SOPhiA 2022
Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis
Programme - Talk
The possibility of a one-many body-person relation
(Philosophy of Mind, English)
he Cohabitation Claim (CC) is the claim that two or more subjects of experience can share the same human body.
Olson (2003) rejects CC on the grounds that it is incompatible with our being material beings.
I show that Olson assumes the point in question, and, therefore, his argument does not give us reason to reject CC.
I argue that it is at least possible that two or more subjects of experience could cohabit in one material body; in other words, that a one-many body-person relation is possible.
I first argue that what it is to be a person is to have unified and continuous mental states, but this is not a strict requirement in order to allow for the kinds of disunities and discontinuities that occur in all single-occupancy beings (those in whom there is a one-one body-person relation).
I argue that it is possible for there to be two subjects of experience in one material body if there are relations of unity and continuity between mental states that form a set, and this set is discontinuous and disunified with another set of unified and continuous mental states.
Chair: Martin Niederl
Time: 14:00-14:30, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location: HS E.002
Aisha Qadoos
(University of Birmingham, United Kingdom)
