SOPhiA 2021

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Semantic intuitions of extension, epistemic intuitions of intension and what they justify
(Epistemology, )

The role of intuition in the philosophical methodology is widely discussed in today's analytic philosophy. Most influential theories of their role seem to accept at least one of the two assumptions which together I will label as "the myth of uniformity of the intuitive". The first assumption is that the methodological role or roles of all kinds of intuitions is the same in the whole philosophy. According to the second assumption there is only one methodological role that could be played by all kinds of intuitions in philosophy. Both these assumptions lead to uniformity view. In my speech I will criticize these views. In order to do so I will compare the role of epistemic intuitions in Gettier Case and the role of semantic intuitions in Kripke's Gödel Case. I will argue that in the Gettier Case the so-called epistemic intuitions of intension, i.e. intuitions about the knowledge itself, not its designators, play an evidential role (for the intuitions of intension/extension distinction see: Craig 1990). Nevertheless, in the case of Gödel Case, the semantic intuitions of extension play an evidential role. In other words, what justifies the verdict about the reference of "Gödel" are not intuitions about what 'reference' is, but instead, intuitions about what is the reference of 'Gödel'. I will show that these conclusions entail that the role of epistemic intuitions is to justify revision of the concept of knowledge, while the role of semantic intuitions in Gödel Case is to indicate the set of data that should be captured by a proper theory of reference. My results entail that (1) intuitions could play different roles in philosophical methodology and that (2) different kind of intuitions could play different roles in philosophical methodology which is contrary to the myth of uniformity of the intuitive.

Chair: Santiago Vrech
Time: 14:40-15:10, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002
Remark: (Online Talk)

Krzysztof Sekowski 
(University of Warsaw, )



Testability and Meaning deco