SOPhiA 2022

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Is transfer of epistemic warrant the mark of inferential transitions?
(Epistemology, English)

The paper focuses on an attempt to capture the notion of inference by an appeal to the idea that, unlike other kinds of transitions, inferential transitions transfer epistemic warrant. An account along these lines is defended by Susanna Siegel. In a nutshell, I argue that her account fails to adequately distinguish inference from other kinds of transition between mental states. I point out that the distinction between inferential and non-inferential transitions cuts across the distinction between transitions that transfer warrant and transitions that fail to do so. It is because, assuming a plausible picture of justification, transfer of epistemic warrant doesn't supervene only on the properties of the states featuring in a transition - instead, it supervenes on the properties of a larger system of states, of which the former states are part. If so, it is to be expected that some non-inferential transitions might transfer epistemic warrant, whereas some inferential transitions might not do it. For example, associative transitions can in principle transfer warrant under some circumstances, so on Siegel's account, such associative transitions would count as inferential. This conclusion is problematic because one of the things that the account aims to do is to capture the difference between inferential and associative transitions. Therefore, the account needs to be modified.

Chair: Leon Assaad
Time: 14:40-15:10, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003
Remark: (Online Talk)

Ilia Patronnikov 
(University of Barcelona, Spain)

Testability and Meaning deco