Programme and Abstracts

Organisation: Department of Philosophy
University of Salzburg

Date: September 18–20, 2019

Venue: University of Salzburg
Unipark, Erzabt-Klotz-Straße 1, 5020 Salzburg

Languages: English and German

Website: http://www.sophia-conference.org
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Preface

In recent years the opportunities for keeping track of science-business for students of philosophy have increased. The raising number of essay competitions and graduate conferences support this claim.

In 2019, the Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy is, once again, joining the midst of these events. The title of the conference already reveals some details about the organisers, the contributors and the conference’s guiding principles. To avoid misunderstandings, we want to add the following remarks: (i) Because of the high number of international participants, ‘Salzburg’ stands for the location of the conference only. (ii) One of the conference’s distinctive features compared to similar events is that we do not make any constraints regarding the topic of presentations. (iii) On the contrary, every philosophical discipline – as long as it is carried out in an analytic way – has its place at SOPhiA.

By combining (ii) and (iii) we want to demonstrate, in contrast to some voices which claim that Analytic Philosophy constrains our intellectual life, that all traditional topics can be advantageously examined in Analytic Philosophy. It is our utmost concern to unite analytic philosophers from all around the world (cf. (i)). This is also in the sense of Carnap, who claims in his early work *The Logical Structure of the World*:

"The new type of philosophy has arisen in close contact with the work of the special sciences, especially mathematics and physics. Consequently they have taken the strict and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their guideline for philosophical work, while the attitude of the traditional philosopher is more like that of a poet. This new attitude not only changes the style of thinking but also the
type of problem that is posed. The individual no longer undertakes to erect in one bold stroke an entire system of philosophy. Rather, each works at his special place within the one unified science.”

In spirit of this motto, we wish you an interesting conference, fruitful discussions and stimulating thoughts.

The Organising Committee

The Organising Committee:

Special thanks to our sponsors:
General Information

TIMEFRAME AND GENERAL INFORMATION. From September 18-20, 2019 the tenth Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy (SOPhiA 2019) will be held at the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The conference is public and attending it is free of charge. The official languages of the conference are English and German. Contributed talks will be given by philosophy students (pre-doc). The conference is hosted by members of the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The organisers can be contacted via organization@sophia-conference.org.

MISSION STATEMENT. In the conference, problems of all areas of philosophy should be discussed. The conference has no specific topic. The presentations should rather set themselves apart by a methodological limitation to the tradition of Analytic Philosophy by usage of clear language and comprehensible arguments. The conference is meant to be a common effort to clearly formulate and critically assess some of the problems of philosophy. No individual is expected to construct “a whole building of philosophy” all by himself; rather, the conference hosts expect everyone, as Carnap proposes, to bring the undertaking forward “at his specific place within” philosophy.

PROCEDURE. The speakers are from institutions of the following 23 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, and USA.

There are three types of talks:

Plenary talks: held by invited speakers
Workshop talks: held by invited speakers
Contributed talks: held by student speakers
INVITED SPEAKERS.

- Hilary Greaves (University of Oxford): *Distributional Weights in Cost-Benefit Analysis*
- Philip Kitcher (Columbia University): *Pragmatism, Truth, and Progress*
- Hannes Leitgeb (University of Munich (MCMP)): *On Merely Expressive Devices (Metzler Lecture)"

WORKSHOP SPEAKERS.

Affiliated Workshop: *Mindless explanations? The causal and explanatory role of mental states*

- Margit Scheibl: *Mental concepts and brain activations: How cognitive neuroscientists look at mental concepts*
- Maria Sekatskaya: *Against willusionism: The role of consciousness in intentional action*
- Alexander Gebharter: *Specificity, proportionality, and the limits of mental causation and explanation*
- Julia Pfeiff: *Concepts of rationality in psychotherapeutic explanations of mental disorder*
- David Hommen: *Psychology as Ethics: On the (Proto-)Moral Status of Mental Explanations*

Affiliated Workshop: *Philosophy of Aging: Theoretical and Practical Aspects*

- Pablo García-Barranquero (University of Málaga) & Gregor Greslehner (CNRS & University of Bordeaux): *Introduction: Towards a Philosophy of Aging*
- Cristian Saborido (UNED, Spain) with Pablo García-Barranquero (presenting author, University of Málaga): *Is Aging a Disease? The Theoretical Definition of Aging in the Light of the Philosophy of Medicine*
- Michael Breitenbach (University of Salzburg): *Remarks on the Biology of Aging*
- Mark Rinnerthaler (University of Salzburg): *From Lifespan to Healthspan*
• Stefano Giaimo (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology): *Defining Aging in Evolutionary Biology*
• Günter Lepperdinger (University of Salzburg): *Longevity and Sexual Selection*
• Gregor Greslehner & Mael Lemoine (CNRS & University of Bordeaux): *Are Microbial Changes a Cause or an Effect of Aging?*

Affiliated Workshop: *Responsibility and Agency*

• Jan-Willem Wieland (University of Amsterdam): *Ways to be Blameworthy*
• Hannah Altehenger (Bielefeld University): *Self-Control, the (Deep) Self, and the Divided Mind*
• Sofia Bonicalzi (LMU Munich): *Rethinking Responsibility for Action*
• Leonhard Menges (University of Salzburg): *Alternative Possibilities, Determinism, and the Right Level of Description*

Affiliated Workshop: *Time/Image*

• Florian Fischer (Uni Siegen): *Begrüßung & Einführung*
• Mirjam Schaub (Kunsthochschule Burg Giebichenstein): *Simultanität im Sukzessiven: Mit Gilles Deleuzes’ Kinobüchern gegen den ‘Präsentismus’ der Zeitphilosophie*
• Sarah Kolb (UFG Linz): *Das Bild als “Quellpunkt der Poesie”. Imagination nach Bergson, Duchamp, Benjamin und Lacan*
• Vivien Grabowski (Uni Köln): *I grew up with dinosaurs. Bild- und Zeitproduktionen in New Scenarios Jurassic Paint*
• Maximilian Lehner (KU Linz): *Synchronie in Basel Abbas’ & Ru- anne Abou-Rahmes “And yet my mask is powerful”*
• Eva Kernbauer (Universität für Angewandte Kunst Wien): *Die Befreiung von der Zeit: Kunst, Politik, Anachronie*
Practical Information
Conference Venue

Internet Access

1. Eduroam is available at the whole university campus.

2. In case you have no eduroam access, you can also use the university Wifi free of charge:

   Network name:   Plus_Event
   Username:       g1068958@sbg.ac.at
   Password:       !Unipark!0919

Printing

You have the opportunity to print at the registration and information desk. Please note that we can only print a few pages (e.g., flight tickets, no handouts).

Venue Accessibility

All rooms are wheelchair accessible. There are also wheelchair accessible toilets available. For support just contact our crew at the registration desk.

Confirmations of Attendance

If you need a letter confirming your attendance, please come to the registration desk (by Friday, 2 p.m., at the latest).
City Map (© OpenStreetMap contributors)
Money, Food, and More

ATM

The nearest ATM is located next to the venue (Hypo Bank, Petersbrunnstraße 3).

Coffee and Refreshments

Coffee, tea, and finger food will be served during the refreshment breaks. All refreshments are served in the first floor.

Bakeries & Grocery Stores

There is also a cafeteria (UnikumSky) at the roof-deck of the venue. There are two bakeries nearby: Bäckerei Holztrattner (Schanzlgasse 8) and Bäckerei Funder (Nonntaler Hauptstraße 29). Two grocery stores (Billa and Spar) can be found a few minutes' walk away, in Kaigasse 28-30 and 32, respectively.

Restaurants

There are several restaurants for lunch and dinner close to the venue (downtown). Directly next to the venue is, e.g., ARGE Beisl (Ulrike-Gschwandtner-Str. 5; international, vegetarian, vegan).

Other nearby options include:

- Uncle Van (Nonntaler Hauptstraße 8; Vietnamese)
- 220 Grad (Nonntaler Hauptstraße 9A; coffee house, also lunch menu)
- The Green Garden (Nonntaler Hauptstraße 16; vegetarian, vegan)
- Lemonchilli (Nonntaler Hauptstraße 24; Mexican)
- Real 80s (Nonntaler Hauptstraße 1a; Chinese)
- Gasthaus Hinterbrühl (Schanzlgasse 12; Austrian)
• Trattoria La Campana da Enzo (Schanzlgasse 2; Italian)
• Pommes Boutique (Rudolfsplatz 1a; Burger and Pommes)
• and Nestroy (Erzabt-Klotz-Straße 22; mixed)

Information about the closing dinner will be provided at the closing session.

Public Transport

A route planer for Salzburg’s public transport system is available at: https://fahrplan.salzburg-verkehr.at

Police and Medical Assistance

If you need to call the police or the ambulance, the emergency number is 112. There is a pharmacy next to the venue: St. Erhard Apotheke (Petersbrunnstraße 13).
Schedule
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<td>10:00-10:15</td>
<td>Opening and Best Paper Award</td>
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<td>10:15-11:45</td>
<td>Plenary Lecture</td>
<td>Hilary Greaves</td>
<td>Distributional Weights in Cost-Benefit Analysis Chair: Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla (Location: HS E.002)</td>
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<td>11:45-14:00</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
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### 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)

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<tr>
<td>14:00-14:30</td>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>Chair: Max Timo Goetsch</td>
<td>Antonio Maria Cleani</td>
<td>Monist Language-fundamentality</td>
<td>Thomas Walton</td>
<td>An argument for the vacuity of the natural/non-natural distinction in metaethics</td>
<td>Anna Elisabeth Höhl</td>
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<tr>
<td>16:00-16:30</td>
<td>Julia Szensny</td>
<td>Aliefs are explanatory valuable</td>
<td>Savvas Ioannou</td>
<td>Source of Reality/Causal Capacity: Outside of the Priority Chain?</td>
<td>Amit Pinsker</td>
<td>My Favorite Option</td>
<td>Hylke Jellema</td>
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<td>16:30-17:00</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
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### 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)

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<tr>
<td>18:20-18:50</td>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>Chair: Alexander Michael Witkamp</td>
<td>Giuseppe Colonna</td>
<td>A Case Study: Backward Causation in the Middle Ages</td>
<td>Stefan Gugeri</td>
<td>Why we should believe in an external world</td>
<td>Michal Hubelik</td>
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<td>19:00-19:30</td>
<td>Philosophy of Science</td>
<td>Chair: Alexander Belak</td>
<td>Deniz Sarikaya</td>
<td>Human Functioning and the Space of Reasons – Epistemic Foundations of Positive Freedom</td>
<td>Damiano Ranzenigo</td>
<td>The Hole Argument and the Nature of Spacetime</td>
<td>Yuxuan Wu</td>
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<td>19:30-</td>
<td>Warm Evening Buffet</td>
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### Time Table

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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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<tr>
<td>10:00-10:30</td>
<td>HS E.002</td>
<td><a href="#">Epistemology</a> Chair: Guido Tana</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>SR 1.003</td>
<td><a href="#">Metaphysics and Ontology</a> Chair: André Ferreira</td>
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<td>10:40-10:55</td>
<td>SR 1.004</td>
<td><a href="#">Ethics</a> Chair: Amit Pinsker</td>
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<td>SR 1.005</td>
<td><a href="#">History of Philosophy</a> Chair: Raimund Pilz</td>
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<td>11:00-11:15</td>
<td>SR 1.006</td>
<td><a href="#">Affiliated Workshop</a> Chair: Maria Sekatskaya &amp; Corina Strößner</td>
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<td>11:15</td>
<td>SR 1.007</td>
<td><a href="#">Philosophy of Mind</a> Chair: Louis Longin</td>
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**Epistemology**
- **Chair:** Guido Tana

**Metaphysics and Ontology**
- **Chair:** André Ferreira

**Ethics**
- **Chair:** Amit Pinsker

**History of Philosophy**
- **Chair:** Raimund Pilz

**Affiliated Workshop**
- **Chair:** Maria Sekatskaya & Corina Strößner

### Session Details

#### 10:00-10:30
- **Denis Kazankov**
  - **Title:** What Are Epistemic Modals Relative to?

#### 10:40-10:55
- **Elton Marques**
  - **Title:** Fatalism is not (just) a logico-semantic doctrine

#### 11:20-11:50
- **Marco Marabelli**
  - **Title:** On Time Travel and Free Will: Why the compatibilism-incompatibilism debate might not be relevant after all

#### 12:00-12:30
- **Stefan Steeuw**
  - **Title:** Catherine Elgin on “felicitous falsehoods”

#### 12:30-14:00
- **Lunch Break**

#### 14:00-15:30
- **Plenary Lecture**
  - **Speaker:** Philip Kitcher
  - **Title:** Pragmatism, Truth, and Progress
  - **Chair:** Gregor Greslehner
  - **Location:** HS E.002

#### 15:30-16:00
- **De Gruyter Session:** Open Access Publishing - Info and Discussion (Christoph Schirner, DeGruyter)
  - **Location:** SR 1.007

#### 16:00-16:15
- **Coffee Break**

#### 16:15-20:00
- **Affiliated Workshop**
  - **Florian Fischer & Vivien Grabowski & Sarah Kolb & Mirjam Schaub**
  - **Title:** Time, Image
  - **Chair:** Florian Fischer & Vivien Grabowski & Mirjam Schaub

- **Affiliated Workshop**
  - **Michael Breitenbach & Pablo García-Barranquero & Stefano Giaino & Gregor Greslehner & Maël Lemone & Günter Rinnerthaler & Cristian Saborido**
  - **Title:** Philosophy of Aging: Theoretical and Pragmatic Aspects
  - **Chair:** Pablo García-Barranquero & Gregor Greslehner

- **Affiliated Workshop**
  - **Hannah Altehenger & Sofia Bonicalzi & Leonhard Menges & Jan-Willem Wieland**
  - **Title:** Responsibility and Agency
  - **Chair:** Leonhard Menges

- **Affiliated Workshop**
  - **Alexander Gebharter & David Hommen & Julia Pfeiff & Margit Scheibl & Maria Sekatskaya**
  - **Title:** Mindless explanations?
  - **Chair:** Maria Sekatskaya & Corina Strößner
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<td>Filippo</td>
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**Springer Session:** Meet the Editor of *Erkenntnis* (Hannes Leitgeb (MCMP))

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<td>14:00-14:30</td>
<td>Artur Szachniecz</td>
<td>On the Nature of</td>
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<td>Towards a Metaphysics with no Simples</td>
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<td>14:40-15:10</td>
<td>Andre Ferreira</td>
<td>No Man is an Island, Some are Archipelagoes</td>
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<td>15:20-15:50</td>
<td>Karol Lenart &amp; Artur Szachniecz</td>
<td>Strong Pluralism and Haecceitism</td>
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<td>16:00-16:30</td>
<td>Ece Derya Senbas</td>
<td>Properties Still Exist: Eternally and How About Musical Works?</td>
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**Coffee Break**

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<tr>
<td>17:00-17:30</td>
<td>Metzler Lecture</td>
<td>Hannes Leitgeb On Merely Expressive Devices</td>
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<td>Chair: Alexander Gebharter</td>
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<tr>
<td>18:30-20:00</td>
<td>Get-Together &amp; Drinks</td>
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<tr>
<td>20:00-</td>
<td>Closing Dinner (Restaurant)</td>
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Plenary Talks
Distributional Weights in Cost-Benefit Analysis

Hilary Greaves

Where a possible government project would involve both benefits and costs, cost-benefit analysis seeks to determine whether or not the benefits are worth the costs, and thus whether the project should go ahead. Usually, the project would on balance benefit some people, and would on balance harm other people; it is therefore relevant in particular how benefits/costs are aggregated across people.

Theorists disagree about whether this aggregation should be “unweighted”, i.e. should simply sum individuals’ willingness to pay (in money terms) to have the project go ahead, or whether instead one should use “distributional weights”, so that a benefit or cost of a fixed size (in money terms) counts for more when it accrues to a poorer than to a richer person. Put differently (but more roughly), defenders of the unweighted approach (resp. the weighted approach) advocate measuring benefits and costs in dollar terms (resp. in welfare terms), for the purpose of straightforwardly summing across individuals.

Among moral philosophers in particular, there is an overwhelming consensus that the weighted approach is the correct one, where the weights are straightforwardly derived from whichever social welfare function one seeks to maximise. For example, if one adopts a utilitarian social welfare function, it seems to follow that the weights (for CBA purposes) should simply be the marginal utilities of consumption, at the various applicable baseline consumption levels.

I will discuss sources of resistance to this consensus, stemming from the observation that various actors (both governmental and private) will react in predictable ways to the government’s decisions as to which projects to fund. In particular, it can happen that a project that naively passes a weighted CBA test (and so naively seems to increase social welfare) actually reduces social welfare, once these responses are taken into account.
Pragmatism, Truth, and Progress

Philip Kitcher

Pragmatists often think of truth as what emerges in inquiry, remaining stable in the long run. Many other philosophers take Tarski’s celebrated formal account as the beginning of wisdom about truth. My aim is to show how to clarify both conceptions, and to reveal how the two approaches can be reconciled.

The concept of progress plays a central role in this project. Think of pragmatism as adopting a view about progress in inquiry: progress consists in solving problems. This is supplemented with a strategy for identifying truths – potential truths emerge as you solve problems, and improve their qualifications as candidates the longer they remain effective in problem-solving. I shall try to show how this approach can help us understand the concept of truth in domains where a correspondence account generates mysteries, and how we should understand the idea of correspondence between representations and the world.
On Merely Expressive Devices (Metzler Lecture)

Hannes Leitgeb

In this talk I will develop a semantics for merely expressive devices: linguistic expressions that help us to express propositions (thoughts) but which do not at the same time contribute to the truth conditions of the propositions thereby expressed. Logical operators constitute paradigm case examples of such merely expressive devices, but I will argue that there are many further merely expressive devices, including stipulatively defined terms and metaphysical modalities. Ultimately, the semantics will throw new light on various important philosophical debates, such as on the viability of analyticity and the metaphilosophical status of logic and metaphysics.

Section: Plenary
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 17:00–18:30, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002
Workshops
Mindless explanations? The causal and explanatory role of mental states

Alexander Gebharter & David Hommen & Julia Pfeiff & Margit Scheibl & Maria Sekatskaya

The relationship between physical and mental entities is the central issues in philosophy of mind. Some authors claim that this relationship is identity, and that every mental state can be at least ontologically, or even epistemically, reduced to a physical state. Others claim that this relation is supervenience, and that mental states therefore are ontologically different from physical states. Besides reductionism and supervenience, there are other positions in the debate, such as property dualism, substance dualism and panpsychism. For each of these positions the question arises how our perception and knowledge of mental entities relates to our scientific understanding of the physical world.

Can mental states causally influence physical states? What is the causal role of the mind? Are mental concepts indispensable in cognitive science? What explanatory role do they play? The symposium gathers talks that address these questions from different perspectives: philosophy of mind, theory and modelling of causation, psychological models and cognitive neuroscience.

In particular, we want to address questions on the intersection of philosophy, psychology and neuroscience such as the following: Which role do psychological and neuropsychological models assign to mental states? Can a mental state play an explanatory role in understanding a brain state? What does it mean to study brain states as responses to mental, e.g. linguistic stimuli? Are mental diseases fully explained by physical causes? And if so, how can psychotherapeutic intervention be explained?
Schedule

10:00–11:00 Margit Scheibel: *Mental concepts and brain activations: How cognitive neuroscientists look at mental concepts*

11:15–12:15 Maria Sekatskaya: *Against willusionism: The role of consciousness in intentional action*

16:15–17:15 Alexander Gebharter: *Specificity, proportionality, and the limits of mental causation and explanation*

17:30–18:30 Julia Pfeiff: *Concepts of rationality in psychotherapeutic explanations of mental disorder*

18:45–19:45 David Hommen: *Psychology as Ethics: On the (Proto-)Moral Status of Mental Explanations*

Abstracts

Margit Scheibel (Duesseldorf): *Mental concepts and brain activations: How cognitive neuroscientists look at mental concepts*

The research program of cognitive neuroscience aims at understanding the relation between mental phenomena and their physiological correlates. Popular techniques in the field (such as MEG, fMRI, PET, TMS) are brain mapping techniques. They are used to localize the brain basis of mental faculties (such as perception, attention, motivation, learning, memory, decision, language, action, emotion etc.), and to develop maps defining the spatial layout of the brain organization. The representation and processing of (faculty-)specific mental concepts are modeled in various, partially controversial ways in the respective subfields. All current models bear on spatial mappings, but the models differ which neural predictions, or which predictions about conceptual problems in case of brain damages, they make. In other words, the models make different assumptions as to the brain systems in which mental concepts should be anchored: The Amodal Symbolic Model, for instance, postulates that mental concepts are abstract amodal symbols anchored in an autonomous semantic system. The contrary extreme is the extreme Grounded Cognition Model which postulates that mental concepts are anchored in the modality-specific
brain systems (systems which are typically involved in perception and action or emotion). In the first part of the talk, exemplary findings of neurocognitive research and selected models often referred to in the context of lexicalized mental concepts will be shortly sketched out to give an impression of how cognitive neuroscientists face mental concepts and deal with conceptual questions.

In the second part of the talk, some (more philosophically relevant) implications of the experimental research will be worked out. It is an assumption of the majority in cognitive neuroscience that the brain is the basis for mental phenomena and brain and mind are essentially two sides of the same coin (ontological monism). However, it is also a common assumption that ‘mind-oriented’ and ‘brain-oriented’ research disciplines describe and investigate mental concepts/faculties from different perspectives and with distinct levels of description (methodological and theoretic dualism). Cognitive neuroscientists use physiological and anatomical notions and methods; they inquire into the neural architecture that correlates with particular mental concepts/faculties. Thus, following the perspective and the general research program of cognitive neuroscience one accepts (although mostly indirectly) the following assumptions:

(i) One accepts that mental phenomena and physiological phenomena are analyzed and theoretically anchored in distinct research disciplines. The distinct descriptions are complementary and neither mental phenomena can be reduced to physiological phenomena nor vice versa.

(ii) One accepts a principled equivalence of mental phenomena and physiological phenomena. One does not assume – given the current methods and analyses – that any one-to-one relation can be described, neither of primitive units (in the sense of 1 neuron = 1 conceptual component/operation) nor of more complex units (in the sense of 1 activation pattern in particular cortical regions = 1 complex concept). This is due to different reasons, e.g. granularity mismatch of the distinct analyses, no a priori knowledge about appropriate mappings of mental and biological concepts, large contextual and individual variances in both mental and biological states etc.

(iii) One is supposed to accept that any description of a systematic relation between mental concepts and brain activations is statistical in nature (and not causal or explanatory). For one thing, this is because of what David Poeppel calls the “map problem”: Spatiotemporal
identification or localization of brain activity reveals correlations, but is no explanation, in which properties of neuronal circuits account for particular mental states/the execution of psychological functions (or vice versa). For another thing, only descriptions of statistical correlations are possible due to the thorny issue of where to draw the line between representation of mental concepts and other, closely related processes (such as generating conscious mental imagery or situation models).

Maria Sekatskaya (Duesseldorf): Against willusionism: The role of consciousness in intentional action

Willusionism claims that recent developments in psychology and neuroscience have shown that free will is an illusion. In the first part of my talk I will show that willusionism implies that many traditional kinds of explanations of intentional action are wrong, because these explanations presuppose causal links between conscious mental states and physical states, and willusionists deny that such links exist. In the second part of my talk, I will review the empirical facts on which willusionists base their theory, and will show that these facts don’t support willusionist analysis of action. In the final part of my talk I will show that these facts, nevertheless, are relevant for the empirically based understanding of the role of conscious mental states in explanation of intentional action. In particular, they constrain the degree of control that agent supposedly has over her actions and give reasons to prefer compatibilist or event-causal libertarian theories of action to agent-causal theories.

Alexander Gebharter (Groningen): Specificity, proportionality, and the limits of mental causation and explanation

Many philosophers hold that the systems studied by the special sciences possess some kind of causal or at least explanatory autonomy. They are committed to the view that higher-level properties have causal powers that are to some extent independent of the causal powers of their corresponding lower-level properties or at least to the view that higher-level explanations are to some extent independent of the details of competing lower-level explanations. In this paper we use tools from the causal modeling literature and from information theory to investigate to what extent
such claims can be underpinned by arguments resting on causal specificity and proportionality. Our analysis shows that while there are plenty of ways higher-level causes can be more proportional w.r.t. their higher-level effects, higher-level properties cannot have any causal powers in addition to the causal powers of their supervenience bases.

**Julia Pfeiff (Hannover): Concepts of rationality in psychotherapeutic explanations of mental disorder**

In my talk, I will be concerned with explanatory practices in psychotherapy that are based on a widely-used explanatory model of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). It was developed in 1985 by Paul Salkovskis, a researcher and therapist. I will investigate how this model is used in psychotherapy to explain the disorders of patients. In this investigation, I am particularly interested in conceptions of rationality that psychotherapists need to implicitly employ for their practices to make sense.

Firstly, I will set the stage by describing and pointing to several noteworthy features of this explanatory model. These are: (1) the fact that it employs folk-psychological vocabulary, (2) that it makes use of a particular concept of dysfunctionality, and (3) that it mainly mentions normal psychological processes and mechanisms to account for the disorder’s symptoms.

These features make it possible for the model to be used in a particular way in psychotherapy. That is, the model is used to simultaneously represent the patient as relatively rational in having particular kinds of beliefs and as needing to revise those beliefs, thus, as being irrational in holding them.

To substantiate this claim, I will take a look at explanatory practices in therapy, identifying several practical aims which psychotherapists pursue when explaining mental disorders. This part of my talk is based on the results of six interviews with cognitive-behavioral psychotherapists that I conducted about their explanatory practices. From these findings, I infer that the primary aims of these practices are tied to the overarching goal of motivating one’s patient to begin and successfully finish structured psychotherapeutic treatment. To achieve this goal, the mental health professional needs to achieve several sub-goals such as, e.g. normalizing and rationalizing (compare Bolton, 2007) her disorder. At the same time, the patient’s harm-inducing beliefs need
to emerge as (in a certain way) irrational for the therapist to challenge them with cognitive disputation techniques. I will formulate two ways of understanding rationality that allow for this apparent tension to be dissolved.

References


David Hommen (Duesseldorf): Psychology as Ethics: On the (Proto-)Moral Status of Mental Explanations

In this talk, I defend the view that the explanations of folk psychology are importantly different from other kinds of explanation in everyday life and science. At the core of folk psychological explanation is a conceptual connection between mental states and what individual agents are able to express – linguistically or otherwise – in their overt behavior. The attribution of mental states places actions which are considered as puzzling and in need of explanation in the context of an encompassing pattern of behavior, which is informed by general norms mediated through a social practice. Psychological explanations can thus be regarded as a kind of ‘normalizing explanation.’

Yet, the one who engages in folk psychological explanations does not merely observe the behavior of agents from a scientistically detached third-person perspective. Rather, she enters an interpersonal epistemic space, in which she struggles with her fellow co-subjects for a shared interpretation of common situations. Hence, the perspective of folk psychologists is more accurately described as a second-person perspective: a point of view within which there are neither objective nor subjective certainties, but merely assimilations of experiences to publicly available yet continuously adapting schemata, which are not to be measured according to criteria of theoretical adequacy but rather according to the ethical goals of communal life.
**Alexander Gebharter**  (University of Groningen, The Netherlands)
Alexander Gebharter is a postdoc at the University of Groningen. His research interests lie within philosophy of science and its intersection with metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Much of his work focuses on causation and related topics from a modelling perspective. For more details, see: [www.alexandergebharter.com](http://www.alexandergebharter.com)

**David Hommen** (University of Duesseldorf, DCLPS, Germany)
David Hommen has studied philosophy, musicology and media sciences and has a doctoral degree in philosophy. He is currently a postdoctoral research fellow in the DFG Collaborative Research Centre “The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition, and Science” at Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf. His main research areas are philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and analytic ontology. He has published books and papers on mental causation, the metaphysics of omissions, concepts and natural kinds.

**Julia Pfeiff** (University of Hannover, Germany)
Julia Pfeiff is a PhD student at Hannover University and member of the DFG research training group “Integrating Ethics and Epistemology of Scientific Research”. She studied psychology and philosophy in Mainz. In her PhD thesis (supervised by Uljana Feest), she investigates the construction and application of explanatory models of mental disorders in clinical psychology and psychotherapy.

**Margit Scheibl** (University of Duesseldorf, Germany)
Margit Scheibel currently does her PhD research at the Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf / DFG CRC 991. She studied German Linguistics and Economics (B.A.) and General Linguistics/Psycholinguistics (M.A.) in Berlin (Humboldt-Universität) and Hamburg (Universität Hamburg).
Margit Scheibel’s main research focus is on semantic-conceptual processing in language comprehension and language production, the interface between visual perception/object recognition and language retrieval, and memory effects in language processing. Her PhD project investigates the specificity of conceptual representations in language processing and cognitive effects of underspecificity.

Maria Sekatskaya (University of Duesseldorf, DCLPS, Germany)
Maria Sekatskaya is a postdoc at the Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf, DCLPS. She studied and worked at the Saint-Petersburg State University (Russia), and was a visiting scholar at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), University of California, Berkeley (USA) and the University of Mainz. Her main research interests are the free will problem, personal identity and philosophy of mind.
This interdisciplinary workshop aims at bringing together philosophers and scientists working on aging. While being a booming field of gerontological research, aging has not received much attention from philosophers of science. Besides obvious bioethical issues (e.g., should we cure aging? what would be the possible consequences of super-longevity?), there are a number of pressing philosophical issues that concern theoretical and practical aspects of aging research. Establishing and addressing these questions surrounding aging would benefit from philosophical approaches and conceptual clarification – in addition to the scientific methods already at work. Explicitly formulating and addressing such issues by working in a close collaboration of scientists and philosophers, we attempt a step towards establishing philosophy of aging as a field of research in philosophy of biology, medicine, and technology.

Section: Affiliated Workshop
Language: English
Chair: Pablo García-Barranquero & Gregor Greslehner
Date: 16:15–20:00, 19 September 2019 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004
Schedule

16:15–16:30  Pablo García-Barranquero & Gregor Greslehner: *Introduction: Towards a Philosophy of Aging*

16:30–17:00  Cristian Saborido with Pablo García-Barranquero (presenting author): *Is Aging a Disease? The Theoretical Definition of Aging in the Light of the Philosophy of Medicine*

17:00–17:30  Michael Breitenbach: *Remarks on the Biology of Aging*

17:30–17:45  coffee break

17:45–18:15  Mark Rinnerthaler: *From Lifespan to Healthspan*

18:15–18:45  Stefano Giaimo: *Defining Aging in Evolutionary Biology*

18:45–19:00  coffee break

19:00–19:30  Günter Lepperdinger: *Longevity and Sexual Selection*

19:30–20:00  Gregor Greslehner & Maël Lemoine: *Are Microbial Changes a Cause or an Effect of Aging?*

Abstracts

**Cristian Saborido (Madrid) with Pablo García-Barranquero (Málaga) (presenting author): Is Aging a Disease? The Theoretical Definition of Aging in the Light of the Philosophy of Medicine**

In this talk, I attempt to shed light on the philosophical debate about the theoretical definition of aging from the discussion of the notion of disease in the philosophy of medicine. As a result, I introduce a concrete approach – the pragmatist approach to aging – to account for the theoretical relationship between the notions of disease and aging, as they are addressed in the philosophy of aging. To that end, the structure of this work is as follows: first, in section 2, I analyze the discussion between the two major positions in this debate, and introduce the influential accounts of authors such as Hayflick, Schramme, Caplan, Murphy, and Callahan & Topinkova. I will show that in this discussion it is being assumed by some authors
that the definition of disease is univocal and corresponds to what some of these authors understand as a “non-natural state”. The motivation of this is straightforward: in order to decide if aging should be defined as a disease we need to clarify first what a disease is and what implies to characterize something as such. In section 3, I will show that the disagreement between those who argue that aging is a disease and those who claim that it is not is ultimately based on an assumption of different notions of disease. In addition, I will also turn to the debate on disease in the philosophy of medicine to analyze the proposals of Callahan & Topinkova and Murphy. These authors advocate avoiding the question of whether or not aging is a disease for pragmatic reasons. The important thing would not be to define aging as a disease but to medically treat it as such. I propose to reformulate this proposal of pragmatic motivation to frame it in an approach to the concept of disease, which I call “pragmatist”, that has advocated philosophers of medicine such as Cooper or Hofmann. I think that this pragmatist approach addresses the issue of medical categorization of aging in a more scientific and philosophical fruitful way.

Michael Breitenbach (University of Salzburg): Remarks on the Biology of Aging

B iologists started studying aging in earnest slightly more than 100 years ago. The question they asked (and we still ask today) is: What is the cause of aging? If there would be a clear-cut answer, we could possibly get a hint how to halt aging. This would possibly mean rejuvenation not only of cells but also of an aged individual. This is the reason why so many billionaires donate money to support aging research and to found new aging research institutions, for instance in California, in Moscow and in other places. Very bluntly: They don’t want to die and they think that money can buy eternal life.

What I will do in my short presentation is to present the most prominent TOAs (theories of aging) and show why they are wrong or why they grossly overstate their message, in every case.

What can analytical philosophy (or philosophy in general) contribute to resolve this conundrum? In my view: It can and should help to develop a so-called regimented language for a theory of aging within which, firstly, the terms and concepts of the theory can be correctly and adequately defined, and, secondly, it can be determined exactly
whether the logical rules of reasoning are obeyed or violated.

**Mark Rinnerthaler (University of Salzburg): From Lifespan to Healthspan**

In Austria the lifespan is still constantly increasing. In the last decade men gained 1.7 years and women 1.05 years. Which does not go along with this increase in years is the healthspan, the part of life during which a person is good in health. It is calculated that in the last 3 years of life the costs for health care explode. Therefore a paradigm shift has taken place in geroscience. The “hot topic” in aging research is not the prolongation of life anymore. Instead the improvement of health in the last years of life has moved into the focus. In this talk several lifestyle interventions will be presented that increase both, the lifespan as well as healthspan. Such interventions include the uptake of active ingredients of the red wine or wheat bran, the consumption of olive oil, but also physical exercise. A brief insight will be given how these interventions target a cell.

**Stefano Giaimo (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology): Defining Aging in Evolutionary Biology**

discuss the concept of aging in evolutionary biology. In particular, I examine conceptually and, partially, historically both demographic and non-demographic notions of aging. Demographic notions are based on the trajectories of survival and fecundity, i.e. the two basic fitness components, over age. These notions capture population-level properties and some are at the basis of the classic theories of aging evolution. However, demographic notions might not always be illuminating with respect to individual ageing and they may disagree or be silent as to whether aging is present or not in a population. Non-demographic notions focus on the ability to sustain some particular biological performance or trait over age. While this may be a good proxy in many practical situations and for understanding individual aging, I suggest that these notions could sometimes be faulty and that not just any biological performance or trait is well suited for studying aging.
Enhanced resistance against major pathologies and stress resilience are strong foundations for living up a long life. Longevity is also acknowledged comprising slow or successful aging.

Most (animal) species reproduce sexually. Interestingly longevity of one sex often exceeds that of the other, with faster senescence occurring in males more frequently. Longevity patterns include differential vulnerability to environmental hazards, distinct patterns of parental care and differential intensity of sexual selection. Across species, avoiding mating with suboptimal partners is likely to be more important for females, because females typically invest more in offspring and thus have more to lose by poor mate choice. Sexual selection is expected to favor a ‘live fast die young’ life history pattern in males due to increased risk of extrinsic mortality associated with obtaining mates thus sacrificing longevity for reproductive opportunity. Yet, for any male, successful mating with a high-quality female may result in a considerable fitness gain for the population.

In age-structured populations, in which generations overlap, there is potential for changing longevity patterns to occur based on the differential age of mating partners. As fertility tends to increase early in life and then decline at older ages for most organisms, mating with a very young or very old individual has the potential to reduce fitness for the other mating partner and in due course the population. With increasing age, mutations may accumulate in germ cells, changing the viability, size, or other fitness-related traits of offspring. Notably surviving to old age may however also indicate high genetic quality. Although undisputed, somatic condition declines in old age, it is thus conceivable that longevity traits may become enforced by mating with males of advanced age.

The contribution of the microbiota to the health status of their hosts has recently received a lot of attention. Changes in the microbial composition and its potential impacts on host physiology appear to a large extent at the beginning and towards
the end of a host’s life span, while being relatively stable throughout the adult life. This raises an important question: are the microbial changes cause or effect of the host’s aging?

In order to answer that question, we argue that the mechanistic details of the involved phenomena and processes need to be spelled out in detail – rather than pitting generalized causal claims in either direction against each other. By properly decomposing both the presumptive microbial causes and their purported effects on aging, causal claims can be made about microbial changes that are caused by certain processes that are part of aging, and vice versa, that certain microbial activities contribute causally to some aspect of a particular aging phenotype. Whether causality can be attributed crudely in either direction is an ill-posed question – for many host phenotypes in general, and for aging in particular.

Michael Breitenbach (University of Salzburg, Austria)

Pablo García-Barranquero (University of Málaga, Spain)

Stefano Giaimo (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Germany)

Gregor Greslehner (CNRS & University of Bordeaux, France)

Maël Lemoine (CNRS & University of Bordeaux, France)

Günter Lepperdinger (University of Salzburg, Austria)

Mark Rinnerthaler (University of Salzburg, Austria)

Cristian Saborido (UNED, Spain)
Responsibility and Agency

Hannah Altehenger & Sofia Bonicalzi & Leonhard Menges & Jan-Willem Wieland

Section: Affiliated Workshop
Language: English
Chair: Leonhard Menges
Date: 16:15–20:00, 19 September 2019 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005

Schedule

16:15–17:10 Jan-Willem Wieland: Ways to be Blameworthy
17:15–18:10 Hannah Altehenger: Self-Control, the (Deep) Self, and the Divided Mind
18:20–19:15 Sofia Bonicalzi: Rethinking Responsibility for Action

Abstracts

Jan Willem Wieland (Amsterdam): Ways to be Blameworthy

Recently, Elinor Mason has argued that there are different ways to be blameworthy. It is one thing to eat meat (for example) while knowing that one’s conduct is problematic, and another to perform the same conduct though without seeing this. In this talk, I will further defend, specify and illustrate Mason’s claim that “ordinary” blameworthiness is quite different from “detached” blameworthiness.

Hannah Altehenger (Bielefeld): Self-Control, the (Deep) Self, and the Divided Mind

Is there any interesting relationship between self-control and the self? Some theorists have claimed that there is. Edmund Henden (2008), for instance, contends that in exercising self-control, “one ensures that one’s behavior derives from one
self” rather than from a motive “from which one wants to dissociate oneself”. And, at first glance at least, there seems to be some truth to this claim: while we often appear to feel alienated from the “target states” of self-control, such as the craving for another cigarette, the urge to yell at someone, or the impulse to flee a certain situation, cases in which we feel alienated from the states in support of which we exercise self-control are much harder to come up with. Still, on closer inspection, the relationship between self-control and the self turns out to be more complex than it may initially seem. As I argue, there is such a thing as exercising self-control against one’s self and even without one’s self. I conclude that, although there is a close relationship between self-control and the self, this relationship is far from perfect.

Sofia Bonicalzi (Munich): Rethinking Responsibility for Action

The aim of the talk is to frame a consistent two-tier account of moral responsibility which combines the insights, while avoiding the drawbacks, of both internalist and externalist actual-sequence compatibilist views on responsibility. In particular, I defend the claim that a self-disclosure view, adequately supported by an account of normative competence, could give reason of many of our usages of the concept of moral responsibility. First, drawing on Watson’s attributability view, I claim that one must distinguish between cases in which the action reveals something morally relevant about the agent, and cases where it does not. The leading intuition is thus that, in cases of moral responsibility, the agent’s motivational structure is explanatory relevant with respect to the action, in a way that makes the agent able to identify with it. However, differently from classic internalist real-self views, identification will not concern individual mental states: recognising the action as a final step in the deliberative process she goes through, the agent identifies with the result of the global decision-making process. In this sense, responsible agency will be based on the encompassing capacity to reflect upon intentional actions as unified phenomena, and on the exercise of a broad metacognitive regulation of one’s own behaviour. In the second part of the talk, I will discuss how externalist integrations, in terms of rational control, are needed in order to provide a functioning framework, able to deal with cases of irrationality or extreme distance from moral standards. For the condition
of normative control to be satisfied, the agent must be able to accept intersubjectively recognised reasons for action as compelling motives.

Leonhard Menges (Salzburg): Alternative Possibilities, Determinism, and the Right Level of Description

Many authors argue that claims about determinism and free will are situated on different levels of description and that determinism on one level does not rule out free will on another. This paper focuses on Christian List’s version of this basic idea. It will be argued for the negative thesis that List’s account does not rule out the most plausible version of incompatibilism about free will and determinism and, more constructively, that a level-based approach to free will has better chances to meet skeptical challenges if it is guided by reasoning on the moral level—a level that has not been seriously considered so far by proponents of this approach.

Hannah Altehenger (Bielefeld University, Germany)

Hannah Altehenger is Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin (Postdoc) at Universität Bielefeld. She mainly works on moral psychology and theory of action and she is also interested in metaethics, normative ethics, and the philosophy of mind.

Sofia Bonicalzi (LMU Munich, Germany)

Sofia Bonicalzi is a postdoctoral researcher associated with the Chair of Philosophy of Mind, at the LMU. She specialised in philosophy of mind/action, philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, and moral psychology. Her current research interests focus on the philosophy and neuroscience of volition and action. Before joining the LMU, she has been a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, UCL (Action and Body Group) and at the School of Advanced Study (UoL), working on theoretical aspects of volition, intentions, and responsibility, and carrying out experimental work on the cognitive neuroscience of
actions and intentions. During her postdoctoral experience, she has acquired technical skills in experimental design and techniques, and data analysis. In collaboration with other philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, she is involved in a project grant (SSNAP, Duke University) aimed to conduct theoretical and experimental research on causation, responsibility and counterfactual thinking. She holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Pavia and she has been a visiting Ph.D. candidate at the Sage School of Philosophy, at Cornell University.

Leonhard Menges (University of Salzburg, Austria)
Leonhard Menges is Assistant Professor of Practical Philosophy at the University of Salzburg where he teaches ethics, social, and political philosophy. In his research he focuses on questions surrounding blame and responsibility and on questions surrounding the right to privacy.

Jan-Willem Wieland (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands)
Jan Willem Wieland is Assistant Professor at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, where he teaches courses in ethics and argumentation. His research focuses on issues in normative ethics and moral responsibility. He has edited a book on the epistemic condition of moral responsibility, and his latest work concerns collective actions problems.

Vor dem Hintergrund aktueller Diskussionen um neue temporale Bezüge in den Medien- und Bildtechnologien und künstlerischen Praktiken der Gegenwart, um eine als Präsentismus bezeichnete Verbreiterung der Gegenwart, um Zeitkomplexe oder eine “Postcontemporaneity” widmet sich der Workshop “Time.Image” insbesondere aus kunstwissenschaftlicher und zeitphilosophischer Perspektive den Relationen zwischen Ikonizität und Temporalität:

- Wie kann Zeit(-lichkeit) im Bild gefasst werden? Welche Möglichkeiten gibt es, in künstlerischen Arbeiten zeitliche Strukturen zu (re-)präsentieren?
- In welcher Weise vermögen es Bilder, Bezüge zu Vergangenem, Gegenwärtigem und Zukünftigem herzustellen und als solche zu markieren?
- Wie können sich temporale Strukturen wie Simultaneität, Sukzession, Rhythmik, Dauer oder Asynchronität im Bild zeigen?
- Inwieweit sind solche Formen der Repräsentation oder innerbildlichen Logik (kunst-)historisch nachzu vollziehen?
- Welche Rolle spielen medientechnologische Gefüge und medienkulturelle Praxen für die Bezüge von Bild und Zeit?

Section: Affiliated Workshop
Language: German
Chair: Florian Fischer & Vivien Grabowski & Maximilian Lehner
Date: 16:15–20:00, 19 September 2019 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003
Schedule

16.15–16.25 Florian Fischer: Begrüßung & Einführung
16.25–17.00 Mirjam Schaub: Simultaneität im Sukzessiven: Mit Gilles Deleuzes’ Kinobüchern gegen den ‘Präsenzismus’ der Zeitphilosophie
17.05–17.40 Sarah Kolb: Das Bild als ‘Quellpunkt der Poesie’. Imagination nach Bergson, Duchamp, Benjamin und Lacan
18.00–18.35 Vivien Grabowski: I grew up with dinosaurs. Bild- und Textproduktionen in New Scenarios Jurassic Paint
18.40–19.15 Maximilian Lehner: Synchronie in Basel Abbas’ & Ruwanne Abou-Rahmes “And yet my mask is powerful”
19.20–20.00 Eva Kernbauer: Die Befreiung von der Zeit: Kunst, Politik, Anachronie

Abstracts

Sarah Kolb (Wien/Linz): Das Bild als “Quellpunkt der Poesie”. Imagination nach Bergson, Duchamp, Benjamin und Lacan


Vivien Grabowski (Köln): I grew up with dinosaurs. Bild- und Zeitproduktionen in New Scenarios Jurassic Paint


Maximilian Lehner (Linz): Synchronie in Basel Abbas’ & Ru-anne Abou-Rahmes “And yet my mask is powerful”


Eva Kernbauer (Wien): Die Befreiung von der Zeit: Kunst, Politik, Anachronie


Frauke Albersmeier (HHU Düsseldorf, Germany)
Frauke Albersmeier MA is a research fellow at Heinrich Heine University, Duesseldorf, working in project A05: “Presuppositions of frame theory in the history of philosophy” of the DFG-funded Collaborative Research Centre 991: “The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition, and Science”. Her research focus is on philosophical methodology as well as animal ethics. She is currently writing her dissertation on “The Concept of Moral Progress”.

FR
Florian Fischer (Uni Siegen, Deutschland)

Vivien Grabowski (Uni Köln, Deutschland)

Eva Kernbauer (Universität für Angewandte Kunst Wien, Österreich)

Sarah Kolb (UFG Linz, Österreich)

Maximilian Lehner (KU Linz, Österreich)

Mirjam Schaub (Kunsthochschule Burg Giebichenstein, Deutschland)

http://www.burg-halle.de/hochschule/information/personen/p/mirjam-schaub/

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Contributed Talks
The Knowledge Argument and the Wishful-Thinking Problem

Joseph Adams

Some philosophers have responded to the Knowledge Argument against physicalism by denying that Mary acquires propositional knowledge upon seeing red for the first time. For David Lewis and Laurence Nemirow, Mary merely acquires a set of abilities relating to the colour red; for Earl Conee, Mary acquires “knowledge by acquaintance” of the colour red. In this paper, I argue that these anti-propositional views are undermined by a problem analogous to the “Wishful-Thinking Problem” for non-cognitivism about moral judgements. Moral non-cognitivists, Cian Dorr shows, are unable to explain the possible rationality of basing one’s beliefs on one’s moral judgements. Anti-propositional opponents of the Knowledge Argument, I argue here, are similarly unable to explain the possible rationality of basing one’s beliefs on one’s phenomenal judgements.

Suppose that Mary is shown a red rose, and forms this thought:

(P1) If that is what it is like to experience the colour red, then I have seen a red rose

Mary is later able to confirm that the colour of the rose was indeed red, making this phenomenal judgement:

(P2) That is what it is like to experience the colour red

On the basis of P1 and P2, Mary concludes:

(C) I have seen a red rose

Mary possesses no counterevidence against C.

Intuitively, Mary’s reasoning here is rational: it is rational for her to accept C on the basis of P1 and P2. This reasoning, after all, appears to be a straightforward application of modus ponens.

For the anti-propositional opponent of the Knowledge Argument, however, it cannot be rational for Mary to accept C on the basis of P1 and P2. On their view, P2 does not express a proposition, and so does not constitute propositional evidence for C. P2 itself does not give Mary any reason to believe C. Mary thus cannot rationally base her belief of C on her phenomenal judgement P2.
To explain how Mary’s reasoning can be rational, we must concede that she acquires knowledge—that upon learning what it is like to see red.

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**Joseph Adams** (University of Nottingham, United Kingdom)

I am a PhD candidate at the University of Nottingham, working primarily in normative ethics, and with research interests in epistemology, metaethics and philosophy of mind. I previously completed both my BA (in French and Philosophy) and MA (in Philosophy) at the University of Nottingham as well. My doctoral research centres on the nature and moral significance of desert. I am interested, for example, in defending a presentist view of desert: on this view, what a subject now deserves is determined exclusively by facts about the present. I am also particularly interested in questions concerning moral rightness more generally, such as whether a maximising-act-consequentialist view of rightness is defensible.

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**Perfect Speakers and Reinterpretation of Thought Content**

Madelaine Angelova-Elchinova

It seems that there are cases where one does not fully understand a concept yet she is a reliable user of sentential expressions invoking that concept. Consider Thumbelina: when she looks after a sick swallow, she advises the bird to stay in her ‘warm bed’. This bed is actually composed of ‘a carpet of hay’ and a leaf serving as a counterpane. I imagine that under normal circumstances, it would be strange to include ‘leaves’ in the concept COUNTERPANE and ‘hay stacks’ in the concept BED. Nevertheless, when Thumbelina does it, it seems only natural.
Bearing this example in mind, I turn to a problem surrounding Burge's social externalism about mental content, namely: how much understanding should be sufficient in order for us to say that a subject S successfully grasps a concept C? If only full understanding qualifies, *concept mastery* will be imperative when deciding whether S possesses some kind of propositional attitude involving C as an element of her thought content. In the case of Thumbelina, it follows that any attribution of a mental state involving BED is unwarranted due to incomplete understanding. Burge provides solid grounds to reject such supposition and to grant partial understanding the role of sufficient condition for *concept possession*. However, Burge's arguments gave rise to another concern. In a recent debate with Sarah Sawyer, Åsa Wikforss raised an objection against externalism because it rests on the assumption that subjects possess only incomplete understanding about their own concepts.

I argue that Wikforss' attack requires that concept mastery is accepted as a necessary condition for understanding and thus, it begets the mythical figure of the perfect speaker – a creature that possesses infallible knowledge about the concepts it operates with. I hope to show that even if externalism suggests that we possess incomplete understanding about our thoughts that should not be a problem, because (usually) we are not perfect speakers.

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**Madelaine Angelova-Elchinova** (Sofia University, Bulgaria)

Madelaine Angelova-Elchinova is a pre-doc student in Sofia University, Bulgaria. The title of her dissertation is "Epistemology in XXth century Bulgarian philosophy". In her dissertation she defends a version of externalism about mental content, externalism about justification and externalism about experience. One of her goals is to provide a solid argument against appeal to intuitions and a priori justification in general. E-Mail: madelaine.angelova@gmail.com
It is generally assumed that cognitive and conscious processes exclusively supervene on neural activity. However, a large number of recent findings seem to support what is defended by the new pragmatic approach in cognitive science; more concretely the idea that cognitive processes should be considered as Embodied, Embedded, Extended or Enacted. Rather than defending one of these positions, the current work will be focussed on criticizing a classic and full neurocentric understanding of the mind that characterizes cognitivist approaches to cognition. In contrast, it will be defended the idea that cognitive and conscious processes depend on the activity of the organism as a whole (the whole brain-body system embedded in the environment). To take into account the role played by the body seriously, it will be necessary to reject the main assumptions of computationalism and start using a notion of embodiment similar to the one defended by enactivists. The body has to be treated as an irreducible biological source of meaning rather than a neural representation or a computational machine (as proposed also by defenders of weaker forms of embodied cognition). It will be discussed two of the most promising arguments aimed to defend the brain-bound nature of cognition and experience. The two arguments are respectively “The Brain in a Vat Thought Experiment” and “The Bandwidth Argument”. The first one is aimed to defend the concept of body neutrality; the idea that the body does not play any special role in the emergence of cognitive and conscious phenomena; the second is aimed to argue that, at least, conscious processes are completely brain-bound. It will be showed that both arguments fail for different reasons. In the conclusion, it will be discussed how a future cognitive science could like in order to study the mental life of the embodied organism seriously. A key role will be played by the integration of dynamical systems theory, ecological psychology and phenomenological approaches in cognitive science.
Giuseppe Flavio Artese (Rub, Bochum, Germany)
My name is Giuseppe Flavio Artese and I am a master student in Cognitive Science at Rub with a background in philosophy. My philosophical interests are related on one hand to contemporary philosophy of mind and on the other to the phenomenological tradition. More in particular, I am interested in the notion of embodiment and in the enactive framework. “I which way the body participates to cognitive processes”, “Will the enactive framework substitute cognitivism in the future?” “Is Cognition a brain-bound phenomenon?” are some of the most central questions that I investigate in my work.
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The Epistemology of Understanding: A Contextualist Approach

Marcus Bachmann

Some decades ago, philosophers like Linda Zagzebski, Catherine Elgin and Jonathan Kvanvig voiced their discontent with the limitation of epistemological interest to the study of knowledge and propagated a turn towards understanding (as grasping a coherent body of information). Since then, many authors have pondered the questions of whether understanding is a form of knowledge, what types of understanding there are, what features are central to understanding and why understanding is a valuable epistemic goal. Being centred on technicalities like these, the debate on understanding is at risk of running idle and largely failed to provide an exhaustive analysis of understanding.

In my talk, I want to hint at such an analysis by embedding the notion of understanding into a contextualist framework. Inspired by the relevant alternatives contextualism about knowledge, I take it that the correctness of an ascription of understanding is determined relative to the context in which understanding is ascribed. This context is constituted by the problems an ascriber considers regarding some subject matter. To qualify for an ascription of understanding, a subject then not only needs to possess knowledge of facts and dependency relations regarding that subject matter, but also needs to be able to satisfactorily
solve the problems that the ascriber considers.

By linking background knowledge with problem-solving abilities, my approach preserves the intuition that understanding is a demanding cognitive achievement that goes beyond the mere knowledge of some subject matter. Furthermore, it accounts for the way we ordinarily ascribe understanding by enabling that two ascribers can judge contrastingly and yet individually correct whether or not a subject qualifies for understanding. Lastly, it benefits the ongoing debate, for instance by bridging the gap between different types of understanding and by offering a direct way to account for the fact that understanding admits of degrees.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Guido Tana
Date: 11:20-11:50, 19 September 2019 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002

Marcus Bachmann (University of Halle-Wittenberg, Germany)
I started to study Grammar School Education for Philosophy, Ethics and English at the University of Halle-Wittenberg in 2011. After a semester abroad at the University of New Castle (England) and a teaching internship at the German International School Pretoria (South Africa), I finished my studies in 2018 with a state examination thesis on the relation of knowledge and understanding. Since then, I am a PhD student at the University of Halle-Wittenberg working on a contextualist approach to understanding.
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Do we really create our words?

Sandro Balletta

The metaphysics of words, as defined by Kaplan (1990), is meant to tell us about the ultimate nature of words and about the relationship between word-types and word-tokens. Among others, the fundamental questions in need of an answer are the followings (see Wetzel 2002):
(1) What are word-types?
(2) How should word-types be individuated?
(3) Under what conditions two word-tokens count as word-tokens of the same word-type?

In the present paper, I aim to take a closer look at question (1). It is a commonplace saying that there is little contemporary literature on the metaphysics of words (see Cappelen 1999; Alward 2005; Hawthorne and Lepore 2011; Irmak 2018); however, there are at least three main answers to question (1): Nominalism, Platonism and Artifactualism. In what follows, I only cursorily describe Nominalism and Platonism and highlight their notorious advantages and limitations. I do so because my real topic is Artifactualism, whose peculiarities emerge most clearly against the background of its competitors. According to Artifactualism, all words are non-eternal abstract artifacts intentionally created by humans. My aim here is to argue against such a thesis, although I accept other central claims made by artifactualists. At the end, I will conclude presenting my own proposal: an amendment of Artifactualism which I call quasi-Artifactualism. To be more exact: do we really create all our words? Contrary to Artifactualism, I will argue for a negative answer to this question. I claim that there are words we do not create which nevertheless are temporal abstracta, namely non-eternal abstract entities. Hence, as far as the metaphysical status of words is concerned, I propose an alternative explanation to both Nominalism and Platonism.
on essential properties of linguistics entities such as words.
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Understanding and Factivity - A framework for weak factivism

Alexander Belak

Does understanding require factivity? It seems that our scientific endeavors are not solely concerned with the mere collection of knowledge about different phenomena, but also with a genuine understanding of what is going on in the world. Respectively, whatever constitutes understanding must somehow answer to the facts.

In order to satisfy a factivity requirement as a condition for understanding, one might hold that whatever constitutes understanding exclusively consists of true propositions. However, this approach has been challenged within recent epistemological discussions considering that even a few falsehoods do not undermine one’s understanding completely. I hold that this problem can be solved in two steps:

First, I will make use of a distinction introduced by Jonathan Kvanvig between symbolic and factual understanding. While factual understanding is concerned with an understanding of phenomena, symbolic understanding is concerned with its representations and therefore, functions as a vehicle to factual understanding. Given that symbolic understanding does not necessarily require factivity, even an understanding of false representations is possible, yet scientifically inadequate. Accordingly, factual understanding can be obtained by only accepting true propositions as the object of one’s understanding.

In a second step, I suggest that we can avoid the emerging problem of scientific models and theories that fall outside the scope of factual understanding because they are already constructed as representations that diverge from the truth. To do so, I will turn to a central feature of understanding, that is, the notion of grasping. I hold that grasping can at least partly be analyzed in terms of a non-propositional gathering of knowledge how aspects of what constitutes understanding can be applied to actual and counterfactual cases. Respectively, factual understanding will be guided by knowledge how scientific models and theories apply to actual cases. Following Henk de Regt’s conception of
scientific understanding, an understanding subject has beliefs about the context in which a scientific model or theory is scientifically adequate. Thus, factual understanding through scientific models and theories can be obtained.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Gregor Greslehner
Date: 14:40-15:10, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.005

**Alexander Belak** (FAU Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany)
Alexander Belak is a PhD student at the FAU University Erlangen-Nuremberg and was born in 1993 in Wuppertal. He studied philosophy at the University of Stuttgart and completed his Bachelor’s degree in 2016. At the moment he is in the final stages of his Master’s thesis. Since September 2018, he has also been working as a doctoral student under Prof. Dr. Gerhard Ernst at the FAU University Erlangen-Nuremberg. His main areas of interest are epistemology and the philosophy of science, especially the nature of scientific understanding, factivity and the notion of grasping.
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**The Normativity of Slurs**

Maria Bibiloni

Slurs are a form of hate speech. They arbitrarily identify a group of people based on a distinctive feature resulting from the normative component of hate speech. It is thus a feature born from hate-agents rather than from natural aspects of the addressees. This characterisation flatly contradicts the traditional approach (TA) to slurs, which defines slurs as based on features of the targeted group such as race, ethnic origin, religion, gender, etc. Contrary to TA, I will propose a Positive Account (PA) that deals best with the semantic content of slurs.

On the one hand, I will characterize TA as the strategy that proposes a double thesis: firstly, that slurs have neutral counterparts that
function as the slur’s reference (NCT) and secondly, that it is not the case that slurs always derogate (¬SOT). The content of slurs is thus described as having a double nature: a descriptive element and a normative element. Furthermore, TA’s double thesis rests on a strong assumption: that normative meaning depends on descriptive meaning. As a result, the fact of affirming NCT commits TA to denying SOT. While neutral counterparts can stand by themselves, purely derogative words are contentless without their descriptive reference. However, TA seems to have some difficulties explaining nonderogatory uses of slurs—even if it advocates for their existence.

On the other hand, PA departs from denying the dual nature TA advocates to slurs. Stating that neutral counterparts stand as slurs’ references implies both a descriptive and a normative nature of slurs’ contents. On the contrary, PA wants to make the case for a fully-fledged normative characterization of slurs’ contents.

I will firstly characterize TA as the approach defending the double thesis NCT/¬SOT. Secondly, I will show TA’s difficulties to explain nonderogatory cases. Lastly, I will make the case for PA. PA also stands for a double positive-negative thesis. However, whereas TA affirms NCT while denying SOT, I will defend the opposite: SOT does hold while NCT does not. There are two immediate consequences of stating this viewpoint: on the one hand, the errors that take TA to counterintuitive characterizations of slurs will be solved and on the other hand, new phenomena regarding slurs left unaddressed by TA will be explained.
abuse and is supervised by Dr Stephan Torre within the Leverhulme International Network Grant "What’s So Special about First-Person Thought?". Back in Argentina, I worked as an educator in vulnerable social contexts which led me to dig deeper into long life concerns such as Education, Feminism, Ethics and Politics; all of which I try to blend with my academic interests.

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Branching what ...? – the ontology of branching time

Marta Emilia Bielinska

In the last couple of years branching time (BT) has become quite popular formalism that allows to describe the nature of world as containing plenty of possibilities. However, even many years after famous Saul Kripke’s letter, philosophers still seem to have no clue what is the ontology of branching time trees – in particular what really branches.

The name of this formalism suggests that this is time, however a quick analysis reveals numerous problems of such approach. Another notion might be to think that this is rather spacetime that branches in BT. Such suggestion leads us to a similar formalism called branching space-time (BST), formulated in 1992 by Nuel Belnap. The last idea that may be found in the literature is that branching time is in fact about histories, as it was suggested by some of polish philosophers who translated BT into their native language as “branching histories”.

In my talk I will describe and consider consequences of accepting each of the options mentioned earlier: time, spacetimes and histories, as well as some other, for example possibilities. As it would turn out, the best conception is to follow the view that these are histories that branches.

Histories in the branching time formalism are usually defined in the framework of formalism and semantics: as the longest chains of the partial-orderings (trees). I will explore this notion and provide connected with it non-formal definition of history supported by numerous examples and ontological arguments. This definition will be compared with corresponding conceptions in models similar to branching time: for example standard possible worlds. Such analysis will lead to confrontation with ontological problems, such as persistence in time, personal
identity or the problem of counterparts. They will be explored in the light of the view that what really branch are histories.

Such analysis will be a step on a path of clarifying the idea of branching time models. This issue of ontology of branching spacetime has not yet been widely discussed.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Michael Witkamp
Date: 17:00-17:30, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.003

Marta Emilia Bielinska (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
Marta Emilia Bielinska is a master student of Philosophy in the framework of Individual Inter-faculty Studies in the Humanities and Physics as a part of Studies in Mathematics and Sciences at Jagiellonian University in Poland. She is mainly interested in Philosophy of Space and Time: the problems of orientation and orientability of spacetime, and the formalism of branching time.
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Practical Wisdom (without Virtue Ethics)?

Practical wisdom has gained popularity in ethics and beyond lately. Especially in applied ethics such as business ethics or ethics of artificial intelligence, practical wisdom is taken to be a promising guidance with respect to practical deliberation resp. moral decision making. Dennis Moberg for instance defines wisdom in the context of business ethics as "a disposition toward cleverness in crafting morally excellent responses to, or in anticipation of, challenging particularities." (Moberg 2007, 535)

Wisdom – in contemporary writings primarily conceptualized as knowledge (Whitcomb 2011; Kekes 1995), reflection (Tiberius 2008) or rationality (Ryan 2012) – enables agents to gather and evaluate relevant
knowledge concerning moral standards as well as e.g. (individual) well-being. Furthermore, it empowers agents to reflect on their own believes and intentions within a specific context regarding oneself and others. In short, wisdom shows itself in good comprehensive judgment and in its capacity to be action guiding. In the light of this very brief (and by no means sufficient) definition it becomes clear why practical wisdom has gained popularity in ethics lately: It seems to make good practical deliberation and good (moral) judgment feasible and accessible not only to average human moral agents but also to e.g. artificial moral agents. At a second glance however, it is questionable whether practical wisdom is up for that task. First, it is doubtful whether practical wisdom can be conceptually detached from a virtue ethical framework. Presumably its power as well as its plausibility depends largely on its embedment into an ethical framework that includes virtues in some way. Otherwise, practical wisdom might not be distinguishable from mere practical rationality. Second, wisdom seems to presuppose a comprehensive knowledge of moral standards, well-being and other relevant standards and facts. Accordingly, it seems to be quite demanding. How does this go together with its supposed feasibility for many; be that humans or artificial intelligent agents? It is the aim of this talk to address this and similar worries regarding practical wisdom and its role in (applied) ethics.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Amit Pinsker
Date: 10:40-11:10, 19 September 2019 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004

Eva Bobst (Dep. of Philosophy, Vienna, Austria)
I received both my BA and my MA degree in philosophy and german studies at the University of Berne in Switzerland. In my master thesis – supervised by Prof. Dr. Monika Betzler – I investigate the epistemological role of moral intuitions in ethics. After an internship (1 year) at the Swiss Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research I moved to Vienna where I started a doctorate in philosophy together with a position as an assistant at the Chair for Ethics and Applied Ethics (held by Prof. Dr. Angela Kallhoff). My current research
is concerned with practical wisdom and practical deliberation in relation to moral demands as well as agent-relative well-being. I also teach classes for BA-students in ethics (applied ethics as well as meta-ethics). E-Mail: eva.bobst@univie.ac.at

The Hard Problem of Self-Consciousness

Artem Bourov

A major component of “the hard problem of consciousness” is addressing an important epistemic or explanatory gap: can we make sense of consciousness in the same way that we make sense of the physical world?

Much debate in response to this question concerns (i) whether conscious experience has intrinsic features and (ii) whether these features are epistemically reducible to the physical. Traditionally, the focus of pro- and anti-reductionists alike has been on the nature of phenomenal qualia (“the feel of pain”, “the sheer redness of red”). Yet others have suggested that in addition to these kinds of “qualitative character”, consciousness also possess “subjective character”: the way in which experiences are always for subjects of experience, such that subjects have a special form of awareness of their experiences (e.g. Kriegel 2004, 2012; Levine 2001, 2015; Strawson 2010; Zahavi & Kriegel 2015). On this view, recognising the “for-me-ness” of experience is essential to articulating the first-person perspective we have in experience and must be accounted for by any position on the epistemic reducibility (or otherwise) of consciousness.

Drawing on the work of Dan Zahavi and the phenomenological tradition, I suggest that the subjective character of experience can be explicated as a form of pre-reflective self-awareness. I further argue that this form of self-awareness is not epistemically reducible to the physical. I conclude by drawing out the implications of this position for our self-conception as subjects of experience with the capacity for agency in a physical world.
Artem Bourov (University of Melbourne, Australia)
I'm a Masters student in philosophy of mind at The University of Melbourne, where I also completed my B. Arts (Hons) / B. Science. My current research project brings together Analytic and Continental perspectives on the nature of consciousness, selfhood and embodiment. I also coordinate a university volunteering program that inspires students from disadvantaged high schools to pursue studies in science and mathematics.
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How Naive is the Naive View?

Daniele Mario Cassaghi

One form of Extensionalism, namely the Naïve View (Phillips 2014) purports to account for the phenomenology of motion and change in a very simple way: experiences unfold and the order and duration of the experiential phases mirror those of the perceived events phases.

The Naïve View has problems with Postdictive Phenomena. These show that the eventual presentation of a later stimulus to my experience may affect the experience of a former stimulus: If the later stimulus had not occurred, the former one would have been experienced differently. This represents a challenge: at the moment of the presentation of the first stimulus (thus before the presentation of the second stimulus) there is no way for the occurring experience to “decide” the way in which it has to be presented.

In order to avoid costly extra-delays in subpersonal elaboration, the answer provided by Phillips (2014) is a “whole-first” conception of experience. Phillips argues that: 1) What a subject perceives at a certain instant is metaphysically dependent on the whole extended experience
encompassing that instant. 2) There are two different whole experiences in postdictive scenarios (either the later stimulus is presented or it is not). 3) Given 1 and 2, it comes to be no surprise that the phenomenology of the former stimulus is different in the two cases.

In this paper, I will show that this strategy is metaphysically very demanding. My aim will be to show that, following this suggestion by Phillips, at each instant a subject is presented with infinite many experiences not sharing any numerically identical parts. This, I will demonstrate, is the direct upshot of assuming the whole-first strategy and the idea that experiences have an unfolding character. Finally, I will illustrate that in case of postdictive scenarios these experiences are even contradictory.

My conclusion will be that the cost of a naïve view is a very dubious metaphysics of experience.


Daniele Mario Cassaghi  
(University of Milan, Italy)
I am a Phd Student at University of Milan (Dept. of Philosophy) and the Centre for Philosophy of Time (supervisor Prof. Giuliano Torrengo). My research focuses on perception of temporal properties and temporal flow. I am currently a visiting Phd student at Warwick University, under the supervision of Prof. Christoph Hoerl. A secondary project of mine is about Moods and how they are related to intentionality.
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Plato and Vagueness: why there cannot be the form of mud

Alessandro Cecconi

Any aspects of Plato’s metaphysics are still highly discussed. However, there is a problem that is not much discussed and to which no satisfactory answer has been given. Plato in the Parmenides tackles the issue of the extent of the forms. At the beginning of the discussion, pressed by Parmenides, Socrates claims that there are no forms of mud, filth and hair. From this claim, Parmenides rises a major objection to the Platonic theory of forms. Moreover, it is in strong contradiction with what Plato has said in the Republic, where it is asserted that everything, which has a name has also a corresponding form. Thus, it is crucial in order to better understand Plato’s philosophy to find out why this claim has been made. The problem is very little discussed in the literature. Moreover, the various attempts of addressing the issue turned out to be quite disappointing. On one hand, many scholars have thought that this passage should not be taken seriously. On the other hand, those who have taken Plato’s words seriously, do not seem to have found answers convincing enough to consider the problem solved. Given this, my paper has two main goals. Firstly, I will argue for a new answer to this question. Secondly, I will look in the contemporary debate for a solution to this issue. Now, it will be a good idea to give a brief sketch of the suggestion and of the solutions that I am going to propose. What I take to be the reason for this rejection is the metaphysical vagueness that these forms would have implied. In other words, allowing these entities in the Platonic heaven would have also allowed for there to be fuzziness, but Plato did not have the theoretical tools needed to deal with it. Therefore, they must be banned. In fact, when he wrote the Parmenides, the paradox of the bald was already well known, thus the indeterminacy of the form of hair was quite straightforward. Likewise, similar criticisms affect the forms of mud and filth. Thus, we shall look in the contemporary debate for them and, hence, for a solution to the puzzle. There seem to be two possible ways. One is to build a system that allows metaphysical vagueness, and so that is able to deal with it. The other is to put vagueness in the realm of language, and so to consider vagueness as semantic indecision. I will explore these two possibilities, in order to discover which fits better our purposes.
Alessandro Cecconi (University of Lugano, Switzerland)
I started being interested in philosophy in high school, therefore, I decided to study philosophy at university. At the bachelor level, I have studied in Milan at Università degli Studi and, then, I moved to Venice at Ca’ Foscari University where I got my bachelor degree with a thesis named "The meaning of playing: fiction and comprehension". As the title of my bachelor thesis may suggest, in my former studies I have been very much interested in aesthetics and in hermeneutics. Also, practical philosophy has been very much of interest for me. However, while I was finishing my bachelor degree, I discovered analytic philosophy and in particular analytic metaphysics, which became my strong philosophical interest, almost the only one. For this reason, I decided to make of analytic metaphysics my main area of research, thus, I went to Lugano at USI, to attend the master program in philosophy. Here, I had the chance to meet and to work with some great philosopher as Kevin Mulligan, Kit Fine, Thomas Sattig, Christian Wüthrich and Anna Marmodoro. I look forward to finishing my program here at USI within next year. My main goal after I will have got my master degree is to be accepted into a PhD program and to pursue an academic career.
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Monist Language-fundamentality

Antonio Maria Cleani

Recent work in metaphysics increasingly relies on the notion of language-fundamentality, intended to capture the idea that some languages afford objectively more perspicuous representations of reality’s metaphysical structure. Despite this trend, research primarily focused on language-fundamentality itself is lacking, with the notable exception of work by Sider and few others. This talk contributes to filling the gap by sketching a simple taxonomy of theories
of language-fundamentality and by motivating an alternative to Sider’s account.

Sider defines a fundamental language as a language all primitive expressions of which are joint-carving (fundamental), where joint-carving is understood as a generalisation of Lewisian naturalness. Sider’s view suggests a simple two-dimensional taxonomy of theories of language-fundamentality, classifying views as atomist or monist, permissive or strict. Sider’s view is a version of permissive atomism (PA).

I introduce a version of permissive monism (PM) as an alternative. This view takes language-fundamentality as primitive and captures expression-fundamentality via a binary predicate: expressions are fundamental in languages, by being primitives in fundamental languages. I motivate PM by showing it satisfies a platitude that PA doesn’t. Let $\Delta$ be a set of inter-definable expressions some of which must be fundamental (e.g. truth-functional connectives). Say an expression e is strongly indispensable iff it’s primitive in all fundamental languages. The platitude is: some $\Delta$s don’t contain any strongly indispensable expression, some $\Delta$s do.

Sider’s PA implies, against the platitude, that no expression is strongly fundamental, because it accepts expressively inadequate fundamental languages?fundamental languages whose primitive vocabulary contains less than enough expressions of some $\Delta$. The obvious move is to exclude expressive inadequacy by counting a language as fundamental if all and only its primitives are joint-carving, but this revision makes any joint-carving expression strongly indispensable, again violating the platitude. By contrast, PM takes language-fundamentality as primitive, so it doesn’t have to explain how role constitutive constraints reduce to facts about fundamental primitives. Hence, PM can take some expressive adequacy constraint as axiomatic, without over-generating strongly indispensable expressions.
Antonio Maria Cleani (University of St Andrews, United Kingdom)
I am a postgraduate (masters) student at the University of St Andrews. Previously, I was an undergrad in Italy at the University of Padua. I work mainly in metaphysics and metaontology, with a focus on persistence, location, properties, fundamentality and the substantivity of metaphysical questions/disagreements. I also have research interests in the philosophy of language and in epistemology, traditional and formal. E-Mail: amc43@st-andrews.ac.uk

A Case Study: Backward Causation in the Middle Ages

Giuseppe Colonna

Backward causation is the particular case in which the causal succession of cause and effect does not coincide with their temporal succession, in other words, it is the particular case in which the effect precedes temporally the cause. We usually read that the philosophical debate about backward causation begins with M. Dummet and A. Flew only in the mid 1950’s, in virtue of some studies of particular phenomena in the field of Physics, producing some paradoxes, i.e. the bootstrap paradoxes, the consistency paradoxes, the Newcomb paradox.

This paper tries, firstly, to show as the notion of backward causation is already present in the medieval debate about some metaphysical questions. Moreover, we will try, secondly, to support the thesis that the broader conception of backward causation used by medieval thinkers could be useful to solve the contemporary paradoxes.

For this reason, it will be necessary to analyse the medieval theory of the four causes (material, formal, efficient and final cause), the grounding relations of the causes with regard to different perspectives considered (ontological, chronological, intentional, causal), the various possibilities of temporal location of a generic cause in relation to its effect, finally, the temporal location of the different four causes in relation to their effect, in other words, the relation between causal succession and temporal succession of every cause in relation to the single effect.

In conclusion, it will be possible to demonstrate that a broader conception of causality can be useful to the contemporary debate to solve the backward causation paradoxes. Indeed, if we admit not only one
kind of cause (the medieval efficient cause), it will be possible to assert
that backward causation does not include only the extraordinary cases
of subjects moving towards the past, but also the ordinary cases of ef-
ffects which, in virtue of their nature, always imply a final cause located
in a successive temporal moment.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Michael Witkamp
Date: 18:20-18:50, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.003

Giuseppe Colonna (University of Italian Switzerland, Switzerland)
I am a graduate student in Philosophy (Metaphysics and Philosophy of
Mind) at the University of Italian Switzerland and musician.

After my previous studies of BA in History and History of Philos-
ophy and my MFA in Piano in Italy, I came in Switzerland to deepen
my analytical background with professors like Varzi, Fine, Mulligan,
Simons, Smith, Marmodoro. I have focused my work on the medieval
theories of time: in particular, the different conceptions of aevum and
eternity; the question about the spatio-temporal location of the sepa-
rate substances (angels and souls). At the moment, I am working on my
master thesis about the medieval tradition of the Aristotelian category
of "When" in its relation with time.

My greatest aspiration concerns the attempt to enrich the actual
debate of contemporary Logic and Metaphysics with some original per-
spectives taken from the Medieval Philosophy.
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Extensionalist explanation and solution of Russell’s Paradox

Ludovica Conti

In this paper, I propose an answer to the open question about the, so-called, explanation of Russell’s paradox. In the debate about this paradox, there are traditionally two main and incompatible positions: the Cantorian explanation and the Predicativist one. I briefly rehearse the reasons why both these positions can be neglected and propose a third, Extensionalist, one, with a related solution.

The Extensionalist explanation identifies the key of Russell’s Paradox in a proposition about the extensions: $\forall F \exists x (x = ext(F))$ that allows to derive, from the existence of Russell’s concept, the existence of Russell’s extension. This proposition is a theorem of classical logic whose derivation presupposes the classical treatment of identity and quantification. So, we can explain Russell’s paradox by the (inappropriate) classical correlation between concepts and extensions and, in particular, in the assumption (provided by classical logic) that the correlation is defined on the whole second order domain.

The solution related to the Extensionalist explanation consists in a re-formulation of Frege’s theory, in which classical first order logic is replaced with negative free logic to allow the derivation of parts of Peano Arithmetic as a logical theory of extensions. We can analyse three different versions of this free-fregean system that share the logical part of the axiomatization (FL) and differ each other only by the non-logical axioms ($E - BLV : \forall F \forall G (ext(F) = ext(G) \leftrightarrow E!(ext(F)) \land E!(ext(G)) \land \Pi x (Fx \leftrightarrow Gx))$; $P - BLV : \forall F \forall G (ext(F) = ext(G) \leftrightarrow (\phi(F) \land \phi(G) \Pi x (Fx \leftrightarrow Gx)) \land T - BLV : \forall F \forall G (ext(F) = ext(G) \leftrightarrow (\phi(F) \land \phi(G) \land \Pi x (Fx \leftrightarrow Gx)))$. All these systems prevent to derive Russell’s Paradox and allow to derive different parts of Peano Arithmetic.

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Ludovica Conti (University of Pavia, Italia)
My name is Ludovica Conti. At present, I am a PhD candidate of Northwestern Philosophy Consortium - FINO (University of Pavia, Italy).

My current PhD project concerns the explanations and solutions of Russell’s Paradox in Frege’s philosophy of mathematics and in the abstractionist programs.
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The DEKI account of scientific representation. A solution to the problem of model-based representation?

Thomas Durlacher

There is general agreement that scientific models play a central role in contemporary science. Models are used to represent, explain, predict and explore natural and social phenomena. Among these model functions representation plays a crucial role, because representational accuracy is a prerequisite for other model functions. Traditionally philosophical accounts of scientific representations made either similarity between the representatum and the represented phenomenon or the ability to draw accurate inferences from the representation, the central element of model-based representations. Recently, Roman Frigg and James Nguyen suggested an alternative account of model-based representations and proposed to formulate the
conditions for a scientific representation in terms of the following biconditional statement (Frigg, Nguyen 2018). According to their account, a model (M) is a model-representation of a target-system (T) if and only if

(i) M denotes T (and in some cases parts of M denote parts of T).
(ii) M exemplifies Z-properties P₁, ..., Pₙ.
(iii) M comes with key K associating the set P₁, ..., Pₙ with a set of properties Q₁, ..., Qₘ: K(P₁, ..., Pₙ) = Q₁, ..., Qₘ
(iv) M imputes at least one of the properties Q₁, ..., Qₘ to T.

Although Frigg and Nguyen’s account represents an important improvement over earlier theories of representation, I will argue that there remain some significant problems regarding their approach. I will show that certain elements of their account, like denotation and exemplification are redundant and that the notion of a key that associates model properties with other properties has to be carefully outlined to avoid the consequence that everything potentially represents everything. My talk will present an alternative version of the Frigg / Nguyen account, which avoids some of these pitfalls.

Section: Philosophy of Science  
Language: English  
Chair: Gregor Greslehner  
Date: 15:20-15:50, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)  
Location: SR 1.005

Thomas Durlacher (University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg)
Thomas Durlacher is a PhD student at the University of Luxembourg. His PhD project is concerned with philosophical questions arising in the context of computer simulations that model the behavior of social agents. Before this, he worked at the Centre for the History of Science at the University of Graz in Austria. His philosophical interests lie in the area of the general philosophy of science, with particular focus on model-based reasoning, representation and scientific explanations.
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Must good cooks be virtuous cooks?

Michiel Esseling

This talk focuses on how we delineate the domain in which moral virtues are developed. This question arises specifically in the analogy between virtues and practical skills. This analogy tries to offer a psychologically satisfying model of how the virtuous person knows what to do. Just like expertise in practical skills, virtues are developed by practice, and exercised intelligently.

A weak spot for this analogy is how it deals with practical wisdom, the virtuous person’s ability to identify genuine virtues, and to arbitrate between seemingly conflicting demands. What makes a person wise seems much more vague and contentious than virtues like bravery, let alone practical skills like chess and piano-playing. It then seems inadequate to analyze wisdom as a separate skill with its own domain.

This challenge must be met by a sophisticated account of wisdom. The resources for this are provided by Julia Annas’ view that practical wisdom develops along with your character as a whole, as opposed to being a separate skill with its own domain. We are wise to the extent that we successfully integrate the demands of different virtues into our character as a whole. To be generous, I must also be sensitive to demands of justice, kindness, and courage for example. What Annas overlooks is the question of what the scope of practical wisdom is. If we define it too narrowly we fail to recognize the extent to which the virtues are integrated in our everyday practices. If we define it too broadly we are ultimately committed to the idea that to be really virtuous, we must also excel at our everyday practices like cooking. I will defend such a broad account. The idea is that my conception living well involves many roles such as being a good student, being a good friend, or being a good cook. “Being a good cook” in this sense is a thick description that means more than just being able to cook nice food, just like “being a good doctor” means more than being able to perform surgery well.
Michiel Esseling (Utrecht University, Nederland)

Michiel Esseling is a student in the philosophy research master program at Utrecht University, and an intern in the Fair Limits project. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy from Utrecht University, where he is currently enrolled in the Research Master program in Philosophy. He is interested in many subfields of practical philosophy, like moral psychology, metaethics and distributive justice, but also in fields like action theory and social philosophy.

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The ontology of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Jordi Fairhurst

Traditionally there are two main readings of the Tractatus. On the one hand, the metaphysical reading (see e.g. Hacker 1986; 1996; 2000; Pears 1987; Koethe 2003) argues that Wittgenstein is committed to metaphysical realism: the ontological remarks that open the Tractatus are truths that characterize a reality independent of how humans conceive it. On the other hand, and against this reading, the resolute reading (see e.g. Connant 1989; 2000; 2002; Diamond 1991; 1997; 2000; Goldfarb 1997; 2011; Cahill 2004; 2011) takes TLP 6.54 as serious as possible and argues that Wittgenstein does not set forth any ineffable metaphysical theory or doctrine. That is, they deny that Wittgenstein is committed to metaphysical realism or any other kind of metaphysical theory. In addition, there are also alternative readings (see e.g. McGinn 1999; 2006; Moyal-Sharrock 2007) that generally coincide in rejecting the idea that Wittgenstein is advancing ineffable metaphysical doctrines – at least with regards to ontology.

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I argue that the rejection of the metaphysical reading by the resolute reading, and other alternatives, operates on the false assumption that the denial of metaphysical realism and its consequences encompasses the negation of any sort of metaphysical theory in the Tractatus. Second, I set forth an alternative metaphysical reading of the Tractatus that does not entail metaphysical realism. I argue that Wittgenstein advances a picture theory of reality that concerns both pictures and ontology. However, Wittgenstein’s
ontology is concurrent to his understanding of pictures; it does not precede it. Ontology is dependent on the logical structure it shares with pictures. Consequently, ontological claims characterize reality as we picture it and represent it in thoughts, language and iconic presentations not reality independent of how humans conceive it. The gap between pictures and ontology is eliminated, thus avoiding metaphysical realism.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Alessandro Cecconi
Date: 14:40-15:10, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005

Jordi Fairhurst (Universidad de las Islas Baleares (UIB), Spain)
Jordi Fairhurst is a PhD candidate at the University of the Balearic Islands with a FPU grant from the Ministerio de Educacion, Cultura y Deporte del Gobierno de España (MINECO). He obtained a B.A. and M.A. in Philosophy from the University of the Balearic Islands. His current project focuses on Wittgenstein’s ethics, although his research interests also encompass meta-ethics, ethics and philosophy of language. His most recent publication is “The Ethical Subject and Willing Subject in the Tractatus: an Alternative to the Transcendental Reading” (Philosophia, 2019).
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No Man Is an Island, Some are Archipelagoes

André Ferreira

Being a life or death question, the persistence question of personal identity aims to answer the conditions under which a person persists or survives. We want to know under which conditions does one remains the same person from a certain point in time to another or just to know why a certain person in a certain point in time is the same person in a distinct one. The first real approach to the problem of persistence was made by Locke in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in which the first psychological criterion – based on memory – for personal identity. Building on
Locke’s foundations, there are several psychological-continuity condition proponents like Lewis, Nagel, Noonan, Nozick, Parfit, Perry and Shoemaker. On the other side of the barricade we have the brute-physical views championed by philosophers like Ayers, Mackie, Olson, van Inwagen and Williams. Between the several theories that try to answer the persistence question, this paper will focus on the lockean psychological-continuity approach and specifically in a paradox presented by David Wiggins (1967) where two functioning halves of a brain are transplanted from their original body to two new ones. This thought experiment – now commonly referred to as the fission case – presents a challenge for the psychological-continuity theories, inasmuch as it seems that all of the conditions of survivability are met still, the outcome seems to be two different persons that are different from each other and the pre-procedure one. Moreover, we will try to admit the fission case while preserving a psychological-continuity based view. Analyzing the role of the Rietdijk-Putnam-Penrose argument – presented in the works by Rietdijk (1966, 1976), Putnam (1967) and Penrose (1989) – and Einstein’s special relativity theory (1905) in showing that if persons extending through space as they do in time, fission cases are unproblematic for the psychological-continuity approaches of personal identity.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 14:40-15:10, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003

André Ferreira (LanCog Research Group - CFUL, Portugal)
André Alves Ferreira started his career in Philosophy at the University of Porto and now holds a BA (Licenciatura) in Philosophy from the University of Lisbon since 2017 where he currently is a MA student. His BA final thesis had the title “Psychological Continuity: Persistence and Distribution”, and is about the implications of the fission problem for a psychological continuity theory of personal identity. André is an active member of the academic and research community, being involved in projects like Argument Clinic and the Nucleus for Political Studies of the University of Lisbon (nepUL) as an invited speaker with a talk titled
“Neoliberalism: The Economic Agent and Egoism,” as well as the Workshop of Analytic Philosophy. His talks include events such as the LV Congreso de Filosofía Joven at Murcia University, the 32nd European Conference on Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care of the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care (ESPMH), the 10th Beyond Humanism Conference at the University of Lower Silesia, the 2018 Ian Ramsey Centre Summer Conference at University of Oxford, the 3rd International Congress of the Portuguese Philosophical Society, and the Cyborg Days Workshop at the University of Zurich.

His main research focus is centered in Philosophical Ethics, more specifically in Personal Identity and Practical Ethics, additionally he has interest in Metaphysics and the persistence of objects and persons. At the moment he’s working on the topic of psychological continuity and the practical implications of these thesis.  
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Human Functioning and the Space of Reasons – Epistemec Foundations of Positive Freedom

Jana Katharina Funk

The idea of this paper consists in an explanation of the epistemological foundations of positive freedom, that I will present as acting for reasons. In my account, I shall start with the conceptional idea of the logical space of reasons, by Wilfrid Sellars: “The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says” (EPM: 336). Within his account, Sellars argues against the Myth of the Given, a kind of empiricist foundationalism according to which mere observation could justify knowledge independently of anything else. In drawing on Sellars, McDowell develops a form of idealistic naturalism, that situates pure intelligible concepts as part of the natural world. In concordance with Kant’s famous saying: “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without conceptions are blind”, McDowell postulates, that sensations are a part of cognition, guiding thinking from without, but not from within. Apriori concepts are thus part of the natural — that means, that experience is always already conceptionally informed. When we
take for granted that the space of conceptions is foremost the space of idealistic/ purely intelligible knowledge, we can conclude that the space of conceptions is the space of the highest form of knowledge, thus the knowledge of values and morals, governed by pure practical reason. Accordingly, conceptual, reason governed space defines our very human nature. Idealistic naturalism is thus the basis for human functioning; and in idealistic terms, the highest form of human functioning is our capacity of engaging in practical reasoning and gaining moral insights according to pure practical reason. Acting according to these insights is the idealistic answer of how freedom fits into the natural world. (Mind and World, xxiii) The question of freedom is consequently being solved through human’s responsiveness to reason. Human’s responsiveness to reason can be conceived of as a meta-faculty: I call it a faculty, because (1) It belongs to human functioning, (2) it also needs to be perfected, as humans are however born with the potentiality of highest moral insight, but the actualization of it (acting according to reasons as freedom) has to be achieved through active engagement. The metafaculty as responsiveness to reason can also be judged as malfunctioning; in the case of it not further fostering a person’s highest form of human functioning: our capacity of engaging in practical reasoning and gaining moral insights according to pure practical reason. As stated, I understand the realization of freedom as acting for reasons. As illustrated, the human life form is inextricably linked with the conceptional sphere — the space of reasons. So, in order to operate within “the logical space of reasons,” one’s responsiveness to reasons must be acceptably well perfected. The better it is perfected the better one will be able to act according to the practical insights. In acting in line with these insights, one exemplifies an acting for reasons that is embedded in McDowell’s account of naturalism. In acting for reasons that belong to human nature, one exemplifies acting according with the highest possible knowledge, moral knowledge, and with that, one realizes positive freedom.
Jana Katharina Funk (Bamberg, Germany)
Jana Katharina Funk studied Philosophy, Area Studies, Theology and Political Science in Berlin, New-Delhi and Bamberg. During her Masters, she worked at the University of Bamberg and interned for MISEREOR and Amnesty International. Since October 2017 she is working on her doctoral thesis at the University of Bamberg. As a visiting scholar, she stayed at Universidad de Buenos Aires, Notre Dame University and DePaul University. Her research interests are Political Philosophy, Ethics and Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion and Epistemology.
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What are Words?

Maciej Głowacki

In my paper I present and examine possible accounts of metaphysics of words. Cappelen (1999) divides theories in metaphysics of words into two categories: intentional and non-intentional. The theory is intentional if it says that it is a necessary or a sufficient condition for an entity being a token of a word that its producer was in a certain intentional state at the production time. A theory is non-intentional, if it denies such conditions. The main proponent of intentionality is David Kaplan (Kaplan 1990, Kaplan 2011). Among non-intentional theories of words most influential are Platonic Type-Token Model (TTM; Katz 2000, Wetzel 2009) and Cappelen’s own Conventional Theory (CT). Both individuate words tokens in virtue of their physical and semantic properties. They specify different grounds of these tokening conditions (Epstein 2006). In case of TTM grounds are intrinsic, whereas in CT tokening conditions are grounded in extrinsic conventions.

I argue that non-intentional theories of words face serious problems. First of all, tokening conditions based on physical similarity of tokens of the same word-type are hard to defend, since two tokens of the same word can differ in spelling (like ’color’ and ’colour’) and pronunciation (like ’schedule’ in British and American English). Words can also change their meaning through time. Moreover, grounding of these tokening conditions in conventions does not help. There is a variety of nonstandard articulations of a word, hence the assumption that there is a convention grounding tokening conditions of each of them is implausible. Compe-
tent speakers would have to know them to communicate. But it seems that our communication skills are based not on the knowledge of such conventions but on our competence of intentions ascription (similar to Strawson 1962). Such a competence is essential for interpretation of ambiguous sentences. I will show that only intentional theory can avoid problems concerning ambiguity in communication.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Eduardo Pérez-Navarro
Date: 14:00-14:30, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006

Maciej Glowacki (University of Warsaw, Poland)
I am a student of philosophy and mathematics at University of Warsaw. I am interested in philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics and logic. Currently, my main area of interest is metaphysics of linguistic entities and phenomenon of self-reference.
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Knowledge and Overall Ability

Max Timo Goetsch

The robust virtue theory of knowledge (RVK) has it that knowledge is true belief, where the belief’s truth is owed to the exercise of epistemic ability. The fake barn case is often considered to render moot RVK (Kelp 2013, Pritchard 2012). In the fake barn case, Barney truthfully believes that he’s facing a barn and apparently does so out of epistemic ability. Yet, since the area is peppered with fake barns, Barney intuitively lacks knowledge. In my talk, I will develop a variety of the no ability response (NAR) on behalf of RVK that wards off two objections. NAR claims that Barney lacks knowledge because, in that environment, he lacks the pertinent discriminatory ability required for knowing from eyesight (Greco 2007, Littlejohn 2014, Millar 2009). Yet this response faces two challenges. First, Kallestrup & Pritchard (2014) argue that NAR entails an implausible account of ability possession. They contend that being temporarily
located in an unfavourable environment never deprives one of one’s abilities. Secondly, Kelp (2016) maintains that NAR wrongly predicts lack of knowledge in so-called epistemic Frankfurt cases. For it allegedly entails that agent’s in epistemic Frankfurt cases lack the epistemic ability required for knowing the target proposition. I will argue that both criticisms fail. Building on Littlejohn (2014), I will show that Kallestrup & Pritchard’s theory of ability possession is at best true for general abilities but not for so-called overall abilities. Having an overall ability to do something depends on a favourable local environment. I will explain how the emerging theory of overall ability possession predicts lack of overall epistemic ability in fake barn cases and possession of overall epistemic ability in epistemic Frankfurt cases. Thus, RVK, interpreted as a claim about overall epistemic ability, predicts both knowledge in epistemic Frankfurt cases and lack of knowledge in fake barn cases.

Max Timo Goetsch (Freie Universität Berlin, Germany)
I have just completed my master’s degree in philosophy and will start doing my PhD on epistemic abilities in autumn this year, under the supervision of Barbara Vetter. My focus lies primarily in epistemology and everything in its vicinity (applied epistemology, social epistemology, theory of science). I am also curious about metaphysics and possible intersections between normative epistemology and ethical/political theory.
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Disagreement matters: why von Fintel’s theory of definite descriptions should be favoured

Aglaia Anna Marlene von Götz

Even when one knows that two sentences both make the same false existential presupposition, one might evaluate one of them as false, while feeling unable to assign a truth-value to the other. For example, some people feel squeamish, i.e. are unable to evaluate the sentence as true or false, when asked to assign a truth-value to sentence (1) but confidently judge (2) to be false. I will call sentences with existential presupposition failure SWEPF (Schoubye 2009).

(1) The king of France is bald.

(2) The king of France is presenting at SOPhiA 2019.

In the contemporary literature several ways of explaining this difference in truth-value assignments have been proposed (Elbourne 2013, Felka 2014, Lasersohn 1993, Schoubye 2009, von Fintel 2004, Yablo 2006 and 2009). I think that there is a further desideratum for a theory that explains the presented difference that has not been discussed so far. The desideratum is the following: I take it that between speakers who judge some SWEPF as squeamish, there remains the possibility of disagreement in how to judge a particular SWEPF. This means that there are evaluator-relative SWEPF such that some speakers judge them to be squeamish and others judge them to be false. I take it that for example sentence (3) is such a SWEPF.

(3) The king of France lives in a spaceship.

In order to account for the desideratum a theory of SWEPF has to either allow for speaker-relativity regarding the correctly assigned truth-value of SWEPF or explain why some people assign wrong truth-values. The discussion of the desideratum is important because not all of the contemporary explanations can account for it. To show this, I will group the contemporary explanations in different approaches and then look how the most elaborated theory of each approach deals with the desideratum. I will then argue that only von Fintel’s theory of SWEPF deals with the desideratum in a satisfying way and that this gives us a reason to favour von Fintel’s theory over the others.
Aglia Anna Marlene von Götz (University of Oxford, United Kingdom)
I am a graduate student in philosophy at the University of Oxford (BPhil in Philosophy). I did my undergraduate studies in at the University of Zurich (UZH), where I studied philosophy (120 ECTS) and mathematics (60 ECTS). My main research interest is in philosophy of language, other than that I am also interested in metaphysics, epistemology, feminist philosophy, the history of analytic philosophy and philosophy of mind.
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Backward causation as a plausible concept

Dennis Graemer & Frenzis Herbert Scheffels

The Main idea of this article is the plausibilisation of backward causation by highlighting the empirical testability in the empirical sciences. From the perspective of the interventionist theory of causation, we argue that backward causation is both possible and testable, respectively. Furthermore we argue that the intuition that the world is fundamentally structured by forward causation, does not exclude backward causation on the macro-level. By applying the concept of epistemological emergence the special sciences do not only maintain their relevance, but are also justified to postulate backward causation in their respective science.
Dennis Graemer (Heinrich-Heine-University; Department of Philosophy, Germany)
Dennis Graemer, B.A., is a master student of philosophy at the Heinrich-Heine University Düsseldorf. His research interests are mainly in epistemology, philosophy of science, ontology and also political philosophy.
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Frenzis Herbert Scheffels (Heinrich-Heine-University; Department of Philosophy, Germany)
Frenzis H. Scheffels, B.A., is a master student of Philosophy at the Heinrich-Heine University Düsseldorf. His research interests are mostly in Epistemology, Ontology, Ethics and Methodology of Thought Experiments.
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Beyond Infinity; Dialethism and the Ontology of the Transfinite

Simon Graf

The main purpose of my talk is to present essential parts of my masters-dissertation “Beyond Infinity; The Epistemology and Ontology of the Transfinite”. Hereby, I will focus on the discussion of classical paradoxes of set theory, as well as their canonical axiomatic solutions and the persistent problems related to these solutions. The idea of iterative set construction in axiomatic systems like ZFC- or NBG-set theory, leads to problematic consequences, which are mainly the result of the rejection of unrestricted comprehension and Cantor’s initial philosophical idea of a domain principle. Whereby, the rejection of these fundamental principles has led e.g. to the problem, that axiomatic systems, in the form of ZFC, are fundamentally restricted in their language and not capable of consistently talking about themselves. These observations inspired radical interpretations, in which (some) all-sets are considered as “dialethia”, which
are bearers of contradictory properties. This metaphysical assumption makes set theory to a paraconsistent project and following to a possible foundation of mathematics in general within the broader domain of paraconsistent mathematics. Accordingly, my talk focuses on the critical representation of these dialethic solutions as well as a comparison to potential alternatives.

**Section:** Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics  
**Language:** English  
**Chair:** Fabian Heimann  
**Date:** 18:20-18:50, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)  
**Location:** SR 1.007

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**Simon Graf** (University of Graz, Austria)  
Simon Graf is prior to completing his MA in Philosophy at the Karl-Franzens-University of Graz, with a certificated Master specialization in History and Philosophy of Science. Accordingly, his research interests focus on Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Mathematics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind as well as Technology Ethics.  
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**Warum wir an eine Außenwelt glauben sollten**  
Stefan Gugerell

Weder die Existenz noch die Nicht-Existenz einer Außenwelt kann letztendlich bewiesen werden. Allerdings lässt sich dafür argumentieren, dass wir im Zweifel aus moralischen Gründen eine Außenwelt annehmen sollen. Das in meinem Vortrag vorgebrachte Argument ist angelehnt an eine Pascal’schen Wette. Aus logischen Gründen sind nur zwei Szenarien denkbar:

(1) Realismus: Unsere Wahrnehmungen korrespondieren mit einer von uns unabhängigen Außenwelt.

(2) Solipsismus: Unsere Wahrnehmungen korrespondieren nicht mit einer von uns unabhängigen Außenwelt.

Falls (1) wahr ist, so existieren andere Menschen und Tiere (mit bestimmten Rechten oder Interessen) tatsächlich. Falls (2) der Fall ist, sind unsere Wahrnehmungen bloße Halluzinationen, und wir können nicht von der Existenz anderer Menschen und Tiere ausgehen. In diesem Fall steht einem radikalen ethischen Egoismus nichts im Wege, da wir keine moralischen Verpflichtungen gegenüber Halluzinationen haben. Falls (2) allerdings doch falsch ist, dann ist die völlige Ausklammerung aller anderer Lebewesen moralisch untragbar. Dadurch würde zu viel Leid in Kauf genommen bzw. zu viele Tier- und Menschenrechte verletzt. Im Zweifel – der faktisch besteht – ist also die Annahme von (1) aus moralischen Gründen geboten.

Stefan Gugerell (Universität Salzburg, Österreich)
"'True' as Ambiguous": A reply to Boscolo and Pravato

Barbara K. Haas & Johanna Rosenberger

In his 2008 paper titled "'True' as ambiguous" Kölbel argues that the truth predicate used in natural language is ambiguous between two meanings: a deflationist and a substantial one. According to the paper, utterances like the ones below are acceptable, even when taken simultaneously:

(1) That dogs are cute is true.
(2) Statements (etc.) about whether or not something or someone is cute (taste judgements) cannot be true or false.

Kölbel therefore concludes that there are two truth-predicates being used by competent speakers: one, as in (1), which corresponds to a deflationist conception of truth: trueD, and one, as in (2), which corresponds to an (unspecified) substantial conception of truth: trueS.

In their 2016 paper Boscolo and Pravato argue against this analysis. They test whether 'true' passes the three most established tests for ambiguity: conjunction-reduction, contradiction and ellipsis. They argue that if 'true' actually were ambiguous then it would have to pass at least one of these tests. Since it fails all of them, 'true' cannot be ambiguous.

The first part gives four possible replies to Boscolo and Pravato’s claims, which could defend Kölbel’s original claim:

1. Failure to pass ambiguity tests is not evidence enough for non-ambiguity.
2. Boscolo and Pravato make subtle changes to the phrasing of the sentences which are used to test the ambiguity of 'true'. These could be the reason for differing judgements.
3. It is not entirely clear who the relevantly competent speakers are, whose judgements could determine the success or failure of 'true' to pass the ambiguity tests.
4. The test applied only work for syntactical ambiguity, but the ambiguity of 'true' could be of a different kind.

The second part of the paper builds on the last reply and argues that there is some evidence that 'true' is actually pragmatically ambiguous. The main claim here is that sentences like in (1) express agreement with the opinion expressed and are a derivation of (2). To back this claim up, some analogies to metaphors and their literal and pragmatic meanings are drawn.

Sources:


Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Katharina Anna Sodoma
Date: 18:20-18:50, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006

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Barbara K. Haas studies Linguistics (BA) and Philosophy (MA) at the University of Vienna. She is an active member and Vice Secretary of the Vienna Forum for Analytic Philosophy.
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Johanna Rosenberger (University of Vienna, Austria)
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Distinguishing Personal and Impersonal Components of Welfare Aggregation

Jonas Harney

There is widespread agreement in moral philosophy that welfare is morally relevant. Its significance, however, is highly controversial. One of the main controversies is often cashed out in the distinction between personal and impersonal views. It is particularly present in debates on the number problem or interpersonal aggregation (Taurek 1977), in critiques of consequentialism (Rawls 1971, Scheffler 1982), and in population ethics (Parfit 1984). Roughly, personal views hold that morality is concerned with particular people and how they fare. Impersonal views, by contrast, focus on promoting welfare in the world. However, the views so construed are neither disjunctive nor exhaustive.

I argue that different notions of personal and impersonal views about welfare ethics haven’t been distinguished accurately. There is not only one distinction but several important ones that are merged within the personal-impersonal contrast. In order to show so, I classify and analyse three (out of seven) categories the personal-impersonal distinction can be applied to. First, the basic final value of welfare can be understood as impersonal (or good simpliciter) or as personal (or good-for). Second, a view either always allows for aggregation of the value of welfare (impersonal) or it doesn’t (personal). Third, a view is either welfare compensatory if it implies that the losses of some people can always be outweighed by the higher overall gains of other people (impersonal) or it isn’t (personal). The classification reveals that, since the categories are logically independent, more fine-grained intermediate positions are possible. Exemplary, I argue that an aggregative and welfare compensatory view is compatible with personal basic final value as long as it still feeds its compensatory aggregative function with personal value only. Hence, we do not need to be full-blown impersonalists for welfare aggregation.
**The Consequence of the Consequence Argument**

Marco Hausmann

Peter van Inwagen has developed a much discussed argument for incompatibilism. The aim of my paper is to compare three alternative formal reconstructions of his argument. In the first part of my paper, I examine van Inwagen’s own reconstruction within a propositional modal logic. I point out that, due to the expressive limitations of his propositional modal logic, van Inwagen is unable to argue directly (that is, within his formal framework) for incompatibilism. In the second part of my paper, I suggest to reconstruct van Inwagen’s argument within a first-order predicate logic. I show, however, that even though this reconstruction is not susceptible to the same objection, this reconstruction can be shown to be inconsistent (given van Inwagen’s own assumptions). In particular, I show that Richard Montague’s result that formal languages that represent necessity by means of a predicate are inconsistent (given plausible assumptions about necessity) can be extended to show that this reconstruction of van Inwagen’s argument is inconsistent as well. At the end of my paper, I suggest an alternative and, in my view, better reconstruction. I reconstruct van Inwagen’s argument within a quantified counterfactual logic with propositional quantifiers. I show that within this formal framework van Inwagen would not only be able to argue directly for incompatibilism, he would also be able to argue for crucial assumptions of his argument.
Marco Hausmann (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany)

Marco Hausmann is writing a dissertation on the problem of free will and determinism at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich. He is author of the paper “The Consequence Argument Ungrounded” (Synthese, 2018) as well as of the paper “Against Kripke’s Solution to the Problem of Negative Existentials” (Analysis, forthcoming). His areas of interest are: Metaphysics, Logic, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Freedom and Philosophy of Religion.
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An algebraic approach to a Kripkean theory of probability and truth

Fabian Heimann

In natural languages, we can formulate sentences as

(1) Sentence (1) is false.

(2) The probability of sentence (2) is less than 1/2.

The first sentence is called the liar sentence and the paradox which arises from the question which truth value should be assigned to it led to the development of different formal theories of truth in the last century. Among those is a very influential fixed point construction by Saul Kripke. As a standard option, it is formulated by means of a three-valued set of truth values and the way the logical connectives and quantifiers operate on the truth values is summarised in the Strong Kleene scheme. But this is not the only scheme available. Other possible schemes include the Weak Kleene scheme and a four-valued extension of Strong Kleene. With an algebraic approach, it is possible to define the Kripkean construction for all the four mentioned schemes at once, as demonstrated in Chapter 2 of Gupta and Belnap 1993.
If one also wants to accommodate probability sentences like (2) in the formal system, the Kripkean construction needs to be extended. For the Strong Kleene scheme, Catrin Campbell-Moore introduced such an account in Campbell-Moore 2015 and showed that it satisfies several desirable properties.

In this talk, I want to extend the account of Chapter 2 of Gupta and Belnap 1993 to the probability case. This will result in an algebraic characterisation of the fixed points of a joint Kripkean theory of truth and probability. It complements the system of Campbell-Moore because also the Weak Kleene and the four-valued scheme are included. Apart from suggesting extensions to the definitions of Gupta and Belnap, I will begin to show that the resulting theory satisfies minimal desiderata like the fixed point property.

References:

Campbell-Moore, C., 2015, How to express self-referential probabil-
ity. A Kripkean proposal,


Gupta, A., and Belnap, N., 1993, The Revision Theory of Truth, Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.

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**Fabian Heimann** (University of Göttingen, Germany)

I am a student of math and philosophy in Göttingen. More precisely, I study math in the M.Sc. programme of Göttingen University and math and philosophy towards a B.A. Before all that, I obtained a B.Sc. in physics in 2017. Some of my interests are numerics of partial differential equations on the math side and know-how, (multi)modal logic, and theories of truth and other circular concepts in philosophy.

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Scientific Understanding and Scientific Explanation

Anna Elisabeth Höhl

Scientific Understanding has not been considered an important topic in philosophy of science until quite recently, and the philosophical research on this issue is still in its beginnings. In this talk, I address the question of how scientific understanding and scientific explanation are related. I claim that scientific understanding necessarily requires scientific explanation.

To defend this thesis, I first present the core concepts of the two most elaborated accounts of understanding, put forward by Henk de Regt (2017) and Kareem Khalifa (2017). Although their accounts differ in some respects, I explicate their commonalities to strengthen my position. Both authors are only concerned with understanding that involves an explanation, because cases from scientific practice show that understanding is achieved via explanation. This observation supports my claim. However, explanatory understanding is not the only kind of scientific understanding discussed in the literature. Objectual understanding, which does not necessarily require explanation, is a possible alternative. In a third part, I discuss the view of Jonathan Kvanvig (2009), who argues that explanatory understanding and objectual understanding are genuinely distinct, and the critique by Kareem Khalifa (2013) on this position. On the basis of this, I present my own account of scientific understanding and explicate how scientific understanding is linked to scientific explanation. Understanding is a cognitive disposition that enables scientists to recognize relations between pieces of knowledge and phenomena. Explanations establish these relations and make them explicit. Lastly, I apply my account to examples proposed by Peter Lipton (2009). He states that scientific understanding can be achieved without explanation. I show that, by adopting my account, explanations are used in Lipton’s examples to gain scientific understanding.
Anna Elisabeth Höhl (Bielefeld University, Germany)
Anna Elisabeth Höhl is a doctoral student in philosophy of science in the DFG (German Research Foundation) research project 2073 “Integrating Ethics and Epistemology of Scientific Research” at the Bielefeld University. Since October 2018, she is working on her dissertation project “Scientific Understanding – Its Nature, Values and Meaning”. After completing her interdisciplinary bachelor studies in physics and history at the Leibniz University Hannover, she joined a master’s program in philosophy of science at the same university. During her master studies, she spent one semester abroad at the University of Nebraska Lincoln. Her interests include many topics in philosophy of science and epistemology.
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Capturing Carbon. A Risk Ethical Approach.

Benjamin Hofbauer

Most climate models, which compute the possibility of keeping the global temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius of the pre-industrial level, incorporate some mechanism of Carbon Dioxide Reduction (CDR). Given the backlog on current carbon emissions, actively reducing the amount of carbon within the atmosphere plays a fundamental role in the 2 degree goal. CDR-technologies come in many different shapes and forms, from increasing carbon sinks (i.e. reforestation, ocean fertilization, etc.), to more industrial methods summed up under the header of Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS). However, techniques of Carbon Capture and Sequestration Systems are problematic in their implementation, since they represent a dangerous mix of economic, technological and environmental hurdles. Abstracting from the economic and technical issues that carbon capture systems carry, the focus here shall be on investigating the ethical implications that such a set of new technologies transports. By drawing on considerations based in risk-ethics, the question of whether imposing the risk of capturing and storing large amounts of CO2 can be morally justified will be examined. This is done by exploring how the i) imposition of the risk through storage, and ii) the risk itself that arises through carbon storage can be evaluated. In the process, two different forms of storage, i.e. geological and ex situ carbonization, will be compared based on their merits in relation to a risk-ethical analysis. The
risk-ethical analysis will largely recruit on Sven Ove Hansson’s approach within the field, discussing concepts such as the Closest Deterministic Analogue as a way to scrutinize the suitability of more traditional ethical theories in the face of climate change. The final arguments will be that a) a risk-ethical approach is necessary to properly evaluate the issues that climate engineering carries; and b) that CCS-technologies are of yet an ethically worrisome solution for climate change.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Jana Holíková
Date: 10:40-11:10, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004

Benjamin Hofbauer (University of Graz, Austria)
- 2017: Bachelor’s Degree in Translation and Interpreting (Spanish; English); University of Graz
  - since 2017: Joint Degree Master’s Program "Political, Economic, & Legal Philosophy"; University of Graz/Ruhr-University Bochum

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A Challenge for Animal Rights Advocates: Communitarianism vs. Liberalism

Jana Holíková

Animal rights advocates are facing a conflict between liberalism and communitarianism. Both ideologies pose certain problems regarding nonhuman animals’ interests. From the liberal point of view, humans, as autonomous beings, have a rightful claim to fulfill their interests, often at the cost of harming nonhuman animals. Communitarianism is closely related to the moral relativism which can easily justify states’ practice of animal exploitation. Advocates for nonhuman animals, nevertheless, adopt certain aspects of both
political theories. One approach, often called welfarism, is based on expanding our duties towards nonhuman animals. The common benefit, animals’ basic interest to live, and their sentience serve as rationales for our caring and responsible behaviour towards nonhuman beings. In the welfarist model no positive rights are attributed to animals and the pivotal concern is their well-being. This rather minimalist approach may be widely held in society, it is, however, not very effective and typically a concern only of NGOs. Most animal rights theorists follow a different path to deal with questions of morality, claiming that nonhuman animals are endowed with intrinsic dignity. They adopt the liberal emphasis on autonomy and argue that animals are conscious beings with equal moral status to humans. This means providing nonhuman animals with certain negative and/or positive rights, as they have abilities to exercise them. I will closely examine one of the variants of this view, the domesticated animal citizenship of Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson. These authors combine the liberal position of inalienable individual rights with the communitarian focus on communal cooperation and participation in social values. Even though their model can be considered daring and problematic in several aspects, it arguably provides the most satisfying compromise between the two philosophies.

**Section:** Ethics  
**Language:** English  
**Chair:** Eva Bobst  
**Date:** 16:00-16:30, 20 September 2019 (Friday)  
**Location:** SR 1.004

**Jana Holíková** (Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic)  
Jana Holíková is a second year Ph.D. student in the Department of Philosophy at Palacký University Olomouc. Her research focuses on philosophy of law and history of ideas. She wrote her master’s thesis on the theological construction of human and animal rights. Besides philosophy, she also studied cultural anthropology during her bachelor’s and master’s studies, which sparked her interest in cultural and moral relativism. She currently deals with the question how animal rights theories are influenced by Christian morality and dignity.  
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At the end of the 1970s, Richard Lewontin’s (1977) and Stephen Jay Gould’s (1978) pluralistic viewpoints sparked the anti-adaptationist movement within evolutionary sciences. Gould and Lewontin championed the notion that evolutionary scholars and scientists, instead of crafting plausible evolutionary explanations, often provide us with mere just-so stories. On the other hand, it was Gould himself (1989) as well as other historically-minded scholars who have argued that due to the nature of the subject-matter, i.e., historical events, evolutionary scientists must inevitably employ narratives as explanatory devices (see Beatty & Carrera 2011; Currie & Sterelny 2017).

While my intention is not to directly challenge adaptationism, I attempt to demonstrate that plausible narrative explanations can be, in principle, successfully distinguished from just-so stories on rational grounds. The monograph by Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber The Enigma of Reason (2017), particularly the adaptive explanation they submit, serves me as a case study for evaluating evolutionary and/or adaptive explanations of the origin of individual phenotypes.

The main goal of this paper is to defend more pluralistic and methodologically robust historical analyses of human evolution. Consequently, to oppose the view that narratives qua explanations imply epistemological nihilism and/or an “anything goes” principle in the endeavour to grasp human (evolutionary) history (cf. forthcoming in 2019).

I conclude by contrasting plausible narrative explanations with just-so stories: I diagnose that (a) just-so stories are a subset of a set of implausible narrative explanations 1 ; (b) just-so storytelling stems from a variety of adaptationist biases; (c) Gould’s and Lewontin’s critique of adaptationism is a useful tool for evaluating evolutionary and/or adaptive accounts for all scientists and scholars implementing evolutionary nomenclature into their own disciplines; (d) the term “just-so story” ought to be reserved for implausible narrative explanations of evolutionary phenomena in order to contrast them with plausible functional, adaptive or non-adaptive evolutionary accounts.
Michal Hubálek (University of Hradec Králové, Czech Republic)
I am a Ph.D. candidate at UHK in the Czech Republic. I work at the intersection of philosophy of science, philosophy of biology and philosophy of history, with a focus on how the epistemological and methodological problems of (S)ience affect the traditional philosophical problems. Currently, I participate in two projects: 1) Internal UHK grant concerning a narrative form of explanation within evolutionary sciences, 2) Adolf Portmann: a pioneer of the eidetic and semiotic approach in the philosophy of the life sciences (Czech Science Foundation)
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Source of Reality/Causal Capacity: Outside of the Priority Chain?

Savvas Ioannou

I will consider two views: metaphysical foundationalism (there are fundamental entities) and metaphysical infinitism (there are infinite chains of ontological dependence). I will talk about an argument for the existence of a fundamental level. There is a foundationalist intuition that there must be a source of reality (Schaffer, 2009, 2010, 2016) or causal capacity (Trogdon, 2017) because a grounded entity inherits its reality or causal capacity from its ground. For Schaffer (2016, p.95), “a regress counts as vicious if and only if there is an endless chain of dependency with transference of the relevant status”. This sort of transference leads to the need for a source. In the grounding case, there is such a transference of reality: the grounded entity exists in virtue of its grounds. “That is why a source of reality is needed, in order for there to be anything to transfer” (p.96).

I find this argument unpersuasive as the source of reality or causal capacity of an infinite chain can be the cause of it. Consider the causal
inheritance premise that was accepted by Trogdon. "The causal inheritance premise: necessarily, if A is nonfundamental and has causal capacity then A inherits its causal capacity from whatever fully grounds it" (Trogdon, 2018, p.192).

I do not think that it is necessary that A inherits its causal capacity from whatever fully grounds it. Instead, I believe that the following conditional is true: if A is nonfundamental and has causal capacity then A inherits its causal capacity from its cause or its full ground. This conditional also satisfies the foundationalist intuition that there must be a source of reality or causal capacity. The cause of A (B) can be its source, and the explanation of why A is real and has a certain causal capacity can end there.

The reality or causal capacity of a grounded object can be metaphysically explained by its full ground. But I believe that it can also be metaphysically explained by its cause. These are two different explanations and I don’t think that the grounding explanation is necessarily needed. One of them is sufficient to explain everything about the reality or causal capacity of a grounded object while avoiding infinite regress. I will argue that if we have a causal explanation in hand, there is no need for an additional grounding explanation in terms of a fundamental entity.

Bibliography


Do we need metaphysics of words?

Antonina Jamrozik & Zuzanna Juślińska

Kaplan’s paper “Words” (1990) has sparked a debate, recently revived, about the metaphysical status of words. A number of authors (cf. McCulloch 1991, Cappelen 1999, Hawthorne & Lepore 2011, Kaplan 2011, Bromberger 2011, Imrak 2018) have thought this debate and the questions it concerns, namely (1) What are words? and (2) How are word individuated? to be both novel and important. Their importance is stressed by emphasising the fact that a word, despite being a concept commonly used in ordinary discourse as well as in linguistic and philosophy of language, has rarely been subject to a deepened philosophical analysis on its own.

In our talk we would like to examine the question whether it is really the case that metaphysics of words is a legitimate and important philosophical inquiry. We suspect a negative answer – although there might be some interesting things to say about the metaphysical status of words, most of the debate that has been going on so far mirrors already existing debates in metasemantics, pragmatics and semiotics. We argue that this is not due to parallels between those domains but to the fact that the questions present in the debate about the metaphysics of words is in fact reducible to the abovementioned ones. In the first
part of our talk we are going to analyse the common points between different stances in metaphysics of words and (1) the interpretationism-productivism debate in metasemantics (2) the problem of “what is said” in Gricean framework (3) the issue of conventional nature of signs in semiotics.

In the second part we will look at the question whether one can defend the enterprise of metaphysical analysis of words by taking it to be part of the domain of philosophy of science – more specifically, philosophy of linguistics. On the face of it, when one needs not concern themself with the common conception of the word and the – often contradictory – intuitions about its usage it seems easier to distinguish the object of one’s enterprise. However, we want to point out that in the case of linguistics it is not the case – it is far from clear what linguists take to be a word, yet the inventory of concepts they propose to describe language seems sufficient for the tasks at hand. So, while metaphysics of lexemes, phonemes or morphemes could all in theory be taken to be important parts of philosophy of linguistics, metaphysics of words cannot.

Section: Philosophy of Language  
Language: English  
Chair: Eduardo Pérez-Navarro  
Date: 15:20-15:50, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)  
Location: SR 1.006

Antonina Jamrozik (University of Warsaw, Poland)  
Antonina Jamrozik is a MA student at University of Warsaw where she studies Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Her BA concerned the relation between Holistic Semantics and the Principle of Compositionality. At the moment she is most interested in dynamic accounts of language and knowledge.  
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Zuzanna Jusińska (University of Warsaw, Warsaw)  
Zuzanna Jusińska is currently enrolled in a MA program in the College of Interdepartmental Studies in the Humanities at the University
of Warsaw where they study philosophy and gender studies. Jusińska graduated two BA programs, one in Philosophy at the University of Warsaw where their bachelor thesis was “Semantic and Pragmatic Analysis of Expressions with Grammatical Gender”, second in Choreography and Dance Techniques where their bachelor thesis was “Dance as Language: Meaning and Communication”. Jusińska’s long term goal is to contribute to the development of queer and feminist philosophy of language and analytic feminist philosophy.
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Seeing Moral Action Through Theoria in Aristotle’s Account of Happiness: The Philosophical Review and Classical Philology

Janset Özün Çetinkaya

There is a famous problem that Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), presents two conceptions of the good life that seem incompatible; one is the life of intellectual contemplation, focused on theoria, and another is the life of practical activity, focused on practical wisdom (phronesis). The broadest interpretative question here is whether Aristotle is inconsistent in giving two accounts of happiness given that a certain set of conceptual criteria of happiness he develops in the first book of NE cannot be applied to both forms of happiness. In this paper I do not aim to solve this intractable problem but I propose a new reading regarding the concept of theoria with regard to the two conceptions of the good life. My proposal is that theoria functions different within intellectual and practical pursuits, in a way that might promise a resolution of the seeming tension between the life of intellectual contemplation and practical activity.

My main argument centres around the claim that the process of theoria in the intellectual and morally virtuous activity differs in kind. Drawing on the etymological meaning of theoria and some passages in NE, e.g., 1139a6-9, 1140a24-27, and 1140b6-8 the conception of theoria will be defined as a deliberative process by which an agent theorises not only necessary and eternal facts but also contingent state of affairs. Based on the elements and stages of practical syllogism, the process of morally virtuous activity will be identified as an activity that is primarily (but not exclusively) based on the activation of the first principles.
(arche) of the particular moral action with regard to the correct reason (orthos logos). This conclusion will be reinforced by Irwin’s interpretation of practical reason (phronesis) and Roochnik’s exposition of the concept of theoria with regard to morally virtuous activity.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Gregor Greslehner
Date: 11:20-11:50, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005

Janet Özün Çetinkaya (University of Nottingham, United Kingdom)
I am a first year PhD student in Philosophy at the University of Nottingham. I completed my BA in Philosophy at Pamukkale University. I wrote a thesis called "Understanding Space-Time: Newton vs Einstein". I earned my MA in Philosophy at Dokuz Eylul University with a thesis, "Science and Utopia in Francis Bacon". After having decided to work on ancient ethical theories, mainly Aristotle’s ethics, I enrolled in another master’s degree programme. In 2017, I received my MLitt degree at the University of St Andrews with a thesis, “Aristotle’s Account of Happiness and Luck”. In April 2018, I joined the PhD programme at the University in Nottingham. My PhD research project is on Aristotle’s view of happiness. My aim is to develop a new reading of Aristotle’s conception of happiness. In doing so, I’m hoping to bring a new perspective to the discussion between exclusive and inclusive interpretation of happiness. Apart from doing philosophy, I give ballet classes to kids with the aim of contributing to their physical strength and wellbeing.
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The value of predictions for criminal cases: on inference to the best explanation and predictivism

Hylke Jellema

That predictions play a key role in the assessment of scientific explanations, such as models and theories, is uncontroversial. However, many philosophers of science also defend the more controversial position of predictivism. This is the thesis that when a scientific explanation is confirmed by a successful prediction, it receives more confirmation from this than if the same fact had been accommodated – where the explanation was built to fit that fact.

In this paper I defend predictivism in the context of criminal cases. Like in science, assessing the truthfulness of explanations is a key part of criminal trials. These explanations come in the form of the stories that the prosecution and/or the defense construct to explain the evidence in the case. Such stories also yield predictions. I argue that when a story is confirmed by a successful prediction, this often gives us an additional reason to infer the truth of that story through a process called inference to the best explanation. A story that accommodates typically does not receive the same benefit.

I distinguish two kinds of stories and argue in favor of predictivism for both. Some stories are built mainly around the testimony of a witness or defendant. Successful prediction gives us a reason to believe that the person who tells the story is credible and reliable. Other stories are constructed through a (police) investigation. Building on the work of Peter Lipton I argue that a successful prediction made by a story of this kind is evidence investigators did not “fudge” the explanation and that the explanation is not based on a biased or misleading set of evidence. I explain the benefits of prediction for both kinds of stories using a real criminal case.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Gregor Greslehner
Date: 16:00-16:30, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.005
Hylke Jellema (University of Groningen, The Netherlands)

Hylke Jellema is a PhD student at the University of Groningen, Faculty of Law. His research focuses on how to combine Bayesian and explanation-based approaches to criminal evidence.

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Counterexample to (the most charitable reading of) Influence Theory of Causation

Milan Jovanović

After abandoning his counterfactual analysis of causation, David Lewis had proposed a theory that defines causation in terms of influence (Lewis 2004). That theory, Influence theory of causation (ITC), has been heavily criticised and there are more than a few counterexamples (CEs) offered against it (e.g. Schaffer 2001, Bigaj 2012). However, since the central notion of the theory – the notion of influence – is defined in a complex way and by using vague qualifications (namely: “a substantial range of not-too-distant alterations”), there is a valid concern about whether the theory itself is committed to the implicit assumptions of the given CEs. The aim of my talk is to offer a CE to ITC which avoids excessive and controversial commitments and which, instead, rests upon a (probably: extremely) charitable reading of the theory. I will start by analysing the vagueness within the definition of influence, and by pointing out what are the desiderata for its resolution. Then, I will propose a “context-sensitive threshold” reading of the influence definition. After that, I will turn to the re-evaluation of some proposed CEs to ITC, with respect to this proposed interpretation of ITC. I will there argue that specific resolutions of vagueness, presupposed by these CEs, are not easy to justify, which in turn affects the plausibility of the given CEs. Finally, I will introduce new CE, which – as I shall argue – avoids the problems of those previously mentioned. Moreover, since it does not depend on some potentially controversial reading of the theory (one that ITC defender might not feel committed to), I consider this new CE to be more plausible and more diagnostically relevant (as an argument against ITC).
Gendered Expressions and Philosophy of Language

Zuzanna Jusińska

The goal of this paper is a philosophical analysis of utterances in which grammatically gendered expressions occur. Grammatical gender is a noun class system which divides nouns into two or three classes - feminine, masculine and neuter - but it also manifests itself in other parts of speech whose forms have to be in agreement with the gender of the noun they refer to. Grammatical gender of nouns designating people and other animals is supposed to correspond to sex/gender of the referent while in the case of inanimate nouns the grammatical gender is conventional and depends rather on the formal qualities of the noun than semantic ones. Using a grammatically gendered language the information about one’s sex/gender occurs in almost every utterance – even if the information about someone’s gender is not what we want to communicate, the language we speak forces us to do so.

I analyze utterances in which grammatically gendered expressions occur within theoretical frameworks of J.L. Austin and H.P. Grice.
Within Grice’s framework the analysis shows that often information about someone’s gender being a part of what is said results in unintended conversational implicatures such as that information about one’s sex/gender is relevant in every context. Within Austin’s framework it shows that the occurrence of these expressions has consequences at locutionary (change of content), illocutionary (performing an act of gendering a person as male or female), and perlocutionary (imposing obligatory gender binary) levels of a speech act. I present a few commonsensical arguments against the outcome of this analysis and propose a modified approach based on the notions of presupposition and background which is well-suited not only for describing oppressive consequences of grammatically gendered language such as the reinforcement of the belief that one’s sex/gender is relevant in every situation and the reinforcement of the obligatory gender binary which is discriminatory against intersex, non-binary and genderqueer people but also for modeling possible alternative and emancipatory linguistic practices which aim for more inclusive, feminist, pro LGBTQIA+ outcome.

Zuzanna Jusińska (University of Warsaw, Polska)
Zuzanna Jusińska is currently enrolled in a MA program in the College of Interdepartmental Studies in the Humanities at the University of Warsaw where they study philosophy and gender studies. Jusińska graduated two BA programs, one in Philosophy at the University of Warsaw where their bachelor thesis was “Semantic and Pragmatic Analysis of Expressions with Grammatical Gender”, second in Choreography and Dance Techniques where their bachelor thesis was “Dance as Language: Meaning and Communication”. Jusińska’s long term goal is to contribute to the development of queer and feminist philosophy of language and analytic feminist philosophy.
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What Are Epistemic Modals Relative to?

Denis Kazankov

Epistemic modals are expressions that quantify over possibilities about how the actual world is that are compatible with someone’s information about it. There is a long-lasting disagreement among philosophers about the semantics of these expressions. For instance, the sentence ‘it might rain’ is taken to say that, as far as someone knows (relative to someone’s knowledge), it is possible that it will rain. The disagreement then surrounds the question of whose knowledge is relevant in this instance (e.g. the speaker’s knowledge, the assessor’s knowledge, knowledge of the participants in the conversation). Nevertheless, in the background of this disagreement, there is a tacit agreement that epistemic modals are expressions referring to epistemic possibilities relativised to someone’s knowledge. In my talk, I will throw doubt on this view and defend instead the understanding-relative account of epistemic modals. Firstly, I will argue that, because of being an inferentially structured and non-factive attitude that comes in degrees, understanding can help us in resolving such issues as the translatability of evidential epistemic modals in the languages other than English, unreliable claims about epistemic possibilities or the problem of ignorance (Dietz, 2008). Upon that, I will attempt to show that the understanding-relative analysis deserves more attention also because it re-frames the problems faced by the two dominant semantic approaches to epistemic modals (standard contextualism and relativism). On the one hand, I will conclude that the analysis creates problems for group contextualism (a type of standard contextualism that is immune to the objection from rejection and retraction) because of the inscrutability of collective understanding as a sensible epistemic attitude. On the other hand, I will argue that the analysis seems to be useful in dealing with the problems related to relativism.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Guido Tana
Date: 10:00-10:30, 19 September 2019 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002
Denis Kazankov (University of Leeds (BA)/University of Oxford (BPhil), Slovakia)
Denis Kazankov has recently earned his BA at the University of Leeds. In the academic year 2019/2020, he is starting the BPhil in Philosophy at the University of Oxford. His research interests are mostly Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Logic and Meta-ethics. 
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Thomas Reid’s missing hand argument

Lukas Lang

Many Reid-scholars take Reid to be directly relevant to current epistemological debates. I think this is a mistake. To better illustrate my thesis, I will frame it as an argument against Greco (2002). In his work, Greco attempts to show that G.E. Moore’s Hand-Argument is a legitimate response to the sceptic, because it adopts epistemological and methodological principles from Thomas Reid (and because these principles of Reid are true). My response to Greco has a critical and a constructive part. The critical point consists in the observation that, given the assumption that Reid does in fact holds these principles, it is puzzling that he himself never confronted the sceptic with such a powerful and easy refutation of the sceptic’s position. Furthermore, a close reading of the relevant passages reveals that Reid did not hold the principles in question. In the constructive part, I will reconstruct Reid’s answer to the sceptic based on the aforementioned results and in a way that is consistent with the relevant passages and his broader philosophy. The conclusion is that Greco’s reconstruction of Moore’s argument, even if it might work as a response to the sceptic, is not Reid’s response to the sceptic. I will end by suggesting that Reid’s response to the sceptic is more promising than Moore’s or Greco’s response.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Alessandro Cecconi
Date: 15:20-15:50, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005
Lukas Lang (University of Hamburg, Germany)
I'm a PhD student and research associate at the University of Hamburg. My thesis explores the nature of common sense in Thomas Reid's philosophy. More general, I'm interested in the interplay between epistemology and the various subdisciplines of philosophy.
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Multiplying Meanings: Lexicalization and Semantic Atomism

Kamil Lemanek

Where meaning is concerned, atomism presents a promising picture. It bolsters compositionality, purports to offer primitive lexical meanings, and wraps it in a plausible story about where they come from. At the same time, chief proponents like Fodor and Lepore have lodged influential arguments against its competitors, reiterating the importance of compositionality and issues with communication against holism and molecularism. Despite that, it seems to me that there is a subtle theoretical fault running through their position.

Atomism rightly makes room for productivity. Its strong form of compositionality straightforwardly facilitates the idea that we can create and understand an indefinite number of unique sentences on the basis of a finitely stateable set of rules and a finite lexicon. As far as atomism is concerned, lexical items correspond to individual primitive concepts, which play the role of lexical meanings. Given that the lexicon of any particular natural language is finite, then at any given moment there is a finite set of meanings in play in that language. The crucial bit is, of course, that natural languages change. Through lexicalization, new words appear and old words are phased out. And presumably, lexicalization is not a finite process; it can introduce an indefinite number of possible meanings into the existing lexicon.

The productivity that semantic atomism secures for complex expressions can be made a source of reliable descriptions that can be used to “locate” possible meanings – that is, descriptions that convey concepts that are not captured in the current lexicon. Descriptions can be used to address individuating properties without taking them to be definitions (without them being constitutive) and without forfeiting primitivity.
Descriptive coordinates can be put together for an indefinite number of possible meanings within the framework of atomism. Such meanings can be made increasingly fine-grained. Given that atomism has weak constraints on the epistemic position of speakers, fielding such an immense set of possible meanings raises the question of whether we can reliably interpret meanings to begin with – which effectively turns a common argument from stability and communication against holism back against atomism.

Kamil Lemanek (University of Warsaw, Poland)
I am a Polish-American doctoral student at the University of Warsaw in Poland. I was born and raised in Chicago. After finishing high school, I moved to Poland to attend university. The title of my dissertation is “On Meaning in the Context of Possibility and Infinity.” My interests in philosophy focus mainly on language and philosophy of mind.
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Strong Pluralism and Haecceitism

Karol Lenart & Artur Szachniewicz

According to some, permanent coincidence is sufficient for identity (see Noonan 2015). However, strong pluralism rejects the sufficiency of permanent coincidence for identity. The regular rationale for strong pluralism is that the coincidents are modally individuated. However, the position has been contested precisely on the grounds that strong pluralism cannot account for the exact physical duplicates’ having different persistence conditions or modal properties (Olson 1998: 102; Noonan 2015: 1082-83). The problem of providing the grounds for the difference in modal properties is deemed to critically undermine the plausibility of strong pluralism.
In our presentation we aim to provide metaphysical motivations for strong pluralism. However, we do not attempt it via the grounding problem (see Bennett 2004). We instead defend pluralism offering a haecceitic interpretation of it, according to which strong pluralism should be read as a position that is committed to the existence of primitive individuals, i.e. the individuals that have their criteria of individuation independently of their qualitative profiles.

We do not aim at defending haecceitism. Instead, our aim is rather modest: we want to provide a different way by which the strong pluralist could supplement his view to make it more watertight. In order to achieve that we provide a map of different approaches towards metaphysical status of haecceities and show that strong pluralist has some options in order to motivate her claim.

Literature:


Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 15:20-15:50, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003

Karol Lenart (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
I am a PhD student and teaching assistant in the Department of Philosophy at Jagiellonian University in Krakow. The main field of my interest is analytic metaphysics, especially issues concerning possible worlds, modalities and individuation. Currently I work on a Lewisian principle of recombination, humanism and quidditism.
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Artur Szachniewicz (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
Artur Szachniewicz is a third year PhD student from the Philosophy Department of Jagiellonian University, Krakow. His interest lie within the metaphysics of ordinary objects and panpsychistic metaphysics.
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The Emergence of Logical Pluralism: A Closer Look at the Philosophy of Hans Hahn

Alexander Linsbichler

Outlines of the history or philosophy of logical empiricism mention Hans Hahn in passing, if at all. He is usually characterized as a typical proponent of the Vienna Circle, embracing both empiricism and modern logic, defending logicism, and rejecting synthetic judgements a priori.

However, by considering archival material and the specific audience of his few philosophical writings, this paper argues that a closer look at Hahn’s philosophy reveals hitherto underappreciated peculiarities.

We argue that (1) by adapting Russell’s logicism and Wittgenstein’s nominalism, Hahn develops his own specific variant of logicism, (2) Hahn consistently defends a principle of tolerance and logical pluralism prior to Carnap and Menger, and (3) contrary to first impressions, Hahn’s logical pluralism is compatible with his endorsement of Occam’s Razor.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Raimund Pils
Date: 10:00-10:30, 19 September 2019 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005

Alexander Linsbichler (University of Vienna, Austria)
Alexander is a fellow at the DK “The Sciences in Historical, Philosophical and Cultural Contexts” and a lecturer at the Department of Economics (University of Vienna). He has worked as a guest researcher at the University of Manchester, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, and Duke University. Besides his current research project on the
Fake News: A Logical Analysis of their Spreading

Filippo Riscica Lizzio & Vita Saitta

Fake news got the headlines both in the academic community (see Lazer et al. (2018)) and in the mainstream media. However, a logical analysis of this phenomenon is until now absent.

The aim of our work is to fill in this gap. An informal characterization of fake news can be found in Lazer et al. (2018, p. 1094), where they are defined as “fabricated information that mimics news media in content form but not in organizational process or intent”. We start our analysis by providing a model that aims to capture the spreading of fake news. This part of the work is based on recent literature on the spreading of opinion, viruses and the like, such as Baltag et al. (2018) and Christoff (2016), and it is based on the formal treatment of social networks through graph theory, as in Easley & Kleinberg (2010).

We provide a model where two groups of agents, the spreaders and the receivers, interact. Fake news, as said, mimics the news. Intuitively, this is done by the spreaders having an agenda that settles the news that they will spread. We capture that by defining a subset of the spreaders indexed by a set of formulas.

The receivers get the news but are sensible to their sources: they trust some spreaders but not others. This feature is captured by a function that settles which level of trust each receiver assigns to each spreader. Moreover, receivers can have criteria to accept the news. For example, only news that are announced by a good number of trusted spreaders are adopted. We model that through a threshold function that assigns to each receiver a threshold over which the news is accepted.

With this setting, we capture the spreading of fake news within a network of receivers that do not act as news-spreaders themselves. In order to capture this other behaviour, we define a function that, given an agent in the model, assigns a level of trust to each other agent, be
it a spreader or a receiver. In that way, the spreading of the fake news becomes not only sensible to the quality of the source, but also on the behaviour of the other agents in the network. Moreover, we show that in that setting knowledge of the networks’ structure plays a crucial role in the spreading of news.

Our work connects the phenomenon, as well its analysis, with analogous works in formal epistemology and economics concerning the spreading of opinions, behaviours, and even diseases.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Madelaine Angelova-Elchinova
Date: 12:00-12:30, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002

Filippo Riscica Lizzio (ILLC, University of Amsterdam, Italy)
I was born in Catania, where I studied Philosophy as an undergraduated. I graduated there in 2015 with a dissertation about the debate concerning the analytic synthetic distinction. I then studied philosophy as a graduate student at the University of Bologna. There I specialized in philosophy of language and logic. While at the University of Bologna, I was an Erasmus student at the University of Helsinki, where I studied modal logic and metaphysics, and a visiting student that the University of Nottingham, where I studied metaphysics. I am currently a Logic Year student at the ILLC, University of Amsterdam, where I am studying mainly modal logic and formal epistemology.
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Vita Saitta (University of Turin & ILLC, University of Amsterdam, Italy)
I studied Philosophy in Milan at the Catholic University of Sacred Heart, where I obtained my BA with a dissertation concerning paraconsistent logics and by MA with a dissertation concerning logical pluralism. I am now a PhD student at the FINO Northwestern Italian Philosophy
Bayesianism aims to give a general normative account of reasoning by giving rationality constraints for credences, i.e. for how strong we believe in propositions. Its fundamental tenet is a coherence norm called Probabilism. This norm says that, in order to be epistemically rational, our credences need to be probabilistic, i.e. they need to satisfy the Kolmogorov axioms for probability.

One recent promising strategy to argue for Probabilism is given in accuracy-first arguments. The core claim is that truth is the only epistemic goal. A mathematical characterization of distance from truth is given. It is then shown via a theorem that probabilistic credences are systematically closer to the truth than non-probabilistic credences.

Richard Pettigrew, in his wonderfully perspicuous and comprehensive 2016 book “Accuracy and the Laws of Credence”, surveys all previous accuracy-first arguments for Probabilism and argues persuasively that each of them fails. He then presents his own proposal. I will argue that it fails as well. Moreover, the reason why it fails constitutes a challenge for future accuracy-first arguments.

Pettigrew’s theorem rests almost exclusively on Decomposition, the claim that distance from truth decomposes linearly into two parts. First, distance from being well-calibrated, where a credence function is well-calibrated if 80 percent of the propositions believed to degree 0.8 are true, and so forth. Second, distance between being well calibrated and truth.

I show that Pettigrew’s justification for Decomposition ultimately rests on an alleged intuition that in certain ceteris paribus situations, closeness to being well calibrated correlates with closeness to truth. I argue that there is no such intuition. In fact, I consider a specific kind of example for these ceteris paribus situations in which there is an intuition
against such a correlation. Basically, this intuition is that moving a credence away from the truth should not be punished harder in terms of accuracy than moving towards it is rewarded. Moreover, I show that this intuition conflicts with the so-called Brier score, a popular measure for distance from truth. I argue that this constitutes a challenge for future accuracy-first arguments.

Richard C. Lohse (University of Konstanz, Germany)
Richard Lohse received a bachelor’s degree in physics in 2015 and a master’s degree in philosophy in 2018, both at the University of Konstanz. He is interested in all subdisciplines of analytic philosophy, but focuses on epistemology.
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Towards a middle-ground of agency for artificial intelligence

Louis Longin

With the emergence of complex artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced robotics, AI has been applied in various industries from automotive to healthcare and robotics. AI is now widely used to aid human decision making in medical diagnostics, to facilitate autonomous driving and to analyse complex data structures. Modern robotic AI-systems such as Joyforall’s robotic Companion Pet or Hanson Robotics’ Sophia are even often treated by humans as interactive agents and are expected to behave as such. This understanding of wide-spread agency is supported by rational choice theory and most of cognitive science. However, the philosophical tradition based on Anscombe and Davidson denies any attribution of agency to computational systems. The problem of whether to conceive complex AI systems
as agents proper represent the topic of this paper. In particular, I will examine the topic of AI agency from two different standpoints: agency in the narrow sense in terms of Davidson’s intentional action and agency in the broad sense in terms of norm-based interaction as commonly understood. I will show that agency in the narrow sense defines agency as the capacity to perform intentional actions which refers to a specific organisation of internal mental states and hence is unachievable for current AI systems. Agency in the broad sense, on the other hand, captures a broad range of intuitions about attributing agency to non-human systems and can function as a minimal theory of agency. After comparing each conception of agency, I will argue that neither conception alone can comprehensively address the various facets of AI agency. Therefore, I finally propose a middle ground between both theories which introduces an additional criterion of consistent intentionality-ascription based on Dennett’s intentional stance. I will conclude that this middle ground provides a robust and comprehensive conception of AI agency.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Ruben Noorloos
Date: 15:20-15:50, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007

Louis Longin (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich, Germany)
I am a final-year Masters student in Philosophy at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich. I have specialised on analysing the philosophical implications of artificial intelligence (AI) such as moral responsibility and agency. During my upcoming master thesis, I seek to develop a comprehensive, gradual account of AI agency which unifies the philosophical demands for higher cognitive capacities with the common intuition of agents as simple interactive systems.
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On Time Travel and Free Will: Why the compatibilism-incompatibilism debate might not be relevant after all

Marco Marabello

In this paper, I show that a dispositional account of free will not only must be accepted by compatibilists but also by incompatibilists.

A virtue of a dispositional account of free will is that it is, arguably, able to cope with the objection raised against compatibilism by means of the consequence argument. However, even the incompatibilist might incur in the same problem. Time travel might throw some light on the problem of the incompatibilist. In a universe where time travel is possible, the concept of determinism, under its standard definition, is threatened. For there is no possibility that from an earlier state of the world together with the laws of nature we can deduce a later state of the world where time travel will occur. Thus, the arrival of a time traveler, I submit, is an indeterministic process. At this stage, the incompatibilist could be tempted to celebrate because if time travel is physically possible, and it might well be the case, then determinism is false and free will would be saved. Nevertheless, further reflection shows that the naïve incompatibilist is wrong. The infamous grandfather paradox shows us that time travel constrains our possibilities too. Therefore, if time travel is physically possible, then determinism is false but still, we would not have alternate possibilities. The incompatibilist has thus two possibilities: either being a skeptic about free will or endorse something has a dispositional account of free will. If she takes the latter option, then she will end up with the very same notion of free will that the compatibilist advocates. But if this is the case, why caring about the compatibilist/incompatibilist distinction? If I am right, constraints on our alternate possibilities are in place whether or not determinism is the case. Therefore, the problems that compatibilist and incompatibilist face are the same and we do not need any such distinction, and all we need is a notion of free will capable to cope with those constraints, as the dispositional one is. Thus, my aim is to show that one and the same notion of free will can and, indeed, must be accepted by both the compatibilist and the incompatibilist. In doing so, I hope to show that
the distinction between incompatibilism and compatibilism is not a relevant one and that the two opposite stances incur in the same problems and thus they have the same solution.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: André Ferreira
Date: 10:40-11:10, 19 September 2019 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003

Marco Marabello (University of Italian Switzerland, Switzerland)
I am a philosophy graduate student at the master in philosophy of the University of Italian Switzerland. I mainly work in analytic metaphysics, but I have interest also in the philosophy of science, especially physics. In the future I would like to work on the metaphysics of science. My next goal is to join a PhD program in analytic philosophy in Europe or anywhere around the globe. Before reaching Lugano and the Master in Philosophy at USI, I graduated from the University of Padua with a thesis on the metaphysics of possible worlds. During my bachelor I also did two periods abroad, one in Munich at the LMU, where I attended classes at the MCMP, and another one in the US at Boston University.
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Fatalism is not (just) a logico-semantic doctrine

Elton Marque

Inwagen defines fatalism as a thesis about the logical or conceptual necessity of everything that is performed by any agent. In the author’s words: Fatalism, as I shall use the term, is the thesis that it is a logical or conceptual truth that no one is able to act otherwise than he in fact does (Inwagen, 1986, p. 23). Taylor defines it as a thesis about the inevitability of all facts and events (Taylor, 2015, p. 42). Inwagen criticises Taylor’s definition, considering it inadequate. His reasons are especially connected with two senses of ‘inevitable’, that the fatalist might have in mind: a strong sense and a weak sense. In the strong sense, a state of affairs is inevitable when it
comes about regardless of what one might do. For instance, when my attitudes have no relevance or no causal connection with what happens to me; so that the states of affairs that become actual and what I myself do are totally independent. The weak sense corresponds to the idea that, if something is inevitable, and one has tried to avoid its coming about, by taking the attitudes one considers preventive, then it is necessary that one should take the wrong attitudes. In that case, ignorance on how to proceed would itself be inevitable in the strong sense, i.e., ignorance would be the case no matter what, without any possibility of it being avoided by me (Inwagen, 1986, p. 25). In this article, I will defend Taylor’s approach on what ‘fatalism’ means, address Inwagen’s notion and try to explain how we can understand the notion of inevitability.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: André Ferreira
Date: 10:00-10:30, 19 September 2019 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003

Elton Marques (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and Center of Philosophy of University of Lisbon, Brazil)
Elton mainly works on the metaphysics of time, relationalism, and substantivism. He has experience in philosophy of science and contemporary philosophy of time in general. As a PhD student at the University of Lisbon, he is working on a thesis on the relation between determinism and eternalism. He is a member of the international research group Lanoog and a full doctorate fellowship by Cnpq, Brasil.
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From mutual knowledge to relational knowledge

Jose Martinez

In this talk, I would criticize the notion of mutual knowledge in pragmatics. The main critic will be that mutual knowledge does not guarantee that a conversation must take place in order to guarantee of (mutual) knowledge. Case in point: How
does speaker A know that speaker B knows that p (and so on)? Even though mutual knowledge resignifies context as dynamic and cognitive, it holds the phenomenon as if it were solipsist: speaker A solely relies on his /her own mental states about his/her knowledge of speaker B cognitive-states (vices versa) without requiring a conversational intercourse with speaker B. Therefore, the question to be addressed is how this is possible at all and whether an early stage is required.

My proposal is that relational knowledge resolves this inconvenience. It builds up the bedrock for mutual knowledge and relies on conversational tools. What is with ‘relational knowledge’ meant? Provisional definition: interlocutors’ actual cognitive states fudge together in a conversation when being expressed by means of linguistic tools.

The main argument would run as follows: (i) interlocutors make utterances by means of linguistics tools (e.g. indexical expressions, audience design tools). (ii) Within conversations, the speaker makes an effort to help the hearer construct a coherent representation of the speaker’s contribution. (iii) Speaker uses additional tools so as to state as clearly as possible what he/she intended to mean, e.g. adjacency pairs, expansion and repair; and to figure out, what the actual cognitive state of the hearer is. (Here I will lead back to conversational analysis). These tools are interpreted as the place were both cognitive states meet and interrelate. (iv) Interlocutors reckon what the other knows in a conversation thanks to the aforementioned tools. Therefore, the speaker’s knowledge of hearer’s cognitive state (and vice versa) is gained by means of relating both bits of knowledge in a conversational transaction.

How does this avoid the problem ascribed to mutual knowledge? Since linguistic tools are employed as vehicles to point out what interlocutors’ cognitive states are, they create a “neutral” zone in a conversation were both participants become mutually aware of what the other knows. Thus, relational knowledge seems to avoid the problem of conversational solipsism.
Human dignity beyond Christian thought and Kantian philosophy: is there a scientific ground?

Szymon Mazurkiewicz

Human dignity is a crucial concept in many ethical systems as well as in law, especially in international and constitutional human rights law. It is said that it is foundation of human rights and whereas we know what human rights are, the nature, content and grounds of human dignity remain highly unclear. There are two main philosophical traditions discussing human dignity: Christian thought, especially Catholic, referring to Imago Dei concept and Kantian ethics claiming that every human possess human dignity due to being the only one ‘end in himself’ and being able to establish moral laws. Modern analytic philosophy tend to take advantage of Kantian ethics and along with analytic notion of the concept of person it developed the view that human dignity refers to human autonomy (Griffin 2008).

While Christian thought and Kantian ethics have constituted a large part of western thought in a few past centuries, so called “scientific world-view” seems to prevail as deep, subconscious and intuitive way of thinking about world for a contemporary man. It is also reflected in contemporary analytic philosophy by naturalistic program that would like to develop philosophy with very strong reference to natural sciences.

The aim of this paper is to propose scientific grounds for human dignity in accordance with analytic program of naturalization and contemporary analytic metaphysics. Conditions to be met for such potential grounds of human nature involve something worth or positively assessed that can be found in those natural sciences that deal with human nature. As to such natural sciences, I will take advantage of evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology, which claim that human nature is constituted by tendency to cooperate (Tomasello 2009), or in a different formulation, that the basic motive in human behaviour is limited
altruism and the basic manner of behavior is limited prudence (Załuski 2009). I will present and analyse those theses and argue that they constitute human nature in scientific approach. Then, I will argue that such a human nature can be a scientific ground for human dignity – it involves something positively assessed and lies on a more fundamental, scientific, level of reality than human dignity.

I will present those issues in two much broader philosophical frameworks of analytic philosophy: naturalism, especially methodological naturalism, and realism. As for the former, I will precisely define the concept of “nature” I use, which is nature as a set of dominant tendencies. As for the latter, I will employ relation of metaphysical grounding – a highly discussed among contemporary analytic metaphysicians relation of metaphysical determination. I will present how, by taking advantage of those frameworks, human nature can constitute the ground of human dignity. Lastly, I will demonstrate consequences of such a naturalized account of human dignity, especially that it can provide strong counterargument against the objection of western ethnocentrism towards contemporary philosophy of human rights.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Amit Pinsker
Date: 12:00-12:30, 19 September 2019 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004

Szymon Mazurkiewicz (Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland) PhD student in Law and MA student in philosophy on Jagiellonian University, Cracow working in the area of philosophy of law, especially analytic legal theory and philosophy of human rights. I focus on studying (meta)metaphysical interpretation of many legal theory claims.
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The Collapse of Logical Contextualism

Timo Meier

Following the publications of JC Beall and Greg Restall the position called 'logical pluralism' experienced a renaissance. The theory, crudely put, consists of two parts:

1. The core concept of validity is given by the Generalized Tarski Thesis (GTT) according to which “an argument is valid(x) if and only if, in every case(x) in which the premises are true, so is the conclusion”.

2. There are at least two admissible instances of case(x).

The most prominent objection to Beall & Restall’s logical pluralism is the collapse problem, which has been formulated by Priest (2001), Read (2006) and Keefe (2014). The question at its core is whether, given the acceptance of some set of premises A, one should accept the conclusion C. As GTT involves truth-preservation, any logic classifying the inference from A to C as valid guarantees that we cannot step from truth to untruth. Consequently, if any encompassed logic classifies the inference from A to C as valid, one should accept C, if one accepts A. This, in turn, implies that there is a single privileged consequence relation: any argument is valid simpliciter if and only if it is valid according to one of the encompassed logics. Logical Pluralism collapses.

Caret (2017) claims that the collapse problem can be overcome by adopting logical contextualism. Agreeing with Beall & Restall that the core of logical validity is given by GTT, Caret takes it that contexts choose deductive standards by which we judge the validity of arguments. The collapse problem, so Caret argues, is avoided as in each context only the logic that is selected for that context has any normative bearing.

I will argue that if no contextualism of truth is to be adopted, the collapse problem maintains its force for logical contextualism. Caret does not acknowledge the ground for the normativity of validity judgements, namely truth-preservation. As such, contextualism cannot escape collapse. Carets efforts to construe a logical contextualism, as I contend, are nonetheless fruitful as they point towards a direction logical pluralism should be understood.
Timo Meier (Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany)
Timo Meier is a PhD candidate at the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz. His research interest lie in the philosophy of logic and metaphysics. Following his master thesis about the logic of fiction, his PhD thesis revolves around the objectivity of logic with particular focus on logical pluralism.
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Normativity in the Concept of Disease
Julia Mirkin

In recent debates within philosophy of medicine there is an ongoing vibrant controversy on the concept of disease and how to classify statements such as ‘x is a disease’ or ‘S is ill’. Normativists emphasize that to claim a condition to be a disease is more than to state a physiological malfunction, but rather a harmful state that needs to be overcome. Accordingly proponents of this position regard normative evaluations of conditions as a constitutive part of the concept of disease and its attribution. Proponents of a naturalist approach argue that statements concerning whether something qualifies as disease or pathological condition, in spite of qualifying as pathological, can be reduced to mere descriptions of a physiological state. These descriptions are independent of individual or cultural judgements, i.e. of a purely objective manner.

In my talk I want to ask whether normativism or naturalism provide an adequate conceptual framework for the interpretation of statements within medical research and clinical diagnostics. Therefore I will present exemplary statements (e.g. definitions of disease entities, catalogues of criteria) and analyze which parts contain descriptive, normative or neutralizing elements. It will be shown that neither of the two provides
a viable approach. In this context I will discuss hybridism concepts of disease as an alternative both to normativism and naturalism, especially in the context of diagnosis and possibly following treatment demands.


Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Belak
Date: 19:00-19:30, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.005

Julia Mirkin (Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany) Julia Mirkin is a masters student at the Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf. She finished her B.A. 2018 with a major in Philosophy and a minor in Political Science. Her bachelor thesis was about “Value Neutrality, Social Responsibility and the Production of Disease”. She works as a student assistant and has conducted several tutorials on logic, philosophy of science and concepts of moral.

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Political Liberalism & The "Myth" of Anti-Perfectionism

Pascal Mowla

It could be said of the numerous, competing liberal theories which have been forwarded over the last century, that John Rawls' Political Liberalism has been, if not one of the most popular, certainly one of the most frequently debated. As part of the project of political liberalism, Rawls sought to set out an ideal conception of justice which should be, "so far as possible, independent of controversial philosophical and metaphysical doctrines". In forwarding this "purely political" liberalism, Rawls aimed to respond to some of the misapprehensions or criticisms that had followed since the publication of his seminal work, A Theory of Justice. In doing so, Rawls also aimed to address something which he deemed to be a major failure within the liberal tradition; that of not drawing a distinction between the political and the moral, and perfectionist and anti-perfectionist theories.

Here, liberal anti-perfectionism can be understood as the claim that it is impermissible for "the state to promote or discourage some activities, ideals, or ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value, or on the basis of other metaphysical claims". This claim is something to which many contemporary liberal theorists might aspire to in the assent for a political grounding of liberalism or state neutrality in the face of reasonable pluralism. However, I will be calling this anti-perfectionism claim into question by scrutinising the political liberal's attempt to bifurcate between the political and the moral in the way alluded to above, and ultimately, I will posit that political liberalism might unavoidably collapse into some kind of perfectionism at the level of higher-order moral values. A corollary of this analysis will be my suggestion that we would do well to understand the political-moral distinction within liberal theory by a matter of degree rather than kind, and that once we understand political liberalism as being perfectionist in certain respects, then we can abandon the "myth" of anti-perfectionist neutrality in lieu of refining the moral concepts underpinning such contemporary liberal theories.
Pascal Mowla (The London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom)

I am an aspiring political philosopher of British-Iranian descent currently living in London and engaging in temporary work before my return to academic study. After an untraditional entry into the subject, I completed a conversion MA in Philosophy with distinction at Birkbeck, University of London in 2018. During my time at Birkbeck, my independent research honed in on the conflict between the liberal state’s aim of providing a liberal education to all children and the cultural or religious groups who might conscientiously object to such an education. Since then, my areas of research interest within political philosophy and public policy have extended past multiculturalism, moral disagreement and tolerance to include; epistemic and distributive justice, procedural fairness and political epistemology.

My desire in attending to such philosophical problems has arisen out of my aspiration to seek practical solutions to the socio-political problems which challenge us today. In this sense, I take note of Bernard William’s statement that applied philosophy should perhaps aim at answering “what is the best form of society we can get to, starting from here?”, rather than cultivating ideal responses to the less constrained question “what is the best form of society?”. A corollary of this is my inclination to view my own study within Philosophy as continuous with political theory and policy, and I am now set to continue my philosophical development at The London School of Economics and Political Science come September 2019. Outside of academia I have worked with the Afghan and Central Asian Association as a voluntary Political Communications intern and I am also an active member of the Fabian society and contributing member of the Young Fabians.

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Normativity as a kind of conformity: Towards a naturalistic account of epistemic normativity.

Basil Müller

There seem to be things we ought not to believe and others we are permitted to believe. Belief is treated as a normative phenomenon both in everyday and academic discourse. At the same time, normativity can be seen as a threat to a naturalistic understanding of the world. Whilst naturalistic claims are of descriptive nature, norms are prescriptive. It is usually held that they cannot be reduced to statements of fact. This problem is also pertinent to the normativity of belief. How is such a phenomenon to be understood within a naturalist framework?

Sullivan-Bissett provides a naturalistic account of epistemic normativity. She claims that beliefs standard of correctness should be understood in relation to a first biological (etiological) function of belief-producing mechanisms, which is to produce true beliefs. Furthermore, Sullivan-Bissett’s account is error-theoretic: She argues that we mistake mere doxastic strategies to be categorical epistemic norms. I will call the mistake we commit the normative pull [NP]: The fact that we believe that or feel as though there are categorical epistemic norms we ought to follow. The disposition to form the NP is brought about by a second function belief-producing mechanisms serve: to effectively organize the individual.

In continuation of Sullivan-Bissett’s account, I draw attention to one of the belief-producing mechanisms which is responsible for bringing about the NP. I claim that normative conformity – a social-learning mechanism – brings about our beliefs in the existence and categorical validity of epistemic norms. Keeping with the evolutionary perspective, I answer questions about 1st the function and 2nd the phylogeny of our mistaken beliefs in epistemic normativity by means of normative conformity and in line with Sullivan-Bissett’s account.

Regarding the first question, I will argue that the function of normative conformity is to make individuals conform to adaptive behavior. For the epistemic case, this is doxastic behavior which fulfills the first proper function of belief-producing mechanisms.

For the second question, I will argue that the disposition to form the NP arises because of the importance of accurate beliefs of individuals.
for their respective social groups. The NP was needed because false beliefs were costly for the group and in turn also for the individual.

Section: Epistemology  
Language: English  
Chair: Max Timo Goetsch  
Date: 15:20-15:50, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)  
Location: HS E.002

Basil Müller (University of Zurich, Switzerland)  
I am a 25-year old master’s-student in philosophy from the University of Zurich. I received a bachelor’s degree in philosophy and history from the University of Basel in the summer of 2018. My philosophical interests lie mainly in the philosophy of mind, epistemology and the intersections of the two fields.  
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A Fictionalist Rule Consequentialism: Is It Possible?

Beşir Özgür Nayir

Among moral philosophers of late 20th and early 21st centuries like David Copp and Brad Hooker it is a commonly affirmed idea that a moral code is to be desired by the agent as a socially enforced and generally subscribed moral rule. This requirement seems to be acceptable and intuitively admissible for a moral consequentialist. However, it has several dimensions for each there will be at least one fundamental question to be answered. Some aspects of it are already held before. However, there is one philosophically crucial aspect that is not clear enough.

Most versions of consequentialism lay upon a form of moral realism. Most of them assume that there are moral facts. They just differ on whatness of those facts, as well as ways of attaining them. For example, for an act utilitarian there is a moral fact for an individual act a under certain circumstances at a given time. For an agent A given all the related information $d$ at a certain time $t$ there is a moral fact that an act $a$ participates. Act utilitarians are trying to find the best way to
approximate that very fact with limited information. Rule utilitarians make the same assumption when they put a moral rule regarding types of actions: they necessarily assume that there is at least one moral fact related to that type of action and a well formed moral rule will approximate that fact.

What I claim is that an anti-realist non-utilitarian moral consequentialism is possible, and even better. Holding on to the idea that a moral code shall be desired to be socially enforced and generally subscribed is way easier if one accepts that there are no moral facts. In this paper I appeal to the idea that there are no moral facts, and I claim that a fictionalist consequentialism that is grounded upon agents’ assumed will to make the world “better” should be a rule-oriented non-utilitarianism. At the end, this project is expected to be (1) less vulnerable to usual criticisms made for consequentialism, and (2) more functional than its alternatives. I will highlight usefulness and applicability as necessary conditions for a moral theory. I will especially refer to several ethicists and metaethicists like Brad Hooker, David Copp, and Daniel Nolan to bridge moral fictionalism and rule consequentialism.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Damiano Ranzenigo
Date: 15:20-15:50, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.004

Beşir Özgür Nayir (Boğaziçi University, Turkey)
I was born and raised in Istanbul. My main area of interest is Moral Philosophy with a special interest in Consequentialism. I conduct my studies with a great effort not to exclude metaethical discussions. I always believed that metaethical and ethical discussions as well as problems dealt by applied ethicists are compound. I wrote my Master’s thesis on the question of committing suicide in applied ethics with a great interest on moral-theoretical foundation of my investigation. I did present an original approach both for moral consequentialism and its application to the problem of committing suicide. Right now I am doing PhD in Philosophy and employed as a full-time teaching assistant in Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey.
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Ancient Analytics: the ontology of state in Aristotle’s philosophy

Paweł Neumann-Karpiński

While studying Aristotle’s Politics one might come to conclusion, that the state is a natural entity, existing separately from other beings, with accordance to its own nature. But even if Aristotle himself explicitly said that states “exist by nature” (I.2.1253a2), he also describes lawgiver – man (or men) who constitutes state’s form – as a craftsman, and thus compares states to products of art (e.g. VII.4.1325b40-1326a5).

But are those two descriptions necessarily contradicting? During my presentation I will argue, that Aristotle’s state can be interpreted as artefact of practical reason which serves as mean to actualize human nature. I will try to refer to Aristotelian state as a way of being a human instead of an ontological separate entity. Since according to Aristotle people are naturally political beings, I will claim that living in a state is the right way of being a human, a proper mean to an ultimate end to which our nature leads – the goal described in Nicomachean Ethics as eudaimonia, happiness (I.1095a15-25). As a result, I will argue for the recognition of Aristotle’s politics as an extension of his anthropology and I will seek for mentioned earlier “nature by which states exist” in the nature of human beings.

In my analysis I will consider Aristotle’s Politics and Nicomachean Ethics together with some of modern analysis of Aristotle’s political theory (D. Keyt, F. Miller). The study will be completed by references to De Anima and Metaphysics, which will supplement its ontological and anthropological framework. As a result I will try to answer the question whether the Aristotelian state should exist like other beings – according to its own nature – or does it only serve to realize the nature of men, as a specific for human beings modus of living?
A Problem About Intentionality for Dual-Aspect Monism

Ruben Noorloos

Dual-aspect monism is the view that while reality is fundamentally one, it nevertheless presents itself under two “aspects,” one experiential and the other physical, both of which are equally fundamental and mutually irreducible. So pain, for example, while a single phenomenon, nevertheless can present itself to us both in its felt aspect and in a neurological one (as C-fiber firing). Dual-aspect monism has recently seen some new defenses, in line with the broader shift in philosophy of mind away from dualism and physicalism towards panpsychism and related positions (see, e.g., Atlanspacher, 2012; Benovsky, 2016; 2019; Skrbina, 2009; 2014).

A crucial challenge for dual-aspect monism is, naturally, how to articulate a suitable notion of an “aspect.” Aspects have to be something more than properties, or dual-aspect monism would slide back into a property dualist position (Skrbina, 2014: 228-9). Instead, recent dual-aspect monists hold that aspects are ways the world “displays” itself (Skrbina, 2014), or “perspectives” on the world (Benovsky, 2019).

However, this raises a problem. Ways of displaying or perspectives are both mentalistic phenomena: in particular, they both involve the idea of an intentional relation to what displays itself. But this mentalistic construal of the ways of knowing is hard to reconcile with its monistic, realistic metaphysical attitude. The problem this leads to is that the mind must both itself (metaphysically) be mental, but must
(epistemologically) be able to apprehend both aspects.

So under what aspect does the mind itself fall? (1) If it is mental, the problem arises that the phenomenal aspect only apprehends things directly (compare the felt aspect of pain). So the dual-aspect monist would be pressed to find an account of sensory perception, in this case – in particular, they would have to find a way to account for their own statement that the world displays itself under a physical aspect. (2) The opposite thing would happen if the dual-aspect monist claims that the mind is primarily physical: they would then face the standard physicalist problem of accounting for the phenomenal aspect. (3) They should therefore claim that the mind is both physical and mental; but this both goes against their own claim that the mental is confined to the mental aspect, and it is arguably contradictory.

I conclude that dual-aspect monism faces an important problem about intentionality. Before dual-aspect monism can be intelligible as a theory of the mind itself – instead of just sensations and physical phenomena – it has to develop an adequate theory of intentionality.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 10:40-11:10, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007

Ruben Noorloos (Central European University, Hungary)
Ruben Noorloos is a PhD student in Philosophy at Central European University. He works on Spinoza’s mind-body parallelism and its implications and applications in contemporary philosophy of mind.
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Relativism, contextualism, expressivism, and the relativist stance

Eduardo Pérez-Navarro

According to relativism, some propositions are true or false only with respect to a context of assessment. Traditional arguments for relativism defend it as a theory that explains how language actually works: the fact that the proposition expressed is true or false only with respect to a context of assessment would explain the characteristic behavior of certain uses of language in regard to phenomena such as faultless disagreement and retraction. In this paper, I pursue a different strategy: I argue that we should adopt relativism not only as the way language works, but also as the way language should work. Relativism implements what I call “the relativist stance”, which is the one to adopt if we want to act in accordance with values, such as the idea of progress, that are widely seen as the ones that democratic societies should promote. Contextualism fails to implement this stance, but expressivism, if understood in a certain way, just puts it in different words. This is in accordance with the view also defended in this paper that certain versions of relativism and expressivism are just notational variants of each other.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Katharina Anna Sodoma
Date: 17:40-18:10, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006

Eduardo Pérez-Navarro (Universidad de Granada, Spain)
I am a Ph.D. student at the Department of Philosophy I, University of Granada, Spain. The aim of my dissertation is to explore how the notion of a relativized proposition has evolved and to compare relativism, the position that argues for the theoretical place of relativized propositions, with other contemporary semantic alternatives, such as contextualism and expressivism. As part of the completion of my thesis, I have been a visiting Ph.D. student at the Institut Jean Nicod in Paris under the supervision of Isidora Stojanovic and at the Department of Philosophy
My Favorite Option

Amit Pinsker

Cases of normative moral uncertainty, as opposed to descriptive uncertainty, are those in which we know all the descriptive facts, but are uncertain regarding which moral theory is in actually correct. There are three meta-normative decision principles for agents under normative moral uncertainty. The two dominant principles in the literature are “Maximize Expected Moral Value” (MEMV), according to which agents should maximize the expected moral value of their actions, just as they would maximize expected utility in non-moral cases; and “My Favorite Theory” (MFT), according to which agents should follow the prescriptions of the theory they have most credence in. The last principle – the one I defend – is called “My Favorite Option” (MFO), and instructs agents to choose the action they believe is most likely to be morally right.

I argue that MFO is the only principle that successfully reflects the motivation of agents under moral uncertainty: motivation to do the right thing de dicto. We face a moral dilemma when we want to do the right thing, but do not know what the right thing is. Our motivation is thus to do the right thing whatever it may be. I show that MEMV and MFT might require agents to choose an action they believe is extremely unlikely to be morally right, which contradicts that motivation. Some vivid cases press the intuition even further, emphasizing that MFO never requires agents to choose against their motivation, and thus always yields the intuitively correct results.

While some argue against moral motivation de dicto, it is widely accepted that agents under moral uncertainty are necessarily motivated this way. If so, this kind of objection is not available to proponents of MEMV or MFT, leaving MFO as the only plausible decision principle for agents under normative moral uncertainty.
Amit Pinsker (The Hebrew University, Israel)
Currently studying for a master's degree in philosophy at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. I completed my bachelor's degree in philosophy and the Amirim honor's program in the humanities, also at the Hebrew University. My main areas of philosophical interest are normative uncertainty, rationality, epistemology, ethics, and the intersections between them.
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From Paraphrase to Tolerance

Jonas Raab

At least since Quine’s seminal “On What There Is,” paraphrase has become a tool in metaphysics. The general idea is to replace sentences apparently ontologically committing us to certain entities with sentences which “do the same work” or “fulfill the same purpose”, but without the apparent ontological commitment. Ontological commitment is to be understood along the Quinean lines, i.e., we are ontologically committed to those entities necessary to make assertions true. For example, if we assert the sentence ‘There are chairs’, we are committed to the existence of chairs (whatever they might turn out to be). To make this paraphrase strategy work, we need a suitable set of adequate criteria for successful paraphrase. Without any such criteria, we’d be allowed to paraphrase a sentence apparently committing us to abstract entities with just any sentence which doesn’t likewise commit us to such entities. For example, we’d be allowed to paraphrase ‘There are numbers’ with ‘There are chairs’ (a paraphrase presumably preserving at least truth) or ‘There are unicorns’. Furthermore, we need to circumvent Alston’s well-known problem of symmetry. Moreover, even if we stick to Quine’s dictum to provide paraphrase in
what he calls canonical notation, the availability of many proper representations of (natural language) sentences in canonical notation which do conflict with one another forces us to decide between these. I argue that there is no such set of criteria so that we are forced to consider several paraphrases – if we do not want to give up on paraphrase. To resolve the direct conflict among them, we need to understand them as given in different languages. This, then, means that we have to endorse a version of Carnap’s so-called Principle of Tolerance. As these languages are prone to ontologically commit us to conflicting entities – where we still construe ontological commitment along the Quinean lines –, this also leads us to revisit the topic of ontological commitment.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Frenzis Herbert Scheffels
Date: 14:40-15:10, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.003

Jonas Raab (University of Manchester, Great Britain)
I am a second year PhD student at the University of Manchester. My main focus of research is metametaphysics; at the moment, I am thinking mostly about how paraphrase strategies work.
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Time-slice Agents, Wantons and Dorian Gray

Damiano Ranzenigo

My aim is to defend the claim that norms of diachronic rationality and hierarchical structures of self-governance are not sufficient conditions of rationality for a rational agent to access moral reasoning in principle. As I will try to show, the impossibility to reason morally is determined by the compatibility of the diachronic self-governing agent with estrangement from one’s personal practical history.

Once we accept a broadly instrumental conception of rationality, satisfying norms of means-end coherence and consistency among attitudes, instrumentally rational agents can still be dysfunctional in two
important ways: they could be time-slice agents (Bratman, 1987, Quinn, 1990), who act only in accordance with present evaluation and fail to extend their rationality over time, or wantons (Frankfurt, 1971, Bratman, 2007, Korsgaard 2009), who are driven only by their first order desires. A rational agent must thence be able to stick with her prior intentions and plans, other things equal, and take a stand with respect to her first order attitudes.

However, such diachronic self-governing agents can fail to access moral reasoning in principle. I will argue that this failure concerns rationality primarily, and not any specific conception of morality. A diachronic self-governing agent is still compatible with estrangement from one’s personal history, in terms of previous rankings of values and principles of action. This kind of estrangement determines the impossibility to access moral reasoning.

A new kind of dysfunctional agent emerges at this point, one who is well described in Oscar Wilde’s famous novel “The Picture of Dorian Gray” (1890). The otherwise rational Dorian Gray fails to build up on his previously adopted practical identities to become a better version of himself, because his personal history gets magically reported on his portrait and leaves no trace on him. Estrangement from his personal history condemns Dorian to always start his deliberation from scratch. He is unable to feel authentic regret and abandons himself to limitless self-indulgence. Toward the end of the novel, Dorian hopelessly wishes to become good, but his wish is delusional, for it belongs to yet a different instrumentally rational agent, who fails to become moral.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla
Date: 17:40-18:10, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.004

Damiano Ranzenigo (University of Vienna, Italy)
I have recently graduated with a Master in Philosophy at the University of Vienna mit Auszeichnung. My main area of specialization is practical philosophy with a focus on theory of action and of rationality. I
am currently looking for a PhD position in philosophy with a PhD proposal on Christine Korsgaard’s conception of practical identity. In the meanwhile, I am participating to workshops and conferences on related topics around Europe.
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Demystifying Strength of Will

Antoine Reboung

Strength of will (SOW), common sense has it, is the ability to resist contrary inclinations (“temptations”) in order to achieve certain goals. Philosophers of action (e.g. Mele 1987, 2012; Kenneth & Smith 1997; Sripada 2014) traditionally distinguish between two varieties of SOW: we display diachronic SOW when we take actions prior to experiencing a temptation so as to resist it when it later arises, while we display synchronic SOW when we resist a temptation while experiencing it.

Since only the latter variety is assumed to be effortful and difficult, it has generated a vivid discussion around the following question: how is synchronic SOW possible? Following psychologist Roy Baumeister and colleagues (e.g. Baumeister, Vohs and Tice 2007), Richard Holton (2009) contends that SOW requires the employment of a special faculty which, much like a muscle, runs on limited resources, tires with use and can be strengthened with exercise.

My talk is divided into two parts. In the first part, I draw from recent developments in experimental research (e.g. Job et al. 2015; Klinger et al. 2018), as well as from conceptual considerations (Levy 2011), to show that Holton’s “muscle model” is misguided, as it wrongly conflates an affectively loaded experience of struggle with the efforts supposedly at work in SOW.

In the second part, I put forward an alternative and more parsimonious account of SOW that gives pride of place to intentions (Bratman 1987, 2007) and plans (e.g. Gollwitzer & Oettingen 2018). I first argue that the diachronic/synchronic distinction is misbegotten, as SOW requires mental action at both levels: diachronically, in the elaboration of intentions and plans, and synchronically, in the direction of one’s attention. I then clarify the sense(s) in which these actions can be deemed effortful.
In closing, I briefly connect this “reductionist” account of SOW with the related, Aristotelian virtue of temperance and its praiseworthiness.

Section: Philosophy of Mind  
Language: English  
Chair: Louis Longin  
Date: 11:20-11:50, 19 September 2019 (Thursday)  
Location: SR 1.007

Antoine Rebourg (University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland)  

In parallel with my studies, I taught both French literature and introductions to analytic philosophy at a high school level.

Since September 2018, I am a PhD student at the University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland, on a four-year grant awarded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. My research focuses on strength of will and cognate concepts such as effort. It is supervised by Profs. Olivier Massin (Neuchâtel) and Richard Holton (Cambridge).

In my free time, I enjoy practicing various sports including football, basketball, running and cycling.
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In which sense does Kant’s categorical syllogistic differ from classical logic?

Davide Dalla Rosa  
This talk aims at offering a reconstruction of Kant’s theory of categorical syllogistic in his general logic. The reconstruction shall highlight the differences between Kant’s syllogistic and a possible formalization of it in classical first-order logic.
The structure of the talk will be the following. Firstly, it will be given a fairly general assessment of Kant’s syllogistic and a reconstruction of Kant’s version of the so-called dictum de omni et de nullo that is based on his published works (1); then it will be examined in more detail a reconstruction of the syllogistic moods Baroco’s and Bocardo’s possible reduction to syllogisms in first figure in which a proof by contradiction, whose use is forbidden by Kant, it is not employed, but rather some alternative logical devices not mentioned by Kant himself (quantification in concepts, obversion, transposition of premises); subsequently, it will be taken into account the reduction of the syllogistic moods that seemingly make use of the immediate inference known as conversio per accidens, which implies a relation of subalternation between terms which does not hold in classical first-order predicate logic; (2).

It will be claimed that the issues connected with these accounts, amongst the others the ones related to the existential import of singular and universal judgements in Kant’s theory (3), could support in principle the problems that we encounter in giving a satisfactorily account of Kant’s categorical syllogistic and of the difficulties we face in proving some specific syllogistic moods.

It will be concluded however that neither subalternation, nor the exclusive negation involved in the reductio proof, seem to be so problematic from the point of view of Kant’s theory of categorical syllogisms in his general logic, but rather that the difficulties lie in the restriction on inferential rules theorized by Kant.

Following this argumentative line, it shall come out that, for these reasons, Kant’s syllogistic as a logical theory shows a behaviour which is somehow divergent from its possible formalization in classical first-order predicate logic.
Davide Dalla Rosa (University of Padova, Italy)
I am currently a PhD student at the University of Padova (Italy). The topic of my dissertation is Kant’s general logic, with special attention to some recent non-classical interpretations of it.

During my PhD I have been graduate visiting student at the UCI Irvine and at the University of Oxford.
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Abominable Junk

Richard Roth

Abominable conditionals are indicative conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know it, p’. Asserting abominable conditionals sounds bad. Dorst (2019) argues that abominable conditionals provide new evidence for the KK-principle: If one knows p, one knows that one knows p. In my talk, I will criticise Dorst’s argument, arguing that abominable conditionals should not be asserted for reasons unrelated to KK.

In outline, Dorst’s reasoning is this: Abominable conditionals cannot be known, as evidenced by the fact that asserting them sounds bad. However, Dorst argues, if KK can fail, abominable conditionals can be known. Therefore KK cannot fail.

In my talk, I present an analogous argument for a false conclusion. My argument concerns the case NEWSPAPER: You trust The Times and The Guardian equally. Reading The Times, you know that Manchester won yesterday. You don’t know what result The Guardian reported, and assert:

(1) If The Guardian reported that Manchester won, Manchester lost.

Here is my analogous (bad) argument: (1) cannot be known in Newspaper, as evidenced by the fact that asserting (1) sounds bad in Newspaper. However, reasoning in analogy with Dorst, we can argue: If it is possible to be in Newspaper, it is possible to know (1) in Newspaper. Therefore, being in Newspaper is impossible.

The trouble with my argument is that cases like Newspaper are clearly possible. Something must have gone wrong. Whatever went wrong, it likely went wrong in Dorst’s argument, too; for the two argu-
ments resemble each other closely.

In my talk, I argue that both (1) and abominable conditionals belong to the wider class of junk conditionals, roughly conditionals that one should reject if one learnt that their antecedent is true. Asserting junk conditionals sounds bad for reasons independent of KK (Sorensen 1988). I close my talk considering and rejecting various explanations why junk conditionals are unassertable.

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**Richard Roth** (New College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom)

I'm interested in epistemology and philosophy of language, currently reading for the BPhil in Philosophy in Oxford. Previously, I did a Master’s at HU Berlin and my undergrad in Heidelberg.

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**Early Putnam’s Functionalist Hypothesis and Artificial Intelligence (AI)**

Suraj Kumar Sahoo

My aim in this paper is to understand the relationship between early Putnam’s functionalism and artificial intelligence; also to analyze the position of AI in the philosophy of mind. Being a functionalist, Putnam has argued that mental processes are computational processes realized in a machine. It explains the mind as a machine. He advances the analogy between minds and machines by putting a question in the case of machines and robots. Could robot or machines be conscious? Or could a robot be more powerful than human beings and also more intelligent than human beings? This Question becomes an inquiry to analyze the relationship between early Putnam’s functionalism and artificial intelligence, where I will try to explore the
states of mind in artificial intelligence. The main aim of artificial intelligence is to reproduce mentality in machines. That is to say that AI aims at producing machines with the mind. If we say that machines have minds, then we have to ascribe certain “belief”, “knowledge”, “free will”, “intention”, “observations”, etc. to a machine.

**Section:** Philosophy of Mind  
**Language:** English  
**Chair:** Ruben Noorloos  
**Date:** 16:00-16:30, 20 September 2019 (Friday)  
**Location:** SR 1.007

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**Suraj Kumar Sahoo** (IIT Bombay, India)  
Apart from being a research scholar at Dept. of H&SS, IIT Bombay, I have been teaching philosophy as a Lecturer in a college since October, 2017.  
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**What is an emotion?**

Derya Sakin

In contemporary studies, emotions have been approached from cognitive, psychological, biological and cultural perspectives, and have been interpreted differently according to these perspectives. The fundamental dichotomy on the study of emotion has been centered around evolutionary psychologists and social constructionists. Evolutionary psychologists assert that emotions are adaptations and they are specific psychological responses that evolved to solve various problems faced by our ancestors. On the other hand, social constructionists assert that emotions are socially constructed which makes them products of nurture rather than nature. Aside from these fundamental approaches, there are also hybrid theories about emotions, which admit that some emotions are adaptations, whereas the other emotions are socially constructed. It seems as if there is no room for suggesting another approach about emotions. However, I assert that the concepts that are used to explain emotions in these perspectives need to
be re-examined. In this context, the concepts of the natural and of the social should be reassessed regarding what they really are/are meant to be. The concept of natural is considered to be contrary to the concept of social, i.e., natural is innate, inevitable, and involuntary fact; social is flexible, variable in time or in places, and learnable. I suggest that social is natural in the sense that socialization is an adaptation that evolved to solve environmental problems. In this regard, I take my position not as a hybrid but as a naturalistic one and argue that being social is significant for understanding our nature since that emotions are both natural and social. Accordingly, in this presentation, I will treat the matter of these approaches on emotions, and scrutinize the nature of emotions in the light of the naturalistic perspective.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Louis Longin
Date: 10:40-11:10, 19 September 2019 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007

Derya Sakin (Middle East Technical University, Turkey)
I was born and raised in Istanbul, Turkey. I completed my graduation from the Department of Philosophy at Yeditepe University in Istanbul. I then pursued my master degree at Istanbul University. Now I am studying my phd. at Middle East Technical University in Ankara, and I have been working as a research assistant at the same university since 2015.

My research focuses primarily on issues in contemporary naturalism and specifically naturalist ethics. I aim to understand the nature of behaviors of both humans and non-humans. I question of what is behind these behaviors such as free will or intrinsic disposition or language which is considered only humans possess. Accordingly, I think philosophy and behavioral sciences should be associated in this sense. I also have a keen interest in the nature and origin of the alleged differences among philosophical traditions such as pragmatism, continental philosophy, postmodernism, and philosophy of language – where I have a particular interest in Wittgenstein.
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In the field of environmental ethics, the concern of moral status is keenly debated. In this study, I aim to discuss two capacity-based proposals of moral status. I start with a discussion of the rationality criterion, followed by the sentience approach. I take up this issue in order to show the ethical and environmental implications of deciding on moral standing on the basis pre-determined set of subjective capacities. I will try to establish whether the plausibility of the capacity-based proposals is weakened if entities that should qualify as having moral standing are excluded, and on what basis the “should” is determined. While capacity-based proposals have some merits, I argue that not only are they inconsistent and irrelevant to why we should confer obligations on any entity; they also do not fully address the different drivers of loss of biodiversity.

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**Olusegun Steven Samuel** (University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia)

Olusegun Steven Samuel is a doctoral candidate at the School of Humanities and Languages, University of New South Wales, Sydney. Samuel’s research in environmental ethics/philosophy is currently funded through the University International Postgraduate Award (Australian Commonwealth Government) and the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Top-Up Scholarship (UNSW Sydney). One of his co-authored papers “Africa versus the West on Reparation” appeared in Peace Review: Journal of Social Justice (2014), Vol. 26 (3), Taylor and Francis.

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The Silent Language – Leibniz’ Dream in (digital) Pictures

Mira Sarikaya

Leibniz had the dream of a language that was able to solve all the problems our natural languages have to deal with. The idea was a life project which never made it to a successful implementation. Leibniz mentions his Lingua Characteristica 1666 for the first time in his Dissertatio de Arte Combinatoria but continued to work on it his whole life. He described a symbolic system which is capable of mapping our mind and its thoughts and therefore would be more powerful and accurate than our natural language. Beyond that he wanted it to pursue epistemic purposes. The system should be able to verify truth but also to find new truth. Even though this last part is hard to find in later projects of artificial languages, we can in fact find a lot similarities between Leibniz’ dream and actual realized projects.

In my talk, we will focus on picture languages. I will start by giving a rough introduction to Leibniz’ idea of a universal language. Thereafter we will get to Otto Neurath and his picture language Isotype (International System of Typografical Picture Education). We will see that this language has much more in common with Leibniz’ idea than you would think at first glance. However, there are also many differences which we will figure out. But when we trace Neurath’s idea over time, we will see that it still lives today everywhere. Especially in our digital world. Every button, every icon can be seen as a part of a picture language. If we compare this developed version of Neurath’s language with Leibniz’ idea we can see the differences vanishing. Concluding the talk I argue that in order to create a functional artificial language with abstract symbols, it is necessary for this language to go through a stage of development where the symbols are iconic (or skeuomorphism in design), as it happened with Neurath’s picture language. From there on the language can evolve into the kind of formal and abstract language Leibniz had in mind (corresponding to flat design).
Mira Sarikaya (University of Hamburg, Germany)
My name is Mira Sarikaya and I am currently a PhD student in Philosophy at the University of Hamburg. After I finished my master’s degree in 2017, I am happy to go on with my work on Leibniz and artificial languages. Already during my master’s studies, I focused on philosophy of language, logic and the history of both areas. In my thesis, I argued that Leibniz’ work on his Lingua Characteristica can be seen as a predecessor of Rudolf Carnap’s Logical Structure of the World. In my PhD thesis, I extend this thought and consider Leibniz as a predecessor of many later projects of artificial languages — both in the area of formal and a priori philosophical languages and in the area of international auxiliary languages like for instance Esperanto. Beside my academic interests I am also interested in nearly every area that has to do with language. I love literature and to learn foreign languages. Also, I am writing poetry and teach creative writing in my own school projects.
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Husserl and mathematical practice: Eidetic variation, anticipations and Wesenschau.

Deniz Sarikaya

In this talk, we want to sketch crucial parts of the philosophy of mathematics of Edmund Husserl and analyze in how far it fits into the quasi-empirical viewpoint on mathematics. We will argue that his approach draws a picture very close to mathematical practice and that this picture allows us to import concepts from philosophy of science into philosophy of mathematics in a very useful manner.

In 1931 Kurt Gödel shows that every consistent, effectively axiomatized theory containing “some arithmetic”, is incomplete. This means
that there is a formula in the language of the theory, which cannot be proven and whose negation cannot be proven either. We often say that this proves the impossibility of the fulfilment of Leibniz' dream of a lingua characteristica and a calculus ratiocinatar. Gödel himself drew in his posthumously published notes “The modern developments of the foundations of mathematics in the light of philosophy” (1961?) a rather different conclusion. While we cannot decide every meaningful sentence purely algorithmically Gödel thought that we can extend our axiom systems by reflection on the basic concepts whenever we need to decide such statements. Gödel thought for instance that we will find extensions of ZFC settling the continuum's hypothesis (CH). To do this Gödel refers to some ideas by Husserl contained in his “Formal and Transcendental Logic” (1929).

Husserl believed that what reaches our sense organs is always under-determined and, in a sense, informed by our history. This does not only hold for concrete objects but for abstract objects as well. Hence those objects – according to Husserl – might be underdetermined, we might form anticipations, which can be confirmed or falsified. We will argue that this allows us to draw parallels from the development of theories in physics and mathematics. Both in foundational endeavors, especially modern set theory but also while defining new notions.

Deniz Sarikaya (University of Hamburg, Germany)
I am currently doing my PhD studies in Philosophy at the University of Hamburg (UHH). I studied philosophy (MA 16 & BA 12) and mathematics (MSc 19 & BSc 15) at the UHH focusing on philosophy of science / mathematics, logic and discrete mathematics. My main areas of interests are Philosophy of Science: Science and Society (Wertedebatte, Wissenschaft und Demokratie), Structuralism and Mathematics from all perspectives: I am working in Philosophy of Mathematics (esp. Philosophy of Mathematical Practice), Mathematics Education and think
Correctly Responding to Reasons While Being Incoherent

Leonhard Schneider

I examine Reason Responsiveness (RR) accounts of rationality. I will analyse and argue against the strategy of RR proponents (namely Lord and Kiesewetter) to account for a datum that is traditionally associated with the concept of rationality, namely Structural Irrationality (SI). Necessarily, if agent A holds certain combinations of incoherent mental attitudes, A is irrational. RR accounts argue that rationality requires A to correctly respond to the normative reasons (hereafter, reason(s)) that are (in some sense) epistemically available to A. Rational requirements are said to be exhausted by such reason response requirements (RRRs). Therefore, RR proponents must account for (SI) by holding Coherence as By-Product (CBP). Necessarily, if A displays any form of structural irrationality, A is not correctly responding to her available reasons (i.e. A violates at least one RRR).

I will focus on how this general strategy is applied to cases of means-end incoherence, i.e. cases where, roughly, an agent intends to perform an action E but does not intend to perform an action M, which she believes to be necessary for E-ing. In certain cases of means-ends incoherence, a transmission principle is needed to account for (CBP). Roughly, this principle amounts to (TP). Necessarily, if (and if because)

(1) A has decisive available reason to intend to E and
(2) A has decisive available reason to believe that intending to M is necessary for E-ing,

it follows (3) A has decisive available reason to intend to M.

After clarifying and amending (TP), I argue that even the most plausible version of (TP), (TP*), does not hold true. This is because the strength of A’s reason to intend to E is not transmitted to what is (only) likely, given A’s evidence, to be a necessary means. Thus, given certain assumptions, A’s reason to intend M will be weaker than A’s reason to intend E. This result will lead me to deny (TP*) and hence (CBP). This puts pressure on RR accounts as their strategy to explain
SI) fails.

Two main steps are needed. First, I will provide an account of the strength of A’s evidence for a proposition. Second, I will connect A’s evidence for “ought”-propositions (of the form ‘A ought to φ’) to A’s available reasons to φ (φ is a belief or intention). Thereby, I establish various principles which allow me to present a counter-example against (TP*).

Leonhard Schneider  (University of Bayreuth, Germany)
Leonhard Schneider studies Philosophy & Economics (BA) at the University of Bayreuth. For the academic year 2018/2019, he is a Visiting Student (Philosophy) at St. Catherin’s College, Oxford. His main philosophical interest is in normativity (metaethics, reasons and rationality). He intends to continue to study philosophy, after completing his BA (expected in 2020).
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Properties Still Exist Eternally and How About Musical Works?

Ece Derya Senbas

In their article, Can a Musical Work be Created, Caplan and Matheson raise three worries about one of the premises of Julian Dodd’s argument against the creationist view of types. The premise says; “Any property exists at all times (if it exists at all)”. (Caplan and Matheson, 2004, p.126). According to them, Dodd’s account of the existence of properties comes from what they call by following D. M. Armstrong, The Principle of Instantiation which says that “a property exists at a time t* such that t* is either before, after, or identical to t and F is instantiated at t*” (Caplan and Matheson,
2004, p.126) and this principle is at the center of their objections. In my paper, I will argue that in Dodd’s book, Works of Music An Essay in Ontology which was released three years after Caplan and Matheson’s article, one can find an answer for each of three objections, although he does not explicitly reply to their objections. In his book, Dodd adopts a different principle for the existence of properties than The Principle of Instantiation. According to Dodd, “a property F exists at t if and only if there is some time t? such that t? is either before, after, or identical with t, and at which it is (metaphysically) possible for F to be instantiated” (Dodd, 2007, p.61). In this paper, will show that Caplan and Matheson’s objections do not apply to the principle adopted by Dodd in his book. On the other hand, in the same book, Dodd claims that the premise of the same argument which Caplan and Matheson refer to) “For any type K and any time t, K exists at t if and only if a corresponding property, being a k, exists at t.” is extremely plausible (Dodd, 2007, p.60). In my paper, as a last point, I will argue that this explanation does not really explain why this premise is plausible, rather it gives another formulation of the same premise.

Bibliography:

Caplan B. and Matheson C. (2004), “Can a Musical Work Be Created?” British Journal of Aesthetics, 44 (2); Arts Module, p. 113

Meta-induction in a decision-theoretic setting

Maximilian Benito Seubold

Meta-induction is a class of meta-inferences, which was developed by Gerhard Schurz (2008) in order to solve Hume's famous problem of induction. There are variants of meta-inductive inferences which are access optimal in all possible worlds. 'Access optimal' means, that there are no accessible alternative inferences, which are more successful than meta-inductive ones. This doesn't imply, that meta-inductive inferences always offer correct predictions. Still, there aren't accessible methods which have a higher predictive success-rate than these meta-inductive inferences and that, so it seems, gives us reasons to use these meta-inductive inferences. These properties of meta-induction can be proofed a priori and illustrated with computer simulations, so it won't be a circular inductive justification of induction. Instead, there is an a priori justification for these meta-inductive inferences and we can justify induction with these inferences, if we accept the a posteriori premise that inductive methods have been more successful than non-inductive methods in the past. So meta-induction offers a solution for some interpretations of Hume's problem of induction.

I want to apply the meta-inductive framework to a decision-theoretic setting and show what might be problems of adding utilities to the framework and how this affects the justification of induction by meta-induction.

First, I want to discuss several technical options of enriching the meta-inductive framework by decision-theoretic elements. Second, I want to present different interpretations which make certain embeddings plausible. My last step will be to outline for each option, whether the optimality of meta-induction can be preserved in the enriched setting, or whether it fails to preserve the optimality and its usefulness as a justification of induction.
Maximilian Benito Seubold (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Germany)
Currently I am a student and student assistant at the university of Düsseldorf. I am interested in epistemology and philosophy of science. I am especially interested in different types of inferences and their justifications.

In my free time I like being outside, riding bicycles and doing sport. E-Mail: maximilian.seubold@hhu.de

Consciousness and Process Philosophy

Friedrich Sieben

In the current debate about the mind-body-problem two positions are prominent: dualism and physicalism. However, both have to face severe problems. According to (substance) dualism, mind and body are two completely separate things. The most crucial problem for dualism is then the causal interaction of these, i.e. the problem of psychophysical interaction. Physicalism on the other hand states that the ontological primacy belongs only to the things described by physics – the mental is thus, if it exists at all, merely a product of the physical. The justified question is then how something so fundamentally different from the physical like the mental can arise out of such. In my talk, I will opt for an alternative to these two positions: the process philosophy of A.N. Whitehead. According to him substance metaphysics is the core reason for the aforementioned problems, which is still prevalent in dualism and physicalism. Opposed to this he comprises the cosmos as process wherein change is the only permanence. The talk will consist of a brief overview of the core principles of Whitehead’s philosophy before trying to show how we can develop a better understanding of consciousness within this completely different framework.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Ruben Noorloos
Date: 14:00-14:30, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007
Friedrich Sieben (Munich School of Philosophy, Germany)
Friedrich Sieben is a Ph.D. student at Munich School of Philosophy. In his thesis he is trying to show how the process philosophy of Alfred N. Whitehead is a more promising approach in understanding consciousness than the other positions in the philosophy of mind are. He is funded by the Hanns Seidel Foundation and supervised by Prof. Dr. Godehard Brüntrup.
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Catherine Elgin on “felicitous falsehoods”

Stefan Sleeuw

Over the course of several articles and books, including her latest work True Enough (2017), Catherine Elgin has developed a comprehensive epistemological theory that purports to offer an alternative to veritism. Veritism, according to Elgin, amounts to the claim that truth is necessary for epistemic acceptability. She believes that veritism cannot account for many intuitively respectable scientific theories that rely on models and idealizations which are known to deviate from the truth. Such “felicitous falsehoods”, as she calls them, should be considered epistemically acceptable as long as their divergence from the truth is negligible.

This raises an obvious question: how do we discriminate between negligible and non-negligible divergences from the truth? Elgin takes this to be a contextual matter: our purposes within a given context of inquiry determine which aspects of a model or idealization are epistemically relevant, and fix their required levels of precision. Still, she also thinks that some ground-level of factual accuracy is needed across the board. Borrowing a concept coined by Nelson Goodman, Elgin maintains that a felicitous falsehood is epistemically acceptable only insofar as it “exemplifies” features of the phenomenon it bears on, in a way that advances our understanding of that phenomenon.

This claim constitutes an important, but questionable link within Elgin’s line of reasoning. As I intend to show, it allows for two different interpretations of the relation between exemplification and understanding, both of which have significant repercussions for her theory
as a whole. On one interpretation, exemplification is considered to be (partly) constitutive of understanding. On another, exemplification is regarded merely as a cognitive means to acquiring understanding. As I will argue, the former reading gives rise to an undesirably radical form of epistemic relativism, while the latter suggests that Elgin is implicitly committed to veritism after all.

Stefan Sleeuw (University of Groningen; Faculty of Philosophy, The Netherlands)
After completing the Philosophy Bachelor programme in Groningen with a thesis on accounts of circular reasoning in argumentation theory, I enrolled in the faculty’s Research Master programme, specialising primarily in contemporary analytic philosophy. During the Research Master, I developed an interest in the concept of understanding in epistemology. Having recently started a PhD project on this topic, I am currently investigating what role (if any) Nelson Goodman’s concept of exemplification could play in an account of understanding.
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Is the Capgras delusion a mentalization disorder?
Adrianna Smurzynska
The Capgras delusion is a type of monothematic delusion, which means that a delusional belief is circumscribed to one topic (Davies, & Coltheart, 2000). People who suffer from the Capgras delusion believe that their relative was kidnapped and replaced by an imposter. Typically, they admit that such person has the same appearance, behaviour, and memories, but at the same time, deny their identity (Davies, & Coltheart, 2000). In most of the interpretations of the Capgras delusion, it is said that in this disorder, the
essential aspect is the lack of the feeling of familiarity when looking at the mentioned relative.

There have been a few attempts within the philosophy of psychiatry to explain the phenomenon of the Capgras delusions, but neither of them is undoubtful. Among them, there have been some attempts which appealed to the mentalization, i.e. the ability to ascribe mental states. Two of them, proposed by Hirstein (2005, 2010) and Newen (2015) will be presented. These conception will be summarized and analysed. There will be also a place for critical analysis of this proposal. The explanatory power of this solution and the way of explaining this disorder by the concept of mentalization will be questioned. At the end, desiderata for the satisfactory explanation of the Capgras delusion will be proposed.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Louis Longin
Date: 10:00-10:30, 19 September 2019 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007

Adrianna Smurzynska (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
I am a PhD student at the Jagiellonian University. I am currently writing a dissertation on mentalization. My scientific interests focus on: philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychiatry and psychology of creativity.
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Moral Relativism, Metalinguistic Negotiation, and “Equal Validity”

Katharina Anna Sodoma

The phenomenon of widespread and persistent moral disagreement plays an important but conflicting role for moral relativism. On the one hand, arguments for moral relativism often appeal to the prevalence of intractable moral disagreements. On the other hand, accounting for the possibility of moral disagreement...
presents a challenge for moral relativists. This challenge takes the form of a dilemma the relativist faces: Either there is moral disagreement between members of different communities, then at least one of the parties to the disagreement must be at fault, or there is no disagreement between members of different communities, then their views are compatible. I show that moral relativists can meet this challenge by accounting for moral disagreements in terms of what David Plunkett and Tim Sundell call a “metalinguistic negotiation”.

I begin by explaining what I mean by ‘moral relativism’ and ‘moral disagreement’ respectively and showing what role moral disagreement plays in arguments for moral relativism. Then, I explain why accounting for moral disagreement, at the same time, presents a challenge for moral relativists and discuss two different strategies to meet this challenge. Finally, I argue that accounting for moral disagreement in terms of “metalinguistic negotiation” presents the best solution to the challenge moral disagreement poses for moral relativists because it allows the relativist to account for disagreement without incurring any additional semantic commitments. I reply to an objection and discuss a consequence of this solution having to do with the moral relativist’s purported commitment to “equal validity”. I conclude by summarizing my argument and considering its consequences for the question of how moral relativism should be understood.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Damiano Ranzenigo
Date: 14:40-15:10, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.004

Katharina Anna Sodoma (University of Vienna, Austria)
Katharina Anna Sodoma is a PhD student in Philosophy at the University of Vienna writing a dissertation on "Moral Relativism and Moral Progress" as part of the ERC Advanced Grant Project "The Emergence of Relativism - Historical, Philosophical and Sociological Perspectives". E-Mail: katharina.anna.sodoma@univie.ac.at
Stakes and Anxious Ascribers

Sergiu Spatan

Jennifer Nagel (2010, Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism. Philosophical Perspectives, 24 (1): 407-35) famously explained the stakes effect on knowledge ascriptions by pointing to the subject of a knowledge claim and to their potential state of epistemic anxiety ("the inclination or desire for increased cognitive activity" Nagel 2010, 414). In my presentation, I want to discuss, on the one hand, a problem with Nagel's account, and to suggest, on the other hand, a further application of <epistemic anxiety> to the ascribers of knowledge.

According to Nagel's account, a subject that is in a high-stakes situation is more epistemically anxious and forms beliefs more reluctantly than a subject in a low-stakes situation, even if the two have the same epistemic position. But then, given that believing is a necessary condition of knowledge, it follows that we do not ascribe knowledge to high-stakes subjects - subjects that presumably are epistemically anxious - because we do not ascribe beliefs to them either. Notice that the concept Nagel has in mind here is <outright belief>, a belief incompatible with uncertainty (Nagel 2010, 413-420).

But are we really interested in whether the subject possesses an "outright belief" - as opposed to a non-outright belief? Actually, is outright belief even a condition of knowledge? Consider the following utterances:

(1) Matt knows he did the right thing, even though he has had doubts his whole life.

(2) You know that this is the answer and you should be more confident about it!

(3) Hannah is just anxious, but she knows very well that she should play that card.

It seems that 1–3 are perfectly felicitous, and we make such utterances all the time. In normal circumstances, we are not very interested, when making third person knowledge ascriptions, in how confident the subject we ascribe knowledge to is. Of course, it is important for the subject to assent in a minimal way to the proposition that we claim she knows. We would not ascribe knowledge that p to somebody who does
not believe in the slightest that \( p \) is true. But we do not seem to be interested in how strong that person believes in \( p \).

Furthermore, one might wonder if epistemic anxiety is not connected more often to the evaluator of a knowledge claim, rather than to the subject of that claim. My contention is that we can explain fuller the salient stakes effect on knowledge ascription if we look closer into the belief-formation mechanism by which ascribers form knowledge-beliefs (i.e. beliefs of the form ‘\( S \) knows \( p \)’ or ‘\( S \) does not know \( p \)’).

Sergiu Spatan (University of Hamburg, Germany)
I am a PhD student and Research Associate at the University of Hamburg, where I work under the supervision of Prof. Thomas Krödel on topics related to skepticism, knowledge ascriptions, doubt, and epistemic feelings. In my dissertation, I will defend a skeptical version of invariantism about knowledge ascriptions, which I call 'Certain sensitivity Invariantism'. According to this account, knowledge ascriptions track the ascriber’s metacognitive attitude of subjective certainty. In order to fully develop this account, in my research I explore such notions as metacognitive feelings, certainty or doubt. Besides research, I also teach at the University of Hamburg. This semester I teach a class on philosophy of emotions, but I also taught an introduction to philosophy of mind, contemporary skepticism and perception. My secondary interest, after epistemology, is philosophy of mind and the ontology of epistemic attitudes.
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History and Philosophy of Science: Chang’s Solution of the Dilemma of Case Studies and Its Pragmatic Roots

Petar Srdanović

Notwithstanding the initial optimism, it turned out that the integration process between history and philosophy of science (HPS) faces some serious problems. Among those problems, one particularly daunting and confusing is usually labeled as "the dilemma of case studies" (DCS). According to DCS, there are two possible ways to conduct research in the integrated HPS — "bottom-up" and "top-down". Either we start from historical cases and use the outcome of our historical research as a foundation stone of valid philosophical theories of science (bottom-up approach) or we start from the well-formulated philosophical theory and only then look up the historical episodes that might confirm or falsify our theory (top-down approach). The whole point of DCS is that neither of two ways completely satisfies. Namely, the bottom-up approach faces an instance of the old problem of induction: what general philosophical conclusions can we make from a single or even several well-connected case studies? On the other side, if we implement the top-down approach, there is a constant risk of biased selection.

In my opinion, the historian and philosopher of science Hasok Chang provided firm ground for the resolution of the problem. His main idea is that the relationship between history and philosophy of science is cyclic: while philosophy, as an abstract activity, provides us the framework of concepts that are necessary for the understanding of scientific history and practice (e.g. 'explanation', 'observation', 'experiment', etc.), historical examples are concrete instantiations of abstract philosophical schemes that can contribute to the improvement of existing philosophical concepts or to the creation of new ones. Good HPS research includes frequent transitions from history to philosophy (and vice versa) because complex cases often require both several conceptual improvements provided by history and many novel philosophical reinterpretations of historical facts. It is a matter of preference which discipline will we choose as a starting point. Consequently, the dilemma is resolved.

The main goal of my paper is to further strengthen Chang’s position. I hope to achieve that goal by making connections between Chang’s view
and the following ideas from the early pragmatist philosophy: 1) John Dewey’s view on the nature of logic, 2) Clarence Irving Lewis’ idea of the pragmatic a priori, 3) the early pragmatist notion of "doubt".

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Alessandro Cecconi
Date: 14:00-14:30, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005

**Petar Srdanović** (University of Belgrade, Serbia)
2014-18 BA Philosophy, University of Belgrade
2018-19 MA Philosophy, University of Belgrade
2019-21 DAAD Stipendiat (MA Theory and History of Science and Technology, TU Berlin)

My main research interests are the general history and philosophy of science, pragmatism and the history of early analytic philosophy.

I also highly appreciate 18th-century philosophy and science (i.e. primarily the Age of Enlightenment).
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**Linguistic Relativism and Conceptual Schemes**

Jan Stepanek

We use our mother tongue every day. We do this not only to communicate with other speakers, but also to grasp the world. We interpret each sensory perception through a set of concepts that derive from our language, through a conceptual scheme. And since we have yet to come across a language completely different and in principle untranslatable to e.g. English, there seems to be only one conceptual scheme common to arbitrarily distant languages. This notion was encouraged in the 1970s by Donald Davidson’s rational argument in his article On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, where he shows that if the conceptual scheme is to be what we believe it to be, then it is impossible to put this framework aside and look at the
matter impartially. Yet Davidson’s position can be criticized from many quarters. Most often, his argument does not directly concern the idea of conceptual schemes itself, but only one its group. Indeed, unless we accept assumptions about the key role of translatability in comparing different conceptual schemes, or we reject Kantian dualism of scheme-content, linguistic relativism will remain disproved.

The reason why to deal with this issue is obvious. If there can be different conceptual schemes, then their owners can live in different worlds. This could mean that all knowledge - including philosophy - is relative to these schemes. In the contribution, I will focus on challenging Davidson’s conclusion from all points of view. I will briefly present linguistic relativism as such, then to show Davidson’s reasoning with mentioned assumptions. In the main part of the contribution, I will focus on exposing the weaknesses of such an approach and try to show the potential viability of linguistic relativism.

Jan Stepanek (Masaryk University, Czech Republic)
I am a Ph.D. student of Philosophy at Masaryk University in Brno. My specialization is philosophy of language, logic and philosophy of mathematics. Specifically I deal with intuitionism (which is also the subject of my dissertation), non-classical logics and linguistic relativism. E-Mail: 380011@mail.muni.cz

Memory and Landauer’s Principle

Athamos Stradis

Why do we know more about the past than the future? One natural explanation of this “knowledge asymmetry” is the fact that we have records of the past but not the future. Being obviously physical in nature, we can expect the asymmetry
of records to be grounded in a yet more fundamental time-asymmetry (as the adage goes, “no asymmetry in, no asymmetry out”). The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that the entropy of the universe increases following any process. Since Boltzmann, various attempts have been made ground the knowledge asymmetry in this “thermodynamic asymmetry”. Today, the belief that this has met success is a received view in physics and a popular view in philosophy. In this talk I examine a salient account in this vein that appeals to Landauer’s Principle.

Landauer’s Principle consists of two claims. The first is that any realistic computer (of which humans are a biological example), if it is not to simply be a growing catalogue of information, must implement logical erasure. The second claim is that that logical erasure necessarily invokes entropic increase in the computer’s surroundings. Hence, Landauer’s Principle is used to explain the knowledge asymmetry as follows. Our experience of a knowledge asymmetry is a product of our brain’s computations, and since these computations necessarily align with the thermodynamic asymmetry, the latter therefore grounds the knowledge asymmetry.

This account, however, faces two obstacles. First, since it only characterises computational systems, it does not explain why many external records (fossils, photos, etc.), which do not constitute computational systems, tell us so much more about the past than the future. Second, and more seriously, this account only manages to align the thermodynamic asymmetry with an asymmetry inherent to computation. It does not, however, establish that the latter must align with a knowledge asymmetry. As it stands, takes it for granted that the information written on a computer is more informative of the world’s lower-entropy states (which lie in the past) than its higher entropy states (which lie in the future), and therefore begs the question it purports to answer. Whatever the merits of Landauer’s Principle, it currently does not explain the knowledge asymmetry.
Athamos Stradis (King’s College London, United Kingdom)
I am in the fourth year of the PhD programme in Philosophy and King’s College London. My background is in astrophysics, which I studied at UCL, during which time I became interested in philosophy through the study of quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, and cosmology. My current research is in philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and metaphysics.
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On the Nature of Ordinary Objects. Towards a Metaphysics with no Simples

Artur Szachniewicz

Eliminativism is considered an ontological theory about what there is and not of the fundamental nature of it (Benovsky 2016). Thus, the ordinary objects’ eliminativism would be all about objects but not about their metaphysical nature. However, ontological claims whatever they may be, limit possible metaphysics. For whatever the account of the ultimate nature of the non-redundant objects is, it cannot entail the extension of ontology beyond what eliminativism has preserved. Thus, plausibly, the organicists (see Byrne 2019:18) like van Inwagen (1990) and Merricks (2001) do not merely offer ontological claims.

According to organicism, all there is are fundamental simples and their composites i.e animals (van Inwagen) and conscious animals (Merricks, see: Door 2003). And the latter is a metaphysical claim biased towards a foundational metaphysics of simples. A less theoretically loaded rendition of eliminativism would disjunctively claim that: (i) there are simples; (ii) there are (conscious) animals (iii) there’s whatever there is composed of animals. Now, eliminativism isn’t necessarily committal to simples, but only to whatever subjects of non-redundant causal powers there are (Merricks 2001: 4, 115), or to whatever it is that constitutes life (van Inwagen). Given that (conscious) animals are alive and causally efficacious, (i) turns out as a redundant metaphysical conjecture.

I’d like to argue for a more parsimonious metaphysics resulting from the jettisoning of (i): a non-foundational metaphysics of infinite descent and complexity. First, it does seem possible (Lewis 1999: 86) and it isn’t
mere conceptual possibility (Schaffer 2007; Cameron 2010; Morganti 2014; Tahko 2014). True, rejecting the category of a simple limits the resources for eliminativism-compatible metaphysics, but we’re not left empty-handed. Mataphysical infinitism coupled with (ii) and (iii) may bring an interesting alternative.

Artur Szaczniewicz (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
I am a third year PhD student from the Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland. I am interested in the metaphysics of ordinary objects and panpsychistic metaphysics.
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Aliefs are explanatory valuable

Julia Szensny

In her paper “Alief and Belief” from 2007 Tamar Gendler has argued for a distinction between belief and what she calls “alief.” She holds that this distinction is indispensable for explaining certain phenomena which involve “belief-behavior-mismatch” (Gendler 2007:5).

In this essay, I will argue for the usefulness of the new category of aliefs. First, I point out that the familiar cognitive attitudes of belief and imagination can’t explain the behavior of a subject in belief-behavior mismatch cases. Second, I will show how Tamar Gendler argues that a new concept of cognitive states is necessary and third, how the concept of aliefs solves the dilemma of belief-behavior mismatch. Gendler presents different cases in which aliefs may play a role. I will characterize the two groups of cases with the help of everyday life examples, to show that aliefs are a necessary concept with an explanatory value for belief-behavior mismatch cases. In many cases a person consciously
believes a certain proposition to be true, but nonetheless acts as if she actually believes it is false. In this cases a subject S judges a proposition P to be true, but in some way fails to act in accordance with P. This can be called a belief-behavior mismatch. It looks as if she considers the proposition to be true, but simultaneously acts as if she represents it as not true.

Tamar Gendler argues for a new category of cognitive states, which can explain such discordancy cases: the aliefs. Besides the conscious belief there is an alief, the content of which is of a different kind. It is representational and action guiding, but different from beliefs; It is possible to at the same time believe P to be true and to have an alief the content of which represents it as otherwise.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Max Timo Goetsch
Date: 16:00-16:30, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)
Location: HS E.002

Julia Szensny (Universität Hamburg, Germany)
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A Taxonomy of Skepticism: On the relationship between Closure and Underdetermination Skepticism

Guido Tana

This presentation will analyze the relationship between the two principles contemporary epistemology considers as the sources of philosophical doubt: Closure (‘CP’) and Underdetermination (‘UP’) (Pritchard 2015). It will be argued that, albeit the two kind of arguments are not equivalent, CP skepticism is parasitic on UP, and the two establish different, albeit related, varieties of skepticism.

CP skepticism threatens knowledge of the external world by disarming the proficiency of epistemic deduction, while UP motivates that one
can claim knowledge, only if she can non-arbitrarily reject a hypothesis known to be incompatible with the claim (Vogel 2004). Anthony Brueckner (1994) argued that UP and CP are logically equivalent, with UP issuing a deeper challenge due to CP’s reliance on it to motivate its premise $\_K(\_SK)$. Stewart Cohen (1998) has objected to Brueckner, arguing that CP is the most fundamental of the two, logically distinct, arguments.

Cohen’s reading will be replied to, by explaining how CP relies on UP. The premise has to be understood as explicating an Ignorance predicament (Pritchard 2005, Kraft 2013, Winters 1981). It will be shown that this entails how CP skepticism doesn’t concern exclusively the truth of knowledge claims, but rather the possibility of claiming knowledge in general. This aspect is the hallmark of a variety of skepticism about the ground of our evidence – called Debasing Skepticism (Schaffer 2010) – whose source is ultimately UP’s attack on the possibility of evidence enjoying meaningful rational support. Closure is thus shown to be parasitic on Underdetermination: the latter’s skepticism about the rational support evidence can enjoy supplies CP with the motivation needed to forbid acquisition of knowledge by means of epistemic deduction.

A further differentiation is then drawn. It is argued that the doubt established by UP is of the normative kind associated with the New Evil Demon intuition (Pritchard 2015, Cohen 1984) – threatening the entailment between evidence and what it should be evidence of (Briesen 2010, Brueckner 1994). This specification allows the relationship between the principles to be traced along James Conant’s classification of Cartesian and Kantian varieties of skepticism (Conant 2012). The former grounds the character of Closure skepticism, concerning matters of correspondence between beliefs and facts. The latter issues the normative skepticism that threatens the very possibility of experience ever enjoying factive rational support which is proper of Underdetermination skepticism. The usefulness of this distinction is then shown in motivating replies to objections against UP’s alleged reliance on infallibilism (Brueckner 2005, 2011) or on the implausible KK thesis (Vogel 2004, Murphy 2013).
Guido Tanaka (University of Edinburgh/Universität Leipzig, Germany)
BA in Philosophy (University of Pavia/Universität Konstanz) 2012
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Knowledge of Meaning?: Reconciling the Epistemic Intuitions and Empirical Theories of Linguistic Understanding

Ryo Tanaka

The aim of this paper is to provide a philosophical account of knowledge of meaning that can reconcile two apparently inconsistent views on the relation between a language user and linguistic meaning.

On the one hand, we seem to have a pre-theoretical intuition about meaning that the epistemic relation between a language user and the meanings of linguistic expressions in her language must be relatively “intimate.” This might lead to a view on knowledge of meaning that linguistic competence requires possessing internal representations of meaning, and they in turn constitute knowledge of meaning in the full-fledged epistemic sense. On this view, each language user would be able to, for instance, access such representations of meaning and employ them as reasons in her rational inference (LePore (1986)). On the other hand, in empirical cognitivist theories of linguistic competence, theoretically postulated cognitive states and processes are often construed as subpersonal (Sedivy (2014)) – they are not directly accessible to consciousness,
and hence cannot play the role of reasons in rational inference (Fodor (1983)). This suggests that there are two apparently conflicting views on the relation between a language user and meaning ((Barber (2013), Gross (2010)).

If the cognitive states and processes that underlie linguistic competence are mostly subpersonal, then they cannot at least directly play the role of reasons in inference (Evans (1981)). However, on my view, this is not incompatible with the claim that such subpersonal cognitive states might be still causally responsible for the production of personal-level beliefs about meaning. On this view, the language user is able to form personal-level beliefs about meaning that reliably track her subpersonal representations of meaning, via a non-inferential causal-cognitive mechanism. I will develop an account of knowledge of meaning on the basis of this idea, and defend it from several possible objections.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Nadja-Mira Yolcu
Date: 10:40-11:10, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006

Ryo Tanaka (University of Connecticut, USA)
Ryo Tanaka is a PhD candidate in philosophy at University of Connecticut, USA. He is currently working on the topic of semantic knowledge, and in the dissertation he aims to provide an account of knowledge of meaning that both incorporates philosophical intuitions about linguistic meaning and findings from the relevant empirical fields (linguistics as well as psycholinguistics). Before coming to Connecticut, he obtained B.A. and M.A. in philosophy at Kyoto University, Japan, where he conducted research on Wilfrid Sellars’ philosophy.
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argue that Steadfast Views of peer disagreement - a family of views according to which standing firm in the face of peer disagreement can be rationally permissible - are incoherent. First, I articulate two constraints that any Steadfast Views of disagreement should endorse:

Steadfastness’s Core: Sometimes, the evidence of disagreement can make it rationally permissible for you to ignore your epistemic peer’s opinion completely. The Deference Principle: Absent any reason to call a peer’s testimony into question, you should defer to the peer’s judgment completely.

I show that (i) and (ii) are inconsistent: they cannot both be true. Because Steadfast Views endorse a set of mutually inconsistent propositions, I conclude that Steadfast Views are incoherent.

The starting point of my paper is the following question: what should your credence in H be, given that you disagree with equally reliable and informed other, i.e., your epistemic peer (let’s call her Nina). The Deference Principle (Deference for short) alone does not determine the answer to the questions. This is so, because, the evidence of disagreement calls into question the accuracy or rationality of Nina’s credence in H.

However, there is still an interesting, logical connection between Steadfastness’s Core and Deference. According to Steadfastness’s Core, sometimes the evidence of disagreement makes the opinion of an epistemic advisor conditionally independent of the disputed proposition.

Now the question that I want to consider is as follows: (Q) What is it about the evidence of disagreement that makes the initially relevant information entirely irrelevant to the value of P(H)? I will concentrate on two possible answers to (Q), which I refer to as the A-explanation and the B-explanation: A-explanation: Your relevant belief is founded on or caused by richer available evidence than Nina’s relevant belief. B-explanation: You’re not rationally required to modify your own belief about H, when you and your peer adopt different epistemic standards. I consider both explanations and show that they cannot account for why the belief of your epistemic peer is entirely probabilistically irrelevant to P(H). Thus, after answering some objections, I conclude that Steadfast Views of disagreement are incoherent.
Tamaz Tokhadze (University of Sussex, United Kingdom)
I am a Ph.D. student in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Sussex. I have completed my BA in philosophy at Ilia State University (Georgia) and my MA in philosophy at the University of Tartu (Estonia).

In my Ph.D. research I aim to develop an objective, non-Bayesian view of evidential support and investigate what legitimate role should non-evidential, subjective factors – e.g. one’s epistemic standards, goals, and prior beliefs – have in determining what one ought to believe. In my project, I use various formal and conceptual tools from Bayesian statistics and decision theory to address some of the central issues in epistemology.
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Utilitarianism is a form of egalitarianism

Nikhil Venkatesh

What does utilitarianism say about distributive policies? It is often criticised by egalitarians for being silent on the issue. Utilitarians, it seems, do not care who gets what or how we relate to one another, so long as overall well-being is maximised. Egalitarians, on the other hand, do care about these things, preferring distributions and systems of relations in which the differences between individuals are less.

There are many forms of egalitarianism. In this paper I will argue that utilitarianism should be considered one of those forms. My argument makes use of another of those forms: Martin O’Neill’s “non-intrinsic egalitarianism” (NIE). I show that utilitarianism is just as egalitarian as NIE. Therefore, if NIE is a form of egalitarianism, so is utilitarianism.
I first outline the structural similarities between NIE and utilitarianism, then resolve the worry that because utilitarianism values only the sum and not the distribution of well-being it is necessarily silent on distributive questions. I then show that utilitarianism is likely to mandate egalitarian policies with similar frequency to NIE, and that both can be concerned with both the distribution of wealth and our relating to one another as equals. The fact that only NIE values the latter intrinsically, does not, I argue, constitute a difference between the two that is significant enough to justify considering one but not the other to be a form of egalitarianism. Lastly, I offer brief arguments for NIE's egalitarian credentials.

I conclude that we should treat utilitarianism as a form of egalitarianism. There are people who take their belief in utilitarianism to justify ignoring egalitarian concerns, and there are people who reject utilitarianism on the grounds that it ignores them. If I am right, both are mistaken.

Nikhil Venkatesh (University College London, United Kingdom)
I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Philosophy at University College London. My current research is on the prospects for reconciling utilitarianism with the conceptions of equality and freedom found in socialist thought. My MPhilStud thesis reconstructed and responded to Bernard Williams's "Integrity Objection" to utilitarianism. I came to UCL from the University of Oxford, where I studied for a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics.
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Professionalism – the best defence against conscientious objection in medicine

Jan Philip Vogelsang

"Conscientious objection" is a term used in the military context and describes the refusal to take part in combat. This objection to fight and kill is motivated and based on the conscience of the objector. This term was introduced into the field of medicine with the permission procure abortion. Medical practitioners, who refused to participate in abortion, were given a legal tool to refuse these interventions with "Planned Parenthood v. Casey" in the form of conscience clauses. Since then until today a political and legal struggle rages about where to draw the line between legal conscientious objections and illegal obstructions of legal and necessary healthcare. This dispute exists not exclusively in the USA, but also in Europe.

This talk serves as an introduction into the debate of conscientious objection on medicine, presents the reason why it is imperative to change the status quo and gives an analysis of the two most commonly used approaches. I will call into question the absolute right to freedom of conscience with regard to professional duties and dismantle the arguments for an unrestrained conscience and the right to conscientious objection. I will defend professionalism as the most practical and already tested solution despite the harsh criticism it gets from the supporters of freedom of conscience.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Jana Holíková
Date: 11:20-11:50, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004

Jan Philip Vogelsang (Heinrich-Heine Universität Düsseldorf, Germany)

Jan Philip Vogelsang is a bachelor's student at the Heinrich-Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany. He wrote his bachelor thesis "Conscientious Objections in Medicine" in 2018. His focus was the clash between professional duties in medical practice and the individual conscience of
professionals. His main interests lie in Biomedical Ethics, Ethics of Science, as well as the analysis of Pseudoscience.
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An argument for the vacuity of the natural/non-natural distinction in metaethics

Thomas Walton

There is an ongoing debate in metaphysics over the application of the term physical, especially as used in contrast with the mental. Noam Chomsky has been a prominent critic of the usefulness of the term physical, arguing that the notion of the physical is vacuous. What is physical, Chomsky argues, consists in nothing more than what is more-or-less presently understood. There is no constraint on how future understanding may alter or eliminate the stock of things to which we presently ascribe the label non-physical and re-ascribe the label physical. As such, to contrast physical with non-physical is to make a vacuous, uninformative contrast, because non-physical has no stable meaning other than being that which we presently more-or-less understand.

I argue that Chomsky’s argument can be extended to the domain of metaethics, where the term natural, especially as used in contrast with non-natural, can by the same argument be shown to be vacuous also. Just as Chomsky argues in the physical case, I argue that there is neither an a priori nor an a posteriori constraint on what may count as a natural moral property. My argument runs as follows:

1) The property of naturalness is exhaustively determined by those properties identified by the natural sciences

2) There is neither an a priori nor a posteriori constraint on what sorts of properties the natural sciences might identify

3) To contrast natural with non-natural is to make a vacuous, uninformative contrast, because non-natural has no stable meaning other than being that which we presently more-or-less understand

Arguments in favour of either a naturalistic or a non-naturalistic metaethics trade on identifying features of moral properties as being either consistent with or deviant from the properties presently understood by those working in the natural sciences. But just as this leads to
vacuity in the physical case, given that there is no a priori or a posteriori constraint on what may count as physical in the future, so this is true in the case of the term natural also.

Section: Ethics  
Language: English  
Chair: Damiano Ranzenigo  
Date: 14:00-14:30, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)  
Location: SR 1.004  

Thomas Walton (University of Oxford, United Kingdom)  
I obtained a bachelor's degree in philosophy from the University of Leeds in 2015 and was subsequently admitted to Oxford University where I completed the BPhil masters degree in 2017. I am currently studying for the DPhil, writing a thesis on motivational judgement internalism and moral nativism. I worked as a research assistant for Professor Noam Chomsky at MIT in 2013, where I developed strong interests in linguistics and philosophy of mind. I continue to write on matters related to these topics in addition to my thesis work.  
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Eine Definition von Nichtexistenz  

Christian Wimmer  

In manchen philosophischen Theorien finden die Begriffe "Nichtexistenz" oder "nicht existierendes Objekt" Verwendung. So spricht etwa Meinong davon, dass es Objekte gibt, die nicht existieren. Generell wird "Nichtexistenz" formal meistens als !\(\exists x \cdot x = a\) definiert. Diese Definition kann wie im Fall von Meinong eine unerwünschte ontologische Verpflichtung zu nicht-existierenden Dingen nach sich ziehen. So zeigt sich etwa in einer Freien Logik mit Dual-Domain Semantik auf der metasprachlichen Ebene, dass eine ontologische Verpflichtung zu Objekten des äußeren Gegenstandsbereichs - dem Gegenstandsbereich der nicht-existierenden Dinge - besteht.

In diesem Vortrag soll eine alternative Definition von "Nichtexistenz" vorgestellt werden, welche das Problem der ontologischen Verpflichtung
vermeidet. Dafür wird die referentielle Story-Semantik der positiven Freien Logik in eine substitutionelle Semantik umgewandelt und um zusätzliche Quantoren erweitert.

Section: Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics  
Language: German  
Chair: Albert Anglberger  
Date: 15:20-15:50, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)  
Location: SR 1.007

Christian Wimmer (Universität Salzburg, Österreich)  
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The Structure of Metaphysical Explanation: A Critique of Foundationalist Explanations Founded on Infinite Regress Arguments

Alexander Michael Witkamp

Why are there the relevant entities that are needed for metaphysical explanations? A typical answer might run as follows. We have the relevant entities necessary for explanations because reality is structured according to the tenets of metaphysical foundationalism. Some entities are fundamental and the properties which these entities have back or just are metaphysical explanations.

An argument invoked in support of this claim is based on infinite regress arguments. According to this argument, if reality had no foundations then there would be no basis for the structure of reality and, consequently, there could be no metaphysical explanations because there would be nothing to explain. I will argue that the inverse claim is true. Specifically, I will claim that infinite regress arguments show only that
metaphysical explanations require secure foundations and, thus, that if reality is metaphysically secure then we can construct metaphysical explanations. So, what infinite regress arguments actually show us is that the metaphysician still needs to clarify the status of those relevant entities which are needed for metaphysical explanations.

This is not a knock-down argument for metaphysical foundationalism, nor is it intended to be, but it does raise a problem which lies at the intersection of foundational metaphysics and theories of explanation. It seems that a theory of explanation requires reality to be structured in a certain way. And it seems that regardless of how we structure reality, reality already has to possess features which allow for explanation. But then the question is: how do we explain that reality has the necessary features which do the explaining given that we need those entities in order to do the explaining in the first place? If we are to make headway on metaphysical explanations and the laws of metaphysics, then this is a problem we will need to work out.

**Section:** Metaphysics and Ontology  
**Language:** English  
**Chair:** Frenzis Herbert Scheffels  
**Date:** 15:20-15:50, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)  
**Location:** SR 1.003

**Alexander Michael Witkamp** (Utrecht University, Belgium)  
I am a MRes student in History and Philosophy of Science at Utrecht University. I specialise in metaphysics. I have spent most of my time researching debates about foundational metaphysics and metaphysical explanation. I am particularly interested in second-order questions about metaphysics and problems which lie at the intersection of metaphilosophy and metaphysics, especially in the way they relate to debates about scientific explanation in philosophy of science.  
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The Hole Argument and the Nature of Spacetime

Yixuan Wu

There has been claims emerging from mathematical practice that the hole argument stems from the confusion about the mathematical formalism of general relativity. This paper argues against this line of response. I specifically examine the argument from mathematical practice by James Owen Weatherall (2018), and the argument from homotopy type theory by Michael Shulman (2016). Secondly, I argue that the more plausible reply to the hole argument should focus on the notion of invariance, which could be employed to provide independent support for metric field substantivalism.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Belak
Date: 17:40-18:10, 18 September 2019 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.005

Yixuan Wu (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Germany)
I am a master student in logic and philosophy of science at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP). I obtained a BSc degree in mathematics and philosophy from University of St Andrews in 2018. My main areas of interest are philosophy of physics, philosophy of science and metaphysics. Before going to St Andrews, I lived in Beijing.
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The Strength of Real-World Egoism

Judith Würgler

Economics is based on the idea the people are exclusively self-interested – they do not care about the others’ well-being. The main argument in favor of this (empirically false) hypothesis is that, when we imagine how to organize a society, we should “economize on virtue”, that is, make sure society can work even though
its members are all selfish. According to this view, a “realistic” or “non-utopian” conception of society should be based on a conception of human nature which is not too optimistic.

This argument in favor of the “self-interest hypothesis” in economics has some force. Yet, we can object that the egoistic conception of human nature that we find in economics is still not “realistic enough”; the conception of human nature on which it relies is still too optimistic. Indeed, the objection says, people in the real-world are far more selfish than what is supposed in economics.

The objection we develop claims that the interpretation of egoism that we find in economics is too weak. In order to argue for this claim, we define the strength of egoism by the value people assign to their own life – and not by the fact that they disregard other peoples’ lives. We then show that, in the economic conception of egoism, the value people assign to their own life is only personal, i.e. their life has value only for themselves, but not in themselves. Yet, in the real world, people assign not only a personal value to their own life, but also an impersonal and intrinsic value. They consider that their life has an intrinsic value from an impersonal point of view. We then show that the ethical theory which appropriately represents this higher value that people assign to their lives is the doctrine of human rights. We then conclude that, if economists had a realistic conception of the strength of real-world egoism, they would support an economic world where it would never be acceptable to use or exploit someone in the name of the society economic prosperity.

Judith Würgler (University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland)
I am in the last year of my PhD research program. I am writing a thesis since 2014 on topics related both to economics and metaethics. The thesis explores the relation between conceptions of human motivations and normative ethical theories. Previously, I did a bachelor and master
degree in philosophy and history at the University of Neuchâtel. I have also spent eight months at the University of Utah during my master degree and ten months at the Goethe-University in Frankfort for a research program during my PhD.
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Is there Expressive Denegation?

Nadja-Mira Yolcu

According to psychological expressivism (Freitag 2018), avowals – first-person present tense self-ascriptions of mental states (e.g. ‘I hope that it is raining’) – are typically explicit expressive acts. In uttering an avowal of the form ‘I ψ that p/o’, the speaker expresses the mental state ψ that p/o (see also Wittgenstein 1953; Finkelstein 2003; Bar-On 2004, 2015; Brandl 2018) instead of reporting on her mental state (descriptivism), thereby expressing the belief that she ψ’s that p/o.

Self-ascriptions of mental states can be negated. Disavowals, such as ‘I don’t believe that it is raining’ and ‘I don’t love you’, are often used in combination with avowals as in ‘I don’t want to be anybody’s prisoner. I want to be a Queen’ (Alice, in L. Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass). Nevertheless, disavowals are rarely discussed. Here, I will make the case for what I call expressive denegation: I claim that if psychological expressivism gives a correct analysis of avowals, then in uttering a disavowal, a speaker typically expresses, in some sense, the absence of the mental state named. I will also consider the main objection to expressive denegation: While it seems easy to make sense of expressing a mental state, it is difficult to make sense of expressing the absence of a mental state. In response to this problem, I propose that in uttering a disavowal of the form ‘I don’t ψ that p/o’ a speaker expresses the proposition that she does not ψ _that p/o_.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Aglaia Anna Marlene von Götz
Date: 14:40-15:10, 20 September 2019 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006
Nadja-Mira Yolcu (University of Mannheim, Germany)

Nadja-Mira Yolcu is a research assistant and PhD student at the Chair of Theoretical Philosophy/Philosophy of Language at the University of Mannheim. In 2015 she received a Bachelor’s degree in philosophy (minor: psychology) from the University of Heidelberg and in 2017 a BPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford. In her dissertation she investigates an expressivist analysis of disavowals.

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Duhem’s Criticism of Newton

Roman Zavadil

Methods used by Isaac Newton in his *Principia mathematica* to prove the nature of gravitational attraction played a pivotal role in subsequent development of modern science. Despite the undisputable empirical success of his theory, it was often targeted by mechanical materialists as an obscure theory, since it proposed action at a distance. That contradicted the main premise that any action can be explained by mechanical interaction of particles. However, their objections were not just theoretical. Unlike Newton’s inductive method mechanical materialists followed a hypothetico-deductive model. Despite the objections, Newton’s theory held strong.

In twentieth century, hypothetico-deductive method gained many followers amongst philosophers of science. One of the most prominent in this respect was French philosopher Pierre Duhem. Like older philosophers, Duhem attacked Newton on both theoretical and methodological ground. Firstly, he pointed out inconsistency between Newton’s theory of universal gravity and Kepler’s laws, which for to Newton represented the main background assumptions for his theory. Secondly, he argued that on many occasions Newton did not follow his inductive method to prove the theory. While some points of Duhem’s criticism are valid the general argument for underdetermination of Newton’s theory might fall short. I will show that the main reason for this is Newton’s much richer notion of empirical success and vast support of agreeing measurements of a parameter from diverse phenomena.
Roman Zavadil (Palacký, Czech Republic)

I am PhD student at the Department of Philosophy, Palacký University Olomouc. My main aim is Philosophy of Science both historical and contemporary. Mostly, I am interested in methodology of science with main focus on Isaac Newton's natural philosophy and problem of under-determination. Currently, I am teaching two courses at the University. One on Newton and the other on David Hume. I am also working on two project that aim on popularization of philosophy on high schools, one of those being a state qualification for International Philosophy Olympiad.

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