SOPhiA 2022

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Predication, Ways of being and Properties
(Metaphysics and Ontology, English)

A In this paper, I propose a new theory of properties in which properties are understand in terms of ways of being: a property (e.g. the property of being human) is an object that encodes a way of being (e.g. being human). So, (i) properties are objects, and (ii) properties encodes ways of being. About the first claim: because properties are objects, I claim, properties have what I call an objectual part in their structures. About the second claim: unlike other objects, properties have something more in their structures. Because properties encode ways of being, I claim, they have what I call a predication part in their structures. This predicational part of properties is where ways of being are encoded. So, strictly speaking, ways of being are not encoded in properties themselves but encoded in the predicational part of properties.

The semantic value of a predicate is a way of being that is encoded in the predicational part of a property. For example, the semantic value of the predicate __is F__ is being F that is encoded in the predicational part of the property of being F. So, the semantic value of __is F__ is being F which in a sense is a part of the property of being F. On the other hand, the semantic value of the singular term __the property of being F__ is the property of being F as a whole or the property of being F as an object (i.e., as something that has the objectual unity). In the statements __The property of being F is a property/an abstract entity__, we are talking about the property of being F as a whole or as an object. Note that these statements describe specifically the objectual part of the property of being F in the sense that they tell us what sort of object the property in question is.

Then, I will show that some puzzles about predication can be solved in my theory of properties, which shows that there are good reasons to accept my theory: (1) My theory can explain why the predicate __is human__ and the singular term __the property of being human__ cannot be substituted for each other. (2) My theory can avoid Bradley__s regress. (3) My theory can explain why, for example, the essentialist statement __Socrates essentially is human__ does not entail __Socrates is ontologically dependent upon the property of being human__ while the essentialist statement __Socrates essentially exemplifies the property of being human__ entails it.

Chair:
Time: 12:00-12:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006

Minseok Kim 
(Syracuse University, the United States)



Testability and Meaning deco