SOPhiA 2021

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programm - Vortrag

Facts and three concepts of truthmaking
(Metaphysics and Ontology, )

A Truthmaking is a relation of gaining the property of being true by some truthbearer (e. g. proposition) in virtue of the existence of an object called truthmaker. So states the truthmaker principle. Hitherto, the philosophers tried to establish one universal sound of the principle by employing in it the mechanism of truthmaking (entailment, supervenience, necessitation, grounding etc.), which they found the most suitable for them. Nevertheless, I hold that all the problems with truthmaking and with the notion of fact in metaphysics emerged exactly because of this approach, which in turn has led to confusion of the different domains by presupposing that truthmaking must have only one face. To solve these problems, I am going to show that one must start with distinguishing three concepts of truthmaking (semantic, ontological, metaphysical) and matching them three truthmaker principles. What is common for these three levels is the operation of satisfaction. However, it might take the form of entailment (semantic truthmaking), necessitation (ontological truthmaking) or grounding (metaphysical truthmaking). The semantic truthmaker principle employs the B-schema: ""p" is true because p? and is deflationary. It merely identifies the references of truthbearers, but does not describe their nature, so its commitments are only alethic (Asay and Baron 2020) and weak. The second principle is the ontological one, which operates in the domain of possibilities and allows to describe the possible nature of objects indicated by referents. Hovewer, speaking of different possible entities like tropes, states of affairs or bundles of properties etc. is not sufficient to commit to their real existence. The third principle is the metaphysical one and only it concerns the existing being. First here appear facts in the strict sense and strong commitments, inheriting alethic and medium ones, which occurred at the semantic and ontological levels. Problems with facts come out when one tries to use the term "fact" on the semantic (as true propositions) or ontological (as Armstrongian states of affairs) levels, confusing it with the notions of referent or possible entity, instead of using it at the metaphysical level. Actually, facts have modest features. They are compositional and obtaining objects that have some ontological characteristics, which depends on the true propositions about reality.

Chair: Andreea Popescu
Zeit: 15:20-15:50, 09. September 2021 (Donnerstag)
Ort: SR 1.003

Blazej Mzyk
(Jagiellonian University Krakow, )

Testability and Meaning deco