SOPhiA 2022

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programm - Vortrag

Uniqueness, Permissivism, and Self-fulfilling Beliefs
(Epistemology, Englisch)

Uniqueness, the thesis that there is just one rationally permissible doxastic attitude given one particular body of evidence has been challenged by various alleged counterexamples. Among the most formidable counterexamples proposed are cases based on self-fulfilling beliefs (Raleigh 2015; Kopec 2015; Kopec and Titlebaum 2016; Drake 2017; Dahlback forthcoming). In these cases, epistemic agents are confronted with a choice between two opposing beliefs whose propositional contents will be true just in case they form the respective belief. Contrary to common reception, I will demonstrate that in a self-fulfilling scenario there is not only a uniquely rational attitude determined by the evidence but also only a uniquely rational attitude to transition into. In so doing, I will show that the respective body of evidence in self-fulfilling belief cases undergoes a mentalist shift in which beliefs about pragmatic considerations become part of the evidential base. Furthermore, if there is practical indifference among the evidentially permitted options and no non-evidential consideration can serve as tiebreakers the agent is not rationally permitted to pick one of the self-fulfilling attitudes, as often argued in practical equilibria. While in practical equilibria we may pick rather than choose when both outcomes have the same expected utility, picking doxastic attitudes, if possible, is not rational since we know in advance that at most one of them can be true.

Zeit: 16:00-16:30, 07. September 2022 (Mittwoch)
Ort: SR 1.003

Simon Graf
(University of Leeds, United Kingdom)

Testability and Meaning deco