SOPhiA 2022

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

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Programme - Talk

Naive Realism and Temporal Expectations
(Philosophy of Mind, English)

This paper defends the idea that phenomenological approaches to time-consciousness can enrich the current analytic philosophy of perception, by showing how naive realism, a prominent contemporary Anglophone theory of perception, can be supplemented with the phenomenological notion of "horizon" in a novel way.



According to Hoerl's (2018) strong temporal externalism, the phenomenology of temporal experience is fully determined by the temporal properties and objects perceived "in absence of a temporal viewpoint".



However, I argue that Hoerl's externalist view, understood within a na__ve realist framework, cannot do full justice to the role of the subject in determining the temporal character of experience because of the emphasis on the constitutive and explanatory role assigned to perceived mind-independent events.



The issue concerns the difficulty of accounting for variations in the phenomenology of temporal experience without the variation in the objects. I argue that Hoerl's externalist view is not well-positioned to explain the discrepancy between "expected" and "felt2 duration of perceived events (e.g., the same events can seem to take "longer than expected" when you're bored and "shorter than expected" when you're having fun) (Tanaka & Yotsumoto 2017).



My alternative approach is to supplement temporal externalism with phenomenological discussions of the "horizonal" structure of experience (Husserl 1927/1991; Merleau-Ponty 1945/2013), to legitimise the subjective (perspectival) aspects of the phenomenology of temporal experience. The claim is that perceptual experience fundamentally involves (i) an "acquaintance" to mind-independent occurrences on (ii) a 2future-horizon2 in virtue of which one can be aware of anticipated experiences one could have.



The proposed view, I argue, is better suited (than Hoerl's) to explain phenomenal variations without the variation in the acquainted events, in terms of variations in the "future-horizon" (i.e., the subject__s anticipation).

Chair: Bruno Cortesi
Time: 15:20-15:50, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002
Remark: (Online Talk)

Daniel Kim 
(University of York, United Kingdom)



Testability and Meaning deco