. and Matheson C. (2004), "Can a Musical Work Be Created?" British Journal of Aesthetics, 44 (2); Arts Module, p. 113

Dodd, J. (2000), "Musical works as eternal types", British Journal of Aesthetics, 40(4), p. 424?440.

Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Time: 16:00-16:30, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003

Ece Derya Senbas 
(Bogazici University, Turkey)

I have graduated from Sociology(BA), Bogazici University, in 2016. I have started Philosophy MA in Bogazici University, by 2017. My main areas of interest are philosophy of art, philosophy of cognitive science, metaphysics and ethics.

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