SOPhiA 2022

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

SOPhiA ToolsDE-pageEN-page

Programme - Talk

A Dispositional Theory of Practical Basing
(Epistemology, English)

Let the practical basing relation be the relation that holds between an action and the reason for which someone does the action. In this paper, I offer a theory of practical basing which I call 'Double Dispositionalism' (DD). According to DD, S's phi-ing is based on R if and only if S's phi-ing involves: (i) S's exercise of a disposition D1 to ? when R, and (ii) S's disposition D2 to believe that R supports phi-ing. With respect to the second condition, DD requires that S embodies D2, which S might exercise by adopting certain beliefs, although as I will argue, such exercises are not required for S's phi-ing to be based on R. Furthermore, I expand DD into a theory of proper practical basing. In this sense, I argue that S's phi-ing is properly based on R if and only if S's phi-ing is based on R and D2 is reliable, i.e., it generally leads to true beliefs. Finally, I show that in contrast to other competing theories, viz., the doxastic theory, and the dispositional theory, DD avoids (i) the problem of over-intellectualization, (ii) the problem of deviant explanatory chains, and (iii) a recent challenge involving higher-order defeat.

Chair: Leon Assaad
Time: 14:00-14:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003

Cristian Vulpe 
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA)

Testability and Meaning deco