SOPhiA 2021

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

SOPhiA ToolsDE-pageEN-page

Programme - Talk

How realist is Husserl's notion of truth?
(History of Philosophy, )

Realist phenomenologists disagree with Husserl's later metaphysics, but often want to maintain his notion of truth. Lee Hardy has presented a reading of Husserl's notion of truth that he deems compatible with metaphysical realism.

My paper grants Hardy all exegetical questions, and focuses on the notion of truth that he ascribes to Husserl.

I briefly introduce two ideas from Brentano to explain why Husserl appears at once as a realist (to his contemporaries) and an anti-realist (to me and some of my contemporaries).

The realist feature is that Husserl reintroduces states of affairs, pace Brentano. With Brentano, however, he maintains a strict correlation between true belief and a possibility of evident givenness.

I present a logical and a semantic problem for this idea, and suggest that the available responses only fit with an anti-realist metaphysics.

Chair: Karol Lenart
Time: 14:40-15:10, 11 September 2021 (Saturday)
Location: SR 1.007
Remark: (Online Talk)

Gregor Bös 
(King's College London, United Kingdom)

I am a PhD student at King_s College London, working on Husserl's phenomenology and philosophy of science, broadly construed. My pre-doctoral training was mostly at LMU Munich, where I studied philosophy and physics. I am also interested in languages, gentle coding, life drawing, theatre, and mentoring young people on travel projects (through My personal website is

Testability and Meaning deco