SOPhiA 2022

Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis

SOPhiA ToolsDE-pageEN-page

Programme - Talk

Naive Realism and Temporal Expectations
(Philosophy of Mind, English)

This paper defends the idea that phenomenological approaches to time-consciousness can enrich the current analytic philosophy of perception, by showing how na__ve realism, a prominent contemporary Anglophone theory of perception, can be supplemented with the phenomenological notion of __horizon__ in a novel way.



According to Hoerl__s (2018) strong temporal externalism, the phenomenology of temporal experience is fully determined by the temporal properties and objects perceived __in absence of a temporal viewpoint__.



However, I argue that Hoerl__s externalist view, understood within a na__ve realist framework, cannot do full justice to the role of the subject in determining the temporal character of experience because of the emphasis on the constitutive and explanatory role assigned to perceived mind-independent events.



The issue concerns the difficulty of accounting for variations in the phenomenology of temporal experience without the variation in the objects. I argue that Hoerl__s externalist view is not well-positioned to explain the discrepancy between __expected__ and __felt__ duration of perceived events (e.g., the same events can seem to take __longer than expected__ when you__re bored and __shorter than expected__ when you__re having fun) (Tanaka & Yotsumoto 2017).



My alternative approach is to supplement temporal externalism with phenomenological discussions of the __horizonal__ structure of experience (Husserl 1927/1991; Merleau-Ponty 1945/2013), to legitimise the subjective (perspectival) aspects of the phenomenology of temporal experience. The claim is that perceptual experience fundamentally involves (i) an __acquaintance__ to mind-independent occurrences on (ii) a __future-horizon__ in virtue of which one can be aware of anticipated experiences one could have.



The proposed view, I argue, is better suited (than Hoerl__s) to explain phenomenal variations without the variation in the acquainted events, in terms of variations in the __future-horizon__ (i.e., the subject__s anticipation).

Chair:
Time: 15:20-15:50, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002

Daniel Kim 
(University of York, United Kingdom)



Testability and Meaning deco