SOPhiA 2022

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Recognition and parity: A consequence of deep disagreement between epistemic peers
(Epistemology , English)

Two kinds of disagreement have been of great interest to social epistemology in the last decades: deep disagreements, which take place when the dispute between the parties is systematic and particularly difficult to resolve, and disagreements between epistemic peers, caused by the confrontation between agents who have the same evidence and cognitive virtues regarding the topic under discussion. The purpose of this article is to work on the intersection of them, evaluating the consequences of a deep disagreement between peers.



First of all, I argue that we can relate both treatments of disagreement from a theory based on the notion of epistemic perspective, which is defined as a set of policies or strategies used by an agent to build factual beliefs when facing certain piece of evidence (Borge 2020). From this point of view, the depth (or strength) of disagreements can often be explained by the divergence of the epistemic perspectives adopted by the parties who disagree, making them support incompatible beliefs even when they are epistemic peers.



Secondly, I defend that, given some characteristics of epistemic perspectives (fundamentality, immodesty, and immunity to the evidence), there exist circumstances in which both parties of a disagreement are epistemic peers, but they cannot recognize them as such because their perspectives are making them perceive each other as partially irrational. This explains why some disagreements are so deep that each part treats the other as their epistemic inferior, even when they both share the same evidence and have equivalent cognitive virtues.


Chair:
Time: 10:40-11:10, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003

Ignacio Federico Madro__al 
(Universidad de Buenos Aires (University of Buenos Aires), Argentina)



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