SOPhiA 2022

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programm - Vortrag

Are Reasons of Partiality Deontic?
(Ethics , Englisch)

This paper aims to unpack two conceptual interlocks as argued along the vein of valuing, partiality, and duty so as to further respond to the inquiry that whether reasons of partiality are and, if so, how they could be deontic. To be specific, the first conceptual interlock denotes that when we value something, such as personal projects, interpersonal relationships, and group memberships, especially in a noninstrumental fashion, we may thus have reasons to take into consideration their _interests, appeals, and demands_ so as to be provided with reasons of partiality to count in favor of them in a _prioritized, special, and even exclusive_ manner, whereas the second conceptual interlock denotes that those reasons of partiality as derived, if any, would be, at least under certain circumstances, deontic ones, namely duties of partiality that we owe to them by virtue our moral responsibilities in a contractualism manner. Having said, by valuing something noninstrumentally, it is argued that we are provided with deontic reasons of partiality as such.



Along this vein, this paper would unfold by unpack those two conceptual interlocks as indicated above as follows. Section II would explicate what valuing something noninstrumentally denotes. By comparing different manners in which the action of valuing is performed, either instrumentally or noninstrumentally as well as other actions similar to but nonetheless different from valuing, we may have a better grasp of the nuanced differences therein, and more generally, both propositional contents and normative implications of valuing from the perspective of practical reasoning. Besides, the relationship between valuing and valuable would be briefly discussed as well in that the counterpart of intrinsic value and extrinsic value, as elaborated by Raz for instance, would be also of much relevance here.



Section III would switch to reasons of partiality and explicate what on earth they denote. By elaborating the propositional contents of reasons of partiality, we may have a better grasp of what we are supposed to do insofar as we are embedded with such reasons. Further to this, a more challengeable inquiry would be the interlock between valuing something noninstrumentally and reasons of partiality as derived, namely why valuing something noninstrumentally may provide us with reasons of partiality. Section IV would finally come to the inquiry that under what circumstance, if any, would it be a justifiable case that reasons of partiality in the circumstance of interpersonal relationships be duties of partiality or otherwise.

Chair: Silvana Pani
Zeit: 16:00-16:30, 09. September 2022 (Freitag)
Ort: SR 1.005
Anmerkung: (Online Talk)

Xi Zhang
(New York University School of Law, United States)



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