SOPhiA 2021

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Epistemic Divergence and Time Slice Rationality
(Epistemology, )

There is a class of arguments, called divergence arguments that traditionally have been understood as supporting inflationary non-summativist approaches in social philosophy. These arguments try to sustenance the inflationary claim that there is a conflict (or divergence) between a property at the collective level and the individual level, by referring to examples of diverging group attitudes. While these arguments have been criticised by Lackey (2016, 2020), among others, I will argue that these critiques fail to dismiss epistemic divergence altogether. Instead, I will present various cases of real epistemic divergence. These cases do not only pose a threat to approaches as advocated by Lackey but, furthermore, tell us something important about the epistemic and ontological structure of social entities rarely accounted for in the literature. Namely, that divergence, as any kind of inflationism, is intrinsically linked to questions in individual epistemology, especially the question of how we should treat rational agents over time. I argue that in striving for continuity in our epistemic theorizing we are advised to endorse the recently popular thesis of Time-Slice Rationality as advocated by Hedden (2015) and Moss (2015). In other words, we ought to treat past time-slices of ourselves similar as we treat members of an epistemic group (we are part of) when analysing the rationality of the temporally extended agents/groups.

Chair: Santiago Vrech
Time: 15:20-15:50, 09 September 2021 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002

Simon Graf 
(University of Leeds, )



Testability and Meaning deco