SOPhiA 2021

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Are the Bundle Theorists committed to constituent ontologies?
(Metaphysics and Ontology, )

A One of the key questions in the contemporary analytic ontology concerns the relation between the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) and the Bundle Theory (BT). The majority of authors believe that BT implies PII and because of this reason. Because of this reason, it is widely believed that the example of the world with two indiscernible spheres invented by Max Black (1952) in order to violate PII, is also devastating for BT. However, this has been questioned by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004), who showed that there is no implication between PII and BT. In order to achieve it, he suggested an interpretation of BT, according to which bundles of universals exists in the world as their instances. However, the result of Rodriguez-Pereyra has been recently questioned by Roberts (2019). He argues that the version of BT with instances is not a constituent ontology, according to which concrete particulars have their own non-mereological structure. According to Roberts, since BT is an example of constituent ontology by its very definition, the instance view cannot be considered as one of its versions. Therefore, he concludes, the solution to the failure of BT proposed by Rodriguez-Pereyra is wrong. During this talk I present the subsequent stages of this debate, which leads me to questioning Robert's reasoning. In particular, I show that the instance version of BT is compatible with the constrains defining constituent ontologies, and therefore Rodriguez-Pereyra's argument is correct.

Chair: Nikolai Shurakov
Time: 12:00-12:30, 10 September 2021 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003
Remark: (Online Talk)

Marta Emilia Bielinska 
(University of Oxford, )

Testability and Meaning deco