SOPhiA 2022

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Cognitive Phenomenal Presence
(Philosophy of Mind, English)

Fabian Dorsch (2018) distinguishes two kinds of features that are phenomenally present (i.e., that make a subjective difference to one's conscious experience) in perception: (1) object-directed phenomenal properties: features that seemingly belong to the object of the experience (e.g., red, blue, cold, hot, etc.); (2) experience-directed phenomenal properties: features that seemingly belong to the experience itself (e.g., blurriness, mineness, etc.). In this talk, I shall apply this same distinction to cognitive phenomenal states. I will thus distinguish between object-directed phenomenal features of thought and experience-directed phenomenal features of thought. Object-directed phenomenal features of thoughts are those features that seemingly belong to the object of the thought. Naturally, this presupposes a clarification of the ambiguous expression "object of thought". For our phenomenological task, I shall assume that our thoughts are transparent to their referents, and that the expression "objects of thought" refers to such referents as they are intended by us. Considering as an example the state of thinking of Pegasus, the object-directed phenomenal features of such thought will thus be: being winged, being white, being non-existent, belonging to Bellerophon, and so on. To the category of experience-directed phenomenal features of thought belong those features that pertain to the phenomenology of experiencing a given thought. Continuing with our Pegasus example, some of these features will be: being thought at this moment, being thought in English, belonging thought by me, feeling irreal, feeling mind-dependent, and so on. In the concluding part of my talk, I will suggest that the sceptics of cognitive phenomenology tend to ignore the second category of features or conflate it with the first category, thereby reducing it to the phenomenology of the associated sensory imagery. My proposed taxonomy is not an argument in favour of the existence of cognitive phenomenology, but it can be a helpful tool to clarify what cognitive phenomenology is and why it cannot be simply reduced to sensory phenomenology. The upshot of this project is to move away from the standard negative definition of cognitive phenomenology (i.e., as what cognitive phenomenology is not, namely non-sensory phenomenology) towards a positive definition.



References



Bayne, Tim and Montague, Michelle, eds. (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dorsch, Fabian (2018). "Phenomenal Presence. An Introduction to the Debate". In Fabian Dorsch & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press.

Husserl, Edmund (1900-1901). Logical Investigations. Vol. II. Translated by J. N. Findlay. Ed. by Moran D. English edition London: Routledge, 2001.

Jorba, Marta (2016). "Attitudinal Cognitive Phenomenology and the Horizon of Possibilities". In Breyer T. & Christopher G. (eds.), The Phenomenology of Thinking. Philosophical Investigations into the Character of Cognitive Experiences. Routledge. pp. 77-96.

Kriegel, Uriah (2015). "The Character of Cognitive Phenomenology". In T. Breyer & C. Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 25-43.

Kriegel, Uriah (2019). "The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling". In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter (2019). Pitt, David (2004). "The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.

Prinz, Jesse (2011). "The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology". In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 174-196.

Robinson, William S. (2011). A frugal view of cognitive phenomenology. In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 197. Siewert, Charles P. (1998). The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton University Press. Tye, Michael & Wright, Briggs (2011). "Is there a phenomenology of thought?". In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 35.

Chair: Jakob Roloff
Time: 11:20-11:50, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002
Remark: (Online Talk)

Valentina Martinis 
(CEU, Austria)



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